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You are here: Home / Archives for Nukes of Hazard blog

August 8, 2011

Essay: The End of Interventionism

Written by John Isaacs, appears in ADA Today:

United States involvement in the Libyan war may turn out to be the straw that broke the political and philosophical back of the military interventionists.

Most of the country having long turned against George W. Bush’s war of choice in Iraq, President Obama has been continuing the process of withdrawal from that (at least tenuously) pacified country. Disaffection with the Iraq war hurt the Republicans at the polls in 2006 and 2008.

As for the Afghan war, many on the left and right were willing to reserve judgment on President Obama’s actions early in his administration because he had inherited a weak position from his predecessor.  Besides, Afghanistan—in contrast to Iraq—was the “good” war, one directly related to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

But the effort to oust long-time Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi means the United States is engaged in three military conflicts at the same time, to say nothing of predator drone strikes in other countries. While liberals are split on the Libyan conflict, the expanding wars are widely perceived to be military interventionism run amuck.

The largest and most expensive conflict is Afghanistan, already the longest in our history, surpassing even the Vietnam War. The Kabul government has little legitimacy, and the political and economic situation remains dismal. Thousands of American and allied personnel have been killed or gravely wounded. President Obama’s decision to withdraw 33,000 troops by September 2012 is a start, but only a start.

U.S. military involvement in Iraq is supposed to end this December although some military officials are pressing to extend our stay.

Then came Libya.

What is interesting is that the opposition to both Afghanistan and Libya is now bi-partisan.  Ever since the Vietnam War, Democrats have been labeled the anti-war party and the Republicans pro-war. Now the differences have become blurred.

When the House of Representatives narrowly defeated an amendment by Reps. Jim McGovern (D-MA) and Walter Jones (R-NC) to require a plan for exiting from Afghanistan, 26 Republicans joined 178 Democrats in support of the amendment.
And 70 Democrats joined with 225 Republicans on June 24 to oppose an authorization for American military engagement in Libya.

Republican candidates for President have joined the anti-war crowd—at least on occasion. Mitt Romney and John Huntsman have raised questions about our continued involvement in Afghanistan, while Michele Bachmann has complained about the President’s Libya policy.

This new political positioning does not mean there is a majority in Congress to cut off funding for the wars.  There is an obvious reluctance among members to be blamed for possible bad outcomes: Gadaffi remaining in Tripoli, the Taliban returning to Kabul or anti-government forces seizing Bagdad.

When the House considered the Defense appropriations bill the week of July 5, it refused to vote to cut off funding for either Afghanistan or Libya. That was apparently still a step too far. But the more Republicans oppose the wars, the easier it will be for Democrats to take that position without fear of being labeled “anti-defense.”

And the more members of both parties garner the courage to oppose the nation’s wars, the easier it will be to ditch the policy of military interventionism and at the same time reduce the military budget.

John Isaacs is executive director of Council for a Livable World and a former ADA staff member.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

August 5, 2011

In Remembrance of Jonathan Tucker

On behalf of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and the nuclear community as a whole, we mourn the passing of Jonathan Tucker at the much-too-young age of 56..

Jonathan was a world-class expert on biological and chemical weapons, as well as nuclear policy issues.  During his esteemed career, he worked at the Scientific American, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the U.S. Department of State, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, as a specialist in chemical and biological arms control at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and most recently at the Federation of American Scientists.

He served as a United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq in the hunt for Saddam Hussein’s chemical and biological weapons programs.

Tucker had the rare ability to speak eloquently on both the scientific and policy sides of the nuclear nonproliferation issue and shifted smoothly in recognition of his audience.  In his work, he was a dedicated and influential nonproliferation advocate and he will be greatly missed.

John Isaacs, the Council’s executive director, worked closely with Jonathan on a variety of chemical and biological weapons projects. They worked together in the efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, which culminated in the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Treaty.  They had lunch only a few months ago in which they reviewed President Richard Nixon’s decision to eliminate the United States offensive biological weapons program, which led to an international treaty to bar these weapons.

Our thoughts go out to his friends and family.

Click  here for a Washington Post obituary and here  to read his paper on the Nixon decision.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

August 4, 2011

Quote of the Day: Sen. Carl Levin on Missile Defense Edition

“These contractual mistakes and screwups happen far too often,” Senator Levin said in an interview that addressed the [ground based midcourse defense] test failures and construction issues in Alaska. “Taxpayers are pissed off and we’re pissed off.“

Sen. Carl Levin, August 3, 2011.  Unfortunately the Bloomberg Government story from which the quote is taken is subscription only.  It’s a stellar read.    

UPDATE:: Check that here’s an open link, courtesy of Yousaf Butt.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

August 2, 2011

The Debt Deal and Defense Spending

There is a lot of confusion surrounding the debt deal and what it means for defense.  Things have gotten so complicated with the defense/non-defense security/non-security debate, that even the experts are uncertain.  

To be clear on at least the definitions, “security,” as defined in the deal, is defense and non-defense security, including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, Intelligence, International Affairs and the National Nuclear Security Administration.  This definition applies to the first two years of the budget deal, and its relevant spending caps, only.

For the first two years, the bill is clear on this category of spending.  For Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the bill sets a $684 billion ceiling for “security.”  This number is a $4.5 billion overall decrease in security spending from the FY 2011 level of $688.5 billion.  The FY 2013 security cap is $686 billion, still tracking below FY 2011 levels.  

While the cut is not large, it is significant, since previous cuts have taken reductions from the amount of increases, rather actually reducing the item from the previous year.

However, what we do not know is how these reductions would be allocated between the Pentagon and, say, foreign aid or the nuclear weapons complex.  Exact funding levels will be left up to Congress.

Then things get even more confusing.  If a longer-term deal is not reached, security spending is redefined as the traditional “050” budget category, meaning the Department of Defense and some defense-related funding within the Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and FBI.

The category does not include foreign aid, homeland security, veterans and other categories of spending.

Of course, even with these definitions, we still do not actually know the extent of future defense cuts.  The White House claims that the deal will result in $350 billion in cuts from the 050 account over the next 10 years, but the claim is only an estimate.  The bill itself contains no language detailing the cuts over 10 years.  

The number proposed by the administration, $350 billion, tracks closely with the $400 billion reduction goal already set out by the President.  It does not add to the $400 billion number, but rather replaces it, with the assumption that the final two years, totaling 12, will see more savings.  

There is one possibility, however, that could result in large savings, specifically from defense (050).  The second part of the bill calls for a joint committee of House and Senate members to fashion a longer-term plan.  If the committee fails to come to an agreement or Congress rejects it, sequestration, or automatic cuts, kicks in.  In the case of sequestration, everything changes.  The plan requires that half of the cuts come from defense (050) and half from non-defense.

Proposed sequestration cuts are based on a formula that would reduce both discretionary and mandatory 050 spending by half of the needed $1.2 trillion in savings.  The cuts would be spread over nine years.  The administration estimates that a total $534 billion cut from the 050 account would result from sequestration over ten years.

The joint committee will have until Thanksgiving to come up with a deal.

So, what does this ambiguity add up to?

Defense hawks can complain that the cuts in defense are too deep.

Defense doves can complain that the cuts are insufficient.

The rest of the world will remain in the dark.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

August 1, 2011

The Debt Limit Deal and the Nuclear Weapons Budget

The deal reached between the White House and Congressional leadership to raise the debt limit could include major cuts to defense (perhaps as large as $950 billion over the next decade).

How will this impact current plans to modernize and replace U.S. nuclear delivery systems (i.e. missiles, submarines, and bombers) and U.S. nuclear warheads and their supporting infrastructure?

According to the White House, the first phase of debt reduction would cut $350 billion from the Pentagon’s budget over the next decade, a figure similar to President Obama’s April 2011 proposal to cut security spending by $400 billion over twelve years. The second phase of the deal includes a trigger mechanism that could cut an additional $500-$600 billion from the defense budget (also known as function 050, which includes NNSA’s weapons activities account) if a congressional committee can’t agree on an additional cut of at least $1.2 trillion to discretionary government spending later this year.

The Department of Energy’s defense programs (i.e. the National Nuclear Security Administration) will be considered part of a “security spending” category for FY 2012 and FY 2013, when there would be separate caps (“firewalls”) for security and non-security spending. Note that NNSA oversees U.S. nuclear warhead maintenance and modernization activities as well as vital nuclear terrorism prevention programs.

There is still a lot of uncertainty about both the extent of the cuts and how they will be allocated (get ready for some wild Congressional budget fights that will pit different defense constituencies against one another). The new reality, however, is that defense spending is likely to come down. There won’t be any sacred cows. This raises serious questions about whether the huge budget increases for nuclear modernization we’ve seen the last two years as part of the so-called ten-year plan can be sustained – especially if the trigger goes into effect. Apparently the GOP cares more about protecting tax cuts for the wealthy than the Pentagon budget.

It’s worth recapping what senior U.S. military leaders and a Republican U.S. Senator who did not vote for the New START treaty have said in recent months about the exploding costs of nuclear modernization and the impact of likely defense cuts:

All elements of the triad need to be modernized.  You may have to make some choices there.


Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 21, 2011

I would just repeat, in essence, what I said before on the budget issues.  If the political leadership of this country decides that it must reduce the investment in defense by hundreds of billions of dollars, then I don’t think we can afford to have anything that’s off the table.
Robert Gates, May 18, 2011

The challenge here is that we have to recapitalize all three legs and we don’t have the money to do it.
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright, July 14, 2011

Reduce Nuclear Weapons Force Structure ($79 billion)
Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), July 18, 2011

We’re not going to be able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what weapon systems cost today…. Case in point is Long-Range Strike. Case in point is the Trident replacement. … The list goes on.
STRATCOM Commander Gen. Robert Kehler, July 26, 2011

*This post has been updated

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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