By Lt. General Robert Gard (USA, Ret.)

Maintaining U.S. troops in a hostile environment when an overwhelming majority of the population is adamantly opposed to their presence is not only foolhardy but also counter-productive, especially when there is an agreement with the host nation government to withdraw them by a date certain.

On 17 November 2008, the governments of the United States and Iraq signed two landmark documents: a “Strategic Framework for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation ….” and an “Agreement … on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq [Status of Forces].” Both entered into force on 1 January 2009, very close to the conclusion of the presidency of George W. Bush.

The Framework agreement stipulates that the United States shall not “seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq,” and the Status of Forces agreement specifies that “All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.” While the Bush administration clearly preferred an agreement that did not specify a specific date for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the Iraqi government insisted on it as a key provision of the formal Status of Forces agreement.

An ABC/USA Today poll, released in March 2007, revealed that 98 % of Iraqi Sunnis and 83% of Shiites opposed the presence of U.S. troops. In May 2007, the majority of the Iraqi Parliament signed a petition urging a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces. President Bush commented: “It’s their government’s choice. If they were to say leave, we would leave.”

Bilateral negotiations on the two agreements began in March 2008. Two Iraqi parliamentarians testified on 4 June that U.S. presence in Iraq is highly unpopular with the Iraqi people and the majority of the Iraqi Parliament would strongly reject any agreement not linked to a clear timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces. On 7 July, Prime Minister al Maliki publicly urged a timetable for withdrawal; and the next day, the Iraqi government’s National Security Advisor, al Rubaie, stated that the Iraqi government is “impatiently waiting for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. Occupation is like a magnet for terrorism. The invasion placed U.S. forces close to Syria and Iran, causing negative reactions with Iraq paying the price.” President Bush surprisingly responded immediately that the Maliki and Rubaie positions did not reflect a fundamental disagreement with his administration.

Also in July of 2008, Maliki declared that the terrorists were defeated; and Major General Mark Hartling, the American commander of the northern sector of Iraq, said: “I think we’re at the irreversible point.” On 25 July, U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker claimed that the insurgency is “not even much of a challenge any more” to the future of Iraq. “Very clearly,” he said, “the insurgency is in no position to overthrow the government or, really, even to challenge it. It’s almost in no position to try to confront it.” Although violence has persisted, it is at a much lower level than in the previous years. By the end of 2008, Iraqi security forces exceeded 600,000, surely enough to prevent any insurgent group from taking over the government.

It therefore is not surprising that the Status of Forces agreement also directed the earlier withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi “cities, villages and localities” by 30 June 2009. The agreement acknowledged the right of U.S. troops to legitimate self defense, but it specified that all military operations by U.S. troops would be conducted only with the agreement of the Iraqi government and in full coordination with Iraqi authorities. In March 2009, Prime Minister Maliki stated that Iraq is ready “right now” to take over the combat mission from American forces. On 16 March 2009, the results of an extensive BBC poll taken in all provinces of Iraq were released. Public opinion was strongly negative on the lack of availability of electricity, clean water and medical care; and attitudes toward foreign troops in Iraq continued to be highly unfavorable: 90% of Sunnis and 67% of Shiites rated as “very or quite bad” how well coalition troops have carried out their responsibilities.

Candidate Barak Obama campaigned for the presidency on a policy of ending U.S. combat operations in Iraq and withdrawing all combat forces over a 16 month period following his inauguration. He stated the intent to retain support troops to provide logistical assistance and continued training for Iraqi security forces, along with a military capability to hunt down al Qaeda in Iraq and protect the U.S. embassy and other American personnel and assets; these troops would be phased out prior to the end of 2011, when all U.S. military units are required to depart.

At their peak, U.S. forces numbered about 170,000 during the 2007/8 surge. By summer 2008, the number was reduced to about 140,000, slightly more than before the surge, and continued close to that level for the remainder of the Bush presidency. As of July 2011, about 46,000 U.S. troops remain in Iraq, encamped in isolated cantonment facilities and subject to attacks that have increased their casualty rate; June 2011 was the deadliest month for Americans in Iraq in three years.

Even if the U.S. fulfills its obligation to withdraw its military units from Iraq, there still would be hundreds of American military personnel there after 2011, with Marine guards and defense attaché personnel at the U.S. embassy, and a military assistance advisory team overseeing American military sales to Iraq and the additional training of Iraqi security forces. Moreover, there will be sizeable security forces hired by the U.S. Department of State.    

Despite all these developments, some officials of the U.S. government have been suggesting that 10 to15,000 American combat forces should remain in Iraq. Last May, then Secretary of Defense Gates expressed the hope that the Iraqi government would request the U.S. to keep troops in their country after 2011, as an exception to the Status of Forces agreement. Other officials have stated that the U.S. would consider any such request, if tendered, by the Iraqi government.

Apparently, there is concern over excessive intervention or even direct control of the country by Iran. Yet it was the results of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the regime that removed Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, and made it possible for Iraq to become the first Shia-ruled Arab country in several centuries. Iran too is ruled by Shias. Significant Iranian influence in Iraq is the inevitable outcome, and the U.S. and its allies in the region must adjust to it. A small contingent of American combat troops outside “cities, villages and localities” would hardly be able to prevent it.

The government of Iraq, with Nouri al Maliki as Prime Minister, is a fragile coalition dependent on the support of the Sadrist movement headed by the young cleric Moqtada al Sadr, who is adamantly opposed to the presence of American military forces. Sadr stated in early 2011 that if U.S. troops remained in Iraq, the Mahdi Army would be “reactivated” to attack American soldiers, bases and vehicles. As Toby Dodge, an expert on Iraq at the London School of Economics recently observed, any residual U.S. combat forces would be as vulnerable as “tethered goats,” given the provisions of the two agreements.    

The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a costly misadventure, inflicting large numbers of casualties among Iraqis as well as our own troops, causing a civil war and some two million Iraqis to flee the country, and creating chaos within Iraq. It was appropriate under these circumstances for the United States to assist in the training of the Iraqi army and its police to enable the government to regain some semblance of order in the country. Much remains to be done, but it can’t be accomplished by U.S. combat forces.

It is evident that U.S. troops are not welcome in Iraq. Should the Iraqi government reluctantly agree to allow U.S. forces to remain in country despite the provision of the Status of Forces agreement to the contrary, its delicate political balance is likely to crumble, and a small contingent of American combat troops will be sitting ducks, subject to attack. The time has come for American combat troops to withdraw from Iraq in accordance with Status of Forces agreement.  

Chief nuclear negotiators from the two Koreas held a two-hour discussion in Bali for the first time in over 2.5 years since the Six Party Talks broke down in 2008. Meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Seoul’s Wi Sung-lac and Pyongang’s Ri Yong-ho agreed to work towards resuming the Six Party Talks “as soon as possible.”

They reportedly discussed a range of issues aimed at building trust and clearing up misunderstandings as part of the three-step approach (inter-Korean talks –> U.S.-North Korea talks –> Six Party Talks) in resuming multilateral nuclear negotiations.

South Korean news reports say the two Koreas did not set a date for their next meeting, and it’s unclear whether it will take place in parallel or simultaneously with U.S.-North Korea talks.

Foreign Ministers from the two Koreas are also expected to meet during the ARF on Saturday.

While Seoul has shown flexibility in delinking the Cheonan and Yeongpyeong Island attacks from the denuclearization process, it had remained firm that Pyongyang needs to show a sincere gesture towards denuclearization before resuming the Six Party Talks. An example has been for Pyongyang to allow IAEA inspectors back into the North, but it remains to be seen how such precondition will be handled.

The Bali meeting is a step in the right direction. It was significant in that it was the first time in 20 years the two Koreas held denuclearization discussions, which is a topic the North has always refused, claiming it is an issue between Pyongyang and Washington.

Just as a senior Seoul official was quoted as saying, dialogue enabled the two Koreas to understand each other’s position better and clear up any misunderstandings. Such a trust-building meeting is undeniably important, but it stopped short of any agreements on substance.

This means, the tough part has yet to come that will decide the fate of the Six Party Talks.

On June 29, six men were arrested in Moldova for attempting to sell uranium to an undercover security agent, who was posing as a North African buyer. On July 15, the House of Representatives passed the FY 2012 Energy and Water Appropriations bill (H.R. 2354).  Though they occurred on different continents, the two events are closely connected.

The House bill cut funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Second Line of Defense program by over $75 million below the FY 2012 request.  The program installs radiation detection equipment to interdict nuclear trafficking at borders, airports and strategic ports in Russia, other former Soviet Union states and further afield.

The bill also cut the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) by $85 million below the FY 2012 request.  The cut would have been more draconian but for an amendment offered by Reps. Fortenberry (R-NE) and Sanchez (D-CA) to add $35 million to the program.  

GTRI is the key U.S. program in the global cooperative effort to secure and eliminate nuclear materials, including highly enriched uranium, at an accelerated rate.  
The Moldovan incident is a warning, as are all nuclear smuggling incidents, that the threat of the theft or sale of dangerous nuclear materials is real.  Securing and interdicting these materials is an urgent national security priority, and funding for the programs that support these efforts (such as GTRI) must reflect the urgency of the threat.  Maj. Gen. Bruce Lawlor, the director of Virginia Tech’s Center for Technology, Security and Policy, argues that, “the odds of terrorists successfully acquiring nuclear material have increased in their favor.”

The men arrested in Moldova were caught in possession of roughly two kilograms of Uranium-235.  The smugglers likely carried low-enriched uranium, according to Russian nuclear specialists, since they only asked for €20 million or $29 million for it, too low a price tag for highly enriched uranium (HEU).  The exact details remain murky, however.

Low-enriched uranium cannot be used in a nuclear weapon.  In order to make a bomb using this material, a terrorist group would need to further enrich it to highly enriched uranium.  This process demands a great deal of expertise and advanced technology, and is likely beyond the means of a terrorist group.  

In March 2010, two smugglers were caught with 18 grams of HEU in Georgia (see former intern Candice DeNardi and Gen. Gard’s post here), which is weapons-grade material.  While 25 kg of HEU is needed for a crude nuclear device, a terrorist group could piece together material from multiple purchases.

According to a May 2011U.S.-Russia joint threat assessment on nuclear terrorism sponsored by Harvard University, the International Atomic Energy Agency has documented 20 cases of theft or loss of HEU or plutonium confirmed by the states concerned, and additional cases are known to have occurred.  The study also warns that what is unknown is how many cases may have gone undetected, or how much stolen material may still be outside of state control.

Inexplicably, the House has twice – in FY 2011 and FY 2012 – cut funding for the very programs that keep nuclear materials off the black market.  While government spending undoubtedly needs to be reigned in, budget cuts to successful programs to mitigate the threat of nuclear terrorism are foolish and shortsighted.      

Congress should also act to bolster the penalties for the theft and smuggling of nuclear materials.  

Sen. Robert Casey (D-PA) and Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) in the last Congress introduced the Nuclear Prevention Trafficking Act in the Senate and House, respectively, which would make selling nuclear material a crime against humanity, simplify prosecuting traffickers and strengthen penalties for those convicted.

The Obama administration recently submitted implementing legislation to Congress for the 2005 Amendment to Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.  Both treaties would augment the international counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism legal framework.

Swift Congressional approval of these common sense nuclear security measures would greatly strengthen U.S. efforts to combat and prevent nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism.

THE HILL BLOG

http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/172803-war-powers-resolution-consistently-ignored

In 1973, in my first job in Washington, D.C., I helped to pass the War Powers Resolution. At the time, it seemed like a good idea.

The country was reeling from the Vietnam War that had proved so divisive and caused so many casualties. Many blamed Presidents John F. Kennedy for surreptitiously getting the country into a war, Lyndon Johnson for using falsehoods to win approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and Richard Nixon for his secret plan to end the war that led to many more years of fighting and dying.

War powers advocates argued that the measure was essential for Congress to reassert its power to make war that had atrophied since the declaration of war against Germany and Japan in 1941 – the last time Congress so declared.

President Harry F. Truman ignored Congress when in 1950 he sent troops to Korea to stave off a North Korean advance into the South. Almost 1.8 million Americans fought in Korea, with some 33,600 American deaths. But there never was a congressional authorization, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to prosecute the war.

The War Powers Resolution also appeared to be a check against Nixon’s power, a President recently overwhelmingly re-elected who was becoming more and more enmeshed in the Watergate scandal.

Indeed, I played only a bit role, helping to convince some liberals such as Representatives Bella Abzug (D-NY) and Robert Drinan (D-Mass.) that Congress was not ceding additional power to the President by giving him or her 60 or 90 days to conduct war without approval of Congress.

Fast forward to today. Every President since 1973, including Barack Obama, has decided to ignore the law as an unconstitutional assertion of power or reinterpreted it as with Libya.

Congress has been deaf, dumb and blind to this lack of presidential compliance. Oh sure, Members give tough speeches, but they won’t stop the wars. The don’t want to be blamed if the conflict goes sour.

Congress has the means to fight back: the power of the purse. Even if the Supreme Court would have ducked a constitutional confrontation between the Executive and Legislative branches on war powers, Congress could have cut off funds for the many conflicts since that time.

But Congress has blinked time and time again, most recently on Libya. On June 24, the House of Representatives refused to authorize U.S. military action in Libya but also refused to limit funding. Last week, the House delivered similar confused messages.

Many Members of Congress have denounced Obama’s war. Rather than denounce Obama – or Bush in Iraq or Reagan in Panama or Truman in Korea – they should protest their own inaction.

For the fault, Dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in the lap of Congress.

Or as Pogo said, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”  

Even if the House eventually votes to cut off funds for Libya, the Senate is not likely to go along.  Even if the Senate were to go along, the President could veto the measure and a two-thirds majority would be required to overcome the veto.

The time has come. If Presidents and Congress are going to ignore legislation, it is no better than an appendix. It is time to expunge the law. Better to have no law rather than one that is ignored by all parties.

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John Isaacs is Executive Director of Council for a Livable World, and has been active on national security issues before Congress since 1972.

“There is little connection between the fighting and dying being done by our young men and women in Afghanistan’s valleys, farmlands and cities and keeping our nation safe from a terrorist attack,”

-Rep. James McGovern (D- MA) and Matthew Hoh, “Change course in Afghanistan,” The Worcester Daily Gazette, 7/20/11

Rep. McGovern, a Massachusetts Representative, and Matthew Hoh, former Marine Corps Captain and State Department official in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a board member of the Council for a Livable World, describe President Obama’s strategy to withdraw 33,000 troops from Afghanistan by summer 2012 as “insufficient.”  The 18-month plan does not reflect the domestic debt crisis or U.S. goals and capabilities in Afghanistan.

McGovern and Hoh make the case that U.S. national security is intertwined with economic security, and, therefore, the strategy is not responsible or realistic.  Though Congress is embroiled in a battle over cutting spending, the government continues to borrow nearly $10 billion a month to pay for the war, adding to the debt.  “Where is the sense in borrowing money to build a bridge or school in Afghanistan that later gets blown up – while telling our cities and towns that we have no money to help them with their needs?”  Though development efforts in Afghanistan are worthy, at what cost to U.S. lives and economic or national security?

The U.S. invaded Afghanistan to ensure that the Taliban would no longer provide a safe haven for Al-Qaeda.  Today, Al-Qaeda has been almost entirely uprooted from Afghanistan, and the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden proved that neither 100,000 nor 70,000 troops are necessary to weaken the organization.  After 2012, roughly 70,000 U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan (with gradual withdrawal) and will continue to fight for a mission they have already completed.  

Beyond the original aim, the U.S. has undertaken social, political and economic development to attempt to leave Afghanistan with peace, a functional government and human rights protections.  However, many Afghanistan experts have argued that the only solution is political.  The President should be encouraging a negotiated settlement and bringing the troops home now, McGovern and Hoh write.  Despite high hopes, the U.S. military cannot “advance the cause of peace, protect the rights of women and ethnic minorities, or strengthen civil society,” and they will lose their lives trying.  

There is no space for compromise or a middle course, and no more time to debate this issue, the writers maintain. This spring was the deadliest spring in the ten years that the U.S. has been in Afghanistan.  “We don’t need to wait 18 more months to change course. We need to do it now.”