Seoul and Washington began revising the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit draft Communiqué this week after participating states made their preliminary marks on it during the June Sous Sherpas (deputies) meeting in Seoul. Korea is the chair of the upcoming Summit and the U.S. was the 2010 Summit chair.

It is the second meeting of its kind following U.S. Sherpa Gary Samore’s (White House WMD policy coordinator) trip to Seoul in early May. (Click ‘Read More.’)

The general scope and details of the agenda are already laid out in the draft Communiqué circulated by Seoul in mid-June. The task now is to fine-tune them, engage in diplomacy to ensure that proper steps be taken to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world, and reach consensus before state leaders gather in Seoul next March.

It appears that world leaders will adopt one document, the Communiqué – unlike the previous Summit’s two documents (Communiqué and Work Plan) – that includes both general consensus agreements and goal-oriented actionable steps. Officials say the “logic” is to prevent the Work Plan from being regarded as an Annex, and to ensure that all pledges are given the political force and attention they deserve.

The challenge is to craft a Communiqué that not only deepens the 2010 Summit pledges but sets goals that are politically acceptable to all state leaders. Substance is most important, but wording is equally important in international agreements. It is a challenge because the objective is to stipulate specific goals and actions, some of which may hope to be time sensitive. An example of a possible political challenge could be agreeing on specific actionable steps regarding highly enriched uranium (HEU) minimization and guidelines.  This is why diplomacy will be key in persuading countries to throw in their support for specific measures that are vital to protecting people and the environment from nuclear and radiological terrorism. Diplomacy would also be important in persuading state leaders to support certain measures they may prefer to address in other international fora at the senior or working level.

Washington had set up the Nuclear Security Summit to be a consensus-based initiative to avoid intrusive measures while respecting each nation’s sovereignty. U.S. officials have heralded it as an effective way to bring countries on board. This is why the 2010 Communiqué includes ambiguous phrases such as “…subject to respective national laws and procedures” and “…as appropriate.”  Diplomacy is still integral in garnering support and consensus, even for ambiguously-worded clauses.

A universal awareness of the nuclear threat is the foundation and starting point for designing and implementing nuclear security measures. However, due to differing threat perceptions, such universality – or the degree in which all states agree on the threat – is a challenge but one that still needs to be pursued.

Another challenge is narrowing the gap between the “haves” and “have nots” as well as between those who desire more specific nuclear security measures and those who are satisfied with the level of agreement reached in 2010.

Click here for my Working Paper on the Nuclear Security Summit.

Senator Richard Shelby’s (R-AL) defense aide(s) appear to have some explaining to do.

At a June 15 Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 defense budget, Sen. Shelby alleged that an ongoing Defense Science Board report concludes that the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) “plans to achieve an early intercept capability as part of the phase-adaptive approach are simply not credible.”

The Defense Science Board is now completing a review on Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept (EI) Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility as a concept to enhance missile defense.  Early intercept refers to hitting a ballistic missile before it releases its payload.  Boost phase intercept refers to hitting a missile soon after it is launched while its boosters are burning.  

The fourth phase of the phased adaptive approach is slated to have an early intercept capability against limited ICBM threats such as those posed by Iran.

According to Shelby the Defense Science Board report “is disturbing…since the MDA’s promise [sic] to develop by 2020 an early intercept capability for the SM-3 Block IIB was the central justification…to cancel the third site in Europe and to kill the KEI boost phase defense program. Now it looks like the nation may be left…with an inadequate defense in Europe and no boost phase intercept capability.”

Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz pointed to Sen. Shelby’s disclosure of the report to question the Obama administration’s competence on missile defense policy – something he has done with increasing regularity as of late.

Shelby and Gertz have their facts mixed up.  In a July 6 letter to the Washington Times, report co-chairman Admiral William Fallon, report co-chairman and Defense Science Board vice chairman General Lester Lyles, and Defense Science Board chairman Paul Kaminski stated that the Defense Science Board did not conclude that the phased adaptive approach or the SM-3 family of interceptors were flawed.

Either Sen. Shelby and his staff misunderstood the contents of the report, or they deliberately twisted it in an effort to score political points…

UPDATE 1/25/2012: Turns out I may have been too harsh on Sen. Shelby. Having read the Defense Science Board’s final report, there are some real questions about the credibility of early intercept in defeating enemy missiles before they release decoys or countermeasures, though the report claims that the success of the phased adaptive approach in defending Europe and the benefits to homeland defense provided by interceptors forward deployed in Europe hinges less on the success of EI per se and more on critical enablers such as fast interceptors and the ability to discriminate. For more see here. I still think Sen. Shelby is wrong about the rationale for the cancellation of the Bush administration’s plans for missile defense in Europe.

Senator Shelby’s assessment of the Defense Science Board report seemed suspicious even before Fallon, Lyles, and Kaminski weighed in to set the record straight. For example, Sen. Shelby conflated the concept of early intercept with boost phase missile defense.  As noted above, they’re not the same thing.  

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen noted at the hearing, “the whole issue of boost-phase intercept is an extraordinarily difficult technical challenge. And at least if someone’s broken through on that, I haven’t seen that.”

In theory, early intercept is easier than boost phase missile defense because there is more time to engage an enemy ballistic missile.

Moreover, Shelby’s claim that the development of an early intercept capability for the fourth phase of the phased adaptive report was the central rationale for abandoning the third site in Europe does not stand up to close scrutiny.

In reality, the main justification for the phased adaptive approach is that it shifted the focus of U.S. missile defense efforts in Europe away from the threat posed by Iranian long-range ballistic missiles (which do not exist) to the threat posed by Iranian short and medium range ballistic missiles (of which there are many).

And as former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates reminded the Subcommittee, “let’s be blunt: The third site in Europe was not going to happen, because the Czech government wouldn’t approve the radar.”

The Fallon, Lyles, and Kaminski letter reveals that Shelby and Gertz utterly misconstrued the contents of the Defense Science Board report.  According to the letter:

While the jury is still out on whether the phased adaptive approach can provide an effective capability against long-range (or even shorter-range) missiles, it’s clear that the Defense Science Board did not conclude what Sen. Shelby and Gertz claimed.

Step II is expected to begin this week in a three-step approach in resuming the Six Party Talks that broke down in December 2008.

Upon U.S. invitation, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-Gwan is expected to land in New York later this week for preliminary talks with a US inter-agency team. Kim, Pyongyang’s former chief nuclear negotiator to the Six Party Talks, orchestrates the North’s nuclear negotiations.

The meeting would come on the heels of Step I held last week between the two Koreas on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bali, and would be the first time in over a year (1 year and 7 months to be exact) since Washington and Pyongyang met directly, face-to-face.  

Seoul and Washington officials are maintaining a cautious stance, and are rightly still suspicious of whether Pyongyang truly intends to surrender its nuclear arsenal.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a statement, “We will not give them anything new for actions they have already agreed to take. And we have no appetite for pursuing protracted negotiations that will only lead us right back to where we have already been.” (Click ‘Read More.’)

SIGNIFICANCE?
The fact that US-North Korea talks will likely take place after a long pause is significant in it of itself. It may even be considered as a reciprocal visit by the North following US Special Envoy on North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth’s Pyongyang trip in December 2009.

It means…

1.    Official dialogue between the US and North Korea is finally beginning.

2.    Pyongyang has accepted Washington’s message that if North Korea wants to talk, it must first go through Seoul before sitting down with Washington.

3.    Washington’s “strategic patience” is now shifting toward “direct engagement” preparations – that perhaps Washington and Seoul recognize the need for talks in the wake of Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program disclosure as well as to prevent future provocations.

4.    The three-step approach in resuming the Six Party Talks may be beginning to work although it is too early to raise hopes since a tough road lies ahead until the actual resumption of multilateral negotiations.

AGENDA?
The resumption of the Six Party Talks and North Korea’s uranium enrichment program are expected to top the agenda in New York. This could include demands for Pyongyang to re-invite IAEA inspectors, to declare a moratorium on its nuclear facilities and missile tests, and to improve relations with Seoul.

The hot topic for North Korea could be US food aid on which Washington has held off a decision since a World Food Programme report in March, and perhaps even a demand to replace the armistice with the a permanent peace mechanism.

NEW CARD?

The invitation of Kim Kye-gwan is not quite a new card. There had been movement for a possible US visit last year following Ambassador Bosworth’s Pyongyang trip, but was disrupted by the sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan corvette and later by continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.

CHALLENGES?

Exploratory and trust-building meetings are valuable and needed, but the tough part has yet to come that will decide the fate of the Six Party Talks. Some key challenges are:

Sincerity to Denuclearize.  The biggest question is whether Pyongyang is, in fact, willing to take concrete steps to roll back its nuclear programs. The conventional wisdom is that it is not, because nuclear weapons are the crux of the regime’s survival.

Conditions and Sequencing.   In Bali, North Korean Foreign Minister Park Ui-chun reiterated that the Six Party Talks must convene without preconditions.

However, Seoul and Washington maintain that a sincere gesture by Pyongyang is needed prior to six-way negotiations. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said in Hong Kong that “we have very clear pre-steps related to nuclear issues, related to proliferation concerns, and we will need to see clearly articulated by the North Koreans if we are to go forward.” This apparently means that the allies may not be in a rush to gather in Beijing for the long-stalled Six Party Talks.

Some examples of a “sincere gesture” would be for to Pyongyang to shut down all nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment program, and allow IAEA inspectors back into the North.

It remains to be seen whether such outstanding issues will be dealt with simultaneously at the Six Party Talks, which is Beijing’s preference, or prior to the Six Party Talks, which is desired by Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.  

Highly Enriched Uranium Verification.  Compared to plutonium, it is much harder, if not impossible, to technically verify the North’s highly enriched uranium. North Korea disclosed a pilot enrichment facility to an American scientist last November, but the real plants used for nuclear weapons are hidden in clandestine locations Pyongyang will likely never reveal.

More Provocations.  History has shown that Pyongyang refrains from provocations when it is engaged in dialogue. However, that same history has also shown that when Pyongyang does not get what it wants during those discussions, it will still unleash provocations and put an end to dialogue since provocations are an integral part of North Korean tactics.

Pyongyang is already reportedly gearing up for a large-scale joint drill by its army, navy and air force. South Korean media reports say the drill is expected around July 27th, the anniversary of the armistice. The last time the three forces conducted a joint exercise was in January 2010, three months before sinking South Korea’s Cheonan although Pyongyang denies involvement.

The regime is preparing to open the doors in becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” in 2012 as it celebrates the centennial of its founder Kim Il-sung’s birth. It is also gearing up to convince the world that it is a nuclear power. This means that even if it is not a direct provocation against the South, it is still possible for Pyongyang to fire its missiles, or perhaps even conduct a third nuclear test, while it is engaged in talks.

Time. The complexity of the issues on the table will require time to untangle before sitting down at the six-way bargaining table. It will also take time to lay the groundwork on substance ahead of a six-nation meeting, and time to coordinate diplomatic schedules among the six parties to set a meeting date in Beijing. Even after the Six Party Talks resume, it will take time to negotiate all outstanding issues before inking an agreement. All this while key players prepare for major changes in 2012 – the US and South Korea will enter into presidential campaign mode, China will prepare for leadership transition and Japan will deal with its own potential change of leadership.

Seoul and Washington have raised expectations for a substantive Six Party breakthrough as senior officials have repeatedly said they will not meet to “talk for talk’s sake” with North Korea. It remains to be seen whether the latest series of preliminary discussions will translate into future substantive steps or end in mere talk.

As the clock continues to tick, the ball is undeniably in North Korea’s court.

By Lt. General Robert Gard (USA, Ret.)

Maintaining U.S. troops in a hostile environment when an overwhelming majority of the population is adamantly opposed to their presence is not only foolhardy but also counter-productive, especially when there is an agreement with the host nation government to withdraw them by a date certain.

On 17 November 2008, the governments of the United States and Iraq signed two landmark documents: a “Strategic Framework for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation ….” and an “Agreement … on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq [Status of Forces].” Both entered into force on 1 January 2009, very close to the conclusion of the presidency of George W. Bush.

The Framework agreement stipulates that the United States shall not “seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq,” and the Status of Forces agreement specifies that “All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.” While the Bush administration clearly preferred an agreement that did not specify a specific date for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the Iraqi government insisted on it as a key provision of the formal Status of Forces agreement.

An ABC/USA Today poll, released in March 2007, revealed that 98 % of Iraqi Sunnis and 83% of Shiites opposed the presence of U.S. troops. In May 2007, the majority of the Iraqi Parliament signed a petition urging a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces. President Bush commented: “It’s their government’s choice. If they were to say leave, we would leave.”

Bilateral negotiations on the two agreements began in March 2008. Two Iraqi parliamentarians testified on 4 June that U.S. presence in Iraq is highly unpopular with the Iraqi people and the majority of the Iraqi Parliament would strongly reject any agreement not linked to a clear timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces. On 7 July, Prime Minister al Maliki publicly urged a timetable for withdrawal; and the next day, the Iraqi government’s National Security Advisor, al Rubaie, stated that the Iraqi government is “impatiently waiting for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. Occupation is like a magnet for terrorism. The invasion placed U.S. forces close to Syria and Iran, causing negative reactions with Iraq paying the price.” President Bush surprisingly responded immediately that the Maliki and Rubaie positions did not reflect a fundamental disagreement with his administration.

Also in July of 2008, Maliki declared that the terrorists were defeated; and Major General Mark Hartling, the American commander of the northern sector of Iraq, said: “I think we’re at the irreversible point.” On 25 July, U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker claimed that the insurgency is “not even much of a challenge any more” to the future of Iraq. “Very clearly,” he said, “the insurgency is in no position to overthrow the government or, really, even to challenge it. It’s almost in no position to try to confront it.” Although violence has persisted, it is at a much lower level than in the previous years. By the end of 2008, Iraqi security forces exceeded 600,000, surely enough to prevent any insurgent group from taking over the government.

It therefore is not surprising that the Status of Forces agreement also directed the earlier withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi “cities, villages and localities” by 30 June 2009. The agreement acknowledged the right of U.S. troops to legitimate self defense, but it specified that all military operations by U.S. troops would be conducted only with the agreement of the Iraqi government and in full coordination with Iraqi authorities. In March 2009, Prime Minister Maliki stated that Iraq is ready “right now” to take over the combat mission from American forces. On 16 March 2009, the results of an extensive BBC poll taken in all provinces of Iraq were released. Public opinion was strongly negative on the lack of availability of electricity, clean water and medical care; and attitudes toward foreign troops in Iraq continued to be highly unfavorable: 90% of Sunnis and 67% of Shiites rated as “very or quite bad” how well coalition troops have carried out their responsibilities.

Candidate Barak Obama campaigned for the presidency on a policy of ending U.S. combat operations in Iraq and withdrawing all combat forces over a 16 month period following his inauguration. He stated the intent to retain support troops to provide logistical assistance and continued training for Iraqi security forces, along with a military capability to hunt down al Qaeda in Iraq and protect the U.S. embassy and other American personnel and assets; these troops would be phased out prior to the end of 2011, when all U.S. military units are required to depart.

At their peak, U.S. forces numbered about 170,000 during the 2007/8 surge. By summer 2008, the number was reduced to about 140,000, slightly more than before the surge, and continued close to that level for the remainder of the Bush presidency. As of July 2011, about 46,000 U.S. troops remain in Iraq, encamped in isolated cantonment facilities and subject to attacks that have increased their casualty rate; June 2011 was the deadliest month for Americans in Iraq in three years.

Even if the U.S. fulfills its obligation to withdraw its military units from Iraq, there still would be hundreds of American military personnel there after 2011, with Marine guards and defense attaché personnel at the U.S. embassy, and a military assistance advisory team overseeing American military sales to Iraq and the additional training of Iraqi security forces. Moreover, there will be sizeable security forces hired by the U.S. Department of State.    

Despite all these developments, some officials of the U.S. government have been suggesting that 10 to15,000 American combat forces should remain in Iraq. Last May, then Secretary of Defense Gates expressed the hope that the Iraqi government would request the U.S. to keep troops in their country after 2011, as an exception to the Status of Forces agreement. Other officials have stated that the U.S. would consider any such request, if tendered, by the Iraqi government.

Apparently, there is concern over excessive intervention or even direct control of the country by Iran. Yet it was the results of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the regime that removed Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, and made it possible for Iraq to become the first Shia-ruled Arab country in several centuries. Iran too is ruled by Shias. Significant Iranian influence in Iraq is the inevitable outcome, and the U.S. and its allies in the region must adjust to it. A small contingent of American combat troops outside “cities, villages and localities” would hardly be able to prevent it.

The government of Iraq, with Nouri al Maliki as Prime Minister, is a fragile coalition dependent on the support of the Sadrist movement headed by the young cleric Moqtada al Sadr, who is adamantly opposed to the presence of American military forces. Sadr stated in early 2011 that if U.S. troops remained in Iraq, the Mahdi Army would be “reactivated” to attack American soldiers, bases and vehicles. As Toby Dodge, an expert on Iraq at the London School of Economics recently observed, any residual U.S. combat forces would be as vulnerable as “tethered goats,” given the provisions of the two agreements.    

The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a costly misadventure, inflicting large numbers of casualties among Iraqis as well as our own troops, causing a civil war and some two million Iraqis to flee the country, and creating chaos within Iraq. It was appropriate under these circumstances for the United States to assist in the training of the Iraqi army and its police to enable the government to regain some semblance of order in the country. Much remains to be done, but it can’t be accomplished by U.S. combat forces.

It is evident that U.S. troops are not welcome in Iraq. Should the Iraqi government reluctantly agree to allow U.S. forces to remain in country despite the provision of the Status of Forces agreement to the contrary, its delicate political balance is likely to crumble, and a small contingent of American combat troops will be sitting ducks, subject to attack. The time has come for American combat troops to withdraw from Iraq in accordance with Status of Forces agreement.  

Chief nuclear negotiators from the two Koreas held a two-hour discussion in Bali for the first time in over 2.5 years since the Six Party Talks broke down in 2008. Meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Seoul’s Wi Sung-lac and Pyongang’s Ri Yong-ho agreed to work towards resuming the Six Party Talks “as soon as possible.”

They reportedly discussed a range of issues aimed at building trust and clearing up misunderstandings as part of the three-step approach (inter-Korean talks –> U.S.-North Korea talks –> Six Party Talks) in resuming multilateral nuclear negotiations.

South Korean news reports say the two Koreas did not set a date for their next meeting, and it’s unclear whether it will take place in parallel or simultaneously with U.S.-North Korea talks.

Foreign Ministers from the two Koreas are also expected to meet during the ARF on Saturday.

While Seoul has shown flexibility in delinking the Cheonan and Yeongpyeong Island attacks from the denuclearization process, it had remained firm that Pyongyang needs to show a sincere gesture towards denuclearization before resuming the Six Party Talks. An example has been for Pyongyang to allow IAEA inspectors back into the North, but it remains to be seen how such precondition will be handled.

The Bali meeting is a step in the right direction. It was significant in that it was the first time in 20 years the two Koreas held denuclearization discussions, which is a topic the North has always refused, claiming it is an issue between Pyongyang and Washington.

Just as a senior Seoul official was quoted as saying, dialogue enabled the two Koreas to understand each other’s position better and clear up any misunderstandings. Such a trust-building meeting is undeniably important, but it stopped short of any agreements on substance.

This means, the tough part has yet to come that will decide the fate of the Six Party Talks.