Global Security Newswire’s all-world reporter Elaine Grossman has done some marvelous work over the past year on DoD’s plans to modernize and replace U.S. nuclear delivery systems.  Her latest reporting (see here, here, and here) documents how the administration and the Air Force have been unable to tell a consistent story about what they plan to spend on preparatory analysis for a possible replacement for the Minuteman III ICBM.

The hook here of course is that given the commitment the administration made to modernize and replace our delivery systems in the Section 1251 report last year in order to secure Republican support for the New START treaty, the failure to identify funds for a new ICBM could be viewed as evidence of backsliding on this commitment.  Indeed, that’s how Sen. Lindsay Graham is viewing the situation.

Bureaucratic fumbling makes for interesting reading.  But I think the spotlight should be less on whether a few million dollars may or may not be available in FY 2012 to study a new ICBM, and more on the necessity and feasibility of developing and deploying a new ICBM, to say nothing about replacements for the other two legs of the triad…

Background

The U.S. currently deploys 450 ICBMs at three locations: F.E. Warren AFB in Wyoming, Minot AFB in North Dakota, and Malmstrom AFB in Montana. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the United States will “deMIRV” all deployed ICBMs, so that all missiles retain only one warhead.  In order to meet the limits in the New START treaty, the U.S. plans to deploy up to 420 ICBMs by the end of the decade.  It’s not clear at this point how the Air Force plans to implement this reduction.

For a look at the pros and cons of the ICBM-leg of the triad, see our fact sheet here.

The Minuteman III first entered service in the 1970s.  In the mid-1990s, the Air Force began a multi-year life extension program to extend the service life of the missile through 2020.  A few years ago the Air Force considered studying options for a follow-on to the Minuteman III but ultimately demurred in favor of sustaining the missile through 2030.  

Among other things, the life extension program has replaced the missile’s flight computer and guidance control system, re-poured its solid-fuel rocket motors, and modified its reentry system to allow for the deployment of the W87 warhead.  Thanks to these programs the Minuteman III is essentially a new missile.

From FY 2001-FY 2010, Congress appropriated $7.7 billion in constant FY 2010 dollars for procurement and research and development for the Minuteman III.  The Air Force asked for $379.36 million for the missile in FY 2011 and $454.6 million in FY 2012.

Plans for a New ICBM

In a November 2010 update to the May 2010 Section 1251 report, the Obama administration informed Congress that “while a decision on an ICBM follow-on is not needed for several years, preparatory analysis is needed and is in fact now underway. This work will consider a range of deployment options, with the objective of defining a cost-effective approach for an ICBM follow-on that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting stable deterrence.”  The update also stated that an Analysis of Alternatives on a new ICBM would begin in 2012 and that the Air Force is funding a Capabilities-Based Assessment for a follow-on missile at $26 million per year.

Thanks to Elaine’s reporting, we know that the Analysis of Alternatives will not begin until 2013 and that the Air Force will spend roughly $1 million in FY 2011 on the Capabilities-Based Assessment (not $26 million) and can’t say how much it will spend in FY 2012.  Despite delaying the start date for the Analysis of Alternatives, the Air Force still hopes to complete its analysis with recommendations for the President by 2014.

Questioning the Conventional Wisdom

According to the Nuclear Posture Review and the November update to the Section 1251 report, a decision on a new ICBM is not needed now.  That should provide time for a robust debate both inside and outside of government about the necessity and feasibility of a new ICBM.  Some questions we ought to be asking include:

• The Minuteman III is expected to go out of service in the late 2020s or early 2030s. No one can predict what the world will look like twenty years from now, but given that (1) changing geopolitical, economic, and technologic circumstances since the end of the Cold War have demanded significant reductions in the size of the U.S. and Russia nuclear arsenals and (2) New START will expire in 2021 (or 2026 if a five year extension is invoked), we should account for the fact that the process of mutual reductions are likely to continue.  This raises the question of whether a U.S. force of say, 1,000 deployed warheads, would alter U.S. requirements in terms of delivery vehicles?  Would it make sense to maintain all three legs of the triad at such levels?
• Under the New START treaty, the U.S. will be able to deploy 1,550 (New START accountable) warheads on 700 delivery vehicles.  Each one of these warheads is orders of magnitude more powerful than the two bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War II.  According to the latest estimates, the U.S. plans to spend well over $200 billion over the next decade to refurbish our warheads and modernize and replace our delivery systems.  If the SSBN(X) (Ohio-class replacement) program is completed as planned, by 2040 the U.S. could still be deploying nearly 800 warheads on just the sea-based leg of the triad.  What threats require such a bloated stockpile and expensive modernization program?  Could the U.S. guarantee its own security and that of its allies in a more fiscally sustainable manner with a smaller nuclear arsenal?  
• As James Acton has argued, if civilian and military leaders do chose to move ahead with the development and deployment of a new ICBM, considerable thought should be given to a smaller, perhaps mobile, fleet and a missile that can only carry a single warhead.  In light of the ongoing debate within Russia about whether to deploy a new heavily MIRV’ed ICBM to replace the SS-18, a single-warhead replacement for the Minuteman III might encourage Russia not build up its strategic forces, which would obviously benefit U.S. security.

By Kingston Reif and Jessica Estanislau

In a speech to Global Zero delegates in Washington last weekend, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher issued a stirring defense of the importance of nuclear transparency:

Undersecretary Tauscher is right: U.S. steps such as the declassification of the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile at last spring’s NPT Review Conference and the entry into force of the New START treaty and its new and improved data exchange, monitoring, and verification provisions are essential to progress on arms control and nonproliferation.  Why then is the Obama administration hesitant to make public information about U.S. nuclear forces that it has made publicly available in the past?…

A key pillar of the New START verification regime is regular exchanges of data between the U.S. and Russia on treaty limited items such as the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles and warheads and the number of warheads on each deployed missile.  The exchanges will also provide information on missile and bomber bases and the much touted unique identifies for delivery vehicles.  The first such exchange took place in March and they will occur about every six months during the 10-year life of the treaty.

Hans Kristensen recently asked the administration whether the content of the exchanges would be made public and received the following response:

How is this transparent? Under START I the U.S. and Russia publicized data on aggregate numbers twice a year.  

Better yet, how is this appropriate under the terms of New START?  At a minimum the treaty allows the release of information on aggregate numbers for each side.  The treaty requires agreement between the two sides to release more detailed information on the other’s forces, but as Pavel Podvig notes, there is nothing to prevent the U.S. from releasing detailed information about its own forces.

Historically Russia has not agreed to release such detailed information, but under START I the U.S. (upon request) released Memorandums of Understanding that contained additional information about each side’s arsenal.  According to Hans Kristensen, this information allowed outside observers to monitor U.S. and Russian compliance with the treaty.

We can all agree that Russia should be more transparent. For example, we know that during the New START negotiations Russia sought a weaker verification and transparency regime than what was ultimately included in the treaty. We can also agree that there is some information, such as the exact location of missile silos, that should remain classified. But that doesn’t excuse the unwillingness to release less sensitive information.  The U.S. isn’t obligated to follow in the footsteps of a country whose history is very much defined by a sense of suspicion and secrecy.

As Hans notes, “Each new step in the arms control process must increase transparency, not reduce it.”  Failure to release aggregate numbers or unclassified Memorandums of Understanding could breed the very misunderstandings and mistrust that Undersecretary Tauscher so eloquently warns us to avoid.

When the Obama Administration launched military operations against Libya, a number of Members of Congress griped about a usurpation of the congressional power to declare war.

Rather than denounce Obama – or Bush in Iraq or Reagan in Panama or Truman in Korea – they should in reality protest their own inaction.

For the fault, Dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in the lap of Congress.

Or as Pogo said, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”  

President Obama announced March 18 that the United States was prepared to use military force to establish a “no fly” zone and strike against Muarmmar Qaddafi’s forces.

While the President’s action was backed by a U.N. Security Council resolution, he declined to ask for a congressional authorization…  

Speaker John Boehner (R-OH), Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon (R-CA) all questioned the duration, cost and goals of the U.S. mission in Libya.

Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL) went further to complain that “I think the extent to which Congress has been bypassed in this process has been breathtaking.” (CQ Today, March 30, 2011)

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee similarly complained that Congress had not authorized the military action. (CQ Today, March 30, 2011)

Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich (D), as his is wont, went off the deep end by charging that Obama’s action was an “impeachable offense.”

It is not the President who should be impeached; the ones who should be impeached are Members of Congress for dereliction of duty.

Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution says Congress shall have power to declare War. The last time Congress used that power and passed a formal declaration was in 1941 when the U.S. began to fight against Germany, Italy and Japan.

Congress can also authorize the use of force through legislation without a formal declaration.

But when President Harry S Truman committed U.S. troops in 1950 to turn back a North Korean invasion of the South, Congress did nothing.

Congress had three years until the 1953 armistice to take action, and still did nothing.  

Almost 1.8 million Americans fought in Korea, with some 33,600 American deaths.

But there never was a congressional authorization, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to prosecute the war.

In response to the Vietnam War that President Lyndon Johnson controversially launched after securing congressional approval of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Congress in 1973 adopted the War Powers Resolution to get Congress back in the game of declaring war.

(Note: yours truly was involved in passing the War Powers Resolution over the veto of President Richard Nixon by helping to convince liberal Members of Congress that the measure did not confer on the President more power than he already had.)

The concept behind the legislation was sound; if Congress had not authorized sending troops overseas within 60 – 90 days, the use of force must be terminated.

Except every President has deemed that core element of the law unconstitutional.

The executive branch submits reports on the military action in accordance with the law, but refuses to bring the troops home within 60 – 90 days.

And the Supreme Court will not intervene in such a high-stakes political conflict between the executive and legislative branches.

Congress has been deaf, dumb and blind to this lack of presidential compliance.

It does not want to be blamed if the actions turns sour, as in Somalia under President Bill Clinton.

So Presidents commit U.S. troops overseas; Members of Congress do a lot of speechifying; but Congress fails to utilize the power it has either to authorize force or cut off the use of funds to continue the war.

To paraphrase Pogo, “We have met the enemy and he is Congress.”  

Guest post by Greg McGowan

At $38 billion, last week’s budget deal marks the largest discretionary cut in our nation’s history – yet the shortsighted cuts to foreign aid may actually increase the debt over time by making future military operations more likely.  At a time of unparalleled demand for the knowledge and expertise of U.S. diplomats, Foreign Service officers, aid workers and administrators, and peacemakers, the budget deal blunts the very tools needed to prevent conflicts, and sets a dangerous precedent for future budget debates.  

By excluding entitlements and defense spending from serious debate, Congress focused solely on the remaining 12 percent of the national budget: non-military discretionary funding.  The $38 billion in cuts includes a whopping $8.4 billion at the expense of the State Department, which amounts to 17 percent of its already humble foreign operations budget.  Included in these reductions is a nearly $16 million cut to the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account, which funds vital efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.  

The national debt, on the other hand, will shed a mere .058 percent.  In simple terms, this is like cutting toenails off an elephant.  As Joseph Nye points out, Congress played up the widespread public notion that foreign aid accounts for a large part of the budget.  In fact, it makes up only a speck, about 1 percent annually.  It is particularly outrageous that this very same budget deal gives the Department of Defense $5 billion more than it requested, giving lie to Congress’s calls for reductions in defense spending.  The $3.3 billion estimated increase in the outlays when emergency funds for Iraq and Afghanistan are included only underscores the enormous cost of war, offsetting nearly all the funds that the budget deal would save.

Cutting foreign aid directly contradicts the goals reiterated by both Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton…

In a rare public demonstration of bureaucratic solidarity, they and other officials have increasingly emphasized America’s troubled military-heavy foreign policy, vocally supporting a comprehensive shift toward civilian-led diplomacy and away from use of force.  In the past year, strategy reviews by the State Department, Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have all stressed lightening our military burden by committing more resources to development and diplomacy.  As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen stated last month, “Secretaries Clinton and Gates have called for more funding and more emphasis on our soft power, and I could not agree with them more.  Should we choose to exert American influence solely through our troops, we should expect to see that influence diminish in time.”

It’s not often that the mindset of our civilian and military leaders is so closely aligned.  Unfortunately, Congress’s ears are deaf to those who directly control and execute the operations needed to advance U.S. security interests.  The value of soft power is invariably underestimated, since foreign operations generally focus on longer-term initiatives rather than immediate, easily-measurable results.  But diplomacy and development are far less expensive than combat operations.  By fostering strategic and economic partnerships and strengthening governance, the rule of law, and public health, foreign operations programs help preempt and mitigate the woes that cause violent conflict in the first place.  

That the budget cuts will likely cost us a great deal in the future is worrying. That the top decision-makers within State, Defense, and the military are being ignored is troubling.  But that Congress continues to spend billions of dollars on defense while severely cutting the civilian tools that are critical to advancing U.S. security is downright alarming. In an age where the greatest threats to our security are posed by shadowy networks of terrorist groups, weak and failing states, the spread of nuclear weapons and materials, and climate change, American leadership must wear more than a military uniform.  If Congress truly wants to reduce future costs and decrease the deficit, it must devote more resources to addressing these threats and preventing war.  It would be wise for our lawmakers to heed the advice of those they chose to represent America beyond Capitol Hill.

Greg McGowan is a Joseph S. Nye, Jr. National Security Intern at the Center for a New American Security.

Another test, another dollar spent (actually tens of millions), another long-range missile interceptor misses its target.  Following two failures of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle in January and December 2010, the Pentagon has directed Raytheon to cease delivery of this missile interceptor.  

The “kill vehicle” is an integral part of the ground-based mid-course system that the U.S. government has spent billions developing, despite its spotty track record.  The purpose of this device, an interceptor, is to take out long-range missiles, sent by hostile actors (cough, North Korea, cough, Iran), to prevent missiles coming anywhere near U.S. soil.  

Despite recently updating the kill-vehicle (making it Raytheon’s most advanced anti-missile device) it has only passed one out of three tests. The original and updated versions have failed seven out of fifteen tests.  I wouldn’t bet my security on a 53% success rate.  

While the launch and release segments of January’s test worked, in the last seconds the interceptor did not hit its target.  The kill-vehicle and the mobile radar system, the Sea-based X-band, were blamed for the failure, but in the December breakdown, only the interceptor failed.  An investigation of the malfunction is ongoing, but these tests spell major problems with the device.  

I’ll add that you and I contribute financially to each test, which run about $150 million an attempt.  Boeing (for whom Raytheon is working on this contract) spokesperson Jessica Carlton did not comment on whether Raytheon will face fines for the test failures/wasting my money.

The Government Accountability Office has called on the Missile Defense Agency to continue reforms in transparency and accountability in order to demonstrate system performance before the missile defense production and acquisition resumes.  That’s great, except you and I have already bought at least 52 of these kill-vehicles from Raytheon at $20-$25million a head.  Carlton also would not say how many more kill-vehicles the Missile Defense Agency contracted Raytheon to build.  

There is no set schedule for recommencing delivery of the kill-vehicle because it is contingent on the results of the December failed-test investigation.  However, the Missile Defense Agency doesn’t seem disheartened by the test failures and has allowed Raytheon to keep working on parts of the kill-vehicle that did not fail during the test. This way, Raytheon can restart production quickly as soon as the investigation is complete and the agency can start stocking up again.  Such confidence seems unfounded considering that the interceptor has not been able to even find an incoming test ballistic missile in the air, let alone disable it, which demands hitting an area, just a few centimeters wide.  

For similar overconfidence, see knee-jerk Republican endorsement of Missile Defense.

Update: The sea-based inter-ballistic missile component of this mid-course missile defense system successfully intercepted an intermediate-range missile for the first time during a test April 15,2011.