Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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"You Don’t Say?" Quote of the Day: SSBN(X) edition

“We know general specs….It [the SSBN(X)] must be able to take care of a crew and have oxygen, but the specifics of the power and weight and layout of all that will now happen as a result of this money being in the ’12 budget. We can rapidly move down that path.”

Adm. Joseph Mulloy, the Navy deputy assistant secretary for budget matters, commenting on the SSBN(X) fleet at a February 14 press conference.

Note: GSN’s Elaine Grossman has been doing some great reporting on the SSBN(X) program in recent months.  Look for some more comments from NoH on the program in the near future.      

Iran’s Ex-Negotiator Presents Plan to Resolve US-Iran Nuclear Stalemate

Guest post by Alex Bollfrass

Below is a summary of remarks made on 2/24 at Princeton University by Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005.

Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead negotiator from 2003 to 2005, presented his vision for a resolution to the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program. In his first public statement since his 2007 arrest, Ambassador Mousavian laid out a plan for political and diplomatic engagement with Iran.

The ex-negotiator described a space for mutual agreement that would respect the US redline of Iranian nuclear weapons and Iran’s non-negotiable right to uranium enrichment.

Without straying far from the official Iranian position, he argued for direct bilateral and comprehensive negotiations between Iran and the United States, while recommending the continued pursuit of P5+1 negotiations. The proper institutional setting, in his view, is the IAEA. The UN Security Council’s involvement and its punitive resolutions should be ended.

Mousavian emphasized that any solution would require the international recognition of Iran’s right to nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment. Iran would also need the provision of security assurances not only from the United States, but regional countries, as well…

Inside Iranian decision-making

In his rhetorical warm-up, he hypothesized that if the shah had remained in power, Iran would today have an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In his view, the West “owes a debt of gratitude to the Islamic Republic” for its restraint on the nuclear front over the past 30 years.

He mourned the lost opportunity for an agreement during President Khatamei’s presidency, which the former negotiator blamed on the Bush administration’s hard line and the West’s misreading of Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment as a sign that it could be pushed to surrender its right to enrichments.

Mousavian identified Ayatollah Khomenei as the ultimate decision-maker on Iranian national security questions, and as having driven the harder line in Iran’s confrontation with the international community upon Ahmedinejad’s election. In a glimpse into the mode of operation in Iran’s government, the ambassador confessed that he had only learned of the Qom uranium enrichment when President Obama revealed it in September 2009 at the G8 meeting in Pittsburgh.

Mousavian’s Plan

In a review of the P5+1’s options, he described the counterproductive effects of military strikes for the entire region. Sanctions have also failed to prevent Iran from developing missile and nuclear technology, while serving the interests of Iranian hardliners. He also argued that the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facility and assassination of nuclear scientists only raised distrust among Iranians and strengthening the arguments for the development of a nuclear deterrent.  

Only diplomacy, in his view, holds promise for a resolution. However, so far the Obama and Ahmedinejad administrations diplomatic attempts have yielded no results because neither has proposed a comprehensive solution.

Mousavian argued that the US should engage Iran directly beyond the nuclear issue and build trust through cooperation on Afghanistan. He saw the UN Security Council’s involvement as counterproductive, in particular its use of sanctions, and as an obstacle to resolution. Therefore, the Iranian issue should be taken off the Security Council’s agenda and placed within the IAEA.  

The NPT would serve as the basic framework to guarantee Iran’s right to enrichment and Iran’s fatwa against nuclear weapons should be taken as an assurance. However, he underlined that Iran would accept no inspections or restrictions that went beyond what is required of other NPT signatories.

Under Mousavian’s plan, there would be two steps of the regional component of engagement. The first would be engagement with the Persian Gulf states. This framework would later be expanded to the broader Middle East in an effort to establish an OSCE-type regional organization. In a veiled reference to Israel’s nuclear weapon, Mousavian called for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as part of this regional integration.

In response to a question about Iran’s insistence on uranium enrichment despite its lack of reactors that could put this fuel to use, Mousavian cited Western and Russian abrogation of past agreements for the provision of nuclear technology and fuel.

Persona non grata in Iran

Following Ahmedinejad’s election in 2005, Mousavian was removed from his position on Iran’s negotiating team with the P5+1 and the IAEA. Two years later, the Iranian government arrested Mousavian on espionage charges.  Despite most charges having been dropped, he received a commuted sentence and barred from serving in the diplomatic corps. Mousavian then left the country for the West.

He has been a fellow at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security for a year and a half. In poor standing with the Iranian regime, he would likely face arrest if he returned.

Alex Bollfrass is the NoH Senior New Jersey correspondent and a graduate student at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs.

House Votes to Cut F-35 Extra Engine

The saga continues in the fight to fund the F-35 extra engine.  Today, the House voted 233-198 on an amendment that would cancel the program.

The vote split both Republicans and Democrats, with over 100 Republicans and around 130 Democrats voting yes.  Rep. Tom Rooney (R-FL) took the lead on the amendment, crediting House GOP leaders with allowing a vote on the issue despite Speaker John Boehner’s opposition.

Freshman Republicans in the House were initially hesitant to trim military spending, but have since broken ranks with their party’s speaker to include $16 billion in military cuts in the current spending bill.  Cutting the F-35 extra engine would save an additional $450 million.

House GOP leaders hope to pass the overall spending bill later this week, which would fund the government through the end of the current fiscal year, but the buck does not stop there.  The bill then goes to the Senate.  Funding for the extra engine could be among the many changes that are made.

Egypt’s Success, North Korea’s Distress

The Egyptian revolution has raised hopes of democracy in the region and beyond. But North Korea is a different story. Click here for the full story or click read more below.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il may have woken up on his 70th birthday with crossed brows rather than a smile.

February 16th actually could be the first of a two-year celebration since he is either 69 or 70-years-old depending on the calculator. Still, the 70th birthday is a very special one in Korea though his are always commemorated with lavish birthday gifts and festivities.

But this year, Kim has woken up to a mix of unhappy birthday presents no 70-year-old dictator would want to accept: South Korean headlines that continue to paint a bleak picture for his health and regime; uncertainty over U.S. food aid to the North; an unstable health; urgent need to fast-forward his son Jong-un’s grooming process; unsuccessful inter-Korean military talks ending with no rice aid; and a struggling economy.

Perhaps most concerning is waking up to the reality that yet another fellow dictator and long-time friend Hosni Mubarak has been toppled by the Egyptian people. Romania, Iraq, Tunisia and now Egypt. One by one, his comrades have fallen.

Kim might have even asked himself, “Could this be my fate one day?”
But his conscience may have immediately answered, “Never!” with another pound of the iron fist.

While the world could not escape the images of Egyptian protests and democracy taking wind in the Middle East, North Koreans were oblivious of the historic moment. State media naturally blacked out the Egyptian revolution, and instead claimed America’s latest headache is smartphones used by U.S. prison inmates to smuggle drugs and weapons.

The regime’s iron curtain has its pores and information reportedly disseminates from the growing popularity of banned South Korean dramas, those sneaking in and out of China, and the expanding number of smuggled mobile phones from China as well as increasing shipments of legitimate mobile phones serviced by Egypt’s Orascom Telecom.

As South Koreans watched Egyptians overthrow their 30-year dictator, the first thought in their minds was, “When will it be North Korea’s turn?” North Korean defectors watched with envy.

There has been news of unhappy North Koreans. Add that to doubts over Kim’s health and one could hope the scale would tip toward homegrown social instability and uproar.

The cruel reality, however, is that North Korea’s turn is unlikely to come any time soon. “Bottom-up” is not a concept that can easily be applied to the North. The fundamental constraint to any civilian protest is the sheer fact that the regime maintains a strict system of absolute power, oppression, monitoring, isolation and gulags.

The North Korean people do not have the power to assemble. Most do not have contact with the outside world. While North Koreans minus the elite are hungry and malnourished, they still worship their Dear Leader and are severely patriotic. Reports may be true that some members of the military and political crème de la crème are unhappy, but they will continue to bask in the glory and goodies of elite-hood as long as they remain loyal.

As grim as the current picture may be for Kim Jong-il, it also gives him more incentive to up the ante and strengthen internal solidarity.

Kim may see an opportune time to unleash more provocations when Seoul and Washington convene their annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle military exercise on February 28th. Military officials say the drills will go beyond defeating a conventional attack, and will reportedly include responding to an all-out war and contingency scenarios such as the death of Kim Jong-il and a crisis during a transfer of power. The exercise may also involve a U.S. aircraft carrier while intensifying their training to search and destroy North Korean weapons of mass destruction.

Pyongyang believes the joint exercises are aimed at toppling the Kim regime, and it has often threatened grave consequences should the drills proceed. As has been the case in the past, the United Nations Command has informed the North of the upcoming exercise date explaining that they are defensive in nature.

The future course of the Korean peninsula is unclear. But what is clear is that Pyongyang will engage in more provocations given the right time and political incentive. What’s clear is that tensions must be reduced. What’s clear is that the international community still needs to feed information to the North Korean people. What’s clear is that a North Korea with nuclear weapons is destabilizing to the region and the world. What’s clear is that solving North Korea will shake the nuclear black market. What is clear is that active diplomacy must persist.