After South   Korea released its international report on the sinking of the Cheonan detailing North Korean responsibility for the incident, tensions rose on the Korean peninsula to levels not seen in recent years.  With South Korea promising a ‘stern response’ to the attack and North   Korea promising retaliation that could include a ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, it looked like there was real potential for escalation.  Now, nearly three weeks on, both South and North Korea appear to be u-turning on a number of the threats they issued. Which begs the question: were the threats just all talk, as we have seen in the past, or were tensions so high (as I explained here) that both sides deemed that they had no choice but to urgently take de-escalatory steps?

Reports initially suggested that South Korea would seek sanctions at the U.N Security Council as part of its promised ‘stern response’ to the sinking of the Cheonan. But Pyongyang threatened to respond to any action at the Security Council using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style.’  Nearly three weeks later, Seoul has finally referred the case to the Security Council and naturally, North Korea has responded again with strong rhetoric – even implying the possibility of more missile / nuclear tests.  But instead of sanctions, South Korea now seems to be looking to send a ‘political, symbolic and moral message’ at the Security Council.  North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric may have contributed to this change in approach, but it also seems that uncertainty over Russia and China’s position curtailed South Korea’s desire to try and get sanctions through the UN.

Another area of policy u-turn seems to be South Korea’s threat to recommence its psychological warfare campaign against the North.  Stopped under the sunshine policy of Kim Dae Jung, South Korea had threatened to rebuild a network of loudspeakers to broadcast propaganda across the Demilitarized Zone and drop leaflets over the North containing the probe results of the Cheonan investigation.  Of all South Korea’s promised countermeasures this seemed one of the most potentially dangerous, given North Korea’s declaration that it would shell the propaganda speakers with its artillery forces and South Korea’s assertion that it would respond to any attack militarily.   Defectors have been on record as suggesting that in this case at least, North Korea’s threats would likely be carried out.  Given the severity of Pyongyang’s warning, it thus seems that Lee Myung Bak heeded it as reality in his decision to withhold resumption of the psychological warfare campaign.  The decision may have also been influenced by his desire to keep the South Korean markets stable, which were rattled significantly in the days following the report’s release.

South Korea also promised to heighten its naval presence and commence new joint-exercises with the U.S. as another element of its response strategy to the Cheonan sinking.  Late last month Seoul carried out a much publicized unilateral anti-submarine exercise, and a joint operation with the U.S. was moved forward by a month.  Predictably, North Korea responded to these moves by saying that it would cancel accords with the South designed to prevent clashes at their military border, and warned of prompt physical strikes if any South Korean vessels entered the disputed area off the west coast of the peninsula.  It appears North Korea’s harsh tone may have again paid off to a degree as South Korea and the U.S agreed last week to postpone the joint naval exercise.  Chinese intervention may also have helped influence this decision, as it called upon the U.S-ROK alliance to cancel or drastically reduce the scale of the exercise.

For North Korea’s part, it too seems to have u-turned on some of its threatened responses – particularly in the case of the joint DPRK-ROK Kaesong Industrial Complex venture.  On May 27 North Korea promptly threatened to block all cross-border traffic to the Complex.  Of course, such a move would have been very self-defeating, as it employs some 43,000 North Korean workers and brings the North millions of dollars worth of badly needed revenue each year.  Not surprisingly, just days after making this threat North  Korea made clear that it had no intention of acting on it, instead advising South Korea that it intended to keep the project open.  For its part, South Korea has had to tread very carefully with regards to the Kaesong complex, due to the potential risk of having its nationals taken hostage by North Korea should tensions further rise.  In the end, mutual restraint prevailed because escalation was in neither side’s interest.

Despite rumours that suggested Kim Jong Il had ordered North Korean forces to prepare for war, on-the-ground reports instead revealed that North Korea was not preparing for anything of the sort.  Once again, the Pyongyang likely calculated that it would neither be in Seoul’s interests to pursue conflict nor for North Korea to initiate what would inevitably be a suicidal attack for Kim Jong Il’s dilapidated military forces.

On Sunday President Lee Myung Bak used a Memorial Day speech to outline his commitment to peace with North Korea. A day earlier he assured investors that there was “absolutely no possibility of a full-scale war”.  It thus looks like (for the moment at least) that the potential for confrontation on the peninsula has been reduced significantly – or perhaps the danger was never all that great in the first place.  From the policy u-turns described it seems that some of the threats made on both sides likely were more than just talk, but at the same time, restraint was viewed by both parties as preferable to escalation.  Although the raising of the Cheonan at the United Nations could lead to further North Korean belligerency (as was the case after the issuance of UNSC 1874), it seems that for now, the status quo has once again prevailed on the peninsula

During the recent UK election campaign Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg made his opposition to like-for-like Trident replacement plans clear, mainly on the basis of the high costs and record breaking budget deficit.   Forming a key element of the newly elected Coalition Government with Conservative David Cameron, Clegg is now in an excellent position to highlight other problems associated with Trident modernization plans before they are irreversibly acted on.

One problem not highlighted in the leadership campaign is the ‘dependence’ of the Trident system on the support of the US.   Indeed, having presented Trident modernization in the 2006 White Paper as meeting the requirement of a ‘UK nuclear force [that] remains fully operationally independent’, suggestions that it is anything short of this call into question the very rationale for renewing it on this basis.

The UK remains the only country in the world to procure its entire nuclear delivery system (Trident D5 missile) and a large proportion of its nuclear infrastructure from another country, the USA.  This cooperation remains unique and originates from collaborative Anglo-American nuclear weapon design, development and operational planning that continues to this day.  This shared approach is best highlighted by the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) and its subsequent renewals (most recently in 2004), that allow for the exchange of information on nuclear weapon designs and technologies if they assist the common security.

In the 2006 White Paper the Government suggested that the Trident missile would not last much beyond 2020 and that under the 1958 MDA, it received assurances from the US that it can participate in the US life extension programme that will extend the D5’s service life until the 2040s

In the same way that the future replacement of the D5 missiles relies on steady relations with the US, the current stock of missiles, build of the submarine and several component lines associated with the warhead design are also highly dependent on US assistance.  Rather than owning the current stock of missiles employed on the Vanguard submarines, the UK instead leases missiles from a US based common pool, which also serves as a refurbishing and maintenance base for UK stocks.  Amongst other items, the neutron generator, warhead design, re-entry body shell and missile guidance systems are all designed and manufactured in the USA. In the unlikely event that relations deteriorate, the servicing of these components could over time become problematic – impacting on the UK’s capacity to launch its missiles independently, if at all.

In terms of being able to launch a missile reliably, the exact position of the submarine (essential for targeting) can only be determined using two US systems, GPS & ESGN, of which the former the US can deny access to at any point.  In addition to this is the fact that the Royal navy is a recipient of ‘US gravitational information and forecasts of weather over targets, both of which are vital to high missile accuracy’.

From these points alone it is clear that the UK nuclear deterrent has and will continue be thoroughly dependent on US technical assistance.  So although some like Commodore Hare might state that the US has no ‘technical golden key’ to prevent the UK from using the system, it seems that at the very least, Washington could, using technical means,  make a launch substantially less straightforward or reliable for a British Prime Minister.  Dan Plesch makes a strong case in arguing that US sourced nuclear capabilities fails the ‘1940 requirement’ – when ‘the US [was] either actively neutral [to the UK] as in 1940 or actively opposed, as in 1956 at Suez, let alone where the US [could be] an adversary’

Although situations where the US would actively withdraw support for the UK’s deterrent are difficult to imagine, the fact that this could happen highlights some the problems associated with employing a US sourced system.  It is thus likely that if the UK were to at some time go ahead and launch a Trident missile against US wishes, Washington could ‘see such an act as cutting across its self declared prerogative as the world’s policeman…’ and would certainly make the UK pay a high price, likely through withdrawal of political and technical support for Trident.

Failing this test of independence, Clegg should therefore highlight the problem to his peers and push for a prompt and thorough review on the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent takes place.  Given the especially high costs of investing in an indigenously produced, truly independent alternative, and the huge British budget deficit at the moment, one would hope that the Coalition government would see sense, lead by example and eliminate its nuclear weapons

Predicting when Iran will get the bomb has been a popular activity for politicians, strategists, analysts, and the public for some time now.  Unfortunately, these predictions are frequently politicized and exploited to justify increased investments in long-range missile defenses, unilateral sanctions, and even military strikes.

Last month, a report released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities concluded that a deployable Iranian ICBM is more than a decade away. The study, authored by former UN weapons inspector Mike Elleman, states that “Iran is not likely to field a liquid-fueled missile capable of targeting Western Europe before 2014 or 2015… Iran is many years away from developing a ‘second-generation’ 4,000-5,000 km intermediate-range solid-propellant missile, if it should decide to do so.” It goes on to say that “many years” has historically been around ten, and thus concludes that since Iran would develop and field an intermediate range missile before developing an ICBM, “a notional Iranian ICBM, based on No-Dong and Scud technologies, is more than a decade away from development.”  The report also separates the development of ballistic missile technologies from the development of nuclear capabilities, saying it can only “appear” that these two programs are linked, but that this cannot be confirmed by the IAEA, and is in fact denied by Iran.

This analysis helps to clarify statements put forward by public officials, which are often stripped of crucial context and twisted by the media in an effort to make an Iranian nuclear weapon seem right around the corner.

For example, in a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on April 14, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright claimed that Iran is currently between two and five years from producing something that could actually produce a nuclear explosion, and would also need three years to develop a reliable means of delivery (such as a missile). Cartwright followed these statements with a note that should Iran simultaneously pursue the construction and the means of delivery of a weapon, the two estimates could be lumped together to produce a final minimum of three to five years.

Complicated and nuanced language on the pace of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs has created never-ending opportunities for the media to overstate the imminence of the threat and over exaggerate certain milestones in Iran’s programs. For instance, while Iran might be able to obtain enough bomb-grade material within a year for a potential weapon, Fox News has falsely interpreted this as synonymous with the completion of an actual deliverable nuclear weapon.  This misinformation is in turn used to bludgeon skeptics of long-range missile defenses and supporters of smart, targeted sanctions against the Iranian regime.

The IISS report has elucidated in writing the stages of the development of an Iranian nuclear bomb (should Iran decide to make one)—something much needed in a field where estimates are easily misconstrued, and extreme precision is needed when answering the question: “when will Iran have a nuclear weapon?”  

Nevertheless, just last week, the press surged with media interpretations of the IAEA’s report on Iran, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” released on May 31, 2010. Characteristically, the imminence of the threat was exaggerated beyond the findings of the report, with headlines such as “U.N. Says Iran Has Fuel for 2 Nuclear Weapons.” Stay tuned for further analysis.

After a recent delay, the White House has expressed confidence that the UN Security Council will back Iran sanctions in the next week, despite controversy over Israel’s Gaza flotilla raid.

While some have all but condemned UN sanctions to a slow and painful death, Robert Gibbs stated yesterday that, “I think the president and the team here remain confident that … within the next week, we’ll have a number that will pass that resolution.”

If a vote does not take place by June 21, as the White House expects, you can bet that Congress will be waiting in the wings to pass its own set of sanctions.

Just prior to the Memorial Day recess, Sen. Chris Dodd and Rep. Howard Berman announced their intention to hold off on Congressional Iran sanctions until the end of June:

With the progress in negotiations at the Security Council, we believe that our overriding goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is best served by providing a limited amount of time for those efforts – and expected follow-on action by the EU at its mid-June summit – to reach a successful conclusion before we send our bill to the President.

Slowed progress will, no doubt, light a fire under those who disagreed with a delay in the first place.

Thanks to our friends over at the Stimson Center, the office has cheerily been playing disarmament video games this afternoon.  Stimson launched “Cheater’s Risk” today, described in their own words below: As part of Stimson’s “Unblocking the Road …