• Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Skip to footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

  • Policy Issues
    • Fact Sheets
    • Countries
    • Nuclear Weapons
    • Non-Proliferation
    • Nuclear Security
    • Biological & Chemical Weapons
    • Defense Spending
    • Missile Defense
    • No First Use
  • Nukes of Hazard
    • Podcast
    • Blog
      • Next Up In Arms Control
    • Videos
  • Join Us
  • Press
  • About
    • Staff
    • Boards & Experts
    • Jobs & Internships
    • Financials and Annual Reports
    • Contact Us
  • Donate
  • Search
You are here: Home / Archives for Nukes of Hazard blog

June 2, 2010

New Start Status Report

As of the Memorial Day recess, there has been substantial progress toward ratification of the New START agreement. While no one knows when the Senate will vote on the treaty, the Obama Administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have done an excellent job building support for the treaty and responding to GOP criticisms…

While many of us complained about the lack of vocal support for the treaty by the Exectuve Branch and by Senators while the negotiations were underway in 2009, those complaints have been calmed by a well-coordinated effort to secure 67 votes once the treaty was completed.

Past Administrations have been riven by national security internicene rivalries and disputes. Indeed, the President-elect appeared to like the theme from Lincoln book of a “Team of Rivals.”

However, the New START team instead is a “Team of Teammates.” It includes the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other key military leaders who have all sung from the same hymnal on New START. Long-time Biden aide Brian McKeon is coordinating Administration efforts and doing an excellent job.

The Administration’s campaign has included joint appearances by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to announce the treaty signing and to testify at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

It included major opinion pieces by Vice President Biden and Secretary Gates in the Wall Street Journal.

It has been comprised of many briefings for key Senators and staff by chief New START negotiator Rose Gottemoeller and her team.

It has also consisted of wide outreach to key former government and military leaders. When former Secetaries of States James Baker and Henry Kissinger testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, both said they had been briefed in advance by the Administration.

It incorporated key supporting roles for the Vice Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, James Cartwright, the head of the Strategic Command, Gen. Kevin Chilton, Missile Defense Agency Director Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Agency Thomas D’Agastino.

The key moment in the debate thus far has been the strongly supportive testimoney by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Schlesinger, working with Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), was a key figure in taking down the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1999. He also opposed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. A leader among conservative national security specialists, Republicans chose him to head the conservative wing of the congressionally-appointed nuclear posture commission.

Schlesinger’s prepared statement before the Foreign Relations Committee was tepid at best, but in response to committee member questions, he suggested that it was obligatory for the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification and that failure to do so would be detrimental to U.S. security. He then proceeded to knock down some of the major criticisms of the treaty.

Support for the treaty by other major Republican figures has been very helpful.  Baker, Kissinger, former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisor Stephen Hadley, former national Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Ambassador Linton Brooks and others have all come out in favor of the treaty.

So too has been unanimous active duty military support for the treaty and the Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: the two have often been discussed jointly in the hearings.

It is very helpful that the two leaders of Foreign Relations, Sens. John Kerry (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) are working to win treaty approval. Past ratification efforts have been handicapped by unfriendly committee chairs, particularly the late Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), who never was enthusiastic for arms control.

Additionally, numerous Democratic Senators are speaking out for the treaty on the Senate floor and in the Foreign Relations committee, including Senators Casey (D-PA), Kaufman (D-DE), Franken (D-MN), Feingold (D-WI), Feinstein (D-CA) and Shaheen (D-NH). In hearings, the committee members have elicted positive responses from committee witnesses.

Sen. Kyl, on the Senate floor, and Sens. Jim DeMint (R-NC), Bob Corker (R-TN), James Risch (R-ID), Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Johnny Isakson (R-GA) in the Foreign Relations committee, have raised a series of criticisms about alleged restrictions on missile defense, the adequacy of nuclear weapons complex modernization, whether the treaty is moving too quickly, the quality of the verification procedures and other topics.

The good news is that both Administration and GOP witnesses have provided credible answers to these questions. The bad news is that Republican Senators keep raising the same issues over and over. However, none but Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK) has declared his opposition, Lugar has argued vigously for the treaty while Kyl has asked his fellow Republican Senators to avoid prematurely declaring a position on the treaty.

Finally, there has been substantial grassroots support for the treaty in states represented by key Republicans, with organizations muting their differences on other issues to work in harness for New START.

It remains impossible to predict timing for Senate action or state definitely that 67 votes will be in hand when the Senate votes. The Administration hopes for a vote in July but that is a wishful scenario.  A vote before the end of 2010 is a more realistic goal. While the administration and its supporters should not view ratification as a given, the major battle will likely be on conditions, understandings and reservations offered to the resolution of ratification reflecting the criticisms already leveled against the treaty.

The Foreign Relations Committee will hold additional hearings (including with treaty skeptics), the Senate Armed Services Committee will conduct a hearing with cabinet secretaries and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of June 17 and the Intelligence Committee will hold a hearing on verification after the intelligence community completes a new National Intelligence Estimate.

All in all – an excellent start to New START.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

June 1, 2010

Post-NPT RevCon Review of the Goal for a NWFZ in the Middle East …And why this goal is so important

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference came to a close on Friday, and the long weekend allowed for ample conversation regarding its accomplishments and imperfections. Under particular scrutiny has been a section of the final document which specifically emphasized the goal of the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The review conference endorsed the appointment of a facilitator to work towards this goal, and the convening of a separate conference in 2012 – to be attended by all Middle Eastern states – which would seek “the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.”

Though it expressed full support for the goals of the resolution, the U.S. took exception to what it saw as the singling out of Israel, despite the fact that the final document recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 RevCon of the need for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of Israeli nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

The U.S. suggested that the goal of a MENWFZ cannot bear fruit until a comprehensive peace in the region is established and diverted attention to Iran by noting that Tehran was the only NPT signatory found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and that it had done little to enhance international confidence in its performance. Israel, which did not participate in the RevCon, lambasted the fact that they were singled out instead of Iran, claiming that the treaty “ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world.”

Israeli disappointment in the NPT RevCon’s final document—viewed as an act of bullying and infringement on their sovereignty—was reflected in two events in recent days, both of which underline exactly why the goal of a nuclear weapons free Middle East is so important.

Reports that Israeli submarines equipped with nuclear cruise missiles will deploy off the Iranian coast affirm the eminence of the threat posed by a nuclear Middle East, and the urgent need to make progress on the MENWFZ. Should Iran succeed in obtaining the capability to develop a nuclear weapon—which it seems bent on doing—the resulting change in power dynamics could be so extreme that Israel might feel obligated to act. Indeed Tel Aviv hasn’t shied away from threatening military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, underscoring its belief that the loss of its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the region in the absence of a peace accord may not be something it is willing to countenance. Israel’s anger over the language in the final document of the 2010 NPT RevCon only reaffirms this point.

What’s more, yesterday’s attack on the aid convoy bound for Gaza has contributed to further political tension in the region and condemnation of Israel by its neighbors and the international community. This incident also underscores how engaging Israel diplomatically in an effort to disarm its nuclear arsenal will prove increasingly difficult, as well as how the regional political volatility increases the danger posed by nuclear weapons in the region.

While the goal of a Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone as reaffirmed in the NPT RevCon final document is laudable, it is clear that Israel is not yet a willing partner in this effort.  The past few days have witnessed Israel deploy submarines armed with nuclear weapons off the coast of Iran and violate international law by attacking a humanitarian aid convoy in international waters. The time is right for the international community to be firm with Israel and demand cooperation in bringing stability to the region. Let’s cross our fingers for Israel’s participation in, and the success of, the 2012 MENWFZ conference.

Posted in: Israel, Middle East, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

May 28, 2010

NPT RevCon Produces Consensus Final Document

Well folks, the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference has successfully produced a consensus final document!  This is the third time in the 40-year history of the Treaty that a consensus document has been achieved, so it is a not-…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

May 28, 2010

Russian Ratification of the Start Follow-on Treaty

It was reported today that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has submitted the New START Treaty to the lower house of the Russian parliament for ratification – the Duma.  While it is well known that Senate ratification could take some time, some suggest that in contrast, Duma ratification is a foregone conclusion.  But are suggestions like this an accurate portrayal of Russian politics or overly simplistic ?

For the START follow-on Treaty to be ratified in Russia, it needs to pass through the two houses of the Russian Federal Assembly.  The lower house, or State Duma, is the more powerful of the two and will be the first port of call for Treaty ratification.  For the Treaty to be approved by the Duma, and thus passed onto the Federation Council for consideration, it must be supported by a majority vote.  The Duma has 450 members, who since November 2007 (after intervention of Vladimir Putin), have been elected by proportional representation.  As a consequence , United Russia (‘essentially a creation of Putin’) now has 64.3% of the seats in the Duma.  This suggests that theoretically, the New START Treaty – especially given United Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev approval of it – will have no problem getting approved at the Duma.

The Federation Council has 168 members, of which more than half need to vote in favor of the Treaty (post-Duma approval) to complete the ratification process.   In 2000 President Putin controversially reformed the Federation Council, which prior had been used by Yeltsin as a means to mitigate the Duma’s power and was thus generally obstructive.  As a consequence of these reforms, Putin ensured the selection of a wave of Kremlin-friendly senators – implying that approval of START follow on in the upper house should also be relatively straightforward. 

Nonetheless, there are two issue areas that could potentially delay ratification, or at worse, lead to no ratification at all.

1. Missile Defense

In the U.S., Republican Senators Jon Kyl and John McCain are well known for their concerns regarding the START follow on Treaty, specifically with regard to it potentially limiting future U.S missile defense deployments.  In response, Treaty negotiators have been at pains to highlight the fact that the Treaty does not formally limit missile defense.   In contrast to Kyl and McCain, some Russians are concerned that a further expansion of U.S missile defense might threaten the nuclear balance of power, limiting both their tactical and strategic missile deployments.  Reflecting this concern, State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov started in March that ratification would not take place if the Treaty ‘does not take into account the link between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense’.   To get around this divergence of opinion, Treaty negotiators included two non-binding ‘unilateral’ statements, designed to appease the likes of Kyl and Gryzlov.  However, because these statements are inherently contradictory, there is potential that despite their non-binding nature, stubborn members in either the Duma or Senate could delay ratification.  As Riki Ellison of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance points out, ”the reality of a successfully ratified outcome will most likely not happen unless we agree to disagree on the linkage of missile defense with Russia.”

2. Presidential Election 2012

Vladimir Putin was forced out of his Presidency in 2008 because of a two-term consecutive limit.  However, because there are no restrictions preventing him running for a third term after someone else serves, rumors now suggest that Medvedev will be facing competition from Putin at the 2012 Presidential Election.  According to Alexander A. Pikayev, the very possibility of this has now triggered a wave of speculation on what appears ”to be a widening crack between those aides closest to the two leaders, if not the leaders themselves.”

The implication it seems is that even though President Medvedev might be eager to get the treaty ratified as soon as possible (to evidence strong leadership in the run up to the 2012 Presidential elections), Putin could delay ratification to undermine his colleague using this power, should he so desire.

Cause for Hope?

In conclusion, while there are two potential risk areas that could delay ratification, it seems that overall it will be in the interests and capability of United Russia, through both Medvedev and Putin, to ensure that ratification is favored in both houses – thus facilitating (if not forcing) a straightforward ratification.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

May 28, 2010

What Do The Non-Nuclear Weapons States Want?

According to Iran, whose representative to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference spoke with press this afternoon while on his way to a plenary session at which the latest draft of the final document was distributed, there are three things hol…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Page 1
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 233
  • Page 234
  • Page 235
  • Page 236
  • Page 237
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 281
  • Go to Next Page »

Primary Sidebar

Recent Posts

  • Will the Iran war set off a new nuclear arms race? “No one speaks of taking out Kim Jong Un” March 25, 2026
  • Front and Center: March 22, 2026 March 22, 2026
  • Why Did the United States Lift Sanctions on Assad’s Chemical Weapons Scientists? March 20, 2026
  • Iran’s Stockpile of Highly Enriched Uranium: Worth Bargaining For? March 16, 2026
  • Trump’s Claim About the Obama Nuclear Deal and Iran’s Nuclear Development March 12, 2026

Footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

820 1st Street NE, Suite LL-180
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202.546.0795

Issues

  • Fact Sheets
  • Countries
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Non-Proliferation
  • Nuclear Security
  • Defense Spending
  • Biological and Chemical Weapons
  • Missile Defense
  • No First Use

Countries

  • China
  • France
  • India and Pakistan
  • Iran
  • Israel
  • North Korea
  • Russia
  • United Kingdom

Explore

  • Nukes of Hazard blog
  • Nukes of Hazard podcast
  • Nukes of Hazard videos
  • Front and Center
  • Fact Sheets

About

  • About
  • Meet the Staff
  • Boards & Experts
  • Press
  • Jobs & Internships
  • Financials and Annual Reports
  • Contact Us
  • Council for a Livable World
  • Twitter
  • YouTube
  • Instagram
  • Facebook

© 2026 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Privacy Policy

Charity Navigator GuideStar Seal of Transparency