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Iran Agrees to TRR Deal… Again

Good news – and, one way or another, I do think this is good news – this morning from Tehran.

Following on talks between Turkish, Brazilian and Iranian leaders over the weekend, Iran has agreed to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in a deal that, according to AP, “could ease the international standoff over the country’s disputed atomic program and deflate a US-led push for tougher sanctions.”

“According to the trilateral deal, Iran will deliver 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey,” said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu during a press conference on the sidelines of the 14th G-15 Summit in Tehran today.  In return, Iran will receive 120 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium fuel rods for use in a Tehran medical research reactor that produces isotopes for cancer treatment.

While the mainstream media may be getting ahead of themselves a bit, this move is good in many ways.  Tensions over Iran’s nuclear program have continued to rise since the announcement of a second, secret, Iranian uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom almost a year ago. Congress is chomping at the bit for new sanctions and even the use of force.

Without a doubt, skeptics will immediately point out Iran’s long history of cooperation up to the very precipice of a deal, with no eventual follow-through.  It may not matter much whether the deal makes it to a close, however.  In the end, it provides for one undeniably positive benefit: time.

In the time it has taken to negotiate this deal, Iran has doubled its stockpile of LEU.  The original purpose, which hoped to delay any Iranian “breakout” capability by at least a year, is effectively dead – so in the end, even “success” will make little difference.  

Politically, however, the deal provides a treasury of stalling techniques to the administration, which will likely want to employ as many as possible.

What remains true is that the situation in Iran needs more time…

When this deal was proposed, Iran remained submerged within an interior struggle over human rights.  While the struggle remains, it has cooled.  Iran’s leaders may now have the ability to turn their attention more fully to the nuclear issue.  

If this is too optimistic a scenario, more time may also provide the administration with what it needs to secure strong multilateral sanctions – the kind that won’t benefit the Iranian Regime.

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast said that the IAEA should expect to receive a letter with regards to the swap deal “within a week.”  

The swap will have to wait for official approval from the Vienna Group, which consists of representatives from France, Russia and the US and the IAEA, but will begin nearly a month after it is given.

The details of the deal are still unclear and agreement from the Vienna Group is far from certain.  Since another country will need to provide 1200 kg of LEU for the swap, this will not be just a trilateral deal – others must be convinced to cooperate.

Where the US is concerned, Jeffrey points out in a great post on Arms Control Wonk why the administration won’t want to be perceived as at fault if this one falls through.  In this way, I would argue that at least tacit US participation is likely.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns are due to discuss Iran at a meeting today with Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov.  

For now, the text of the agreement is below:

JOINT DECLARATION BY IRAN, TURKEY AND BRAZIL
(17 May 2010)

Having met in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, the undersigned have agreed on the following Declaration:

1) We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in accordance with the related articles of the NPT, recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

2) We express our strong conviction that we have the opportunity now to begin a forward looking process that will create a positive, constructive, non-confrontational atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and cooperation.

3) We believe that the nuclear fuel exchange is instrumental in initiating cooperation in different areas, especially with regard to peaceful nuclear cooperation including nuclear power plant and research reactors construction.

4) Based on this point the nuclear fuel exchange is a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations. Such a move should lead to positive interaction and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities replacing and avoiding all kinds of confrontation through refraining from measures, actions and rhetorical statements that would jeopardize Iran’s rights and obligations under the NPT.

5) Based on the above, in order to facilitate the nuclear cooperation mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran agrees to deposit 1200 kg LEU in Turkey. While in Turkey this LEU will continue to be the property of Iran. Iran and the IAEA may station observers to monitor the safekeeping of the LEU in Turkey.

6) Iran will notify the IAEA in writing through official channels of its agreement with the above within seven days following the date of this declaration. Upon the positive response of the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France and the IAEA) further details of the exchange will be elaborated through a written agreement and proper arrangement between Iran and the Vienna Group that specifically committed themselves to deliver 120 kg of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).

7) When the Vienna Group declares its commitment to this provision, then both parties would commit themselves to the implementation of the agreement mentioned in item 6. Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its readiness to deposit its LEU (1200 kg) within one month. On the basis of the same agreement the Vienna Group should deliver 120 kg fuel required for TRR in no later than one year.

8) In case the provisions of this Declaration are not respected Turkey, upon the request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran’s LEU to Iran.

9) We welcome the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue as in the past
their talks with the 5+1 countries in Turkey on the common concerns based on
collective commitments according to the common points of their proposals.

10) Turkey and Brazil appreciated Iran’s commitment to the NPT and its constructive role in pursuing the realization of nuclear rights of its member states. The Islamic Republic
of Iran likewise appreciated the constructive efforts of the friendly countries Turkey
and Brazil in creating the conducive environment for realization of Iran’s nuclear
rights.

Another Republican Policy Committee Report on New START

The Senate Republican Policy Committee (RPC) is back with another report on New START.  Recall that the last time the Committee released a report on arms control (in September 2009), it cited the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 25 times to raise doubts about the New START negotiations, yet omitted the single most important statement the Commission made re: the impending expiration of START I:

“The moment appears ripe for a renewal of arms control with Russia, and this bodes well for a continued reduction in the nuclear arsenal. The United States and Russia should pursue a step-by-step approach and take a modest first step to ensure that there is a successor to START I when it expires at the end of 2009.  Beyond a modest incremental reduction in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, the arms control process becomes much more complex as new factors are introduced.” [emphasis mine.]

The main thrust of the new report seems to be that the Senate should evaluate the new agreement carefully and thoroughly.  The RPC would be hard pressed to find supporters of the treaty who actually disagree with this position.

In general, the new report seems to lack the same vehemence that characterized the last one.  For example, the best the Committee could come up with on verification is that before the treaty annexes were complete, “the Administration was already proclaiming that New START has an “effective verification regime.”  And on the tactical nuclear weapons, the report states: “In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Treaty of Moscow in 2002, Chairman Biden lamented that it did not address tactical nuclear weapons.  Of course, Sen. Biden voted for SORT, as did 94 other Senators.

Perhaps I’m being overly optimistic, but I think this bodes well for the treaty’s prospects, even if a tough fight on conditions, understandings, and declarations on the treaty is on the horizon.  All (or nearly all) the information the Committee asks for will be (or already has been) provided and all the questions it raises on specific issues have answers that have been provided and will continue to be provided by the Obama administration and the many moderates and conservatives who have already come out in support of the treaty.  

Where’s My Trigger?! Your Weekly Iran Sanctions Update

This week saw more confident language surrounding ongoing UN sanctions talks:

“I am very confident that unless Iran does something significant that demonstrates that it is taking confidence building measures, I am very confident we will get a Security Council resolution that is supported by the majority of the UN Security Council.”

In his comments this past Tuesday, White House WMD czar Gary Samore confirmed his belief that both Russia and China are likely to support an eventual resolution.

Unfortunately, Samore is not so confident about the zombie fuel swap, noting that that current Brazilian and Turkish efforts are unlikely to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough and, as such, the US is holding out little hope for the deal.

“The Iranians have frankly not been prepared to accept that offer, it’s pretty clear to anybody,” Samore said, “and Turkey will soon satisfy themselves of that.”

He also added that Iran’s “nuclear clock is not moving as quickly as some feared, because of problems the Iranians have had in terms of their centrifuges,” but declined to say whether the centrifuge problems were a result of alleged Western attempts to thwart work by the machines.

Meanwhile, Congress is hard at work making the case against exemptions for cooperating countries from corporate sanctions, such as those requested by the administration…

On Wednesday, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, led by Chairman Joe Lieberman, heard testimony from GAO that, despite existing US sanctions, seven firms involved in the Iranian oil, gas and petrochemical sectors received $880 million in US government contracts over the past four years.  

CQ Today reports that:

Although the GAO report, dated May 4, did not attempt to determine whether the seven firms violated the existing U.S. sanctions enacted in 1996, senators were quick to interpret the findings from Congress’ independent investigative arm as further evidence that successive administrations have failed to enforce the restrictions.

Lieberman made clear after the hearing that “a lot of the ‘should’s’” in the 1996 bill language will need to “become ‘shall’s’” this time around.

To that end, Lieberman announced that he would put together a letter to both Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates detailing the panel’s concerns, including the GAO’s latest findings.

Though it may look like the administration has dropped a pretty significant ball here by not pressing harder for exceptions, especially when those same exceptions could potentially make or break the aforementioned, very confident, support needed for UN sanctions, it seems that the administration may be busy waging its own private, very sanction-ish, campaign on the sidelines.  

Since March, a significant number of foreign companies have announced plans to cut, suspend, or rein in ties with Iran, including oil majors Eni, LUKOIL and Royal Dutch Shell, Indian refiner Reliance Industries, US construction and mining equipment maker Caterpillar, and luxury German carmarker Daimler.  KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young have also declared themselves free of any business ties to Iran.

Reuters reports that all this may be the handiwork of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, who has been traveling to foreign capitals to talk to governments, financial regulators, banks and business leaders for months:

“We view the business community as an ally and we talk to them in that sense. We have information regarding Iranian illicit conduct that they might not have, and we provide them with the advantage of our viewpoint so they can better assess their own risks.”

Levey notes that his goal not to squash Iran’s economy completely, and he would prefer to minimize the impact of these cuts on Iran’s citizens, but “It’s hard to get it surgically precise.”

Three Quick Thoughts on the Gates Op-Ed

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has an Op-Ed in today’s Wall Street Journal on New START.  The last paragraph is the key paragraph:

The New START Treaty has the unanimous support of America’s military leadership—to include the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of the service chiefs, and the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, the organization responsible for our strategic nuclear deterrent. For nearly 40 years, treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons have been approved by the U.S. Senate by strong bipartisan majorities. This treaty deserves a similar reception and result—on account of the dangerous weapons it reduces, the critical defense capabilities it preserves, the strategic stability it maintains, and, above all, the security it provides to the American people.

 My takeaways:

1. Given that DoD plans to deploy up to 240 SLBMs and keep 14 boomers (probably 12 deployed with 20 SLBMs each and 2 in overhaul), we’re really going to be putting Section IV of Part III of the Protocol and the Ninth Agreed Statement to work.  Amy Woolf runs the numbers here.

2. The Senate ICBM coalition fared pretty well. It looks like one squadron of 50 Minuteman III ICBM’s will now become non-deployed, but DoD will retain all 450 silos.  Recall that non-deployed ICBMs are not limited by the treaty, so the U.S. will not have to destroy the extra missiles.  There also appears to be a built-in ceiling of 20 ICBMs for a prompt global strike capability, in the event that DoD decides to deploy it.Update 5/13: Upon closer inspection it looks like the 420 number for deployed ICBMs probably has nothing to do with Prompt Global Strike. Jeffrey asks some questions here . I think the key point, as he notes, is that the administration has seven years to figure out how to get down to 700 deployed delivery vehicles, and they may not be quite sure how they’re going to do that yet.

3. I was glad to see Gates say that the treaty “limits significantly U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals” instead of something like“the limit is 30 percent lower than the limit in SORT.” The former formulation is more accurate.