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Post-NPT RevCon Review of the Goal for a NWFZ in the Middle East …And why this goal is so important

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference came to a close on Friday, and the long weekend allowed for ample conversation regarding its accomplishments and imperfections. Under particular scrutiny has been a section of the final document which specifically emphasized the goal of the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The review conference endorsed the appointment of a facilitator to work towards this goal, and the convening of a separate conference in 2012 – to be attended by all Middle Eastern states – which would seek “the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.”

Though it expressed full support for the goals of the resolution, the U.S. took exception to what it saw as the singling out of Israel, despite the fact that the final document recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 RevCon of the need for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of Israeli nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

The U.S. suggested that the goal of a MENWFZ cannot bear fruit until a comprehensive peace in the region is established and diverted attention to Iran by noting that Tehran was the only NPT signatory found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and that it had done little to enhance international confidence in its performance. Israel, which did not participate in the RevCon, lambasted the fact that they were singled out instead of Iran, claiming that the treaty “ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world.”

Israeli disappointment in the NPT RevCon’s final document—viewed as an act of bullying and infringement on their sovereignty—was reflected in two events in recent days, both of which underline exactly why the goal of a nuclear weapons free Middle East is so important.

Reports that Israeli submarines equipped with nuclear cruise missiles will deploy off the Iranian coast affirm the eminence of the threat posed by a nuclear Middle East, and the urgent need to make progress on the MENWFZ. Should Iran succeed in obtaining the capability to develop a nuclear weapon—which it seems bent on doing—the resulting change in power dynamics could be so extreme that Israel might feel obligated to act. Indeed Tel Aviv hasn’t shied away from threatening military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, underscoring its belief that the loss of its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the region in the absence of a peace accord may not be something it is willing to countenance. Israel’s anger over the language in the final document of the 2010 NPT RevCon only reaffirms this point.

What’s more, yesterday’s attack on the aid convoy bound for Gaza has contributed to further political tension in the region and condemnation of Israel by its neighbors and the international community. This incident also underscores how engaging Israel diplomatically in an effort to disarm its nuclear arsenal will prove increasingly difficult, as well as how the regional political volatility increases the danger posed by nuclear weapons in the region.

While the goal of a Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone as reaffirmed in the NPT RevCon final document is laudable, it is clear that Israel is not yet a willing partner in this effort.  The past few days have witnessed Israel deploy submarines armed with nuclear weapons off the coast of Iran and violate international law by attacking a humanitarian aid convoy in international waters. The time is right for the international community to be firm with Israel and demand cooperation in bringing stability to the region. Let’s cross our fingers for Israel’s participation in, and the success of, the 2012 MENWFZ conference.

Russian Ratification of the Start Follow-on Treaty

It was reported today that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has submitted the New START Treaty to the lower house of the Russian parliament for ratification – the Duma.  While it is well known that Senate ratification could take some time, some suggest that in contrast, Duma ratification is a foregone conclusion.  But are suggestions like this an accurate portrayal of Russian politics or overly simplistic ?

For the START follow-on Treaty to be ratified in Russia, it needs to pass through the two houses of the Russian Federal Assembly.  The lower house, or State Duma, is the more powerful of the two and will be the first port of call for Treaty ratification.  For the Treaty to be approved by the Duma, and thus passed onto the Federation Council for consideration, it must be supported by a majority vote.  The Duma has 450 members, who since November 2007 (after intervention of Vladimir Putin), have been elected by proportional representation.  As a consequence , United Russia (‘essentially a creation of Putin’) now has 64.3% of the seats in the Duma.  This suggests that theoretically, the New START Treaty – especially given United Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev approval of it – will have no problem getting approved at the Duma.

The Federation Council has 168 members, of which more than half need to vote in favor of the Treaty (post-Duma approval) to complete the ratification process.   In 2000 President Putin controversially reformed the Federation Council, which prior had been used by Yeltsin as a means to mitigate the Duma’s power and was thus generally obstructive.  As a consequence of these reforms, Putin ensured the selection of a wave of Kremlin-friendly senators – implying that approval of START follow on in the upper house should also be relatively straightforward. 

Nonetheless, there are two issue areas that could potentially delay ratification, or at worse, lead to no ratification at all.

1. Missile Defense

In the U.S., Republican Senators Jon Kyl and John McCain are well known for their concerns regarding the START follow on Treaty, specifically with regard to it potentially limiting future U.S missile defense deployments.  In response, Treaty negotiators have been at pains to highlight the fact that the Treaty does not formally limit missile defense.   In contrast to Kyl and McCain, some Russians are concerned that a further expansion of U.S missile defense might threaten the nuclear balance of power, limiting both their tactical and strategic missile deployments.  Reflecting this concern, State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov started in March that ratification would not take place if the Treaty ‘does not take into account the link between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense’.   To get around this divergence of opinion, Treaty negotiators included two non-binding ‘unilateral’ statements, designed to appease the likes of Kyl and Gryzlov.  However, because these statements are inherently contradictory, there is potential that despite their non-binding nature, stubborn members in either the Duma or Senate could delay ratification.  As Riki Ellison of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance points out, ”the reality of a successfully ratified outcome will most likely not happen unless we agree to disagree on the linkage of missile defense with Russia.”

2. Presidential Election 2012

Vladimir Putin was forced out of his Presidency in 2008 because of a two-term consecutive limit.  However, because there are no restrictions preventing him running for a third term after someone else serves, rumors now suggest that Medvedev will be facing competition from Putin at the 2012 Presidential Election.  According to Alexander A. Pikayev, the very possibility of this has now triggered a wave of speculation on what appears ”to be a widening crack between those aides closest to the two leaders, if not the leaders themselves.”

The implication it seems is that even though President Medvedev might be eager to get the treaty ratified as soon as possible (to evidence strong leadership in the run up to the 2012 Presidential elections), Putin could delay ratification to undermine his colleague using this power, should he so desire.

Cause for Hope?

In conclusion, while there are two potential risk areas that could delay ratification, it seems that overall it will be in the interests and capability of United Russia, through both Medvedev and Putin, to ensure that ratification is favored in both houses – thus facilitating (if not forcing) a straightforward ratification.

The NPT Review Conference’s Focus on a Nuclear Free Middle East

As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) comes to a close in New York, the call for a ban on nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East has come back into the fore as a top issue. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs), which exist in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, are zones in which countries commit themselves to not acquire, manufacture, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Article VII of the NPT affirms the rights of countries to establish such zones.  A NWFZ in the Middle East has been on the NPT agenda since the treaty’s entry into force in 1970. Since the 1995 NPT RevCon, the goal has been more adamantly pursued by Egypt, but still to no visible avail.

Nevertheless, the start of this year’s NPT RevCon saw the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China all voice unequivocal support for the initiative— with ample support from states in the region too.  The Arab Group has stated that failing to achieve it would be a failure of the NPT as a whole.  While some view a NWFZ in the Middle East as a lofty, far-off, or even impossible goal, there is no denying the worth it would have.

The implications of the initiative are clear. Israel, not just Iran, would have to foreswear nuclear weapons.

Israel’s program is controversial for numerous reasons.  First, Israel is deliberately ambiguous about its nuclear weapons capability, officially maintaining that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the region.  Second, as one of the only countries in the world to have ever carried out preemptive attacks on nascent nuclear programs (for example in Iraq and Syria), Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is often viewed as particularly hypocritical. Finally, in defiance of numerous requests and resolutions issued by the General Assembly of the UN which call on Israel to join the NPT, Israel nevertheless continues to refuse. This places it in the not so select company of Pakistan, North Korea, and India.

The situation is further complicated by instability in the region and the ongoing peace process- the progress of which will be consequential in determining the success of disarmament efforts (a belief supported by the current U.S. administration). Many Arab states and Iran view Israel’s nuclear arsenal as a threat to their security and the stability of the region. Moreover, they view the removal of Israel’s arsenal as a precondition to lasting peace in the region. Israel, however, tends to view peace as a precondition to any disarmament or reduction in force levels, claiming it needs a strong defense to defend against “hostile” neighbors. Iran’s nascent nuclear program, coupled with Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetoric, lend credence to Israel’s argument.

This deadlock implies neither the situation for disarmament nor the situation for peace exists; and yet, it is evident that the current situation is not sustainable.

It is thus encouraging that on the eve of the close of the NPT RevCon, leaders are hustling to reach a compromise on how to establish the NWFZ. Egypt has submitted working papers that outline tangible steps towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, and is leading a movement—now seconded by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon- to create a conference to specifically address the establishment of a Mideast NWFZ. Meanwhile, U.S. and Egyptian senior officials are attempting to secure Israel’s attendance at this conference. Tomorrow evening will reveal if they succeed.

If a final document is agreed to, it will likely call for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Important as these steps are, there are other challenging steps that must be taken if these goals are to be achieved.  

For example, Israel will have to make dialogue and diplomacy a more important part of their foreign policy, as opposed to military threats, and will have to withdraw from the occupied territories. Meanwhile, the Arab states and Iran must acknowledge Israel’s existence as a state, and respect its sovereignty accordingly. This involves, for example, the cessation of rockets fired from Southern Lebanon by Iranian sponsored Shi’a Hezbollah militants.

Achieving the goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East will be taxing and perplexing at each level of the process – but it will be well worth the effort.  It is encouraging to hear that representatives at the NPT RevCon appear up for the task. We can only hope they will begin to make progress.