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Flexibility, Thy Name is New START

NoH has been arguing for some time that given the delivery vehicle range outlined in the Joint Understanding last July, together with the slow trickle of news that the new treaty would likely contain simpler conversion and elimination rules, the U.S. wouldn’t have to make any significant changes to its current nuclear force structure (long live the triad!) or chop up systems that have been converted to conventional-only roles.

Now that the treaty text and protocol have been released, the amount of flexibility (and by extension the hedge against uncertainty) that the treaty allows for is truly astounding.

Of course, this won’t stop some critics from saying that the treaty could endanger the triad, that it disproportionately benefits Russia – since the deployed number of Russian delivery vehicles is anticipated to drop dramatically with or without a new arms control agreement – and/or that it limits U.S. prompt global strike capabilities.

Indeed, Sen. John Thune (R-SD), who has made ensuring that the triad remains inviolable a kind of pet project of his, flight tested some of these arguments at last Thursday’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review.  Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Jim Miller and STRATCOM Commander Kevin Chilton were having none of it, however, and their responses are worth quoting at length…  

The Limits are Key

Chilton really drove home the point that New START prevents Moscow from maintaining a larger number of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles than it otherwise might have without the agreement:

THUNE: Will the Russians have to cut their number of delivery vehicles to get to 700?

…

THUNE: Well and my understanding is that they’re already going to be below that level [700 delivery vehicles]….I guess my next question would be what if anything do we get in return for that concession?

CHILTON: …One thing I was pleased to see in the treaty were these limits because as you look to the future though Russia may be close to or slightly below them already, when you look to the future we certainly don’t want them to grow and they would have been unrestricted otherwise without these types of limits articulated in the treaty… [emphasis mine.]

This gets it exactly right. The fact the some Russian reductions might happen in any event is beside the point. If nothing is put in place to replace START I, we can say goodbye to the important limits on and an essential means of verifying Russia’s still enormous force of deployed warheads in particular, but also delivery vehicles. Such an outcome would make the United States less safe.

Each Side Can Determine for Itself How to Structure its Forces

Unlike START I in its waning days, New START is tailored to the current realities U.S. force posture and planning. It also allows the U.S. to meet the limits without endangering the triad. As Chilton put it, “it not only made sense strategically it certainly is doable to sustain the triad at these numbers [i.e. 700 deployed delivery vehicles] and I believe at lower numbers.” Miller provided still more context:

THUNE: …I also want to know if you could elaborate a little bit on what the implications are for each leg of the nuclear triad under these reductions. How many land-based missiles, subs, bombers will we have to cut to be in compliant with the treaty?

…

MILLER: Senator let me add very briefly that the New START treaty has provisions that allow us to do three things that will allow us to reduce the requirement for the number of strategic delivery vehicles while still keeping the same force structure.  The first one is it eliminates what we’ve called the phantom strategic delivery vehicles, those that are counted under the old START treaty but are no longer associated with the nuclear mission….Second, the treaty also allows further conversion of current dual capable bombers to a conventional only role that would take them off the books as well and we are looking at that possibility for some B52-Hs.  And finally the treaty allows for the elimination of launchers from accountability for submarines through a variety of means including the simple removal of the gas generator that would eject the SLBM.  [emphasis mine.]

The SLBM provisions, which are laid out in detail in the Ninth Agreed Statement and Section IV of Part III of the protocol, are pretty amazing.  In fact, not only can SLBM launchers be converted in the way Miller describes, but converted tubes can be located on the same boomer with launchers that have not been converted.  The treaty makes it a lot easier to convert or eliminate ICBM launchers and heavy bombers, too.  

In other words there is flexibility galore, and DoD could go in any one of numerous different directions to meet the treaty’s limits on delivery vehicles (both Miller and Chilton stated that DoD will provide a specific force structure associated with New START as part of the Sec. 1251 report due to be submitted to Congress with the treaty in early May).  In fact, the U.S. could probably get away with not having to physically destroy a single launcher; it could simply convert and/or deactivate its way below the limits.  This doesn’t mean that the reductions wouldn’t be “real,” but remember that this treaty was never about deep reductions in the first place.  Predictability and stability are its calling cards.  

Prompt Global Strike is Alive and Well

Finally, on the issue of prompt global strike, Miller points out that New START will count ICBMs and SLBMs whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads; thus a prompt global strike capability would be subject to the treaty’s limits. However, a warhead limit of 1,550 and a deployed delivery vehicle limit of 700 would still give the U.S. the flexibility to deploy a small number of conventionally armed submarine- and/or land-based long-range missiles, if it ever decides to do so:

THUNE: The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the development of conventional prompt global strike capabilities.  Will these prompt global strike systems count against the New START limits and require further nuclear cuts to accommodate them?

MILLER: Senator Thune….[t]he NPR explicitly looked at that as it did force structure analysis and looked at further reductions under the 700 and 800 combined limit that would leave room for that and indeed would leave room for a small number of conventional ICBMs. [I]f…the determination were made that that was desirable it would be a very small number. [emphasis mine.]

New START provides space to deploy a small number of advanced conventional ICBMs, though the wisdom of such a course is another matter.

What this all adds up to is that New START is a huge win for U.S. security.  Our entire military leadership strongly supports it.  It should be a no brainer in the Senate.

(Note: Last Thursday’s hearing was incredible on many different levels, not the least of which was the shouting match that broke out between Sen. John McCain and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, and will probably be the subject of some future NoH posts.)

Stephen Hawking, Aliens, and Sole Purpose

Perhaps this is what the authors of the NPR had in mind when they said that “the United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.”

Or as a colleague put it: “Is anyone else really hopeful about living to see the day that [sic] a Nuclear Posture Review makes an argument about needing reserve nuclear weapons to hedge against extrageopolitical surprise.”

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Stay home ET. UK scientist: Aliens may pose risks

The Associated Press
Monday, April 26, 2010; 7:42 AM

LONDON — British astrophysicist Stephen Hawking says aliens are out there, but it could be too dangerous for humans to interact with extraterrestrial life.

Hawking claims in a new documentary that intelligent alien lifeforms almost certainly exist, but warns that communicating with them could be “too risky.”

The 68-year-old scientist says a visit by extraterrestrials to Earth would be like Christopher Columbus arriving in the Americas, “which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans.”

He speculates most extraterrestrial life will be similar to microbes, or small animals – but adds advanced lifeforms may be “nomads, looking to conquer and colonize.”

The Discovery Channel said Sunday it will broadcast “Stephen Hawking’s Universe” in Britain next month.

Iran Celebrates its Military Might on Army Day

Army Day marked the unveiling of some um… exciting new possibilities in Iran.  Take this fabulous mock-up of their new stealth fighter (h/t to Stephen Trimble at The DEW Line).  The mock-up was one of two that appeared at the event, both probable variants of Iran’s Sofreh Mahi, tested in February.

Since Iran has trouble just supporting its current force of U.S.-built F-5s, F-4s, F-14s and former Iranian fighters, U.S. Air Force officials have noted that the idea of Iran developing its own stealth fighter or UAV is highly unlikely.  This rudimentary mock-up serves as an excellent example of their thoughts.

During the parade and celebration held on April 18, President Ahmadinejad commented that Iran’s armed forces have such strength that its enemies will not even think of attacking the country.

Just one truly interesting development did come out of the event…

It appears that several canisters, *potentially* carrying Russian S-300s, may have made an appearance.  Hmm…

Egypt is NPT’ed (a.k.a. Not Particularly Thrill’ed)

Lest there are a few of you out there who have flirted with the notion that the so-called “Nuclear Spring” would cause the rest of the world, particularly the non-nuclear weapon states, to hold hands and sing “kumbaya”, Colum Lynch’s report from Monday’s UN General Assembly debate on Disarmament and World Security provides a chilly does of reality.    

Via Lynch:

“There is mistrust,” said Egypt’s U.N. ambassador, Maged A. Abdelaziz, who is serving as chairman of the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement. Speaking before the General Assembly debate entitled “Disarmament and World Security,” the Egyptian envoy said the five major nuclear powers are seeking to impose new demands on non-nuclear powers while failing to fully live up to their own disarmament obligations, and permitting a special group of nations — India, Israel, and Pakistan — a free pass to produce nuclear weapons, without having to abide by the obligations of signatories to the NPT. “States outside the treaty are reaping the benefits of the treaty,” he said.

…

The Egyptian diplomat outlined the NAM’s opposition to a series of Western-backed initiatives, including a proposal to punish countries that withdraw from the NPT and a plan to establish a U.N. fuel bank to supply nuclear non-nuclear states. In addition, he said NAM had “serious concerns” about U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887, promoted last September by Obama, which strengthens the 15-nation body’s authority to confront states that fail to comply with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. “We are not as non-nuclear states going to accept that each time there is progress in disarmament that we have to take more obligations on our side,” said Abdelaziz. [emphasis mine].

I suspect that those who actually believe that the NPT Review Conference will be a cakewalk for the U.S. meet in a very small room.  But this does not mean that the Conference is doomed to failure.  Nor is it to say that New START, the NPR, and the Nuclear Security Summit haven’t strengthened the U.S. case that it is revitalizing its commitment to its obligations under the NPT…

Rather, my sense is that Egypt and other NAM states are laying down a marker.  They want to signal that while the actions taken by the U.S. and Russia in recent weeks are welcome, they do not equal disarmament, and as Daryl notes, they certainly do not render null and void the obligations the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states made at previous review conferences.

Three things in particular stood out to me about Ambassador Abdelaziz’s remarks.  First, the issue of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East will once again be a point of contention.

Second, Abdelaziz’s reference to states outside the treaty reaping the benefits of the treaty suggests to me that the U.S.-India nuclear deal could be a much bigger issue at this review conference than some people think.

Finally, while stockpile reductions are important, non-nuclear weapon states certainly do not see them as a panacea.  As Deepti Choubey pointed out in her excellent 2008 study on the attainability of new nuclear bargains,

The lesson from this exchange is that further stockpile reductions alone will not rehabilitate the U.S.’s reputation or provide it with enough leverage to gain more support for its nonproliferation agenda. “The United States would get more credit if it linked its actions to its commitments,” observed one UN official.

The world’s reaction to the Nuclear Posture Review is likely to be especially important in this regard.  These reactions are still coming in.  On Wednesday the Carnegie Endowment hosted an event on international perspectives on the NPR that I was unable to attend, but I look forward to scouring the transcripts to see what came out of the discussion.

In any event, it looks like Ambassador Susan Burk and her team are going to have their work cut out for them in New York come May.

French Nuclear Weapons Policy and Black Swans

Last week, President Sarkozy said in a CBS television interview that France would never give up its nuclear weapons unilaterally because they continue to ‘underpin’ France’s security in a ‘dangerous’ world.  He argued that his nation of 65 million inhabitants’ has ‘fewer conventional weapons than the US, than Russia, than China’.  Although Sarkozy was keen to mention the fact that France has renounced nuclear testing and reduced its nuclear arsenal by one third, he added that he would be ‘jeopardizing’ the security of his country if any further reductions were made.  Since his comments were picked up by a large number of news organizations, one might have initially thought there was something unique about Sarkozy’s position, but to the few French nuclear watchers out there, all of this no doubt sounded like old news…

From Sarkozy’s comments it is evident that French thinking remains wedded to the idea that nuclear weapons make a nation ‘free and independent’.  It’s an idea that has long driven France’s nuclear weapons program, visible in statements by leaders such as Charles De Gaulle, Lionel Jospin, and Jacques Chirac.  France’s defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany in World War II, their subsequent inability to overcome Viet Minh forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (thus ending French-Indochina, a.k.a.Vietnam), and the Sueze Canal crisis and subsequent rift with the U.S., all undoubtedly sowed the seeds of France’s appetite to develop an independent ‘life-insurance policy’ to guarantee its vital interests at home and abroad.   But since then, with the era of decolonization, the creation of the European Union, and France’s reentry into NATO, the rationale for the French nuclear deterrent has essentially evaporated.

France relied on a triad of air, land and sea based nuclear weapons for its deterrence until 1996, when President Chirac announced the retirement of France’s land based missile facilities.  At the same time, France contradicted this positive step towards disarmament by conducting a series of nuclear tests at the Mururoa Atoll and injecting significant resources into modernizing its nuclear weapons.

Similarly, when Sarkozy stated in April 2008 that France would reduce its nuclear arsenal to 300 warheads, it coincided with the inauguration of the first of France’s new ‘Triumphant’ class nuclear submarines and efforts to perfect the new M51 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile.  And despite that reduction, France still remains the third largest nuclear power – surpassing even China, a country with a population some 21 times bigger.  Which raises the question: how does France’s large and modern nuclear arsenal contribute to its ‘independence’?

France’s recent White Paper on Defense and National Security states that the ‘sole purpose’ of nuclear weapons is to ‘prevent [likely meaning deter] any State-originating aggression against the vital interests of the nation’ (although there are some questions regarding the accuracy of this official translation).   In this context, the section on ‘new security parameters’ implies that French nuclear weapons might potentially have a role in responding to future threats such as the ‘the emergence of new weapons’, ‘cyber warfare’, ‘the offensive use of outerspace’, and even “black swan” events (yes, see page 5!).   Given the absence of such threats today, France seems to reason that since it already has nuclear weapons, it might as well keep them as a hedge against future uncertainty.

Looking back, nuclear weapons have so far been useless for France – both in defending vital interests and enabling it to engage in overseas conflicts.  Several low level interventions in Africa, a few contributions to multinational forces in international conflicts, and a stabilization force sent to Haiti – that’s pretty much it for French military intervention over the past fifty years.

Recently Sarkozy pointed to Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs to suggest that ‘the future of Europe is at stake’, but it is hard to understand why this actually might be the case.  Indeed, to think that Iran would ever be developing these programs with Europe primarily in mind seems an absurd and egotistical notion.  Beyond being a key trading partner for Iran, Europe also has vast conventional superiority, is increasingly interconnected (and thus less practical to target), and contains many countries that profit from NATO’s alliance structure.  In fact, as long as France remains a member of a nuclear armed NATO, then there seems literally no justification for Paris to possess its own independent nuclear deterrent.

Of all the countries today with nuclear weapons, France is arguably facing the fewest threats, and as a result of increased European integration, exists in one of the most stable regions of the world.  In this context, if France still thinks it needs its nuclear weapons to keep it ‘free and independent’, then it’s very hard to imagine any circumstances under which it will ever feel comfortable without them.  Realistically, beyond using nuclear weapons to clutch on to an increasingly fading notion of ‘great power’ status, it seems that France has as much justification to own nuclear weapons as its neighbor Switzerland would have.