The IAEA defines a “significant quantity” of fissile material, or the amount needed to produce one functioning bomb, as 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of 90 percent highly enriched uranium. 25 kg of weapons grade uranium, however, does not a deliverable arsenal make.

I don’t pretend to be a physicist, not even close, but this much I know: Any attempt to have a serious conversation about Iran’s nuclear program would be tainted if I were not aware of the most basic principles behind the construction and delivery of a nuclear weapon.

Enter the United States Senate…

Yesterday, a disturbing exchange took place between Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, and the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

During his testimony, Army Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess reported that Iran could potentially produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb within one year. This led a number of SASC committee members to assume that Iran could have a deliverable weapon within one year. Were it not for Committee Chair Sen. Carl Levin, they may have held on to that assumption. Apparently wise to the fact that there are a few more steps involved in the process, Levin asked for further clarification…

In terms of the highly enriched uranium, your answer is clear… it would take a year or more… Now, you indicated in terms of putting together a weapon, of assembling a weapon, that’s a different issue. We need in open session to learn something about that since intelligence officials apparently are indicating that’s something more than a year… Otherwise, the headline tomorrow is, ‘Iran could get a weapon in a year’… Should they make a decision today to put together a weapon, we know the uranium piece of it; tell us about the other piece what you can in open session.

Gen. Cartwright responded that it would take “another two to three, potentially out to five years to move from the idea of having the material to… something that can actually create a detonation, an explosion that would be considered a nuclear weapon.” Cartwright went on to clarify for Levin that, should the enrichment of uranium and the development of a weapon take place simultaneously, “experience says that it’s gonna take you three to five years.”

At that, Sen. John McCain expressed his shock:

You’re saying – to this committee – that before the Iranians would have a deliverable (also wrong in the context, but let’s not nitpick, yet) nuclear weapon it could be as long as five years? … That is obviously a very critical point in this entire situation. If it’s two to three to five years, then that’s one thing. If it’s one year, then that’s another… Every report I’ve seen is a year to eighteen months, that’s why I’m somewhat astonished to hear you say it could be two to three to five years. Now [getting flustered] this doesn’t clarify it to me.

Levin specifically asked again, receiving the same clarification, and then went on to tack on one more step: that ‘deliverable’ part McCain referred to earlier:

“Now on the missile piece, what can you tell us about that?”

Cartwright responded, “…again, not knowing exactly where they are, their capabilities… it would still take them another three years. That does not necessarily mean it would be sequential.”

So, at the end of all this (further clarifications not included) our minimum assumption becomes three to five years. Not one, not two, three to five.

This misperception of imminent danger becomes even more disturbing when we note that McCain opened the same Senate hearing by stating that Iran will get the bomb unless the United States begins to act more boldly…

I think “pull the trigger” may have been the gist of his statement.

Back in February I blogged about the ongoing delays surrounding the delivery of Russia’s S-300 PMU-1 air defense system to Iran.  At the time, Russia cited technical problems as being the cause of the delay whilst simultaneously promising Tehran that they would still honor the sale.  But according to a new story from Russian media outlet RIA Novosti, it seems that the Iranians are still no closer to getting their hands on the advanced air defense system.  This time the delay has been explained as being caused by ongoing ‘talks’, again with the Russian caveat that ‘contracts have been signed, and they are being implemented’.

Since the S-300 contract was signed in December 2005, it would seem that the only talks that could be delaying delivery are those not involving the Iranians.  As Richard Weitz recently pointed out, in light of the ongoing nuclear impasse, its likely that Israel and the U.S are exerting significant diplomatic pressure on Moscow to delay delivery for as long as possible.  Iran’s hope that ‘Russian officials [are not] swayed by political pressure from other countries’ reflects their frustration at what appears to be the continuing success of Israeli and American efforts.  But as Weitz suggests, these efforts ‘will matter little if China chooses to sell them its HQ-9 surface-to-air missile, which is characterized as “a not-so-bad Russian S-300 for less money.”’  Which is where things get interesting…

Just three days ago it was reported that Russia had shipped China 15 batteries of the S-300 missile defense system.  According to a Russian language source (translated using Babelfish) these missiles were of the advanced PMU-2 variant, and were ordered in August 2007. This Interfaks source suggests the Chinese ordered 15 battalions, not the 15 batteries reported by RIA Novosti, which would be a far larger order.

China’s purchase of the S-300 system is nothing new, having ordered an initial batch of the PMU-1 variant back in 1992.  However, following substantial orders in the early 90s, Russia gave China clearance to begin manufacturing their own clone of the S-300 PMU1 in 1995, which Beijing called the Hongqi-10 (HQ-10).  China then built upon this technology and since 2002, has been producing its very own longer-range modification – the HQ-15.  But given that the HQ-15s 200 km extended range now matches that of the S-300 PMU2, why did China feel the need to order 15 battalions / batteries from Russia in 2007?

One explanation could be that despite its similar range, the HQ-15 might not yet be on par with the PMU-2 system in other technical areas.  As such, the Chinese may have invested in the PMU-2’s in order to reverse engineer them, with the aim of refining their own HQ-15 technology.  But given the already close nature of the two systems, might it not have made more sense and been cheaper for the Chinese to simply invest in one or two ‘evaluation’ systems to work from, instead of the reported fifteen batteries / battalions?  Perhaps, but given China’s ample fiscal resources it’s also possible that they sought to field a large network of PMU-2s as soon as possible, supplementing them with refined HQ-15’s as and when possible.  

If this theory is true, and assuming these PMU-2s are designed to replace older (but still relatively modern) surface to air missile systems such as the HQ-9 / HQ-10 or Russian made S-300 PMU-1s, it’s possible that China may now have fifteen spare air defense systems.  Keeping in mind that Iran only ordered five systems from Russia, and that Tehran has recently alluded to the possibility of buying alternatives from the Chinese, Beijing’s spare capacity could serve as the basis of a China-Iran deal if and when it were to come up.

Alternatively, although far less likely, is that China ordered some of these PMU-2s directly on behalf of Iran, and may transfer them either overtly or clandestinely at a future date.

Even if neither of these theories is true, the bottom line is that the quick order-to-delivery time of China’s PMU-2’s illustrates that Russia can and will sell its defense systems promptly if it wishes.  Which is why Iran’s frustration with Russia is likely only growing.

After months of negotiations, China has agreed to, er, negotiate.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner announced on Wednesday that China would join the United States, Britain, Russia, France, and Germany for talks on a fourth round of U.N. sanctions against Iran.

“China will participate in a meeting tomorrow (Thursday) in New York,” said Kouchner, “Whether they will talk about the text, whether it’s just to respect formalities, I don’t know.”

The U.S. and others are hoping to speed up an agreement by sending P5+1 ambassadors directly to the United Nations. In the past, political directors from the six countries have agreed on an outline before negotiations moved to the U.N. to hammer out the final text.

But the buck doesn’t stop there.

Once the six countries agree on a text, it must then be presented to the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council for further negotiations. Several, including Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon, have already indicated their opposition to sanctions.

Further, both China and Russia have been historically difficult when negotiating Iran sanctions. Just yesterday, President Medvedev reportedly told President Obama in Prague that there remain limits to his country’s support:

“Let me put it straightforward,” Medvedev said, “I have outlined our limits for such sanctions, our understanding of these sanctions.”

China’s opposition has been loud and ongoing, but appears to be waning in recent weeks, and while China does ultimately hold veto power on the Security Council, many analysts agree that its opposition will result in a watered down resolution, rather than none at all.

Travis fired up an op-ed in today’s Washington Times responding to some of the hysterical whining on the right that the NPR and the Prague Treaty will compromise the U.S. nuclear deterrent.  Note to Travis: Mad props on convincing the Times to let…