by Kingston Reif Published in DoD Buzz on March 16, 2010 Article summary below. In their recent commentary on DoD Buzz (“Will START Talks Go MAD,”), the Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring and Helle Dale recycle a snake oil sales pitch that first emerged at the dawn of the Atomic Age. The illusion is that the […]
Iran’s Green Movement May be Carbo-Loading Right About Now
I ran off to the Bahamas for a week and all hell broke loose!
… okay, well, not exactly (unless you count SnOMG).
There was some bad news. Iran will move forward with its plans to produce 20 percent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), and has already produced its first “consignment” of the material. At the least, this likely means an end to the already-doomed fuel swap and a big push for further sanctions, “smart” or not.
February 11, though, also marked a great disappointment for Iran’s Green Movement, which had designed what they called a “Trojan Horse” strategy in advance. In the culmination of their months of protest, backers of opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi planned to attend the official regime-backed rally commemorating the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, assemble in front of the cameras of the foreign news media, and denounce the brutality of the Iranian government for the entire world to see.
Rather, President Ahmadinejad stood in Azadi Square and informed the public, once again, that the Islamic Republic had become a “nuclear state.” I’m not sure how many times this official “announcement” can be made with the same bone-chilling affect on the media, but for now it does still seem to be working.
It has certainly sent a chill down the spine of those supporting the Iranian opposition. Foreign Policy reports that Mohammad Sadeghi, who administers Mousavi’s official Facebook page, admits now “that he doesn’t know what comes next” and is “at a loss.”
Since the protest movement had not previously planned its activities beyond February 11, they must now take a step back to re-evaluate, or fade into obscurity.
As Cameron Abadi notes, “Cynicism and despair may be the order of the day among Iranian activists. They would do well, though, to remember that social movements on this scale are not a sprint, but a marathon.”
Ahmadinejad Declares Iran a Nuclear State on Anniversary of Islamic Revolution
Less than a week after declaring to the international community that Iran was increasing its uranium enrichment from 3.5 to 20 percent, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that the efforts were successful and that Iran should be considered among the nuclear countries of the world.
Making his declaration at an event in Azadi Square in Tehran to commemorate the thirty-first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad insisted that the uranium enriched to 20% was for peaceful purposes. “The Iranian nation is brave enough that if one day we wanted to build nuclear bombs, we would announce it publicly without being afraid of you,” he told the crowd assembled for the observation of the anniversary.
Uranium enriched to 20% U235 is considered highly enriched uranium that could be further enriched with relative ease to make a nuclear weapon. Iran claims that the enriched uranium will be used in a research reactor to produce medical isotopes. Tehran backed away from an earlier international offer to further enrich its low-enriched uranium outside the country, raising concerns that Iran’s intentions may not be as benign as it is making them out to be…
There is consensus among nuclear experts that, while Iran does have the capacity to enrich uranium to 20%, the amount that could have been produced by the time of Ahmadinejad’s announcement is negligible. The International Atomic Energy Commission suggested that Iran’s increased enrichment efforts are only modest to this point, though David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security suggested that at the rate Iran plans to produce 20%-HEU, it may have enough HEU in three years to further enrich enough material for one nuclear weapon.
The announcement of Iran’s intention to increase the level of uranium enrichment, and the later claims of success, was met with an announcement by the United States Treasury Department of further “smart sanctions” against a handful of Iranian construction companies affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard allegedly involved in weapons production and trade.
There is also talk of a fourth round of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. Russia — which has historically been less enthusiastic about sanctions than the United States, the United Kingdom, and France — has indicated that they might support further sanctions. The international community seems increasingly dubious of Iran’s denial of intent to develop a nuclear bomb. However, China remains reluctant to impose new sanctions and may thwart attempts by the UN Security Council to tighten the economic sanctions imposed on Iran.
In light of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s sudden announcement of scaling up mere days before the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, one cannot help but wonder if Ahmadinejad’s triumphant proclamation was an attempt to flex muscle to an increasingly vocal and active opposition and an international community sympathetic to the anti-government activists and increasingly distrustful of the aims of Iran’s nuclear program.
All steps adopted by the United States and the international community should be careful to avoid undermining the pro-democracy opposition movement in Iran. The international community should continue strong and active diplomatic engagement with Iran, and impose sanctions only so long as they are targeted and designed to minimize the burden on the civilian population. Calls for aggression and military intervention should be turned aside; the consequences of such escalation on both the stability and security of the region and on the civilian population would be catastrophic.
At the same time, the international community must continue to implore Iran to be more transparent with the IAEA about its intentions and grant it greater access to suspected nuclear-related information and facilities. Iran should know that its plans to increase enrichment will only increase concerns over its nuclear program, especially since it rejected an earlier international offer to further enrich its low-enriched uranium in France and Russia.
Patience, careful monitoring and involvement by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and persistent diplomatic engagement by Western powers will not guarantee success but is the only sensible option to try to block Iran’s nuclear weapons plans.
Jon Stewart: "The problem seems to be the weapon."
Long-time readers of NoH know that Jon Stewart has been a big fan of ours for some time.
Last week Stewart once again sported his nuke policy wonk credentials in an interview with Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly. Below is a brief excerpt from the exchange on nukes, which occurred in the context of O’Reilly vetting Stewart for a hypothetical O’Reilly-Stewart ’12 ticket. A transcript of the full conversation can be read here. Or watch it beginning at the 1:22 mark of the embedded video.
O’REILLY: All right, let’s go to Iran. If you’re my VP, I’m going to have to put you in charge of very delicate negotiations. Now Iran’s building, you know, nuclear weapons over there. And if they get them, they might give them to some guy named Ahmed, who might take then to them Cleveland and blow everything up. So what are we going to do with that?
STEWART: Well, doesn’t Pakistan have a nuclear weapon?
O’REILLY: Yes, they do.
STEWART: Well, couldn’t they give it to somebody?
O’REILLY: I don’t know. I don’t think…
STEWART: Doesn’t Russia have nuclear weapons?
O’REILLY: Russia does.
STEWART: Couldn’t they give it to somebody?
O’REILLY: They could.
STEWART: The problem isn’t the country that gets them. The problem seems to be the weapon.” [emphasis mine.]
More juvenile behavior from Pyongyang?
The DPRK on Sunday announced five new ‘no sail zones’ on both its east and west coast, raising concerns in the South that Pyonyang may be gearing up for more short-range ballistic missile tests.
North Korea’s last round of short-range missile launches in October were passed off by many observers as evidence of Pyonyang’s ‘two-track’ strategy of asserting strength whilst trying to bring the Obama administration back to the negotiating table on the nuclear issue. So was last week’s artillery barrage near the ROK border. References to bargaining chips, double standards and even ‘the juvenile behavior of a teenager’ continue to pepper analysis of most North Korean belligerency. As North-South relations warm with talk of a possible summit between Kim Jong-Il and President Lee Myung-bak, any tests in the next few days will no doubt also be explained in similar terms. However, should we accept this conventional wisdom…
Whilst North Korea is mainly known for its SCUD-derivative Hwasong, Rodong and Taepodong series of ballistic missiles, its October 2009 tests involved suspected KN-02 missile technology. Like the rest of the North Korean missile program, the KN-02 is based on old Soviet technology (in this case the reverse engineered 9K79 Tochka provided to North Korea by Syria in 1996). However, what separates the the KN-02 from the rest of the North’s missile arsenal is that it uses solid-fuel, is more accurate than the notoriously inaccurate SCUD derivatives, and is road mobile. The KN-02 allegedly also flies a cruise missile profile, making it difficult for PATRIOT missile batteries located in South Korea to intercept. If fired from close enough to the DMZ, it could target U.S. military installations in the ROK.
Given the success of previous KN-02 tests, it is somewhat notable that all five of last October’s tests were considered failures. Whilst the North is well known for shortcomings in its long-range missile program, it is regarded as being relatively accomplished in the area of short- and medium-range missile design. Consequently, could the October tests have been experimental tests of enhanced KN-02 technology?
Bruce Bennett of RAND suggests that “North Korea may well be testing some different fuel, engine, or other missile variations, perhaps preparing to apply the KN-02 technology to a larger missile.’ Bennett notes that the missiles flew further, or at least in a manner which suggested they had a longer range (130km – 160km), than previously expected. Interestingly, these tests also came just twenty days after Iran’s very own short range, solid-fuel missile tests. Was this just coincidence or evidence of another Iran-DPRK missile cooperation project?
If the failed October 2009 tests do represent Pyonyang’s attempt to further enhance its KN-02 technology, then it’s likely that any short-range launches in the next few days will involve the testing of more KN-02 derivatives. Given the last round of KN-02 tests received a somewhat muted diplomatic reaction, its possible that further tests might also get brushed off merely as attention grabbing behavior. Consequently Pyonyang could get away with enhancing its firepower without damaging its ever-improving relations with the South. The finished product may too become a hit on the export market; small enough to hide in a van and seemingly light enough to transport by small aircraft.
Given current food shortages it would seemingly take a lot more than just juvenile behavior for Pyonyang to ban its own fishing trawlers from so many of its waters. Further tests should therefore be understood as being motivated by more than just an attempt to gain international attention.
