North Korea’s Foreign Ministry yesterday released its ‘Memorandum on the N-Issue’.  The majority of material is nothing new.  For example the memo states that the North’s nuclear program was motivated primarily in response to the threat of the U.S., that its weapons have ‘drastically’ reduced the potential for a war, and that a peace treaty is required as a prerequisite to denuclearization.   But beyond these recognizable declarations, the document does delve into some new areas – all of which are seemingly interlinked by an underlying attempt to assert and legitimize North Korea’s international nuclear status…

Although North Korea’s desire to be formally recognized as a nuclear weapon state are nothing new, yesterday’s document expresses these desires in a new context.  The document suggests that North Korea’s external relations department have been keeping a close eye on the recent flurry of non-proliferation activity and news.  Consequently it seems that North Korea has concluded that jumping on the non-proliferation bandwagon is now the best way for it to assert its nuclear weapon status.

First – in the context of the recent Nuclear Security Summit, the Foreign Ministry’s call to ‘join the international efforts [on] nuclear non-proliferation and on nuclear material security’ can be read as an attempt to inject some credibility into the concept of North Korea as a responsible nuclear steward.  A country that should be regarded on an equal footing with others in the nuclear ‘club’, that could presumably even contribute expertise to the next Nuclear Security Summit, to be held in 2012 in South Korea.  

Next, it seems the mostly positive international reaction to the U.S Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has motivated North Korea to attempt to win similar praise.  Thus the articulation of the ‘mission of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK’, which describes Pyongyang’s arsenal largely in defensive terms, appears to be an overt attempt to emulate Washington’s mainly defensive posture.  By going down this path, North Korea may be hoping to win some hearts and minds and be seen in a similarly responsible and non-aggressive light – characteristics it realizes are required in order to get the recognition it so desires.  Note: It’s worth pointing out that Pyongyang didn’t catch up to Washington in one respect: It’s posture statement includes its own version of the so-called “Warsaw Pact” clause, which the U.S. NPR just ditched.

Finally, North Korea’s PR people seem to have also picked up on the momentum surrounding the forthcoming NPT Review Conference as a way of aligning their nuclear status with that of the five recognized nuclear states.  Indeed, part of the Memorandum is strongly reminiscent of the language and obligations found in Article VI of the NPT. Compare:

From North Korea’s posture memo: ‘[North Korea will] neither participate in [a] nuclear arms race nor produce more than it feels necessary… [And will] join the international nuclear disarmament efforts’
To:

And from Article VI of the NPT: ‘[Parties will pursue] effective measures relating to [the] cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.’

This similar choice of language attempts to paint North Korea as an advocate for disarmament and as a responsible nuclear steward – again, no matter how incredible that might sound to some.

In short, it appears the objective of this Memorandum is to present North Korea’s nuclear weapon status to the rest of the world as an irrefutable and justifiable fact, using the language and rationales traditionally used by the other nuclear weapon states (apart from Israel).   Just like them, North Korea is now saying that it will keep nuclear weapons until ‘they are eliminated from the peninsula and the rest of the world’.  You could say imitation is the best form of flattery.

Chairman Kent Conrad announced the passage of his fiscal 2011 budget resolution by the Senate Budget Committee today on a party line vote of 12 to 10.  The document is a nonbinding framework that doesn’t have to be signed into law by the president, but provides a strong indication of the budget road ahead.

Proposals include a $4 billion cut of President Obama’s discretionary spending request, as well as a freeze of non-security discretionary spending for three years.  

No surprises here – I’m sure we can all think of a few things that might be cut from the President’s request, and since it does make up over half of discretionary spending, it would be prudent to start with defense, right?  Not according to Conrad.

The Chairman’s Mark finds its entire $4 billion cut in the budget for International Affairs, a move that, according to the document, is “strong on national defense” – meaning weak on development and diplomacy?  

Also unexplained is a change to the reporting of discretionary spending.  Unlike previous years, where spending was broken into Defense and Non-Defense, this resolution breaks spending into Security and Non-Security, providing lines for Defense, International Affairs, Veterans and the Department of Homeland Security.  This may seem like a small change, but could be highly misleading.  

On one hand, expanded reporting may simply provide a more detailed breakdown of cuts, separating those programs that are exempt from the spending freeze from those that are not.  Unfortunately, this simple breakdown also implies that the majority of cuts Senate Democrats plan to propose would come from “security” initiatives.  Previously, Conrad’s $4 billion cut would have been listed under Non-Defense.  

In reality, the only portion of the President’s fiscal 2011 budget increase for International Affairs that is left intact is funding for what one might call security:

The Chairman’s Mark, therefore, preserves the increase requested due to our current wars, as well as the supplemental funding. Additionally, the Chairman’s Mark also funds an increase of $1.2 billion for our nation’s allies, including Israel, as part of the Middle East peace process… Given our severely constrained fiscal environment, the Chairman’s Mark focuses on those capabilities crucial to our current wars and the Middle East and increases international affairs funding to $54.8 billion for 2011.

As a result, proposed cuts will likely come from programs related to the things I listed above, development and diplomacy.  

The IAEA defines a “significant quantity” of fissile material, or the amount needed to produce one functioning bomb, as 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of 90 percent highly enriched uranium. 25 kg of weapons grade uranium, however, does not a deliverable arsenal make.

I don’t pretend to be a physicist, not even close, but this much I know: Any attempt to have a serious conversation about Iran’s nuclear program would be tainted if I were not aware of the most basic principles behind the construction and delivery of a nuclear weapon.

Enter the United States Senate…

Yesterday, a disturbing exchange took place between Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, and the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

During his testimony, Army Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess reported that Iran could potentially produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb within one year. This led a number of SASC committee members to assume that Iran could have a deliverable weapon within one year. Were it not for Committee Chair Sen. Carl Levin, they may have held on to that assumption. Apparently wise to the fact that there are a few more steps involved in the process, Levin asked for further clarification…

In terms of the highly enriched uranium, your answer is clear… it would take a year or more… Now, you indicated in terms of putting together a weapon, of assembling a weapon, that’s a different issue. We need in open session to learn something about that since intelligence officials apparently are indicating that’s something more than a year… Otherwise, the headline tomorrow is, ‘Iran could get a weapon in a year’… Should they make a decision today to put together a weapon, we know the uranium piece of it; tell us about the other piece what you can in open session.

Gen. Cartwright responded that it would take “another two to three, potentially out to five years to move from the idea of having the material to… something that can actually create a detonation, an explosion that would be considered a nuclear weapon.” Cartwright went on to clarify for Levin that, should the enrichment of uranium and the development of a weapon take place simultaneously, “experience says that it’s gonna take you three to five years.”

At that, Sen. John McCain expressed his shock:

You’re saying – to this committee – that before the Iranians would have a deliverable (also wrong in the context, but let’s not nitpick, yet) nuclear weapon it could be as long as five years? … That is obviously a very critical point in this entire situation. If it’s two to three to five years, then that’s one thing. If it’s one year, then that’s another… Every report I’ve seen is a year to eighteen months, that’s why I’m somewhat astonished to hear you say it could be two to three to five years. Now [getting flustered] this doesn’t clarify it to me.

Levin specifically asked again, receiving the same clarification, and then went on to tack on one more step: that ‘deliverable’ part McCain referred to earlier:

“Now on the missile piece, what can you tell us about that?”

Cartwright responded, “…again, not knowing exactly where they are, their capabilities… it would still take them another three years. That does not necessarily mean it would be sequential.”

So, at the end of all this (further clarifications not included) our minimum assumption becomes three to five years. Not one, not two, three to five.

This misperception of imminent danger becomes even more disturbing when we note that McCain opened the same Senate hearing by stating that Iran will get the bomb unless the United States begins to act more boldly…

I think “pull the trigger” may have been the gist of his statement.