Despite signing a contract with Iran for five batteries of the S-300PMU1 missile defense system back in December 2005, Russia continues to put off delivery of the system to Tehran.  The latest news from Moscow alleges that the current delay is due to ‘technical’ problems – a rather bizarre excuse given that the S-300 has been functioning quite well since 1979.  Perhaps this is why Almaz-Antey (the company that builds the S-300) told Interfax news that “there are no technical problems with the S-300 systems. This is a political issue.”  

With Russia contractually obligated to deliver the system (it already received payment from Tehran), it’s interesting to speculate about the reasons for the delay…

The S-300 is one of the most advanced surface-to-air missile systems in the world.  Road mobile, it can be set up in just five minutes.  It is capable of engaging up to six targets simultaneously and can lock targets up to 90 km away, at altitudes ranging from 25 – 30,000 meters, and at air speeds of up to 1,150 meters per second.  It can even engage short-range ballistic missiles within ranges of up to 35 kilometers.

By installing S-300 missile batteries close to its nuclear facilities, Iran could make it a lot harder for Israel to successfully destroy Iran’s nuclear program from the air. Naturally, Israel is vehemently opposed to the S-300 deal, as illustrated by Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow last week where he attempted to scupper things for Tehran.  

Although Israel might not ultimately get its way, its concerns have resonance with the Russians.  Indeed, Russia has close, albeit complex, ties with Israel.  For example, Israel froze arms sales to Georgia in 2008, though some Russia officials allege that such sales have resumed.  Russia also benefited from a 2009 deal to acquire advanced Israeli UAV’s.  At the same time, Russia also wants to maintain cordial political and economic ties with Iran, especially as the two countries increase cooperation in the energy sector.  

Given Russia’s close relations with both Iran and Israel, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that Moscow has delayed delivery of the S-300 system for so long.  Eager to avoid rocking the boat, Russia may continue to hold off for the foreseeable future.

Other factors could also be behind Russia’s hesitance to deliver the system to Iran.  

First, Israel has warned that if S-300 batteries are installed in Iran, it could ‘neutralize’ them using an ‘electronic warfare device’ prior to an air strike.  Such a move, if successful, would be a significant blow for both Russian national security and the lucrative S-300 export market.    

Similarly, Russia is also likely aware that Israel as expressed interest in purchasing the U.S. F-35 joint strike fighter.  Touted as being the answer to the S-300, Russia is unlikely to want its highly regarded defense system proven ineffective by top-shelf U.S military hardware such as the F-35.

As its ability to credibly explain further delays reduces with time, might Moscow eventually decide to provide the batteries covertly?  Such a move would be greatly facilitated by the large common border Russia shares with Iran and the mobile nature of the S-300 system.  

And in light of Iran’s recent announcement that it is now developing an air defense system that it claims will have “the capabilities of the Russian S-300, or even more,” Iran could accept a covert Russian transfer of S-300 batteries and plausibly explain it as being its own, indigenously developed alternative to the S-300.  Still, such a move on Russia’s part would come with great risks.

If Russia does cancel the S-300 contract, and assuming Iran is not capable of designing its own replacement, Tehran may instead look to China’s HQ-9 system – an S-300 clone.  Given China’s recent moves to prevent further sanctions against Iran, it is unlikely that they will be as sensitive to Israeli pressures as Russia.

While many people were rightly upset over a  recent piece in The Cable by Josh Rogin entitled “‘New START” dead on arrival?” they may have overlooked some very important words by Arizona Senator John Kyl.

Kyl is the bête noire of those promoting a new nuclear reductions treaty and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

He has sent a series of missives along with many of his colleagues raising issues such as nuclear weapons modernization and missile defense. He has also delivered a number of speeches on the same topics.

As the British would say, he is constantly throwing a spanner into the works (i.e., monkey wrenches).  

But check out what Sen. Kyl said in the Rogin story:

If that is his gold standard, then he will get his wish — perhaps the gold, silver and bronze…

Defense Secretary Gates is one of the key architects of the Administration’s nuclear weapons policy as reflected in the recent Obama budget submission, the on-going Nuclear Posture Review and Vice President Biden’s recent Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal.

Just last week, Secretary Gates introduced the Vice President at his National Defense University speech explaining the Administration’s nuclear weapons policy.  

Also there was State Department Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright, National Nuclear Security Agency Administrator Thomas D’Agostino and other officials.

The message was clear: The Obama nuclear policies are the Obama-Biden-Gates-Cartwright-Tauscher-D’Agostino nuclear policies.

If Senator Kyl will only support New START if Gates is happy with the nuclear modernization program, then we have, in the immortal words of George Tenet, a slam dunk.

Kyl did not stop with that quote.

He went on to express  his concerns about Russian statements about missile defense.

But again, let’s look at the tape.

On nuclear modernization, he suggested it would be “very difficult for the Senate to
support” the new treaty unless Gates concerns have been answered.

On Russian assertions, he used milder words such “very troubling” and “very damaging.”

In no event did Senator Kyl say he would oppose the new treaty — unless Gates is not a happy man.

Kyl clearly will continue throwing spanners into the works.

But pay close attention to his words. He continues to stop short of outright opposition to New START.

With President Ahmadinijad last week boasting of the production of Iran’s first batch of highly enriched uranium and its “capability to enrich at over 20 percent and at over 80 percent,” the need to accurately account for and safeguard Iran’s nuclear material is of ever-pressing importance.  

Most observers agree that any weapons program in Iran is more likely to follow a clandestine path, since Tehran is unlikely to risk diverting materials from IAEA monitored facilities.  Yet just how satisfied can we be that Iran can’t actually misuse the stocks of uranium currently safeguarded by the IAEA?

Given the scope of the IAEA’s worldwide responsibilities, it must rely on remote nuclear monitoring equipment to ensure that the nuclear fuel under its watch is not diverted for military use.  Many people fail to realize that this system is not fool proof.  However, the steps required to fill in these gaps and strengthen the IAEA require additional resources that the international community has to date been unwilling to provide…  

In 2008, the Non-Proliferation Education Center’s Henry Sokolski pointed out that of the IAEA’s 1,200 remote inspection cameras, nearly 800 have no “near-real-time” feedback, and virtually none of those with live streams can be found in “countries of concern.”   Recordings from the “offline” cameras are instead collected manually once every 90 days by IAEA staff.  As such, the IAEA has just four opportunities per year to find out if materials it claims to be safeguarding have been diverted for weapons use.  

Worse still, notes Sokolski, is that in a review of these recordings, it was shown that between 1999 and 2005 there were twelve occasions when camera “blackouts” lasted for more than thirty hours.   The proliferation risks associated with camera “blackouts” in countries of concern is magnified by the fact that the IAEA may not find out about them for weeks at a time.   When viewed in the context of the extremely short time it took Iran to announce the completion of its first batch of 20% HEU, the potential for an Iranian nuclear weapons “break-out” scenario under full IAEA supervision is not beyond the realm of possibility.

Given the shortcomings detailed so far, it is clear that the IAEA’s capacity to monitor the Iranian nuclear program needs to be increased.  The Additional Protocol, which once in force would give the IAEA much greater access to suspected nuclear information and sites, is seen by many as a key part of the solution.  

However, research conducted by Dr. Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists shows how difficult it can be to accurately account for nuclear materials even in countries that have ratified the Additional Protocol.  In 1994 for example, 69 kg of plutonium was unaccounted for at the Tokai-mura fuel fabrication plant in Japan, and was found only after a lengthy and costly investigation.  More recently, a 2005 leak at the UK’s BNFL Sellafield facility (which led to an accumulation of deposits containing 19 tons of uranium and 190 kg of plutonium) was not discovered until eight months after it began – this despite BNFL’s claim that the plant possessed one of the most advanced monitoring systems in the world.  

Whilst these examples illustrate some of the difficulties associated with safeguarding nuclear materials – even under the auspices of the Additional Protocol – it is important to understand that these difficulties can be greatly minimized through improved safeguards processes, increased scrutiny, and more staff.  Likewise, the IAEA’s regular monitoring capacity can be bolstered significantly by implementing real-time surveillance technologies throughout all declared facilities.  Naturally though, these fixes come with significant costs for the IAEA.

Whilst the IAEA has taken on more and more responsibility in recent years, its activities have remained underfunded.  Hence it should be no surprise that there have been problems in monitoring nuclear activities worldwide.  2003 finally saw the end of a decade of zero budget growth for the agency.  However, increases since 2003 have been minimal, prompting Mohamed ElBaradei to state in 2007 that the “dichotomy between increased high priority activities and inadequate funding, if continued, will lead to the failure of critical IAEA functions.”

Few countries seem to have taken any notice.  In August 2009, the IAEA’s Board of Governors did vote for a rare budget increase for 2010, but this marked only a 5.4 percent increase (2.7 per cent in real terms) compared to the 2009 budget, falling well short of the 11 per cent sought by Mohamed ElBaradei at the time.  Of this, only $40 million is currently dedicated to global nuclear safety and security, roughly what NBC bosses are paying to secure the departure of Conan O’Brien from ‘The Tonight Show’

As more and more countries develop civilian nuclear power programs, the burden on the IAEA will continue to increase.  Currently the funding system is based on a UN formula that links a country’s GDP to its expected level of contribution.  Consequently, a state with an extensive nuclear industry can, at the moment, end up paying less than a state with little or no nuclear industry.  Whilst this system is supplemented by additional donations (for example, the Obama administration’s FY 2011 budget request includes a voluntary contribution to the IAEA of $79.5 million, an increase of nearly $15 million over what was requested last year), the IAEA should not be forced to rely on voluntary contributions for additional funding.  

Given the threats posed by the diversion or theft of highly enriched uranium and/or weapons-grade plutonium, it is essential that the global community take heed of the IAEA’s budget more seriously.  That it is deemed as worthy an investment as getting rid of Conan O’Brien is not a laughing matter!

In the wake of the release of the Obama administration’s FY 2011 budget request, which includes a ten percent increase in funding to maintain our nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure, Greg Mello took to the online pages of the Bullet…