The Nuclear Posture Review seems to have been on the mind of more than one reporter over the holidays.  Both Bryan Bender over at the Boston Globe and Paul Richter at the LA Times penned very strong articles on some of the fault lines within the ongoing Review.  However, each article contains a mixup/error that requires a correction and some further explanation…

First, Richter’s piece contains the following graf:

For instance, some U.S. submarines in the Pacific carry nuclear-tipped torpedoes, which, Ferguson said, many Japanese officials like for their possible deterrent effect against a growing Chinese navy. Because nuclear weapons provide such assurance to a key ally, some U.S. officials are reluctant to cut back on the capability.” [emphasis mine].

I’m not sure what is meant by “nuclear-tipped torpedoes” but the context of the paragraph suggests that the piece may be referring to the SLCM known as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM-N).  As Jeffrey noted last May, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States erroneously asserted that the TLAM-N is deployed on some U.S. Los Angeles-class attack submarines. In reality, as a result of President George H.W. Bush’s 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), the U.S. “cease[d] deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft during ‘normal circumstances’”.  We do however apparently retain the capability to redeploy TLAM-N on attack submarines if necessary.  

Bender’s suspect graf reads as follows:

But for war planners, they [submarines] also bring more bang for the buck. Under the terms of the proposed treaty with Russia, each submarine and its 24 Trident missiles would count as only one “delivery system,’’ unlike the land-based missiles, which each count toward the total allowed.”[emphasis mine].

Either Bender or his editors messed something up here.  I find it hard to believe that the Russians would agree to allow our entire strategic submarine force to count for only 12 (or 14 depending on whether the two U.S. subs in overhaul at any onetime are included) delivery vehicles.  Those 24 missile tubes certainly aren’t phantoms! As one colleague put it to me earlier today, if the Russians had agreed to count them as one delivery vehicle, then the U.S. could have easily agreed to the Russian-proposed limit of 500 delivery vehicles for the New START treaty!

It’s looking increasingly likely that the U.S. and Russia will be unable to sign a New START agreement until sometime early next year.  Of course, if the two sides manage to sign an accord  this weekend or early next week, I reserve the right…

Earlier today Iran tested an allegedly more advanced version of its solid-fueled Sejjil-2 medium range ballistic missile.  The missile has a similar range to that of the liquid-fueled Shahab-3 (i.e. approximately 2,000-2,500 kilometers) and could reach targets in Israel, Turkey, and portions of southeastern Europe.

In the wake of today’s test, it’s worth recalling that the Bush administration’s plan to deploy ten long-range ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland and an accompanying radar in the Czech Republic was not designed to deal with Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.  Click here for a nice map, courtesy of the BBC, demonstrating the limitations of the GBI-based system.      

In contrast, the Obama administration’s modified missile defense plan for Europe is specifically designed to counter the threats posed by Iranian short- and medium-range missiles such as the Sejiil-2.  The new approach will rely on “scores” of SM-3 interceptors, at first based on Aegis ship destroyers, which will be capable of defending more of Europe than the Bush administration’s plan. And the initial pieces of the system are slated to be deployed by 2011, some six or seven years before the Polish and Czech sites would have been completed.  As Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright stated in a September 17 press conference announcing the decision:

We built the original system on the idea of a rogue-nation threat: three to five missiles that could come from either North Korea or Iran. The reality is, we’re dealing with hundreds of missiles in the [intermediate-] and medium-range capabilities…. What you can do with an SM-3 in affordability and in deployment and dispersal is substantially greater for larger numbers of missiles than what we have with a ground-based interceptor.

In sum, if you’re inclined to view the Sejjil-2 as a major threat, it’s tough to argue that the Obama administration’s decision to pursue a new missile defense architecture for Europe was the incorrect one.

In his new book, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, Dr. Gregory Koblentz, a member of the Center’s Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, observes that “biological weapons are the least well understood of the WMD” and that “use of terms such as WMD and ‘chem-bio’ has hindered our understanding of the international security implications of biological weapons.”

Below are three concepts that illustrate the current challenge presented by biological weapons (BW)…

1.    “The dual use dilemma is absolute.”  – Kathryn Nixdorff in Verifying Treaty Compliance: Limiting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions

At an AAAS panel discussion last week, Senior Bio Advisor of the U.S. National Counterproliferation Center, Dr. Lawrence Kerr, explained that all life science research is dual-use by nature. The very same technologies, techniques, and studies designed to create pharmaceuticals, for instance, can be employed nefariously to manipulate biological agents (pathogens and toxins) and identify exploitable vulnerabilities in the human body.

Dr. Koblentz takes this concept a step further, arguing that the biological dilemma is more accurately described as “multiuse”:

In [Living Weapons], the term “multiuse” is used to highlight the distinct but overlapping applications of biotechnology in civilian, defensive, and offensive domains. The old distinction between military and civilian applications of biological and biotechnology has become more blurred in recent years as more civilian institutions become engaged in defensive research and military organizations become more interested in applying biotechnology in areas of energy, materials science, logistics, medicine, and electronics.

2.    “In the life sciences, proliferation is over.”  – Dr. Lawrence Kerr at AAAS panel discussion, 8 December 2009

Techniques and technologies in the most advanced biological fields are already spread across the globe and across populations. The life sciences’ immeasurable potential for legitimate and constructive use, the culturally entrenched value placed on improving human health worldwide, the aforementioned dual-use dilemma, and decreasing costs have made most biological materials and biotechnologies largely uncontainable. And from a global public health perspective, they should not be contained.

It is possible now for amateur biologists to genetically alter or synthesize pathogens out of their own closets. These at-home “biohackers” can “tinker with the building blocks of life in the comfort of their own homes” for a modest price.

Striking the proper balance between reaping the benefits of the life sciences and reducing the risks of technological abuse is extraordinarily tricky. Professor Barry Kellman of the International Security and Biopolicy Institute has called biothreat policy “the most multifaceted, multidimensional, nuanced undertaking in the entire security domain.”

3.    “What do you mean we can’t do this? We’re doing it now.”  –Dr. Raymond Zilinskas, quoting the scientific community’s response to an assessment of biotechnological capabilities

The biotechnology industry is moving at a revolutionary pace. Dr. Raymond Zilinskas, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, co-authored a 2002 report detailing the threat of bioterrorism. According to the Washington Post, the report noted that “some key biotechnologies would be achievable only three to four years from then.” However, by the time the final report was sent out for review by bench scientists, the report’s expert panel learned that some of those technologies had been developed. “It shows how fast the field is moving,” noted Dr. Zilinskas.

From altering biological agents at their most fundamental building blocks to “de novo” synthesis of preexisting or new microbes, the wonders of biotechnology often seem boundless. The risks presented by advances in biotechnology will increasingly demand attention in the future.

This summer, NOH’s Madeleine “MadFo” Foley called attention to rampant U.S. alarmism concerning the relationship between two men that never fail to raise hackles: Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  

Yesterday, Bret Stephens at the Wall Street Journal suggested that a new document, detailing an agreement “to cooperate in the field of nuclear technology,” may shed some light on the supposedly threatening Venezuela-Iran relationship. Stephens’ editorial, though, missed some key factors in the association…

Stephens concluded that “Forty-seven years ago, Americans woke up to the fact that a distant power could threaten us much closer to home. Perhaps it’s time Camelot 2.0 take note that we are now on course for a replay.” Iran is far from its stated objective of 10 additional nuclear facilities, let alone a deliverable nuclear weapon, so a comparison to the fully capable Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis is ridiculous. Moreover, Venezuela today is economically dependent on the United States, in contrast to Cuba in 1962, which had been under a partial commercial, economic, and financial embargo.  

Stephens’ Cold War analogy is fatally flawed, as most of the threat-hyping on this issue has been. Nonetheless, there are some factors to be aware of in the Iran-Venezuela relationship.

First, after many trade and investment agreements, diplomatic visits, mutual honors, and photo ops, the relationship between Iran and Venezuela is considerably stronger today than it was ten years ago.  

Second, the strengthened relationship has sparked concern about regional and global security. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control targeted the assets of two Hezbollah supporters living in Venezuela, one of whom was a Venezuelan diplomat. The influx of Hezbollah, increased weapons imports, and the porous borders of Central American countries have caused some observers to worry about terrorist infiltration. Furthermore, in May 2009 a secret Israeli government report obtained by the Associated Press implicated Venezuela and Bolivia in the sale of uranium to Iran. This was the first allegation that South America may be involved in the development of Iran’s nuclear program.  

Though the current relationship between Iran and Venezuela may be cause for measured (not Stephens-esque) concern, Venezuela is still dependent on the United States economically. The main destination for 53.9 percent of all of Venezuelan exports is the United States. The next highest destination, the Netherlands Antilles, receives only 8.8 percent. Venezuela still sells over half of its oil to the United States. This amounts to more than 1.5 million barrels per day. Further, a considerable portion of Venezuelan refining capacity is located in the United States, which gets less than 15 percent of its oil from Venezuela. This relationship is not likely to change in the near future. An oil embargo might hurt the United States, but it would cripple Venezuela.  

Since the United States holds this economic trump card, the relationship between Iran and Venezuela is unlikely to be more than a moderate irritation in the foreseeable future. In the effort to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the United States should see the “Tehran-Caracas Nuclear Axis” for what it is – a sideshow that distracts from the real security problems in the Middle East.