Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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That’s More Like It

In my post last week on the Kyl Amendment, I noted that the Obama administration needs to more forcefully make the affirmative case for the START follow-on treaty, with particular emphasis on (1) why a new arms control treaty with Russia will increases U.S. security and (2) rebutting arguments made by skeptics of the START follow-on process.

As if right on cue, newly-appointed Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher did just that in her remarks at the STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium on July 30 in Omaha, Nebraska.  I’ve excerpted her comments on START from her full remarks below the jump.  My only (minor) qualm is that I would have led with how the new treaty “will enhance our national security and provide for an effective deterrent.”  Instead, Tauscher begins by stating that the new treaty ” is the beginning of a new narrative for the post-Cold War generation that need not be paralyzed by the threat of nuclear war and it is a down payment for deeper reductions in the future.”  But overall it was an excellent case for the START follow-on treaty.

Update 8/6: John argues that while Tauscher’s remarks were effective in rebutting criticisms of the START follow-on process, they were largely silent on why nuclear reductions are important and would benefit U.S. security. I think that’s a fair point, though given that this was the first real effort on the part of a high-ranking administration official to make the case for the agreement, this was still a strong initial step.

Let me start by making the strongest case I can for the New START Treaty.

I believe the New START Treaty is the beginning of a new narrative for the post-Cold War generation that need not be paralyzed by the threat of nuclear war and it is a down payment for deeper reductions in the future.

We are fortunate to begin our work on the foundations already established by the Limited Test Ban, INF, SALT, START, and the Moscow Treaty as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Rose Gottemoeller and an interagency team are hard at work with their Russian counterparts drafting the New START treaty that will combine the predictability of START with the flexibility of the Moscow Treaty. In the recent Moscow Summit’s Joint Understanding, two separate limits are set out for delivery vehicles and their associated warheads. In case there is doubt, you can find it in paragraph four of the Joint Understanding. Both of these steps will enhance our national security and provide for an effective deterrent.

I want to take a minute to address some of the criticism that’s been directed at the New START treaty. Some say that the new treaty will not induce other countries to give up their weapons programs.

We are not so naïve as to believe that problem states will end their proliferation programs if the United States and Russia reduce our nuclear arsenals. But we are confident that progress in this area will reinforce the central role of the NPT and help us build support to sanction or engage states on favorable terms to us. Our collective ability to bring the weight of international pressure against proliferators would be undermined by a lack of effort towards disarmament.

Critics have also said that we are putting the New START treaty ahead of the Nuclear Posture Review. That is not the case. As many of you know, the Obama Administration tasked the NPR, as a first step, to develop a nuclear force structure and posture for use in the negotiations.

While the NPR’s work is still going on, it will inform the positions we take as we negotiate the New START treaty with Russia. The United States’ positions in the treaty negotiations are fully consistent with the nuclear policy strategy and force structure being developed in the NPR. I want to thank STRATCOM for its substantial contributions to this process.

Regardless of the numbers and force structure and strategy identified by the NPR, we need a robust nuclear infrastructure. We need to ensure that there is a safe and effective deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist without nuclear testing. I strongly support the critical role that extended deterrence has played in our national security policy. It must remain a central element of our national security policy.  We must be able to tell our allies, “We’ve got your back.” This is one of the key issues being addressed in the NPR.

The Obama administration and key stakeholders must address the serious need to bolster the human capital and infrastructure necessary to maintain a credible, safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile.  As our nuclear arsenal is reduced to its appropriate level, these capabilities will become even more critical. A loss of the skilled engineers, technicians, planners, and operators, increases the risks and uncertainties we could face in the years to come.

Because of the critical role a viable nuclear arsenal has in our deterrent strategy, I helped write sections of the Defense Authorization bill that are intended to help ensure a sustainable nuclear deterrent as long as we need it. It’s called the Stockpile Management Program. It’s right there in section 4204 of the bill. We were very specific that the program increase the reliability, safety, and security of the stockpile without having to test.

And we built a fence around the program. We said that any changes to the stockpile cannot create new weapons and should further decrease the likelihood of testing. This is going to survive in conference and the next hurdle is to make sure that Stockpile Management is properly funded.

I want to make one last point. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev agreed that missile defenses will not be part of these negotiations, even while recognizing that there is an inherent link between offenses and defenses, something first recognized by the Nixon administration in 1972. The New START Treaty is about offensive arms.

We have agreed to continue to discuss these issues separately with the Russian government. But we have made it clear, our missile defense plans in Europe are aimed at the burgeoning Iranian capability and are not directed at Russia. I’m a strong supporter of missile defense. I know they have the potential to protect against attacks by countries with ballistic missile arsenals, like North Korea and Iran.

So we will pursue programs that are operationally and cost effective. The problem is that if we build systems that don’t address near term threats or are not thoroughly tested, we’ll lose the support of the American people. That’s why, I often say, that I have worked to protect missile defense from its most ardent supporters.

Sandinista!

Recent rumors about Iran’s “close ties” with Latin America have caused Washington to shake in its alarmist boots. In January, Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of Iranian “subversive activity”  in the region. “The Iranians are building a huge embassy in Managua,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added in May. “And you can only imagine what that’s for.”

To date, there is still no sign of the embassy in Nicaragua despite Clinton’s breathless warning. But additional warnings have come from elsewhere.

In May, a secret Israeli government report was leaked that implicated Venezuela and Bolivia in the sale of uranium to Iran. Hugo Chavez has not found time in his weekly 12-hour broadcast “Alo Presidente” to refute the accusation. The Evo Morales camp in Bolivia denied it, though Morales did raise eyebrows after announcing a pending low-interest $280 million loan offer from Iran.

In July, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman visited Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Argentina to address Israeli concerns over uranium sales and terrorist activities throughout the continent. His concerns were not reciprocated in Brazil or Colombia. Brazilian President Lula said little about Iran’s program, noting only that he hoped for “every state to sign the NPT” and for the Middle East to be a region “free of nuclear weapons.”

Though it severely undercuts the international non-proliferation regime to play fast and loose with the nuclear fuel cycle, the NPT is not entirely proliferation-proof. It is an imperfect document that is only as strong as the collective will of its signatories. The NPT has been circumvented and ignored before. In 1980, France aided Iraq’s nuclear program by selling it a research reactor and 165 lbs of highly enriched uranium.

Many non-nuclear weapons states resent that they must accept far tougher restrictions on their civilian nuclear activities than the nuclear weapons states. Arguably, Venezuela and Bolivia are acting within the bounds of the treaty, and Iran is just cashing in on its sovereign right to pursue “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” as guaranteed in Article IV of the NPT.

Links between Iran and alienated, leftist South American regimes no doubt leave U.S. officials with images of Contras and coups dancing in their heads. Yet if the United States wants to maintain control over proliferation not curtailed by the NPT, it should address the root causes through sustained dialog with Iran and its alleged suppliers in both bilateral and multilateral settings. Ominous public warnings by American policymakers will do little to bring the truth to light or resolve the situation diplomatically.

More Fog on FOGBANK

FOGBANK just won’tgo away.  Writing in today’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus revisits the now well-known difficulties NNSA has had in reproducing the classified substance as part of the refurbishment of the W76 warhead.   According to Pincu…

U.S. and Russia Struggle with Chemical Weapons Convention Deadline

In the latest Arms Control Today, an interesting news piece examines U.S. and Russian obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which requires its 188 ratifying members to destroy their stockpiles of chemical agents and delivery vehicles by April 2012. While both the United States and Russia have made progress, it is unlikely at this juncture that either will meet the deadline.

Though not intentionally flouting an international agreement, the United States could face a diplomatic problem by not meeting its CWC deadline obligation.

Though unlikely, the United States could face sanctions and the stripping of voting rights in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the CWC’s monitoring and membership body. The United States should at the very least expect to face a blast of rhetoric, according to Jonathan Tucker at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Besides the CWC deadline, the United States also faces a 2017 deadline mandated by Congress. This is likely to be missed, too. The United States’ two remaining chemical weapons depots at Blue Grass, KY and Pueblo, CO are expected to have barely commenced destruction by 2017. Complete destruction of their stockpiles is even further off, with current estimates standing at 2020 and 2023, respectively.

Increased funding could help address the problem. The DOD’s Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program is in line to receive $550 million in fiscal year 2010, an increase of $5 million above the Pentagon’s request. This would be a total increase of almost a third from last year’s budget of $427 million. Global Security Newswire recently reported that the ACWA “could collect $1.2 billion in extra funding over several upcoming budgets.”

Russia’s situation poses a more serious challenge to the CWC. About 28,000 metric tons remain in its chemical stockpile, and there are concerns over Russian disposal methods. In some facilities, destruction of the stockpile has slowed after the first phase (when the toxic chemicals are drained from their munitions and neutralized but before the munitions casings and the remaining chemicals are incinerated). Until the weapons casings are destroyed, the risk exists that they could be appropriated and refilled.

Another risk lies in allowing standards to slide on what counts as disarmament. In order to meet the 2012 deadline, Russia already has negotiated with the OPCW to set modified procedures for disarmament that credit Russia short of full destruction. This half-step to chemical disarmament could provide a dangerous precedent in the nonproliferation regime. If a non-signatory country were to accede to the CWC, what would stop them from following Russia’s example and retaining munitions or chemical agents?

Do the Right Thing

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei addressed the holes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and called for international regulation of the nuclear fuel cycle in his July 19 op-ed in the Guardian. The article is a much-needed comprehensive articulation of where the world is going wrong on non-proliferation. Sadly, ElBaradei’s complaints will probably fall on deaf ears.

He says that the five nuclear weapons states undermine the NPT by not taking seriously their obligation to pursue disarmament. Other deficiencies in non-proliferation include lax export controls that don’t effectively safeguard against the shipment of materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons, along with gross underfunding of the IAEA. The international community has been coasting and some states have only been doing the bare minimum to prevent proliferation of non-peaceful nuclear technology.

Rogue states like North Korea and Iran create a new set of problems for the next IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. Amano takes office December 1, 2009 and will inherit the looming threat of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The jury is still out on whether enthusiasm for non-proliferation will be sufficient to fuel ElBaradei’s pet project: a global low enriched uranium bank. The bank is meant to replace domestic enrichment programs in non-nuclear weapon states in the long-term. The proposal is still a tough sell to developing nations who view such restrictive initiatives as impinging on their sovereign rights under the NPT.

The world is at a critical impasse where nuclear proliferation is concerned, given the recent explosion of countries seeking nuclear power and domestic enrichment programs. Hopefully, renewed U.S.-Russian commitment to nuclear weapons reductions will spur the rest of the international community to take their non-proliferation responsibilities seriously.