Just as Barack Obama finished eulogizing Chuck Hagel’s tenure as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State John Kerry came on the air from Vienna to announce more unfortunate news: the P5+1 negotiating team was unable to come to a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran before today’s deadline.

“In these last days in Vienna, we have made real and substantial progress, and we have seen new ideas surface. And that is why we are jointly…extending these talks for seven months with the very specific goal of finishing the political agreement within four months.”

Kerry, in a tone of determination unseen after the July extension, went on to underscore the success of the interim deal that was put in place last November, largely thanks to Iran’s compliance under the interim deal, and the strict inspections regime that was able to verify Iran’s cooperation.

Later that day, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif echoed much of the same, again citing “new ideas” that had come to the table in the last hours, disappointment for not obtaining a deal by the deadline, and an eagerness to close the remaining gaps to establish a political framework well before the March deadline.

As soon as it became clear what the officials in Vienna would be reporting, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation released a statement of its own to issue deserved praise for the negotiating teams, who have worked tirelessly and made real progress on solving this nuclear puzzle.

Policy Director Laicie Heeley gave specifics about what an extension will look like, including a continued freeze on Iran’s nuclear program. In his statement, Kerry also applauded the interim deal for scaling back the program, citing Iran’s “zero” stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

A year after Iran, the U.S., and their international partners sealed an interim deal, we must remind ourselves that we are already safer than we were one year ago.

“One year ago, Iran’s nuclear program was rushing full speed toward larger stockpiles, greater uranium enrichment capacity, the production of weapons-grade plutonium, and even shorter breakout time. Today, Iran has halted progress on its nuclear program and it has rolled it back for the first time in a decade,” said Kerry this morning.

Angela Canterbury, Executive Director of the Center, went on to express optimism that a deal be inked, else the opportunity will come for hardliners in both the US and Iran. Presumably, should parties end up walking away from the table with no agreement in place, hardliners in Iran could race toward a nuclear weapon and reverse the progress of the past year. And in the US, congressional hawks could race toward more crippling sanctions or–worse–toward war. “Congress must ask tough questions, said Canterbury, “but allow negotiators the space to press for a good deal, and then verify it to make us safer.”

We’ve seen diplomacy and cooperation, combined with monitoring and verification, bring Iran’s nuclear program to a standstill. Iran and the U.S. are still at the table, eager to finish these negotiations and come to a good deal.

Today was not a failure to come to an agreement. Rather, today was an indication of continued progress on difficult and complex negotiations. Today was an indication the success of these diplomatic efforts—preventing a nuclear-armed Iran—is closer than we realized, and that our diplomats are more eager than ever to get there.

Negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran are ongoing in Vienna, with reports on all sides, but trustworthy revelations on none. While onlookers wait with bated breath (there are at least a few of us out there) little information can be gleaned from various comings and goings of officials or word that might leak out. In fact, at this point, it’s more likely that leaks to the press have been devised by one side or the other to influence the outcome we expect to hear on or around the 24th.

So here we are. Pondering the implications of what could be a deal, a partial deal with an extension, an extension, a breakdown of epic proportions, or hey, some other unicorn… we’re tired and we really don’t know. (Though surely not as tired as the folks in Vienna.)

Here are a few key issues to think about while we wait for the real news to come…

Breakout

The Associated Press reports that Iran may now be willing to come down to 8,000 centrifuges. Reports also indicate that Iran has agreed to ship its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to Russia.

These two moves together could extend Iran’s “breakout time” to around eight months.

This is more than enough for the U.S. to respond to an Iranian move toward a bomb (something that under a strong verification regime, the IAEA should be able to detect within days).

Speaking of the IAEA…

According to David Albright, the “most striking point” in the IAEA’s latest safeguards report regards the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. In case you’re not familiar, PMD encompasses a bevy of outstanding concerns the IAEA has over Iran’s past nuclear activities, largely dating back to its activities prior to 2004.

Those who would place these dimensions at the top of the list of must-solve issues prior to inking a deal would argue that since some of those activities might still be ongoing, we must have an explanation before we proceed. What this contingent fails to acknowledge is that if PMD is allowed to become a sticking point (a likely situation, it seems, in Congress) it could mean the failure of a deal, or worse, the implosion of a precariously formed international coalition that sits like the boy with his finger in the dyke of the sanctions regime.

Perhaps this is worth it for something that might jeopardize our ability to detect future progress on an Iranian nuclear weapon. But this is not the job of 2004’s inspectors or even today’s. This is the job of those inspectors who will remain on the ground after a deal is signed, with increased access to Iran’s disputed facilities that ensures those inspectors are able to alert the international community the second a hair falls out of place.

Of course, without a deal, those inspectors will be home. And then we can all just hope.

We don’t trust Iran, and we don’t need to

The IAEA has verified that Iran continues to comply with the conditions of the interim deal, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA).

With regard to those two areas of past activities related to nuclear weapons development, or PMDs, Iran has agreed to continue to meet with the IAEA. It has not, at this time, provided any information or an explanation to the agency, and it missed an Aug. 25 deadline for giving the agency information.

This is a problem, but not one that is related to ongoing nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. Because the PMD process is a separate track with the IAEA, Iran is not obligated to answer these questions prior to inking a deal.

What is more important is that P5+1 negotiators deliver a deal that keeps Iran’s nuclear program under lock and key. Over the past year, Iran’s nuclear program hasn’t just been stopped in its tracks, key elements have been rolled back, and what remains is under constant surveillance. A good final deal will expand the ability of the IAEA to keep an eye on each and every move Iran makes, ensuring that not only do we avoid an Iranian breakout, we avoid a sneak-out too.

So what does this all mean?

First, verification is important. The importance of the number of centrifuges Iran is allowed to keep or the details of past nuclear activities Iran is forced to reveal shouldn’t be discounted, but in many ways they’re the backup dancers in the main show. Any agreement must be assessed in its entirety.

Second, what we’ve achieved over the past year isn’t exactly chopped liver. We’ve come a long way, and it’s time to make this a permanent situation. The alternative is to go back to where we were: a strong sanctions regime with increasingly diminishing returns, an Iranian program just inches from the bomb, and the possibility of a U.S. or Israeli attack.

And if that sounds like fun, well, maybe we can find you a unicorn too.

As the Iran nuclear negotiations near their self-imposed deadline of November 24th, Jon Stewart adds his atypically subtle commentary to the fray through his new film Rosewater. Rosewater, which depicts the 2009 Iranian political protests and the imprisonment of a reporter covering the election controversy, comes out at a particularly crucial moment in US-Iran relations. But while a cursory glance may arouse the assumption that the film is meant to demonize Iran, Stewart insists that is simply not the case.

When asked if his film would be used as a weapon against the nuclear deal with Iran, Stewart was blunt: “For those that don’t want a deal, they will use anything to sabotage it on both sides… You cannot control what idiots will weaponize, and to censor yourself for their ignorance would be a mistake.” In fact, the film is a good reminder of why diplomacy through negotiations with Iran, especially with the November 24th nuclear deal deadline approaching, should continue to be supported. Here are three examples of how themes from Stewart’s Rosewater parallel the Iran negotiations:

1. Iran Responds to International Pressure: The film highlights international pressure as an effective tool in ending the internment of protagonist Maziar Bahari. Similarly, there is an international coalition of support behind the Iran nuclear negotiations and the sanction regime that has brought Iran to the table. This is a proven recipe for success when dealing with Iran and it is in the U.S.’s interest to maintain international support. By adopting extreme demands or flatly rejecting a deal that would monitor and verify Iran’s nuclear activities, the U.S. would break the international support and sanctions regime, leaving Iran to engage in nuclear activities as they please.

2. Iran is not a monolith; violence hurts the innocent: The film depicts socially conscious Iranian youth fighting for their political freedom. Launching a bombing campaign, as is a likely scenario if negotiations break down and Iran pursues a bomb,  without first giving every opportunity to diplomatic solutions puts those innocents at risk. Maziar Bahari, the reporter whose story this film examines, perfectly articulates this point: “For those ‘bomb, bomb’ people — for American people in general — it’s important to understand that when you’re bombing a people, you’re not only bombing the intelligence organizations or the Revolutionary Guards.”

3. Iran will do what it takes for self-preservation: The government of Iran’s interest, both in the film and in reality, is in self-preservation. A country who is comfortable repressing its own citizens will surely feel comfortable developing a nuclear weapon for regime-preserving capabilities. But the current Joint Plan of Action has halted nuclear activity in Iran and has been verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Failure to reach a deal sends Iran on its way without monitoring, under besiege by further US sanctions, and arguably in need of a nuclear bomb. Adopting a good deal keeps the freeze on Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions; opposing the diplomatic process gives Iran a reason to sprint towards a nuclear weapon.

Whether you watch Rosewater for its political commentary, its inspirational message, or purely for its entertainment value, keep a keen eye on how far US-Iran relations has come since the 2009 Green Revolution. Failing to give diplomacy a chance would negate the progress made over the last year of negotiations and lead down a path towards conflict that is not in interest of the United States, its allies, or even Iran.