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Kendall: Money doesn’t grow on trees, even at the Pentagon

The Pentagon is making the case for an overhaul of its fleet, and according to Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall, the nuclear enterprise is at the front of the line. That is, if they can just figure out how to pay for it.

At the Air Force Association’s annual conference this week, Kendall delivered remarks that had been prepared by the Secretary of Defense, who had been pulled away at the last minute. The speech referred to the nuclear enterprise as, “the very foundation of U.S. national security.”

Driving the point home, Kendall repeated twice, “No capability we maintain is more important than our nuclear deterrent.”

Of course, Kendall and Hagel have reason to want to reassure the Air Force that nukes are a top priority, but Kendall’s speech leaves little room for interpretation.

Know that what you do every day is foundational to America’s national security and the top priority of the Department of Defense – the top priority of the Department of Defense.

Secretary Hagel wants you and our entire military to know that comes from him personally.

But paying for those upgrades will take more than reassurance. And there’s the rub. The Pentagon simply does not have enough resources to pay for its entire wish list of upgrades, both nuclear and conventional. And, perhaps surprisingly, Kendall acknowledges that fact, telling reporters that:

There’s been some conversation about that, but at the end of the day we have to find money to pay for these things one way or another, right? So changing the accounting system doesn’t really change that fundamental requirement. We still need the money and it has to come from somewhere.

Kendall’s bout of honesty comes on the heels of some speculation that world events might allow for some wiggle room in the DOD’s budget – or at least OCO. But the acknowledgement of the budget challenges to come is significant nonetheless.

At a time when the Air Force is in need of a multitude of updates more relevant to the current threat environment, the issue is likely much greater than Kendall lets on. The true cost of focusing myopically on the nuclear enterprise is that it will leave other programs to starve in its wake.

Report Illuminates Potential Spending Catastrophe; Nukes Part of Problem

The original version of this post erroneously stated that Todd Harrison’s report states that nuclear weapons are unaffordable. The post has been updated to correct the error.

The U.S. Defense Department is careening towards a seemingly inevitable budgetary catastrophe. On September 4, Todd Harrison, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment’s well-respected defense budget extraordinaire, released an eye-opening assessment of this year’s defense budget request. Harrison’s report highlights the many ways in which the Pentagon’s current spending plans over the next decade assume the availability of billions of dollars that are unlikely to be available. In other words, these plans are a fantasy.

What the report also shows is that nuclear weapons and missile defense make up a significant portion of this planned spending – contrary to those who argue that nuclear weapons “don’t actually cost that much.” In fact, so staggering are the expected costs of existing plans to build new ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-capable long-range bombers that military planners won’t be able to afford them without gutting conventional forces.

Fortunately, the United States can scale back its current nuclear spending plans while still maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent – and save billions of dollars too.

Assumptions and underestimations = Simply not enough dough

According to Harrison, the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 “budget appears insufficient to support the defense program and strategy articulated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)”.

The Pentagon’s five-year spending plan, known as The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), exceeds the Congressionally mandated budget caps contained in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 by $116 billion over the next five years and $168 billion over the next ten.

Imagine the defense department were planning to build a giant, nay, the MOST giant pizza ever made. While during the prep stage, there may be enough scraps to begin the process, in the end there just won’t be enough dough. That’s the situation the Pentagon finds itself in.

Harrison identifies a litany of unsupportable or unsustainable assumptions built into the budget request. For example:

1) The budget request does not fund Army and Marine Corps end strength and Navy aircraft carriers to the levels outlined by the QDR as necessary – roughly $20 billion short over the FYDP;

2) The budget assumes that some programs and activities typically funded by the base budget, can be moved to the Oversees Contingency Operations (OCO) account, which funds U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and is not restricted by the Congressional budget caps. Based on recent trends, the Pentagon may be expecting $10-$20 billion annually in OCO funding for non-Afghanistan related activities that belong in the base budget, totaling $50-$100 billion over the FYDP;

3) Historically, large acquisition programs are 20 to 50 percent over their planned budget estimates. Harrison approximates that the “acquisition funding included in the budget is likely to be insufficient to execute all of the currently planned acquisition programs”.

4) The biggest assumption in the budget is that Congress will allow the Pentagon to exceed the Congressional budget caps by $116 billion over the next five years. While the caps were raised modestly by Congress for FY 2014 and FY 2015, no relief appears on the horizon for FY2016 and beyond.

Nuclear weapons and missile defense spending atop the spending charts

In what might come as a surprise to many, the four most expensive Pentagon acquisition programs over the next decade and beyond are all exclusively or partly nuclear weapons related:

a) The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (some later versions of which will be endowed with a capability to deliver B61 nuclear bombs); estimated cost: $351 billion;

b) The Ohio Class Replacement submarine (exclusively nuclear); estimated cost $90 billion;

c) The Long-Range Strikes bomber (LRS-B) (the Air Force is pursuing a new long-range penetrating bomber primarily for conventional reasons, but the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 25% of the costs as nuclear-related); estimated cost: $73 billion; and

d) The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) (key aspects of which are designed to defend against nuclear attacks); estimated cost: over $151 billion.

While some modernization of our nuclear weapons is necessary, the current U.S. nuclear arsenal of approximately 4,800 nuclear weapons greatly exceeds U.S. security requirements. Moreover, both former and current military leaders agree that planned spending on nuclear weapons, which could top $1 trillion over the next thirty years, is unaffordable. Harrison concurs, notes that, given current budget constraints, the Pentagon will not be able to afford its currently proposed buys for the Ohio replacement and Long-Range Strike bomber without making cuts elsewhere.

Ultimately, Harrison concludes that “[i]f the budget caps are not raised by Congress, DoD will be forced to fund this shortfall by making additional cuts to force structure, personnel, acquisitions and readiness beyond what is proposed in the request”, meaning greater risk in implementing the defense strategy. Not only would scaling back current spending plans save billions that could be better spent on more urgent national security priorities, but doing so would not jeopardize our safety or deterrent capability.

Could the Loch Ness Monster Lose Its Bang?

Scotland is best known for scotch, golf, and the Loch Ness Monster; but a new phrase should come to mind as of late: nuclear weapons. Scotland will hold a historic referendum this Thursday to vote on independence. If Scotland’s largest political party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), gets its way, Scotland’s secession from Great Britain will mean seceding from the UK’s nuclear arsenal, too.

Britain’s nuclear program, colloquially known as Trident, includes four Vanguard-class submarines which carry 160 nuclear warheads on 58 Trident II D5 missiles leased from the US.  Today, this fleet of submarines is exclusively housed and serviced out of Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, near Glasgow, Scotland. HMNB Clyde is comprised of Faslane Naval Base and the Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulpart.  The secessionist party, however, envisions an independent Scotland free of nuclear weapons and intends to expel the Trident program within the first term of the Scottish Parliament, by 2020.

So, what happens to Trident if Scotland votes yes?

A “yes” vote would threaten the UK’s nuclear deterrent. A “no” vote would continue the union of Great Britain and Scotland , and current plans to renovate the nuclear weapons program will continue as planned.  

In a letter to Scottish first minister Alex Salmond, the former British chief of naval staff Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope wrote, “Your plans for the removal of all nuclear submarines from Faslane in the event of Scottish independence would add a dangerous period of destabilization in our nuclear defense posture at a time when the international picture is clearly deteriorating…”  Scottish National Party spokesperson Angus Robertson replied, “While the anti-independence camp is determined to waste over £100 billion on unusable and obscene Trident nuclear weapons, a Yes vote will rid Scotland of weapons of mass destruction.”

In actuality, the money allotted for renovations on the Trident program is closer to £35.8 billion, which is equivalent to roughly $58.1 billion– nearly one fourth of the UK’s projected defense budget for the next decade.

The Ministry of Defense denies having a contingency play for Trident, hoping that Scotland will vote to remain part of the United Kingdom.

Perhaps Britain is reluctant to publicize a plan of action because there are no good options. The four prevailing theories on what will become of the Trident program in an independent Scotland are generally troublesome and will likely be unpopular. If the referendum passes, Britain could:

Relocate the submarines and their support vessels to HMNB Portsmouth in Plymouth, England
According to the Royal United Service Institute’s August 2014 paper on relocation possibilities for Trident, HMNB Devonport in the southwest town of Plymouth, England is the most logical location. Relocating the nuclear-armed submarines and their support vessels would not be cheap, though. HMNB Devonport is not logistically equipped to accommodate this type of weapon. It would force out the base’s existing fleet, and access routes would have to be dredged for the larger submarines to dock. Safety is a concern, too. Risk of accidental ignition could be perceived as threatening the lives of Plymouth’s 260,000 inhabitants. The proposed replacement munitions facility is near Falmouth, a popular tourist destination east of Plymouth. Additionally, the submarines stationed at Devonport would have to travel 50 nautical miles, or three times the distance between Faslane and Coulport, to reach Falmouth; t least six hours of patrol time would be spent making that journey.

Base the UK’s nuclear program in the US or France
The UK leases its Trident II D5 missiles from the United States. Britain’s nuclear-armed submarines frequent the US Naval Submarine Base in Kings Bay, Georgia for repairs and maintenance.  While hosting the UK’s nuclear program in Georgia, or NATO’s other nuclear-armed country, France, may be tempting, it’s not a suitable long-term solution. As the RUSI report notes, one of the main purposes of Britain’s nuclear program is to be equipped to defend itself if, in the case where the US or France is unwilling or unable to defend the UK against a nuclear threat – no matter how unlikely the scenario. Housing Britain’s nuclear weapons in another country would call into question the credibility of the UK’s program.

Additionally, Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly states that nuclear-weapon states are not permitted to transfer weapons to other countries. The UK arsenal would have to be entirely isolated from foreign hands in order to avoid accusations of not adhering to the NPT.  

Scrap its nuclear weapons program altogether
A “yes” vote could lead, however unlikely, Britain to scrap its nuclear weapons program altogether; after all, there are no easy or cheap alternatives. Support for Britain’s nuclear arsenal in England and Wales is marginally higher than those opposed (43% in favor, 36% opposed). In contrast, Scottish voters support disarmament 46% to 37%.  If the UK were to abandon its nuclear program, the US would become the only nuclear power in NATO as France does not promise its nuclear weapons to the alliance. The US is keenly interested in the UK maintaining its nuclear commitment to NATO.  

Leave the nukes in Scotland
The  Scottish National Party recognizes that the removal of nuclear weapons from HMNB Clyde will take time; their target date for relocation is four years after their goal of formal independence by 2016. In any event, keeping the UK’s nuclear arsenal in an independent Scotland long-term would be problematic. Keeping the UK’s nukes in a territory that’s no longer part of the UK would lead to obvious questions about Britain’s nuclear force credibility.

Whether the Trident fleet is relocated to England, elsewhere, or becomes the newest exhibit at the Imperial War Museum in London, is yet to be seen. What is clear is that Westminster will have a major challenge on its hands relating to the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal if Scotland votes “yes” this Thursday.

A Note from our New Scoville Fellow, Greg Terryn

Hi,

My name is Greg Terryn and I’m the new Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.  I’m a recent graduate from the Gerald Ford School of Public Policy’s Undergraduate program at the University of Michigan, where my studies focused on international crisis and recovery policy. As the Scoville Fellow, I’ll be assisting in the Center’s advocacy for sensible national security policies, with a primary focus on nuclear threat reduction and nonproliferation. I’ll also be working on U.S. nuclear weapons spending, the 5+1-Iran nuclear negotiations, the Obama administrations nuclear policy legacy, US-Russia relations, and a variety of other international issues relevant to US security.

I’m excited to be working with the talented team at the Center. The sheer volume of knowledge and experience on staff is awe-inspiring and I am thrilled to be learning from the same people whose articles and research I was reading in college. To be working in such a collaborative and passionate community as nuclear policy is rewarding and I look forward to contributing to the collective goal of increased global stability and a more peaceful future.

Greg Terryn

A Note from Our New Communications Associate, Amanda Waldron

Today marks my tenth day as the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation’s newest communications associate, and my eleventh day in Washington, D.C. I haven’t yet had a chance to adjust to the humidity, but I’m already diving head first into managing the Center’s web presence and social media outlets, working collaboratively with the nuclear community, and creating engaging graphics for our issues.

Word around the office is that I have big shoes to fill, but I’m feeling up to the challenge. Last year, as I finished my senior year of college, I served as an intern at Ploughshares Fund in San Francisco. Over the course of my time there, I went from 0 to 60 on nuclear weapons policy and gained broad experience in communications at a national security organization. Most importantly, though, I became addicted to this fulfilling work, and to the everyday gratification that comes with doing one’s part to make the world a safer place.

In June, I graduated with summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa honors from Santa Clara University in the Bay Area, where I studied political science, French, and history. I also have a particular issue area of interest, having written my 60-page honors thesis on changes in Iran’s foreign policy since 1979.

Just two weeks ago, I jumped at the amazing opportunity to join the Center. I have so much to learn from Center staff, board, and the security community at large here in D.C. I’m thrilled to be a part of this impressive team and to contribute to the Council and Center’s tremendous work.

I look forward to working with you all.