Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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A new kind of IAEA report (The kind with good news)

Over the past few years, reading the IAEA’s regular reports on Iran has become a bit tedious – much like a game of “Where’s Waldo,” searching for the small bits and pieces that have changed, for better or worse. But with the implementation of the November Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and separate agreements with the IAEA, the game has changed. My eyes almost don’t know how to read an IAEA report with so much good news.

Rather than list the same ongoing concerns and nuclear progress that was almost always for worse, the IAEA’s latest report shows that Iran is complying with the restrictions required by the November first step deal. For the first time in four years, the size of Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium has gone down. As required by the JPOA, the IAEA has confirmed that Iran is not enriching uranium above 5 percent at any of its declared facilities; is not operating any of its cascades in an interconnected configuration; is continuing to dilute and convert its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium (and currently has no process line to revert that converted fuel back into 20 percent); and has not conducted “any further advances” at its enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow or its heavy water reactor at Arak. This includes the installation of any additional IR-1 or IR-2 centrifuges.

Since the IAEA’s previous report in November, Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium has grown by 37.4 kg, to 447.8 kg. Of this, 160.6 kg remain in the form of uranium enriched up to 20 percent. This is 35.4 kg less than the IAEA’s previous report. Additionally, Iran has reconfigured its centrifuges at Fordow to produce only uranium enriched to 3.5 percent as opposed to 20 percent.

On January 20, pursuant to the implementation of the JPOA, Iran ceased its production of 20 percent enriched uranium and began downblending some of what it had produced into uranium enriched to no more than 5%. The remainder is being converted into uranium oxide.

In addition, the IAEA has installed additional containment and surveillance measures at Iran’s nuclear facilities to confirm compliance with the JPOA, and has been granted daily access to Natanz and Fordow. The IAEA was also able to visit Iran’s centrifuge assembly workshops, rotor production facilities, and centrifuge storage facilities.

Despite this progress, however, the IAEA report documented plenty of areas of continuing concern and is yet another reminder that there is still much diplomatic work to be done to lengthen breakout timelines, shorten our ability to detect breakout, and ensure Iran is not pursuing a secret path to the bomb.  

For example, the report documents the IAEA’s outstanding questions regarding the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program including its request for access to Parchin.  The details of Iran’s past weapon’s related work will be one of the top topics of discussion between the P5+1 and Iran in discussions that began in Vienna this week on a final deal. A good omen for progress on this front came as part of an agreement earlier this month between the IAEA and Iran, in which Iran agreed to provide information on its need for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.

Also of some concern is Iran’s intention to begin testing a new centrifuge, the IR-8, at Natanz, and its intention to build a new light water reactor that would be fueled by 20 percent enriched uranium. While these issues are of some concern, any construction is likely many years off and continued research and development on centrifuges is allowed under the JPOA. Iran’s future centrifuge and reactor plans are still unclear, and neither poses a threat at this time. These are issues that will be dealt with as part of a final deal.

Although Iran still has a long way to go to prove that is program is exclusively peaceful, and a final deal is still an uncertain prospect, as someone who’s gotten used to such a dearth of good news on Iran, especially from the IAEA, this latest report is a refreshing break. A final deal with the P5+1 will address the additional concerns on the table and ensure that Iran is put farther away from a nuclear weapon than at any time since it began enrichment, so it’s good to see implementation of the JPOA going smoothly, bringing us one step closer to that final deal.

The Defense That Does not Defend: More problems for national missile defense

I have a new article up over a the mothership on the latest setback for the Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Here’s how it starts:

America’s troubled national ballistic missile defense system just found more trouble.

For the first time, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Dr. Michael Gilmore, has determined that this system, known as Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), may be too flawed to save.

In his Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 report to Congress, Dr. Gilmore states that the design of the two types of “kill vehicles” that sit atop our 30 long-range interceptors in Alaska and California are of questionable “robustness” and that the Pentagon should consider redesigning them. Translation: the system as currently configured – which has cost the American taxpayer roughly $40 billion – can’t be relied upon to perform its intended mission of protecting the U.S. homeland against even rudimentary long-range missiles launched from North Korea or Iran.

Dr. Gilmore’s report is but the latest in a long list of setbacks for the GMD system, all of which cast serious doubts over the wisdom of the Pentagon’s plan to spend $1 billion to deploy 14 additional ground based interceptors in Alaska with the existing flawed kill vehicles – to say nothing about building a third site for the system in the eastern half of the country, as proposed by some Republicans in Congress.

Click here to read the whole piece.

Supporters continue to back off on Iran sanctions vote

Sen. Robert Menendez, Chairman of SFRC, took to the Senate floor yesterday to express his concerns about the current path forward on Iran, both in the administration and in the Senate. In a long and detailed speech, Menendez chastised the administration for its use of the term “war-mongering,” criticized the Joint Plan of Action, and stated his disinterest in playing partisan politics.

Atomic Anxiety: Iranian Enrichment and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

The recent joint plan of action concluded between the P5 + 1 and Iran has met with mixed reviews both at home and abroad. States in the Middle East have been particularly vocal on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, leading some to suggest that any continued Iranian enrichment could yield a cascade of proliferation in the region. Since the P5 + 1 agreement came into effect, some have insisted that if a final deal allows even a very limited level of Iranian enrichment, countries throughout the region will be tempted to pursue nuclear weapons or a substantive nuclear energy program with enrichment and/or reprocessing capabilities. The evidence, however, suggests that such fears are unfounded.

Saudi Arabia has long been skeptical of international negotiations with Iran. Saudi leaders have enthusiastically supported the international sanctions aimed at Iran, and as a competing regional power, it is likely that they would not mind seeing Iran weighed down by continued sanctions. Other Gulf States share Saudi Arabia’s concern. Bahrain resents alleged Iranian interference in its internal affairs and opposes any negotiated settlement that might alleviate Iran’s economic woes. Abu Dhabi, the largest member of the United Arab Emirates, also opposes any sanctions relief, partly due to their own territorial dispute with Iran.

Of the states opposing the current deal, however, the first to receive a visit from a US leader was Israel, where Vice President Joe Biden discussed the Iranian nuclear program and a host of other issues with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Though Israel strongly opposed the initial P5 + 1 deal, its reaction following the announcement of the implementation agreement was somewhat muted. Saudi leaders similarly offered a tepid statement of support for the deal, but some in the ruling family have publicly criticized it. Saudi Arabia will receive a visit from President Obama in March designed in part to allay Saudi concerns. Though Saudi and Bahraini business leaders have also evinced skepticism of a thaw in relations with Iran, they appear ready to wait and see if a comprehensive nuclear deal can allay some of their concerns.

Middle Eastern states are not, however, unanimously united against the joint plan of action. Turkey, which has previously evinced wariness of the Iranian nuclear program, praised the agreement and offered “to provide every kind of support for the success of the process”. Oman hosted the secret US-Iranian talks that led to the breakthrough meetings in Geneva, and Dubai, which aims to bolster its trade with Iran, has welcomed the P5 + 1 agreement, putting it at odds with its fellow emirate, Abu Dhabi.

While these states have been more welcoming of the deal, it is clear that they support the diplomatic process partly because they fear the possibility of a nuclear Iran. While Iran’s neighbors generally feel threatened by the possibility of a nuclear Iran, the support for the pact—even if tepid in some states—suggests that a civil Iranian nuclear program with low levels of enrichment would not spark a new wave of nuclear proliferation.

When it comes to nuclear proliferation, not all states are created equal. Rather, when making the argument that an Iranian nuclear program, however limited, could lead to a cascade of proliferation, the three states most frequently identified as possible proliferators are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Egypt, however, will need to cobble together a functioning government before it can explore enrichment. Turkey, which would be more capable of such an undertaking than Egypt, already hosts US nuclear bombs through NATO.

Saudi Arabia, it would seem, is the most likely of the three to seek nuclear weapons or a substantial enrichment program in response to continued Iranian enrichment. US security guarantees, which, as in the case of Turkey, sometimes come in the form of nuclear bombs but could just as easily rely upon conventional forces, will play an important role in dissuading these countries from pursuing dangerous and potentially destabilizing nuclear programs of their own. For the time being, ongoing diplomatic efforts have forestalled any such moves, and even though other states are clearly threatened by a hypothetical Iranian nuclear weapon, it is not clear that a limited degree of Iranian enrichment conducted under IAEA safeguards would yield proliferation in the region.

In addition, as Kingston Reif argues in his recent Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column, it is not at all clear why an agreement that verifiably puts Iran farther away from a bomb than at any time since it began enrichment will suddenly increase the incentives for other Middle Eastern states to start hedging.

The technical and managerial challenges associated with nuclear programs are daunting enough. As has been argued elsewhere, however, it would take a perfect storm—more than simply an Iranian nuclear weapon, let alone a restricted enrichment program—to provoke proliferation in any of the states considered above. The continued existence of a limited and closely monitored Iranian nuclear energy program and accompanying low-level uranium enrichment is thus unlikely to encourage proliferation in the region.