“This deal is unprecedented. International inspectors will have daily access to Iran’s nuclear facilities to ensure that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon,” said Laicie Heeley, director of Middle East and Defense Policy. “This is leaps and bounds ahead of what we have now in terms of ensuring the national security of the United States and our allies, especially Israel.”
Making a nuclear deal with Iran
With Iran’s nuclear program dominating the nonproliferation airwaves, I wrote my November Bulletin column on the merits of the ongoing talks in Geneva (the latest round of which resumed on November 20 and could continue into the weekend) and why a negotiating strategy premised on forcing Iran to surrender its enrichment program is not a wise strategy. Here’s how I begin:
When, in early November, Iran and six world powers met in Geneva, negotiators made significant progress toward an initial agreement that would pause Iran’s nuclear development. Hopes are high that the remaining obstacles to a first-phase deal between Tehran and the P5+1—the United States, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—can be overcome soon,and that future talks will further allay concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.
Despite diplomatic progress, though, skeptics in the United States and Israel argue that the current negotiations are a fool’s errand. They say that the only worthwhile agreement would be one that requires Iran to dismantle its entire nuclear program, including uranium enrichment. In addition, the skeptics argue that Iran only responds to extreme pressure, and that therefore the US Congress must pass tougher sanctions immediately and back them up with a credible threat of military action.
These Godfather-esque arguments have a certain appeal. If the United States makes Iran an offer it can’t refuse, then surely it will back down and give in to every demand, or so the theory goes. But this isn’t Hollywood, and such tactics are much more likely to backfire than succeed.
A diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear impasse is squarely within American national security interests. A reasonable deal would constrain Iran’s nuclear program, increase the international community’s ability to monitor and verify compliance, and give the United States ample warning in the event that Iran makes a dash to acquire the bomb. The first-phase deal the Obama administration is pursuing is a step toward these ends. Attempts by the US Congress to increase sanctions and condition relief on unrealistic maximalist positions—such as insisting that Iran cease all uranium enrichment—would likely doom current diplomatic efforts, thereby increasing the likelihood that the outcomes Washington is trying to prevent come to pass. Those could include unconstrained Iranian nuclear development; a nuclear-armed Iran; a US war against Iran; or all of the above.
Read the whole thing here.
One issue I did not address in the column is the reported reasons for the failure to close an initial deal at the November 7-10 Geneva round. In most tellings, a deal appeared imminent until France insisted that the P5+1 drive a harder bargain, which the Iranian negotiating team could not accept without further guidance from Tehran. The most oft-cited stumbling blocks were (and continue to be?) how to deal with Iran’s construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak and how to describe/characterize Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium as part of an agreement.
On Arak, Jeffrey Lewis makes a strong case that the French were right to insist that “A freeze on Iran’s nuclear program needs to include a freeze on construction work at Arak.” Most experts seem to think that the P5+1 and Iran can reach a compromise that prevents this issue from becoming a deal breaker.
A modus vivendi on Iran’s enrichment rights could be a trickier road to hoe, but here to there is cause for cautious optimism. According to a November 15 report in the New York Times attributed to Western diplomats, a potential compromise “would be for an interim accord to affirm that Iran would be entitled to all of the rights of signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran and world powers would then agree to disagree on how to interpret that treaty.” Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif appeared to bless such an approach. However, its not clear if this will fly with the Supreme Leader or if additional sanctions relief beyond what the P5+1 has offered will be required in return.
Ultimately, a first-step deal that freezes and begins to roll back Iran’s nuclear progress is one the United States (and its allies) should take. As Shashank Joshi aptly puts it, “If Iran cheats, the West loses almost nothing; if it doesn’t, then Iran is put further from a nuclear weapon and trust is built for a bigger deal. Like all good diplomacy, it hedges against its own failure.” Meanwhile, the contemplated sanctions relief being offered to Iran is proportional to the cap on and more intrusive international monitoring of the program that is being asked of Iran. The claim that the very limited and reversible sanctions relief on offer would eviscerate the larger sanctions regime doesn’t stand up to scrutiny.
The value of the deal should be assessed relative to the gains Iran could make over the next six months in the absence of the deal. Critics of reported agreement must explain how more coercive approaches will reduce Iran’s breakout potential, given that existing sanctions to date have not stopped Iran’s nuclear progress.
The Saga Continues: Syria
In what quickly is becoming the real-life manifestation of the classic P. Diddy song, the situation in Syria swings from the cusp of war, to a major diplomatic breakthrough, and now on to uncertainty over the next stages.
First, let’s examine the status of the proposed U.S.-Russia framework to disarm Syria’s chemical arsenal:
- Syria declared its chemical weapon and facilities. (October 24, 2013)
- The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) completed site inspections of 21 of 23 facilities and continues destruction of mixing/filling/weaponizing equipment. (October 27, 2013)
- OPCW completed and verified functional destruction of chemical weapons equipment. (October 31, 2013)
- OPCW verified a 22nd site near Aleppo. (November 7, 2013)
- OPCW Executive Council adopted a plan to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons by June 30, 2014. The plan included the transportation of Syria’s arsenal outside of the country for destruction in the “safest and soonest manner.” (November 15, 2013)
At this stage, the OPCW has nearly entirely eliminated President Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons in the future. While questions exist regarding destroying the specific chemical agents, the ability of the Syrian regime to weaponize and use chemical weapons has nearly vanished. This is a clear success for the framework and international moratorium against chemical weapons.
On November 18, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry stated at a press conference that the Department of State was evaluating two options for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. He did not give further details.
In the next days, newspapers began reporting that the two options under consideration are the use of mobile destruction technologies within Syria and/or at-sea destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal. The U.S. Department of State and OPCW also stressed that they are still working with other States to review destruction options.
If the OPCW uses the mobile destruction technology that has been developed, the facilities would be operational within ten days of reaching their location. This option allows for the weapons to be destroyed where they are currently stored and does not require shipment to another country. The concern is the risks associated with carrying out the sensitive destruction process during an ongoing civil war.
The at-sea destruction option includes incineration or hydrolysis units placed on ships that will neutralize the precursor and chemical agents under European Union and American environmental safety standards. Smaller scale at-sea destructions have been successful, most notably by Japan. OPCW would retain its verifying and inspecting role but it is unclear what nation/organization would provide the diplomatic status of the floating destruction location.
The major concerns about this approach are the necessity to ship the neutralized but still toxic chemical weapons to a port, opening the opportunity for the material to be stolen, “misplaced,” or captured. Additionally, there are significant security and environmental concerns. Supporters of the plan stress that the chemicals will be neutralized to harmless salts and solids.
Regardless of which destruction options are undertaken, the major concern is funding the OPCW’s operations. As of early November, OPCW had raised $13.5 million for its operations and that funding will run out by the end of November, according to a Reuters exclusive. Moving destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal offshore would certainly increase costs. Some countries have agreed to provide security and logistical support for the transportation of Syria’s chemical weapons. They could be convinced to provide similar support for at-sea destruction.
Logistical challenges are not the only issues complicating the U.S.-Russian framework to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. On November 5th, CNN reported that U.S. officials were reviewing intelligence that Syria had not been entirely truthful with its chemical weapons declaration or entirely cooperative with the destruction protocol established by the OPCW Executive Council. U.S. officials have suggested that Syrian President Assad is likely to want to preserve some chemical weapons capacity as a hedge against his perceived threat from Israel.
It is important to note that both the OPCW Executive Council decision and United Nations Security Council resolution had strong and speedy enforcement mechanisms for Syria’s non-compliance.
It is clear that there are a number of nagging issues that need to be resolved to completely eliminate Syria’s chemical arsenal but in less than two months the functional capacity of one of the world’s largest chemical arsenals has been dismantled. This success is worthy of international celebration.
The Diplomat Publishes OpEd on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea by General Gard
‘Strategic Patience’ with North Korea By Lt. General Robert Gard November 21, 2013 North Korea’s nuclear weapons program marches on. According to several reports, Pyongyang recently re-started its reactor to produce spent fuel from which weapons grade plutonium is reprocessed, upgraded its uranium enrichment facility, dug additional tunnels in its nuclear test site and expanded […]
How to Save $48 Billion from the US Nuclear Triad Over the Next 10 Years – While Still Keeping it
Last week, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its annual ”Options for Reducing the Deficit” report outlining 103 options to reduce the budget deficit between FY 2014 and FY 2023. Of specific interest to us, the report identifies potential savings in the submarine and bomber legs of the US nuclear triad; the ternary strategy of nuclear delivery systems that includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long-range strike bombers (LRS-B).
Individually, the bomber option would save $32 billion between FY 2014 and FY 2023 while the submarine option would save $16 billion between FY 2015 and FY 2023. Amazingly, neither option would eliminate either leg of the nuclear triad. Below are summaries of the two options:
Bomber Option: Postpone the development of the new Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). The Air Force currently possesses 76 B52-Hs, 63 B1-Bs and 20 B2-As for a total fleet size of 159 long-range strategic bombers. The service is planning to replace this aging fleet with 80-100 new long-range strike bombers beginning in the middle of the next decade to the tune of an estimated total procurement cost of $55 billion. The CBO option would defer development of the new bomber until after FY 2023. This would save $32 billion between FY 2014 and FY 2023.
Option advantages identified by the CBO:
1. The $32 billion in savings could be spent on maintaining quality and readiness, which the Air Force claims is suffering from a lack of funding.
2. The delay could potentially allow the Air Force to incorporate newer technologies into the aircraft design that do not currently exist. This would likely improve the lifespan of the aircraft in future years.
Option disadvantages identified by the CBO:
1. There is a risk that the current generation of bombers may need to be retired earlier than expected and/or that the new LSR-B may take longer to develop than expected. If either scenario occurs, the US may be left without an adequate long-range strike capability.
2. The existing bomber fleet consists of only 20 stealth aircraft, the B-2As. As air defense systems become more advanced, the need for long-range stealth aircraft increases. Going forward, such a small fleet of stealth aircraft may not suffice.
3. As the US re-balances to East Asia, a region marked by limited basing options and long distances, the existing LRS-B capability may be inadequate.
Submarine Option: Cut the number of existing Ohio-class submarines in addition to deferring the development of and reducing the total order of the new Ohio-replacement submarines. At present, the Navy maintains a fleet of 14 Ohio-class nuclear-armed submarines (designation SSBN). The Navy currently plans to replace this fleet with 12 new nuclear-armed submarines (designation SSBN(X)) by 2042. The CBO option would reduce the existing SSBN fleet from 14 to 8 by FY 2020, defer the start of the SSBN(X) program from FY 2021 to FY 2024, and reduce the total order of SSBN(X) submarines from 12 to 8. Implementation of this option would save just under $16 billion between FY 2015 and FY 2023.
Option advantages identified by the CBO:
1. The sea leg of the US strategic deterrent would remain credible and robust. Each of the 8 submarines (of either class) can carry 128 warheads deployed across 16 missiles (8 warheads per missile). This would total 1,024 deployed nuclear warheads in the sea-leg of the nuclear triad alone, allowing the United State’s to maintain the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.
2. Costs accrued from modernizing the missiles and warheads that these submarines carry would potentially be reduced. Because there are fewer submarines in the fleet, fewer missiles and warheads will require modernization at the end of their life span.
Option disadvantages identified by the CBO:
1. The submarine leg of the nuclear triad would be less effective. Fewer submarines would mean that fewer areas could be patrolled and that a smaller fleet would be available for deployment in a crisis.
2. Each submarine would be easier to target. Because each submarine would have to fire more ballistic missiles in order to hit the same amount of targets that a fleet of 12 submarines could, more trajectories could be used by an adversary to accurately calculate the origin of the launches.
3. Delaying development of the SSBN(X) would disrupt the joint UK-US development of a common missile compartment, which the UK requires for its own fleet of strategic nuclear-armed submarines.
The Pentagon will hopefully give these options some serious consideration. If across-the-board sequester cuts remain in place, $454 billion will have to be cut from the Pentagon budget between now and FY 2021. The two CBO options won’t cover all of these required savings, but they sure would help.
