Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

On Thursday, October 20 the San Antonio Express ran my Op-Ed calling on the Super Committee and Congress to make real changes in government spending, read- the defense budget. You can find it here. Below is an excerpt: Both the “supercommittee,” a gr…

STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler spoke to the Defense Writers Group yesterday and according to GSN’s Elaine Grossman, raised some interesting albeit vague questions about the future of the triad.  He also repeated an oft-heard argument about the likely impact of further reductions below New START levels on the triad:

Kehler said a key concern about maintaining a triad at lower numbers is that remaining weapons could become “hollow” — a situation in which forces might appear robust on paper but fail to reflect a diminished capability out in the field.

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“We need to be very careful,” Kehler told reporters. One worry, he said, is that “you can have a hollow nuclear force in the industrial complex that supports the weapons. I think you [also] can have a hollow nuclear force in the force itself.”

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“But I think there will be some very tough decisions to make here at certain [nuclear force] levels, and whether or not you can then sustain a leg of the triad without it becoming hollow,” Kehler said. “Can you have enough expertise? Can you have enough sustainment horsepower, if you will, behind it to really make it a viable leg? Those are all great questions and those are questions we’re going to have to address.”

 In a September interview with Arms Control Today, White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction terrorism Gary Samore stated that “we’ve reached the level in our forces where further reductions will raise questions about whether we retain the triad or whether we go to a system that only is a dyad.”  He didn’t elaborate as to why he believes this to be the case.

Is the conventional wisdom correct?  

In their now well-known article arguing that the U.S. can maintain stable deterrence with a nuclear force of 311 nuclear weapons deployed on a triad of delivery vehicles, Col B. Chance Saltzman, chief, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Headquarters Air Force, and two professors at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama stated that the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal “should be based primarily on the requirements for a stable, reliable, nuclear deterrent, with support issues like industrial base support, crew force management, and training only weighing in as secondary considerations.”  

In a follow-up article responding to their critics, Saltzman et al., go into greater detail:

The second charge appears to be more problematic. Presumably, a smaller force would be less efficient and more difficult to maintain than a larger one because a smaller force would result in a smaller industrial base, which means greater dependencies on a relatively small number of suppliers. Theoretically, this is cause for concern, but in reality it is not. The entire nuclear weapons complex has been a government enterprise since the beginning. It currently consists of eight sites that research, develop, produce, procure, assemble, maintain, disassemble, and test the nuclear and nonnuclear components of the arsenal. The production of nuclear weapons requires a very large capital investment and is characterized by the predominance of fixed costs and a single consumer of its products, the US government. Indeed, the same physical plant would be necessary to produce 10 or 1,000 nuclear weapons. This suggests it is a natural monopoly that has been controlled by the government for its entire existence. The supply of delivery vehicles, such as long-range bombers, booster rockets, and SSBNs, however, is subject to the vagaries of the marketplace, as consolidation of the defense industrial base over the past few decades makes clear.

Lastly, there is the question of force management. Just how small can a force become until it does not resemble a force at all? That is a difficult question to answer. Certainly, large numbers can lead to organizational competencies and the development of a professional cadre. However, as originally suggested, a small force can also achieve those aims. The Navy’s SEALs are selective, well funded, and effective. One might wonder how a nuclear force with similar qualities might look. For starters, it would attract the best candidates. To enhance recruitment, incentives might be offered; bonuses being one, prestige another. The services are expert at managing both, so this should not be too problematic. Nuclear warriors also deserve the best equipment, which gets back to designing, testing, and deploying new systems, if required.

The authors don’t appear to deny that maintenance of the triad at lower levels may not be cost-effective (particularly if the Pentagon is forced to make significant spending reductions).  Moreover, they don’t address the potential impact on strategic stability of maintaining a triad at lower numbers or building new systems. They also don’t offer much in the way of advice as to how to circumvent entrenched political interests calling for the maintenance of the triad at or near current levels (i.e. the ICBM caucus).

Nonetheless, its interesting food for thought, especially their claim that its possible to sustain expertise and a motivated work force with fewer nuclear weapons.

REPRESENTATIVE DOUG LAMBORN (R-CO): …Well, then, as a follow-up, do you believe there are now an adequate number — I think it’s too limited of a number, but do you think there’s an adequate number of ground-based interceptors both to counter the thr…

By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman

(For more information on this feature, see here.)

And this week’s in the weeds conceptual/theoretical articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Non-Proliferation
Hymans, J. E. C., 2011. Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Non-Proliferation. International Security. Fall, 2011.

“The key point here is that even though the regime-type variable may not be significant, this should not be taken to mean that domestic institutional variables are not significant”. (p.158)

Hymans looks at how states make the decision on whether to pursue a nuclear bomb.  Hymans finds that an important aspect of the decision is institutionalized veto players.  These are individuals who are able to veto the decisions states make.  Hymans performs a case study on Japan, and uses the institutionalized veto players concept to explain why Japan has not moved to acquire a nuclear weapon, nor discard its plutonium fuel cycle.  Institutional Veto players in Japan are able to prevent any attempt by Japanese leadership to pursue a nuclear weapon, but also prevent Japan from discontinuing its plutonium production cycle.  As a result of this finding, the regime type is not as important as the structure of government institutions.  When analysis of a states’ proliferation potential is undertaken, a states’ government institutions must be examined.  

Self-Regulation to Promote Nonproliferation
Hund, G. & Seward, A., 2011. Self-Regulation to Promote Nonproliferation. Public Interest Report (Journal of the Federation of American Scientists). Spring 2011. pp.41-43.

“The nuclear industry has a unique opportunity to promote the control and security of nuclear material and technologies. The companies involved in the production and trade of nuclear, radiological, and dual-use commodities and technologies are in an ideal position to bolster existing governmental mechanisms to secure these operations and prevent proliferation.” (p.41)

In this article, Hund and Seward, set out to explain how the nuclear industry could help promote non-proliferation through certain self-regulatory measures. Their argument is based on research by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. They find that many industrial self-regulation processes start by a trigger event, like an industrial accident. They suggest that one such trigger for the nuclear industry could be a nuclear terrorist event. Before this happens, the authors urge companies to take action both on an individual and a cooperative level. These actions can include anything from better regulatory standards to government lobbying. Hund and Seward furthermore argue that it would be in the companies’ best interest to regulate since it could lead to a higher profit, or at least the avoidance of losses.

Proliferation Implications of Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Hymans, J. E. C., 2011. Proliferation Implications of Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Theory and a Case Study of Tito’s Yugoslavia, Security Studies, 20:1, March 2011. pp.73-104

“Atoms for Peace can substantially retard or even reverse the growth of technical capacity to build the bomb, despite the transfer of hardware and know-how that it promotes.” (p.100)

In this article Hymans argues, contrary to the prevailing literature, that civil nuclear cooperation, such as the Atoms for Peace program, can help in preventing developing countries from acquiring a successful nuclear weapons program. He claims that the current literature is outdated and oversimplified. The central thesis of his argument concerns brain drain. By “changing the career opportunities available to the most talented and energetic workers […] Atoms for Peace makes their choice of loyalty more complicated, their choice for voice less dangerous and their choice for exit more feasible” (p.101). The author bases his argument on a case study of the nuclear developments and subsequent closure of the nuclear weapons program in Yugoslavia. He does not claim that Atoms for Peace singlehandedly resulted in the closure of the program or that the results could easily be generalised. He does however call for further studies to be done and he asks for a more nuanced debate on civil nuclear cooperation since it does have policy implications for the U.S.