by Kingston Reif On February 2, President Obama officially ratified the New START treaty in a low-key signing ceremony at the White House. The eight month-long campaign to win the Senate’s approval of the treaty, however, was anything but low-key. It was a knock down, drag out fight, the outcome of which was in doubt […]
European Missile Defenses: Following in the Inept Shoes of National Missile Defense?
The knock on United States National Missile Defense based in Alaska and California is that it never has been proved to work in real-world situations. Billions of dollars have been spent on that system, now called “ground-based mid-course,” but there is no sure evidence that the defense would work should North Korea launch nuclear-tipped missiles against us.
Because of the powerful political backing for the program, missile defense has avoided the commonsense “Fly Before You Buy” mantra that prevents billions from being wasted on weapons that may eventually prove ineffective.
According to a recent report by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), the government auditing agency, the Obama Administration is risking repeating history with its proposed missile defense systems in Europe.
The Bush Administration hid the true costs of National Missile Defense and avoided close scrutiny by using a policy it labeled “spiral development” – which probably should have stood for spiraling costs.
The Obama Administration’s new label is “phased adaptive approach.” According to the GAO, there are more questions than answers about the new plan.
To review the bidding, on September 17, 2009, President Obama announced a new approach for missile defense in Europe while canceling the Bush-planned system for establishing a third site for National Missile Defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. The revised system, to be deployed in phases of an increasingly capable system, was called “European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Administration argued that the new system could be deployed sooner against a nearer term threat and more comprehensively than the previous approach.
The first interceptors would be designed to protect U.S. forces deployed in Europe and our European allies against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched by Iran. Eventually, a matured system would help defend against longer-range threats.
The original interceptor deployments would take place on Aegis ships as early as 2011. Phase 2 is scheduled for 2015, including an Aegis defense system on land in Romania. In 2018, there would be more deployment in Poland and then a long-range defense by 2020.
NATO recently endorsed the territorial missile defense system, although it has yet to reach agreement on how to implement the new mission.
However, the missile defense agency is still exempt from rigorous standards. The GAO notes that: “MDA [Missile Defense Agency] continues to be exempted from DOD’s traditional joint requirements determination, acquisition, and associated oversight processes.”
In other words, there is no way to judge success if there are no clear requirements and goals except those defined by the agency with the most stake it defining the system as a success.
The GAO continues: “DOD does not have the information it needs to assess whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify potential problems,
or analyze how changes will impact the execution of this effort, and therefore is exposed to increased schedule, performance, and cost risks.”
As with National Missile Defense, the Pentagon may follow the proposed schedule and spend billions with no idea whether the system will really work. Pentagon does not yet have an overall cost estimate, according to the GAO. “DOD has not yet developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates and has indicated that it is unlikely to do so because EPAA is considered a policy designed to maximize flexibility. As a result, DOD does not have a basis from which to assess EPAA’s affordability and cost-effectiveness and is missing a tool with which to monitor implementation progress.”
The GAO adds: “Without life-cycle cost estimates DOD may not be able to determine whether its revised approach to BMD in Europe is fiscally sustainable and affordable.”
In other words, the United States may be buying more pigs in pokes with no ability to reply on the new system during a crisis.
By rushing forward with many aspects of the program, the GAO notes, the system will may have challenges in getting all its parts working together: “EPAA’s phases are not yet integrated with key acquisition activities and so are exposed to risk of schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased cost”.
Now none of these criticisms should phase [pun intended] Republicans, who have long embraced missile defense whether or not the system has been proved to work.
These Republicans are modern-day Potemkin-ites. According to history/myths, Russian minister Grigory Potyomkin had hollow facades of villages constructed along the Dnieper River in order to impress Empress Catherine II during her visit to Crimea in 1787.
The modern-day equivalent is the hollow missile defenses in Alaska and California. The new Obama plan is running the same risk as the West Coast system.
The Administration should slow down, set realistic goals, come up with a definitive cost estimate, and test the hell out of the system.
Obama Signs (and Ratifies) New START
Today, February 2, 2011, President Obama signed New START!!! NoH was invited to the ceremony, but sadly had other pressing business to attend to (I kid, I kid, both about being invited and the other pressing business)! The treaty has now officiall…
An (anonymous) American Advisor in Rural Afghanistan: Part V: The Successes of Capacity Building
The fifth of occasional postings
Guest Post by Afghanistan Ag Man
In the months since I last posted on Nukes of Hazard there have been many country-wide and provincial-level changes in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal was relieved of command over a Rolling Stone article, which prompted Embassy staffers to rather humorously compare and contrast the affair with that of the movie Almost Famous. President Hamid Karzai attempted to ban private security companies and, thus, change the face of development in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has moveded into once Taliban-controlled territories. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has followed suit; and so I have transitioned from an eastern province to an even more kinetic—or combat active—district in Kandahar.
Last November, I saw the last of the 173rd Airborne paratroopers that I lived with for the past year leave on twin Chinook helicopters and head back to their bases in Italy and Germany. With the fighting season over in most of the country and winter in full force, we are fine-tuning our goals and objectives for the new year (or the last half of the Islamic calendar year). Yet at the same time US civilians and Afghan government officials plan for what is to come, we are also taking stock of the previous year. While there is much to be done, we have much to be proud of.
From my perch at the provincial level, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL) has reignited a lackluster extension service that now effectively takes agricultural education to remote corners of the province, created farmers associations that revived export of Afghan products, increased services to once isolated parts of the province, and weaned itself away from primary dependency on foreign checkbooks and onto the Afghan government for support…
The monthly DAIL training sessions, for instance, bring 60 farmers to the capital from every district in the country, thus ensuring a DAIL presence in Taliban-controlled districts without risking the lives of US or Afghan civilians or troops. These training sessions have focused on various topics, including: integrated pest management (IPM) strategies, irrigation techniques, pruning, thinning, livestock health, and extension service efficiency. USDA created the trainings and provided funding for tools and techniques that are pertinent to the subject matter. Participants in these workshops then return to their own villages to share what they have learned. In my province of roughly half a million residents, for example, it is estimated that these trainings impact directly or indirectly impact roughly 200,000 farmers and their families each month.
In keeping with USDA’s mission of capacity building (aka “training the trainers”), these monthly sessions exemplify what capacity building can accomplish when properly executed. After we conducted the first set of trainings, the DAIL leadership independently organized a calendar with agricultural topics that coincided with the appropriate seasons (ie. pruning in late fall, pollination in early spring, etc). Even the funding for these workshops—which originally came from military Commanders Emergency Response Funds (CERP)—is now administered and regulated by the Afghan Provincial Development Council (PDC). Outside funding from Non-Governmental Organizations, USAID, and some bulk CERP funds still play a role, but decisions are filtered through the appropriate GIRoA officials for approval.
There are other examples of capacity building success. USDA established a farmers association (or cooperative) in a key terrain district within my province. The cooperative assists these farmers in post-harvest handling, packaging, processing, and methods of export. It now numbers 800 farmers. Equipping leaders with passports to the United Arab Emirates and India, USDA, DAIL, and implementing partners have been able to empower growers to export their fruit products at higher prices abroad, thus increasing disposable income at home and increasing the overall quality of life and health of Afghan farmers.
The cooperative is now taking the lead in establishing an even larger association in a neighboring district. In the past, these districts would have viewed one another as agribusiness competitors; however, these tribally mixed associations of Hazaras, Tajiks, and Pashtuns now see the financial benefits of cooperation and realize that a province-wide association is the key to raising profits long-term.
USDA has even helped the DAIL leadership physically access districts (via military convoy or air assets) that were—until last year—unreachable due to insecurity or geographic location. In one district DAIL leaders hosted the largest shura (or gathering) of farmers that the entire province had ever witnessed (with over 250 farmers). Just six months earlier, the Taliban sent a night letter threatening to kidnap and murder of any person caught working with USDA or DAIL, which resulted in USDA’s initial failed shura attempt in the district.
USDA, with the immense help of military and civilian partners, has fostered an extremely close relationship with the Afghan agriculture officials. These invaluable working relationships have built the foundation for a strong and responsive government directorate, and this can be seen in the growing confidence that Afghan citizens have toward their infant government.
For instance, when the kuchi (or nomadic herdsmen) (in my province?) experienced an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), they turned to the DAIL to assist them with vaccinations. When the codling moth and black rot were decimating apple yields, orchard owners turned to the DAIL to train them in cultural practices and sustainable solutions. When the floods destroyed orchards and eradicated the wheat harvest, the landowners turned to the DAIL for assistance in replanting techniques.
Just a year ago, the coalition forces were the sole source of funding and assistance for just about everything, whether for a mosque refurbishment or a generator or a well. Currently, such requests are now funded through the Afghan-led PDC and approved by the appropriate GIRoA line directors.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and implementing partners have a significant role to play as they complement government efforts. However, as it stands today, my province has realized that legitimate government bodies (i.e. DAIL, PDC, etc) that exist today will NOT be phased out anytime soon. Government ministries and directorates are serving their constituents, with tangible results that are strengthening their role in Afghan society.
As I look back on my time, I can see a lot of success mixed in with the occasional setback. This is a war, afterall, and things will not be perfect. We have lost many good men and women—both international and Afghan, military and civilian; government centers have been attacked; improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have detonated at increasing rates. These setbacks are right to be highlighted, but we shouldn’t lose sight of the real and measurable progress that has been made.
The Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Police Protection Program (AP3), the Afghan GIRoA officials, and the Afghan civilians that are working with the government all have made great strides this past year under the new counterinsurgency strategy. And the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops and non-Afghan civilians imbedded with them have a lot to be proud of as well.
I leave this province in the hands of the 10th Mountain Division, the Nevada Agribusiness Development Team, and a new USDA Advisor. More importantly, however, I leave this province with a functioning, competent DAIL that is on the path toward reaching its many lofty goals—goals that were once deemed too unrealistic to ever be achieved.
In light of this large amount of progress, I am compelled to remain in Afghanistan for another year and to take over the agricultural efforts in a critical district in Kandahar. With half of my future district controlled by Taliban and the district governor recently assassinated, the challenges will be great and the promise of succeeding will be small. However, the successes I saw this past year will sustain me when I face the heat (literally and figuratively) of my new post and I look forward to what lies ahead.
Last word (until the next word) on Keith Payne and New START
Following the Russian Duma’s third and final vote of approval of the New START treaty on Tuesday, the upper house of the Russian Federal Assembly (known as the Federation Council) gave its approval on Wednesday by a unanimous vote of 137-0. The treaty will enter into force once the U.S. and Russia exchange what are known as “instruments of ratification” (the official treaty documents that Presidents Obama and Medvedev actually sign). Last week we speculated that this could happen as early as next weekend on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. (UPDATE 1/31: The speculation was correct: The U.S. and Russia will exchange instruments of ratification on February 5 on the sidelines of the Munch Security Conference. Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov will do the honors.)
The initial exchange of data on missiles, launchers, heavy bombers, and warheads subject to the treaty is required 45 days after the treaty enters into force. The right to conduct on-site inspections begins 60 days after entry into force (i.e. sometime in April).
The ratification of New START is a big deal for all of the reasons the administration, the military, NoH, and so many others have laid out over and over again over the past two years. Yet Keith Payne is pointing to the Federal Assembly’s consideration of the treaty as evidence that he was right to oppose it. For Payne, the politics of churlishness appears to continue to take precedence over the best judgment of our military leadership…
In a parting shot at New START published in the National Review, Payne alleges that the Obama administration misinformed the Senate about the nature of the reductions required by the treaty. “The Obama administration typically presented the treaty as requiring Russian reductions,” he writes, while in reality Russia plans to reduce its stock of deployed delivery vehicles and warheads with or without New START. Payne has been beating this drum for over 18 months, but thinks he’s found the smoking gun in the form of Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov:
“Now — after the U.S. Senate has approved New START — senior Russian officials have confirmed the fears of U.S. skeptics. An Interfax-AVN article entitled “Russia’s Current Number of Nuclear Arms Well Within START Limits” reports that in a speech to the Duma about New START, Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov said that Russia will not eliminate any nuclear launcher or warhead before the end of its service life: “We will not cut a single unit.” The article reports that Serdyukov explained to the Duma that “Russia today has fewer nuclear warheads and delivery systems than the quantity set by the new Russian-American treaty” and that “by all the parameters, even launchers, we will only achieve the level that’s in the treaty by 2028. As for nuclear weapons, we will get there by 2018.” The Duma presumably appreciated the news.”
There is far less here than may meet the eye. First, the administration never argued that the treaty will require Russia to reduce its delivery vehicles. In a June 14 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated: “The Russians, the number of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is in fact below the treaty limits, but the number of warheads is above the treaty limits. So they will have to take down warheads.”
Regarding warheads, it appears that Defense Minister Serdyukov told the Federal Assembly that Russia won’t eliminate any systems before the end of their service life, which isn’t the same thing as saying that Russia won’t have to eliminate any warheads. According to unclassified estimates, Russia currently deploys approximately 2,600-2,800 warheads. In order to get down to the 1,550 limit in the treaty, Russia will eliminate the warheads on its oldest delivery vehicles – namely those on the SS-19 and SS-25 ICBMs and SS-N-18 SLBMs that it plans to retire in the coming years.
As I’ve noted before, the fact the some Russian reductions might happen in any event is beside the point. New START is not in the first instance a reductions treaty, although some reductions in deployed forces are required. Rather, the treaty’s legally-binding limits and data exchange, monitoring, and verification provisions will place a cap on Russia’s deployed forces. The administration has always been crystal clear about this. As STRATCOM Gen. Kevin Chilton pointed out in April 2010: “One thing I was pleased to see in the treaty were these limits because as you look to the future though Russia may be close to or slightly below them already, when you look to the future we certainly don’t want them to grow and they would have been unrestricted otherwise without these types of limits articulated in the treaty…”
Does Payne want to bet that Russia would continue to reduce its missiles and bombers without New START? Our military certainly wouldn’t make such an irresponsible wager. Without limits on the size of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, Russia would have less confidence in its ability to maintain a stable strategic nuclear relationship with the United States. This could prompt Moscow to maintain a larger number of deployed delivery vehicles (and by extension warheads) than it plans to keep under New START. Perhaps this is the outcome Payne hoped to see all along.
