“Nobody except the wackos has been flat opposed to any arms control.”
Joe Biden, Senate Floor Debate on the FY 2001 NDAA, June 7, 2000.
Russia’s Process for Ratification of the New START Treaty
By Kingston Reif and Jessica Estanislau
Now that the U.S. Senate has approved the New START treaty, the next step on the way to final entry into force (and the resumption of on-site inspections of U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear forces) is approval by the Russian legislature – aka the Federal Assembly of Russia. The Federal Assembly consists of a lower house (the Duma) and an upper house (the Federation Council). Russian law requires that both houses approve the treaty by a majority vote. All indications are that this will happen before the end of the month.
Don’t expect a knock down, drag out fight over the treaty in Russia (as was the case in the U.S.). The Russian legislative and executive branches are tied much more closely at the hip than their U.S. counterparts. In other words, what Medvedev and Putin want, Medvedev and Putin will get. And they want New START.
Which raises the question: Why has Russia waited until now to act on the treaty? When the two sides signed New START last April, Moscow made it very clear that the Russian parliament would be synchronizing its ratification process with the U.S. process. The reason for this is that the Russians feared that if they quickly ratified the treaty only to see the U.S. Senate eventually reject it, they would be the ones left holding the bag.
While the Russian legislature’s approval of the treaty remains assured, it has adjusted the review process to address the conditions attached to the New START resolution of ratification by the U.S. Senate…
In July 2010, the international affairs committee and the defense committee in the Russian Duma recommended that the Duma ratify New START (without any reservations) at around the same time the U.S. Senate gives its approval. However, in the aftermath of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s action on the resolution of ratification, which appended a total of 26 conditions, understandings, and declarations about how it interpreted the treaty, and due to continued delays in the full Senate’s consideration of the agreement, both Duma committees retracted their endorsement in order to reconsider the treaty.
Following the full U.S. Senate’s approval of New START on December 22, the Duma quickly gave its preliminary approval on December 24th by a vote of 350-58. Prior to the Duma’s second reading of the treaty on January 14, Russian lawmakers added six articles to the ratification text that outline the Duma’s understanding of the treaty. Further tweaks to the text could be made in the lead up to the third and final vote in the Duma scheduled for January 25 or 26, after which the Federation Council is expected to give its prompt approval to the treaty. (UPDATE 1/21: In addition to the ratification text responding to the U.S. resolution of ratification, the Duma international affair committee has also prepared a supplementary statement “On the Provision of Combat Readiness and Development of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Nuclear Arms Segment and Defense Plants Operating in it.”)
Pavel and Jeffrey have posted a translation and some analysis of the Russian ratification text. Nothing issued by either side changes the actual text of the treaty. From our vantage point most of it amounts to rhetorical throat-clearing in response to the Senate’s action on the treaty – save for perhaps the statement in Article 2 re: new kinds of strategic offensive weapons. The parts on Russian strategic force modernization and missile defense are nothing new. And it’s interesting that the ratification text describes the controversial New START preamble as having “indisputable significance” (according to the State Department’s translation) as opposed to being “legally binding.” Or is this simply a distinction without a difference? In any event, as Pavel notes, “nothing [in the ratification text] strikes me as irreconcilable.”
Some New START critics have already latched on to the Russian ratification process to claim that their fears about the treaty are being realized. NoH will touch on these claims in a later post. In the meantime, look for Presidents Obama and Medvedev (or duly designated ambassadors) to exchange instruments of ratification sometime in late January or February, perhaps on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference to be held February 4-6.
Experts Reject Zero Enrichment Push Ahead of Talks in Istanbul
As a new round of P5+1 talks with Iran are just getting underway in Istanbul, the following letter has been released by a group of experts including Columbia professor and former National Security Council staffer Gary Sick, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador John Limbert, and former British Ambassador to Iran Sir Richard Dalton. The letter urges the US to “reinvigorate diplomacy” by engaging with Iran more persistently, broadening the US-Iranian dialogue, and above all, setting realistic objectives. The group advocates that the US be prepared to recognize a peaceful Iranian enrichment program following the establishment of more effective monitoring and verification mechanisms, including the Additional Protocol.
Text is below and after the jump:
As the United States prepares for the upcoming round of multilateral talks with Iran, it is imperative that the Obama Administration reinvigorate its diplomacy by pursuing engagement with Tehran more persistently, setting realistic objectives, and broadening the US-Iranian dialogue. Diplomacy is the only sustainable means of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, avoiding the dangerous folly of military confrontation in the Middle East, and enabling progress in other critical areas of US interest, such as Afghanistan and the human rights situation within Iran.
Reinvigorating diplomacy means seeking to engage Iran more persistently. The upcoming Istanbul meeting is only the fourth meeting on the nuclear issue involving both the United States and Iran, and no breakthrough can be expected without additional talks. Fortunately, time exists to pursue a diplomatic solution. Both US and Israeli officials have made public statements recently acknowledging that Iran remains years away from having the capability to construct a nuclear weapon.
Reinvigorating diplomacy also means pursuing realistic objectives. Unrealistic outcomes, such as insisting that Iran cease uranium enrichment entirely, however desirable, must be set aside. Focus should instead be placed on establishing monitoring and verification mechanisms that can ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is, indeed, used solely for peaceful purposes. Secretary Clinton stated in December that the United States would be prepared to recognize a peaceful enrichment program on Iranian soil. This is a productive step to achieve a satisfactory compromise for which the Administration should be commended.
Finally, reinvigorating diplomacy means addressing issues with Iran beyond the nuclear file. Tehran presents challenges and opportunities in many other areas of importance to US national security, including the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq, drug trafficking, and the human rights situation in Iran itself. The US should seek common ground in all areas of interest and not hold progress in one area hostage to resolution of others. Indeed, progress on human rights or Afghanistan may create a better climate for progress on the nuclear issue. The US engagement agenda must be expanded to reflect this.
Diplomacy with Iran will not be easy and no quick fixes should be expected. Iran must also negotiate in earnest and make the serious compromises necessary for resolution of the nuclear issue. The concerns of the IAEA, the P5+1, and the international community more broadly must be addressed by Iran on the basis of transparency and cooperation. Resolving decades of enmity between the US and Iran will require that both sides work to create openings for successful engagement.
Only reinvigorated diplomacy holds the promise of bridging the many divides between the US and Iran and achieving a sustainable solution that prevents a disastrous military confrontation, prevents an Iranian bomb and the additional proliferation that would follow, and protects the human rights of the Iranian people.
Barry Blechman, co-founder, the Stimson Center?
Professor Juan Cole, University of Michigan ?
Sir Richard Dalton, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Former British Ambassador to Iran ?
Debra DeLee, President and CEO, Americans for Peace Now?
Jonathan W. Evans, Legislative Representative for Foreign Policy, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Professor Farideh Farhi, University of Hawaii ?
Chas W. Freeman, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and President, Middle East Policy Council
Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr., (USA, Ret.) Chairman, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation ?
Col. Sam Gardiner (USA, Ret.)?
Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association ?
Amb. John Limbert, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Firuzeh Mahmoudi, Executive Director, United4Iran?
Paul Kawika Martin, Policy Director, Peace Action ?
Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy?
Robert Naiman, Executive Director, Just Foreign Policy?
Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council?
Bruno Pellaud, Former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency?
Professor Paul Pillar, Georgetown University?
Jon Rainwater, Executive Director, Peace Action West?
Rachelle Lyndaker Schlabach, Director, Mennonite Central Committee U.S. Washington Office?
Professor Gary Sick, Columbia University?
Professor John Tirman, Executive Director and Principal Research Scientist, MIT Center for International Studies
South-North Korea Military Dialogue Soon?
South Korea has reportedly accepted North Korea’s proposal for high-level military talks. Pyongyang’s proposal came on Thursday immediately following U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao’s Wednesday summit, which called for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue and denuclearization. So it appears there was prior coordination between Beijing and Pyongyang ahead of the U.S.-China summit. It also appears preparatory cross-border talks at the working-level could commence in early February. However, the two Koreas are in for some very tough discussions, and the results of the preparatory meeting will determine whether and when formal military talks take place.
It would be the first time in about three months since the two Koreas held military discussions. Last September, Pyongyang was unwilling to discuss the sinking of the Cheonan ship and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.
This time, Seoul’s Unification Ministry says Pyongyang proposed discussing the sinking of the South’s Cheonan ship and artillery attacks on Yeonpyeong Island.
Why the sudden seemingly conciliatory gesture? (Click “read more”).
It’s hard to know for sure, but it cannot be easily ruled out that there may be a hidden agenda behind their outward show.
Seoul, Washington and Tokyo’s conditions for the resumption of the Six Party Talks are inter-Korean dialogue to address Korean tensions and a sincere gesture to denuclearize:
1. Inter-Korean dialogue & Pyongyang’s proposal on agenda:
It does not seem likely that North Korea would easily apologize for its two attacks, and it may try to steer the focus toward establishing a special peace zone in the West Sea as agreed upon during the October 2007 Inter-Korean summit. Pyongyang may also be using the cross-border meeting as a mere show hoping to jump on the fast-track toward direct talks with Washington.
However, the upcoming cross-border talks will still be a chance for Seoul to gauge how sincere Pyongyang is in taking responsibility for its attacks and promising to restrain from further provocations.
–Yeonpyeong Island attack: North Korea has publically acknowledged shelling the South Korean island that killed soldiers and civilians, so Pyongyang could “express regret” over the incident, which could be interpreted as a form of taking responsibility.
–Cheonan ship sinking: This is a much trickier matter because Pyongyang has denied torpedoing the South Korea ship, which goes against the results of an international investigation . It seems unlikely that Pyongyang would reverse its position at the inter-Korean military talks. Instead, the regime could choose to say something along the lines that it “would continue to work together toward resolving the issue.” However, it is unclear whether this type of “flexibility” would be enough for Seoul to give the green light for Six Party Talk preparations.
2. Nuclear talks:
Seoul would also like to hold high-level cross-border talks on the North’s nuclear programs to gauge the level of Pyongyang’s sincerity to denuclearize. However, the regime has in the past refused to discuss the nuclear issue with Seoul claiming it is a matter between it and Washington. The North has typically used the “nuclear card” to elicit direct talks with the U.S.
On the surface, it appears the pieces are about to become aligned to create an environment favorable for the resumption of the Six Party Talks. But there’s still a lot work to be done before all the pieces can fall into place.
Dueling Quotes of the Day, Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Edition
Note: Sorry for the lite blogging as of late. Expect it to pick up over the next couple of weeks.
Asked if the final cost [of the UPF] will be somewhere between $4.2 billion and $6.5 billion, [John] Howanitz [B&W Y-12’s senior vice president for transformation and projects] replied: ‘That’s the question of the day. If you ask me today, I will tell you that based on the information we have acquired, the pricing we have on hand, I’m very confident that this is a good estimate. But I’m not at 90 percent design. …Will it go down? I don’t know. Will it go up? I don’t know. But, if someone were to say, can someone come in and validate this, I would welcome anyone to come in and look at our product — in fact, the government has — and we have a good product.”
Via Frank Munger, January 18, 2010
NNSA is developing 10 new technologies for use in the UPF and is using a systematic approach—Technology Readiness Levels (TRL)—to gauge the extent to which technologies have been demonstrated to work as intended….However, NNSA does not expect all 10 new technologies to achieve the level of maturity called for by best practices before making critical decisions….In addition, DOE’s guidance for establishing optimal TRLs prior to beginning construction is not consistent with best practices or with our previous recommendations. As a result, 6 of 10 technologies NNSA is developing are not expected to reach optimum TRLs consistent with best practices by the time UPF construction begins. If critical technologies fail to work as intended, NNSA may need to revert to existing or alternate technologies, possibly resulting in changes to design plans and space requirements that could delay the project and increase costs.
GAO Report on the UPF, November 2010
