Adding to the suspense building up to his Tuesday talk in Washington, DC, Siegfried Hecker has again disclosed pertininent information about North Korea’s nuclear development. On Sunday November 21, Hecker purported that Pyongyang has built a new pilo…
Consequences of Failure to Ratify New START
Straight from the mouths of our military leadership and current and former high-ranking government officials from both parties…
Gen. Chilton: Russians unconstrained, lose insight into Russian nuclear arsenal
Without New START, we would rapidly lose insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex and more costly. Without such a regime, we would unfortunately be left to use worst-case analyses regarding our own force requirements. Further, we would be required increasingly to focus low-density/high demand intelligence collection and analysis assets on Russian nuclear forces.”
[General Kevin Chilton, STRATCOM Commander, 6/16/10]
Adm. Mullen: Lost of trust weakens deterrence
“And as I have said many times, in many different contexts, in this fast-paced, flatter world of ours, information, and the trust it engenders, is every bit as much a deterrent as any weapon we deploy.”
[Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen, 11/12/10]
Brent Scowcroft: Nuclear negotiations thrown into chaos
“The principal result of non-ratification would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of chaos.”
[General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.), President George H.W. Bush’s National Security Advisor, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, 6/10/10]
James Schlesinger: U.S. non-proliferation efforts undermined
“Failure to ratify this treaty “would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others with regard to, particularly, the nonproliferation issue.”
[James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense for Presidents Nixon and Ford and the Secretary of Energy for President Carter, 4/29/10]
William Perry: U.S. leadership on non-proliferation forfeited
“If we fail to ratify this treaty, the U.S. forfeits any right to leadership on nonproliferation policies.”
[Former Defense Secretary William Perry, 4/29/10]
Sen. Richard Lugar: Work to secure nukes in Russia would suffer
“It is unlikely that Moscow would sustain cooperative efforts indefinitely without the New START Treaty coming into force.”
[Sen. Richard Lugar,11/8/10]
Henry Kissinger: Adversaries and allies unsettled
“This START treaty is an evolution of treaties that have been negotiated in previous administrations of both parties. And its principal provisions are an elaboration or a continuation of existing agreements. Therefore, a rejection of them would indicate that a new period of American policy had started that might rely largely on the unilateral reliance of its nuclear weapons, and would therefore create an element of uncertainty in the calculations of both adversaries and allies. And therefore, I think it would have an unsettling impact on the international environment.”
[Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor to President Nixon and Secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford, 5/25/10]
Robert Kagan: Strengthens Putin, undermines cooperation on Iran, Afghanistan
“There’s no getting around it: Failure to pass START will help empower Putin . . . On Iran, Russia will become less cooperative . . . Russia’s refusal to deliver the S-300 air defense system to Tehran and its earlier agreement to allow the U.S. military to ship material to Afghanistan across Russian territory have been the reset’s big tangible payoffs.”
[Robert Kagan, Brookings Institution senior fellow, 11/12/10]
Los Alamos director: Less information about Russians
“Without data from new START, would that create more uncertainty for us about Russia? Certainly the country would not get as much information that the monitoring program would provide through new START.”
[Michael Anastasio, Director of The Los Alamos National Laboratory, 7/15/10]
Lawrence Livermore director: Less certainty
“I think that it is certainly true that the START treaty that is under your consideration does offer the ability to understand, provide more data on what’s going on in Russia with their systems. As a technical person, data is always valuable and so it will certainly reduce our uncertainties.”
[George Miller, Director of The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,7/15/10]
Former Senator Chuck Hagel: U.S. leadership on non-proliferation compromised
“If this were to go down, the ripple effect consequences around the world would be the worst possible outcome we’ve seen since World War II. It would set in motion the disintegration of any confidence in the leadership of the two major nuclear powers to deal with this and it would set in motion a disintegration of any structural boundaries and capacities to deal with this. This would devastating not just for arms control but for security interests worldwide.”
[Chuck Hagel, former Republican Senator from Nebraska, 7/19/10]
Lt. General John Castellaw (US Marine Corps, retired): lose inspections, worst-case planning
“U.S. ability to conduct on-site inspections will continue to be suspended . . .U.S. is obliged to plan on worst-case scenarios with regard to our own deployments.”
[Lt. General John Castellaw (US Marine Corps, retired), 11/15/10]
Lt. General Dirk Jameson (USAF, retired): Less information about Russians
“Without it [New START] we’d be poorly equipped to monitor Russia’s arsenal.”
[Lt. General Dirk Jameson, former Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of U.S. Strategic Command, 7/19/10]
Gates, Clinton, Mullen, etc.: Ratify New START Now!
Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates had an op-ed in The Washington Post yesterday urging prompt Senate approval of the New START treaty.
Their message to the Senate is clear and simple: It’s time to get your act together because “our national security depends on it”.
Clinton and Gates highlight three key national security objectives that will fall by the way side without New START:
1. Essential data about and verification of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which we have not had since the START I Treaty expired last December , just over 340 days ago.
2. A “reset” in the relationship between Russia and the United States that has important benefits far beyond the issue of nuclear stability.
3. A reduction in the U.S. deployed strategic arsenal to an acceptable level that in no way hurts our national security interests
Last week Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen also spoke out about the importance of New START… At a gathering at Stanford University, Mullen explained that militarily, this treaty, “allows us to retain a strong and flexible American nuclear deterrent.” Mullen added that, “it [also] strengthens openness and transparency in our relationship with Russia.”
Mullen also noted: “as I have said many times, in many different contexts, in this fast-paced, flatter world of ours, information and the trust it engenders, is every bit as much a deterrent as any weapon we deploy.” As Clinton and Gates point out, “Ronald Reagan’s favorite maxim was ‘trust, but verify.’” Without New START, all we have is trust.
Other national security heavyweights have also recently spoke to the consequences of failing to ratify New START.
Senator Lugar stated in a November 8th speech in Madrid re: the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program, which has been protecting the U.S. from the threat of Russian “loose nukes” for twenty years, “it is unlikely that Moscow would sustain cooperative efforts indefinitely without the New START Treaty coming into force.”
No New START means no verification of Russia’s still enormous deployed nuclear arsenal, no future agreement to increase transparency over or reduce Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal, and perhaps no future cooperative efforts to safeguard Russian nuclear materials, warheads, and delivery systems from potential loss or theft by terrorists.
And that is just what would happen to our relationship with Russia. We must remember that the world is watching the U.S. Senate’s deliberations on the treaty. If we fail to ratify New START, we’re essentially telling the rest of the world that we’re incapable of leadership on nonproliferation and that we’re unwilling to adhere to our obligation under the NPT to take steps to reduce our own nuclear arsenal. As former Republican Senator Chuck Hagel explained:
[Failure to ratify New START] would set in motion the disintegration of any confidence in the leadership of the two major nuclear powers to deal with this [nonproliferation] and it would set in motion a disintegration of any structural boundaries and capacities to deal with this. This would be devastating not just for arms control but for security interests worldwide.
So the question is simple: Are we really willing to give up verification of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and future arms control treaties, and hurt our relationship with not only Russia but all nuclear and non nuclear weapon states, all at a time when the threat of proliferation and nuclear terrorism pose the greatest threat to our national security? You certainly don’t need me to tell you what the answer should be.
U.S.-India Nuclear Ties: More Exceptions & Inconsistencies?
U.S. President Barack Obama’s trip to India last week undoubtedly carried a message pointed straight at China. By underlining the importance of and building strategic partnerships with Beijing’s regional rivals, the apparent objective is to bring down China’s role and growing influence amid a bilateral dispute over the yuan’s exchange rate. Where does India fit in? It’s seen as a counterweight to China and the two countries have been long-time competitors. All this, on top of the obvious U.S. objective to deepen relations with the world’s largest democracy, a big security partner on counter-terrorism, and enormous market on which American businesses can thrive. So, it’s apparent that Washington is treating India as a responsible power and ally to American interests after having never been regarded as a possible ally in the second half of the 20th century. National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon told reporters on Air Force One, “President Obama intends this trip to be — and intends our policy to be — a full embrace of India’s rise.”
Yes, the world and international relationships are constantly evolving, so policies should be crafted (sometimes revised) to fit new realities of the time and the future. However, on the nuclear front, we must remember some facts from history, near and distant, as well as the implications. Click “read more.”
Key facts:
1. Recall that the Bush administration signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with India in 2008, which undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since New Delhi is not an NPT-signatory. It also made it harder for the U.S. to be strict with other countries in future civilian nuclear agreements.
2. Recall that the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that same year awarded India with an exemption by lifting an embargo on nuclear trade with New Delhi. This embargo was put in place immediately following India’s nuclear test of 1974, the same year the NSG was formed. The waiver was granted based on India’s promise to abide by strict non-proliferation policy (still without signing the NPT) and in recognition of its energy needs. The waiver allows India to buy uranium for its existing reactors along with technologies to reprocess spent fuel and reduce radioactive waste (a process that also can help build nuclear bombs). However, this also opens the door for India to use the uranium for nuclear devices. It’s important to remember that India is the only non-NPT country to enjoy such a perk. Basically, the waiver recognizes India, which is outside the NPT, as a “nuclear weapons state” – a term and status that is strictly given to NPT members.
President Obama in November 2009 re-affirmed U.S. commitment for “the early and full implementation of our civil nuclear cooperation agreement [with India]… The lifting of U.S. export controls on high technology exports to India will open vast opportunities for giant research and development efforts. It will enable U.S. industry to benefit from the rapid economic and technological transformation that is now underway in our country.”
His recent trip ignited a wave of news articles from the Indian press about Washington’s plans to support New Delhi’s full membership in the nuclear club and other multilateral export control regimes (NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australian Group, Wassenaar Arrangement). Again, India is relying on the U.S. for successful entry, and reiterated its strong commitment to non-proliferation ahead of Obama’s trip.
Concerns in a nutshell:
1. India is not a signatory of the NPT, which means, it is not held accountable by the international non-proliferation regime.
2. India has signed the Additional Protocol (a good thing) and put its existing and future civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards (another good thing), but international inspectors cannot touch New Delhi’s military nuclear facilities. India also retains the right to designate a reactor as “civilian” or “military” (not good things).
3. India has agreed to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and to strengthen the security of its existing nuclear arsenals. However, nothing exists to prevent it from carrying out nuclear weapons tests. The 2008 NSG decision has made it more difficult to persuade India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and stop producing weapons-usable fissile materials.
4. Exceptions and inconsistencies: The plan for India’s entry into the NSG and export control regimes appears to be in phases. Deputy National Security Adviser Mike Froman reportedly said “As the membership criteria of these four regimes evolve, we intend to support India’s full membership in them. And at the same time, India will take steps to fully adopt the regime’s export control requirements to reflect its prospective membership.” NSG membership rules (as well as the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement) are currently linked to the NPT. But the U.S. and India appear to be working towards transcending the existing non-proliferation regime. Froman said the U.S. would “encourage the evolution of a membership criteria of these regimes consistent with maintaining their core principles” while a senior Indian official said, “We are constructing a paradigm beyond the NPT.”
New LWR In North Korea?
North Korea is constructing an experimental light-water reactor (LWR) capable of generating 25 to 30 megawatts of electricity, according to Stanford University’s Siegfried Hecker on Saturday. After a North Korea trip, Hecker told reporters in Beijing that Pyongyang informed him in March of its plans to build a LWR power plant that uses its own nuclear fuel. In September, David Albright with the Institute for Science and International Security disclosed satellite images of construction work underway in the Yongbyon complex where the North’s cooling tower was demolished in 2008 as a symbolic gesture to denuclearize. David Albright has not yet disclosed conclusions to his findings, but one Washington nuclear expert initially suspected that North Korea could be building a cooling facility to provide the same function of a cooling tower needed to produce nuclear weapons.
It is too early to sound alarm bells or to be overly concerned. Still, if the North is in fact building a LWR, then some initial thoughts that come to mind are that Pyongyang again has a domestic and international agenda. It appears to be a sign that the North will continue to pursue uranium enrichment even though it will take years to complete the reactor and will have difficulty receiving outside help for its construction due to a series of UN Security Council sanctions resolutions and export bans. The only way to receive outside help is to smuggle in reactor parts, centrifuges and other technology under the radar of export controls. In realistic terms, the envisioned reactor can only be small in size. Even China is unable to safely build large reactors on its own.
The move also seems to be a part of the “mighty and powerful nation by 2012” equation and to prepare for a leadership succession. The LWR construction could also have an element of eliciting negotiations from the U.S. despite an apparent decision to rely on big brother China for life support. And then of course, it could be a show to grab international attention.