Secretary of Defense Robert Gates “The answer for successive presidents, as Secretary Clinton has said, of both parties, has always been with an agreement. The U.S. Senate has always agreed. The same answer holds true for New START. The U.S. is better off with this treaty than without it, and I am confident that it […]
Arms Control 101
In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, former George W. Bush administration official Doug Feith writes that whereas he stood firm in the face of Russian demands to limit U.S. missile defenses, the Obama administration caved to Russian demands. According to Feith, “In the SORT negotiations, they [the Russians] demanded that the treaty recognize an “interrelationship” between offensive arms reductions and missile defense,” which the Bush administration rejected. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a similar claim in her recent Journal op-ed endorsing the treaty.
Others remember this history a little differently. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on New START notes,
This is by no means the first time the interrelationship between offensive and defensive systems has been recognized. For example, in their joint statement of July 21, 2001, President Bush and President Putin agreed that ‘‘major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and defensive systems. We already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We will shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems [emphasis added].’’ In the press conference that followed, President Bush emphasized that offensive and defensive systems were interrelated, stating, ‘‘And along these lines, as the President said, that we’re going to have open and honest dialogue about defensive systems, as well as reduction of offensive systems. The two go hand-in-hand in order to set up a new strategic framework for peace.’’ [emphasis mine.]
A link is of course not a limit. But it has been longstanding U.S. policy to note the link between offensive and defensive forces. And it’s still our policy. To quote from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report once more:
The interrelationship between our strategic defensive arms and other countries’ strategic offensive arms is fundamental to our current missile defense policy: the United States desires that our capability to defend against limited attack will render useless the initial strategic offensive capability that certain countries are contemplating or developing. As the BMDR Report notes, in addition to defeating a limited ICBM attack should deterrence fail, our Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system is designed to ‘‘dissuade’’ other states from developing an ICBM capability and to ‘‘deter’’ those countries from using an ICBM if they develop or acquire such a capability. The United States is thus counting on the interrelationship between strategic defensive and offensive arms to which the New START preambular language alludes to undermine the threats posed by countries capable of deploying only limited numbers of strategic offensive arms against the United States, its forces, its allies, and its partners.
To reiterate, this interrelationship is an objective reality that undergirds U.S. policy toward rogue states (and still undergirds U.S. policy toward Russia, albeit in a different way). It’s Arms Control 101. I guess Doug Feith only remembers what he learned in that class when Republicans are President.
For more information on the New START treaty and missile defense, check out our handy fact sheet over at the mothership.
Consequences of Failure of New START to Enter into Force
Gen. Chilton: Russians unconstrained, lose insight into Russian nuclear arsenal “Without New START, we would rapidly lose insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex and more costly. Without such a regime, we would unfortunately be left to use worst-case analyses regarding […]
New START and Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Overview New START does not impose limits on non-strategic warheads. No previous arms control agreement has limited these weapons. While experts agree that tactical weapons present difficult challenges, there was not sufficient time to reach an agreement on nonstrategic forces during this round of negotiations. The best way to address tactical nuclear weapons is to […]
New START and Missile Defense
Overview According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, New START “will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses.” While Russia is concerned about U.S. missile defense plans, the Obama administration kept missile defense on a separate track from reductions in […]