Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

December 21, 2010 Republican Senators voting aye bolded and italicized YEAs —67 Akaka (D-HI) Alexander (R-TN) Baucus (D-MT) Begich (D-AK) Bennet (D-CO) Bennett (R-UT) Bingaman (D-NM) Boxer (D-CA) Brown (D-OH) Brown (R-MA) Cantwell (D-WA) Cardin (D-MD…

Friday, after successfully stripping the fiscal 2011 National Defense Authorization Act of all controversy, the House sent their shiny new and simplified (over 900 pages worth of simple) version of the bill to the Senate.

Gone, but not lost, from the measure is a provision to repeal “don’t ask don’t tell,” the same provision that prevented the House’s original bill from moving forward earlier this year.  Also missing is a Senate Armed Services provision that would have allowed privately funded abortions in military hospitals.

The bill’s effect is limited, since programs are funded by individual appropriations bills, but it still packs a considerable punch.

The $725 billion measure would authorize a 1.4 percent pay raise for troops starting next month, extend Tricare coverage for military dependents to age 26, create a counter-IED database to assist with troop-protection efforts, and direct the development of better lightweight body armor for ground forces, among other provisions.

The bill fails to provide guidance either way on the F-35 extra engine, neither preventing nor providing for the program.  It would, however, require the troubled F-35 program to adhere to a new set of management guidelines under which decisions to commit to specific levels of production would be linked to the program’s progress in meeting specific milestones.

Now we wait for the Senate, which was expected to follow suit immediately, but remains bogged down in the details.  If the Senate amends the bill it will be sent back to the House, and days are limited.

New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, who retruned from a private mission to Pyongyang, said that North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, and negotiate the sale of 12,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. At a …

1.      (Defeated) McCain Amendment 4814 to strike

“Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more importation as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.”

2.      Inhofe Amendment 4833 VERIFICATION to increase the number of Type One inspections from 10 to 30 as well as increasing the number of Type Two inspections from 8 to 24.

3.      (Defeated) Risch Amendment 4839 would insert the following into the preamble:

“Acknowledging there is an interrelationship between non-strategic and strategic offensive arms, that as the number of strategic offensive arms is reduced this relationship becomes more pronounced and requires an even greater need for transparency and accountability, and that the disparity between the Parties’ arsenals could undermine predictability and stability.”

4.      Ensign Amendment 4840 RAIL MOBILE seeks to clarify that a self-propelled device means a railcar or flatcar (road mobile devices).

5.      Thune Amendment 4841 WARHEAD LIMITS seeks to increase the limits on the number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers) from 700 to 720.

6.      Thune Amendment 4842 WARHEAD LIMITS seeks to increase the limits on the number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers) from 700 to 800.

7.      Vitter Amendment 4846 MISSILE DEFENSE would strike the section of the treaty that precludes the parties from converting ICMB launchers for missile defense use.

8.      LeMieux Amendment 4847 TACTICAL NUKES would alter the treaty to include a provision that states that a year following the enactment of this treaty that both Parties will start negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons.

9.      Kyl Amendment 4854 WARHEAD LIMITS would amend the treaty to insert the following language into Article 2 (which relates to the number of strategic weapons)

“Each Party undertakes not to produce, flight-test, or deploy silo-based ICBMs with more than one warhead.  This limitation does not apply to existing types of ICBMs as of the date of the signature of this Treaty.”

10.  Ensign Amendment 4855 RAIL MOBILE would amend Part One of the protocol to strike “the self propelled devise on which it is mounted” and insert “the self-propelled device or railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted.”

11.  Ensign Amendment 4856 ROUGE REGIMES would amend the preamble of the treaty by inserting  after “reduction in nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century” the following:

“as well as the negative effect on the world situation of the proliferation efforts of rogue regimes such as North Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela and others.”

12.  Ensign Amendment 4857 ROGUE REGIMES would amend the preamble of the treaty by striking “Expressing string support for on-going global efforts in non-proliferation”  and replacing it with:

“Expressing the need for increased support for on-going global efforts in non-proliferation, especially in dealing with North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and other rogue regimes.”

13.  Ensign Amendment 4858 RAIL MOBILE seeks to insert into Part One of the protocol after paragraph 57: “or railcar or flatcare” after “self-propelled device.”

14.  Kly Amendment 4865 MISSILE DEFENSE TARGET VEHICLES would amend the treaty to provide an understanding that missile defense target vehicles do not count against the United States limit on deployed or non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs.

Resolution of Ratification Amendments

Declaration

15.  Sessions Amendment 4851 NUCLEAR ZERO would amend the resolution of ratification would state that it is the sense of the Senate that the US government will not pursue a policy of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

Condition

16.  Thune Amendment 4852 BOMBER UPGRADES would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President first certifying that the USG will development a replacement for a heavy bomber that has nuclear and convention capabilities.

Condition

17.  Cornyn Amendment 4835 INTERRELATIONSHIP B/W DEFENSE AND OFFENSE would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President submits to the Senate and notifies the Russia that the USG rejects the preamble as it relates to the interrelationship between offensive and defensive.

Sense of the Senate

18.  Kyl Amendment 4859 PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE would amend the resolution of ratification by stating that it is the sense of the Senate that it is the “understanding of the United States that conventional prompt global strike systems that may be deployed by the United States will not be counted towards the central limits of the new START Treaty pertaining to either delivery vehicles or warheads.”

Condition

19.  Kyl Amendment 4860 LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISED MISSILES would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President negotiating a legally binding side agreement with the Russian Federation that states Russia will not deploy a significant number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missile during the duration of the START Treaty.

Condition

20.  Kyl Amendment 4861 TREATY EXTENSION would amend the resolution of ratification to state that any extension of the new START Treaty could only be done so with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Condition

21.  Kyl Amendment 4826 TELEMETRIC EXCHANGES ON BALLISTIC MISSILES DEPLOYED BY RUSSIA would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President shall certify to the Senate that Russia has agreed that it will not deny telemetric exchanges on new Ballistic Missile System it deploys during the duration of the New START Treaty.

Understanding

22.  Kyl Amendment 4863 GLOBAL STRIKE CAPABILITIES would amend the resolution of ratification to state that the US Senate interprets that the Bilateral Consultative Commission does not have jurisdiction or can the United States complete any agreement limiting the conventional global strike systems of the United States or otherwise limit the conventional global strike systems of the United States.

Condition

23.  Kyl Amendment 4864 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that the President intends to 1) modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems (ICBM, SSBN. SLBM, Heavy Bomber) and 2) maintain the US rocket motor industrial base.

Understanding

24.  Kyl Amendment 4866 TELEMETRIC INFORMATION ON MISSILE DEFENSE would amend the resolution of ratification to provide an understanding that the United States will not provide the Russian Federation telemetric information on its missile defense systems for the duration of the New START Treaty.

Understanding

25.  Kyl Amendment 4867 BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION would amend the resolution of ratification to provide an understanding that no provision adopted in the Bilateral Consultative Commission can take effect until 30 days after it has been notified to the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee as well as the National security Working Group.

Condition

26.  Kyl Amendment 4868 GLOBAL STRIKE CAPABILITIES would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President’s certification that the Department of Defense will deploy conventional prompt global strike systems during the duration of the New START Treaty.

Declaration

27.  Kyl Amendment 4869 MODERNIZATION OF WARHEADS would amend the resolution of ratification by declaring that it is the sense of the senate that modernization of warheads must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis using the full spectrum of life extension options available based on the best technical advice of the United States military and the National Nuclear Weapons Laboratories.

Understanding

28.  Kyl Amendment 4870 MODERNIZATION would amend the resolution of ratification to provide an understanding that the United States failure to fund the nuclear modernization plan would constitute a basis for United States withdrawal from the New START Treaty

Declaration

29.  Kyl Amendment 4871 REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN ARMED FORCES OR ARMAMENTS would amend the resolution of ratification to declare that any agreements obligating the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments, including the development  and deployment of missile defense or of any offensive or defensive space capabilities, of the United States in any manner may be made only pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President.

Declaration

30.  Cornyn Amendment 4872 MODERNIZATION would amend the resolution of ratification to declare that if the President submits an annual budget request that fails to meet the resource requirements set forth in the President’s 10 year plan to ensure the safety, reliability and performance of the US nuclear forces that would constitute an extraordinary event that has jeopardized the supreme interests of the United States under Article XIV.

Condition

31.  Inhofe Amendment 4873 MILITARY SPACE SYSTEMS would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that the United States shall not be bound by any international agreement entered into by the President that would in any way limit the research, development, testing, or deployment of military space systems of the United States  or that would limit the options of the United States military in operating such systems unless the agreement is entered pursuant to the treaty making power of the President.

Condition

32.  Ensign Amendment 4874 CONSIDERATION BY THE DUMA would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that 1) the Russian Duma has completed the constitutional process necessary for ratification of the New START and 2) that the Duma has not adopted in its resolution containing any provision related to missile defense, prompt global strike, rail mobile, TREATY verification, or submarine launched cruise missiles.

Condition

33.  Risch Amendment 4875 TACTICAL NUKES would amend the resolution of ratification to declare that it is the sense of the senate that

1) the number of strategic nuclear weapons, both operationally deployed and non-deployed, are reduced, the implication of non-strategic nuclear weapons for strategic stability becomes more important, and it is regrettable, therefore, that the imbalance in US and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons was not addressed

2) Dealing with the imbalance in US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons is urgent

3) Until the Russia substantially reduces its tactical nukes in a transparent manner, the Senate shall not support future negotiations to further reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles

4) Recognizing the difficulty the US has faced in ascertaining with confidence the number of nuclear tactical weapons and the security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to seek an agreement with the Russians with the objectives of

A) Establishing cooperative measures to give one another to improve accurate accounting and security of the weapons

B) Verifying that the Russians have fulfilled commitment made under the President’s Nuclear Initiatives in 1991 and 1992

C) Providing US or other international assistance to help the Russians ensure the accurate accounting and security of their tactical nukes

5) The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of START is subject to the condition that the President may not permanently remove US tactical nukes in Europe until

           A) The Russian tactical nuclear weapons are substantially reduced

           B) the Member of NATO decide by consensus in favor of removal.

Understanding

34.  Risch Amendment 4876 GLOBAL PROMPT STRIKE would amend the resolution of ratification to provide an understanding that any additional NEW START Treaty limitation on the development and deployment of strategic-range, conventional weapons systems beyond those contained in Article II, including any limitation agreed under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, would require an amendment to the START Treaty which may enter into force for the US only with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Declaration and Understanding

35.  Risch Amendment 4877 MODERNIZATION OF STARTEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES would amend the resolution of ratification to provide that it is the sense of the senate that

1)      United States deterrence and flexibility is assured by a robust triad of strategic delivery vehicles

2)      To this end, the US is committed to accomplishing the modernization and replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and to ensuring the continued flexibility of US conventional and nuclear delivery vehicles.

It would also amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying

1)      The President has made a commitment to develop and deploy a next generation nuclear capable bomber, a new nuclear capable air launched cruise missile and modernizing Minuteman III

2)      That the President is taking actions to preserve the rocket and missile industrial base of the US and pursue steps to maintain the nuclear weapons in the US deterrent to the highest possible standards.

Condition

36.  Risch Amendment 4878 STOLEN US MILITARY EQUIPMENT would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that Russia has returned all military equipment owned by the US that was confiscated during the Russian invasion of Georgia.

Condition

37.  Risch Amendment  4879 WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIANS FROM GEORGIA would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that Russia has fully honored its obligations under the ceasefire agreement of September 9, 2008 with Georgia and has withdrawn its military forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Condition

38.  Ensign Amendment 4880 RECOVERY OF SA-24 MISSILES TO VENEZUELA would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that Russia has recovered all SA-24 missiles delivered to Venezuela.

Condition

39.  Ensign Amendment 4881PROHIBITION ON SALE OF S-300 MISSILE SYSTEM TO VENEZULEA would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that Russia has no plans to sell the S-300 missile system to Venezuela and that it has guaranteed the US that it will not sale them.

Condition

40.  Barrasso-Enzi Amendment 4882 MODERNIZING ICBMs would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that the Department of Defense will maintain 450 Minuteman ICBMs as part of the 700 deployed and 800 deployed and non-deployed Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles.  The President must also certify that he will modernize command and control infrastructure to support existing ICMB launchers.

Condition

41.  Barrasso-Enzi Amendment 4883 ICBM FOLLOW-ON would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that he will review alternatives for ICBM follow-on systems that do not consider continued reductions in our land-based strategic nuclear deterrent.

Condition

42.  Barrasso-Enzi Amendment 4884 PRESERVING ICBMs would amend the resolution of ratification to condition the entry into force of the START Treaty on the President certifying that the President will deploy no fewer than 450 ICBMs and that the President has take action to maintain and modernize 450 ICBMs.

As floor action on New START enters its sixth day, Majority Leader Reid just announced that the Senate today will consider two amendments: The Thune amendment on warhead limits (#4841) and the Inhofe amendment on verification (#4833).  Below are some responses to each amendment:

Thune Amendment 4841 WARHEAD LIMITS seeks to increase the limits on the number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers) from 700 to 720.

Response:

• The U.S. military believes that the central limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is enough to sustain a robust and flexible nuclear triad without altering current or planned basing arrangements.  As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright has stated:  “I believe the treaty limitation of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles imposed by New START provides a sound framework for maintaining stability and allows us to maintain a strong and credible deterrent that ensures our national security while moving to lower levels of strategic nuclear forces.” The U.S. agreed to this limit after careful analysis among relevant branches of the U.S. military, including U.S. Strategic Command.
• Altering the central limits of the treaty via amendment would kill the treaty because Russia would surely reject the change, forcing the treaty to be renegotiated.
• Under New START the U.S. will maintain the following force structure of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles: up to 240 SLBMs on distributed among 14 SSBNs; up to 420 ICBMs; and up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers.  The planned force of 720 deployed delivery vehicles will eventually need to be reduced to 700, which the U.S. could do by moving 20 delivery vehicles to non-deployed status (as allowed by New START’s limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear launchers).  The treaty limits must be met seven years are entry into force, so the U.S. military has until that time to make any final decisions on how it plans to meet the treaty limits.  
• The Obama administration has announced a plan to spend $100 billion over the next ten years to sustain and modernize all three legs of the triad.

Inhofe Amendment 4833 VERIFICATION to increase the number of Type One inspections from 10 to 30 as well as increasing the number of Type Two inspections from 8 to 24.

Response:

• The U.S. military and intelligence community believes that the number of allowed inspections is sufficient to verify Russia’s compliance with the New START limits.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified that, “in totality, I’m very comfortable with the verification regime that exists in the treaty right now.”Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has echoed similar sentiments: “I think the earlier, the sooner, the better [for New START]. You know, my thing is: From an intelligence perspective only, are we better off with it or without it? We’re better off with it.”
• Altering the number of inspections in the treaty via amendment would kill the treaty because Russia would surely reject the change, forcing the treaty to be renegotiated.  Without the treaty there would be zero on-site inspections of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.  
• New START allows for up to 18 annual on-site inspections per year, including direct monitoring of Russia’s deployed nuclear warheads. While this is a smaller number of inspections than the 28 inspections allowed under START I, New START’s ten “Type One” inspections at bases for deployed missiles and bombers can verify data that required two inspections under START I. Coupled with the eight “Type Two” inspections of non-deployed systems, the 18 New START inspections are actually equivalent to 28 inspections under START I. What’s more, New START’s inspections only have to cover 35 Russian sites, whereas START I covered 70 sites in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In sum, as Admiral Mullen notes, under New START “there are almost twice as many inspections per facility, per year than under the previous treaty.”
• Concerns that the New START verification regime is weaker than START I’s verification regime are unfounded.  While New START draws upon much of what was in START I, the new treaty contains new limits and rules which reflect the fact that the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship is different than it was when START I was negotiated at the close of the Cold War. New rules and limits in turn require verification provisions that are actually pegged to those new rules and limits. In the view of Admiral Mullen, the “verification regime that exists in [the New START Treaty] is in ways, better than the one that has existed in the past.” He also stated he is “convinced that the verification regime is as stringent as it is transparent…and born of more than 15 years of lessons learned under the original START Treaty.”

For more on these an other New START issues, see our online START Resource center here.