by Robert G. Gard and John Isaacs Executive Summary The first rule of physicians is “Do No Harm.” The first rule of a nation’s reprisals should be “Do No Harm to Yourself.” Yet in the wake of the conflict between Russia and Georgia, both the United States and Russia are considering reckless steps aimed at the […]
by Kingston Reif After more than 18 months of hesitation, the United States and Poland on August 20 suddenly signed an agreement to place American missile defense interceptors on Polish territory. According to the Associated Press, parliamentary and presidential approval also appears likely, though no date has been given for when this might occur. AFTER […]
The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and its Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons delivered this statement at the Meeting of Experts of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on August 19, 2008.
Despite the death of Bruce Ivins, the man the FBI claims is solely responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, questions about the largest biological attack carried out on U.S. soil still remain. What are the big picture implications for our nation’s security from biological attacks? What can be done to strengthen the oversight of national biodefense programs and dual-use research in the life sciences? Starting Monday, August 18, Alan Pearson, the Center’s Director of Biological and Chemical Weapons Prevention, will blog from a major international UN conference addressing some of these very issues.
To defend against bioweapons, we need not more but better research efforts. The probability that biological weapons will be used against Americans is low, but the consequences of such an attack could be devastating. We cannot meet the threat safely or effectively with a strategy that puts bioweapons agents in more and more people’s hands.