According to Iran, whose representative to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference spoke with press this afternoon while on his way to a plenary session at which the latest draft of the final document was distributed, there are three things hol…
The NPT Review Conference’s Focus on a Nuclear Free Middle East
As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) comes to a close in New York, the call for a ban on nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East has come back into the fore as a top issue. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs), which exist in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, are zones in which countries commit themselves to not acquire, manufacture, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Article VII of the NPT affirms the rights of countries to establish such zones. A NWFZ in the Middle East has been on the NPT agenda since the treaty’s entry into force in 1970. Since the 1995 NPT RevCon, the goal has been more adamantly pursued by Egypt, but still to no visible avail.
Nevertheless, the start of this year’s NPT RevCon saw the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China all voice unequivocal support for the initiative— with ample support from states in the region too. The Arab Group has stated that failing to achieve it would be a failure of the NPT as a whole. While some view a NWFZ in the Middle East as a lofty, far-off, or even impossible goal, there is no denying the worth it would have.
The implications of the initiative are clear. Israel, not just Iran, would have to foreswear nuclear weapons.
Israel’s program is controversial for numerous reasons. First, Israel is deliberately ambiguous about its nuclear weapons capability, officially maintaining that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Second, as one of the only countries in the world to have ever carried out preemptive attacks on nascent nuclear programs (for example in Iraq and Syria), Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is often viewed as particularly hypocritical. Finally, in defiance of numerous requests and resolutions issued by the General Assembly of the UN which call on Israel to join the NPT, Israel nevertheless continues to refuse. This places it in the not so select company of Pakistan, North Korea, and India.
The situation is further complicated by instability in the region and the ongoing peace process- the progress of which will be consequential in determining the success of disarmament efforts (a belief supported by the current U.S. administration). Many Arab states and Iran view Israel’s nuclear arsenal as a threat to their security and the stability of the region. Moreover, they view the removal of Israel’s arsenal as a precondition to lasting peace in the region. Israel, however, tends to view peace as a precondition to any disarmament or reduction in force levels, claiming it needs a strong defense to defend against “hostile” neighbors. Iran’s nascent nuclear program, coupled with Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetoric, lend credence to Israel’s argument.
This deadlock implies neither the situation for disarmament nor the situation for peace exists; and yet, it is evident that the current situation is not sustainable.
It is thus encouraging that on the eve of the close of the NPT RevCon, leaders are hustling to reach a compromise on how to establish the NWFZ. Egypt has submitted working papers that outline tangible steps towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, and is leading a movement—now seconded by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon- to create a conference to specifically address the establishment of a Mideast NWFZ. Meanwhile, U.S. and Egyptian senior officials are attempting to secure Israel’s attendance at this conference. Tomorrow evening will reveal if they succeed.
If a final document is agreed to, it will likely call for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Important as these steps are, there are other challenging steps that must be taken if these goals are to be achieved.
For example, Israel will have to make dialogue and diplomacy a more important part of their foreign policy, as opposed to military threats, and will have to withdraw from the occupied territories. Meanwhile, the Arab states and Iran must acknowledge Israel’s existence as a state, and respect its sovereignty accordingly. This involves, for example, the cessation of rockets fired from Southern Lebanon by Iranian sponsored Shi’a Hezbollah militants.
Achieving the goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East will be taxing and perplexing at each level of the process – but it will be well worth the effort. It is encouraging to hear that representatives at the NPT RevCon appear up for the task. We can only hope they will begin to make progress.
Dangerous Developments in the Koreas
The international team investigating the sinking of the Cheonan released its report last week, alleging North Korean responsibility for the attack. With the outcome of the investigation widely accepted by the international community, condemnation of Pyongyang has been nearly universal. As I explained in last week’s analysis, both South Korea and its allies have few avenues to reprimand the DPRK. Nonetheless, talk of U.N sanctions and the resumption of South Korea’s psychological warfare campaign has infuriated Pyongyang, which has threatened to retaliate with ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style’. While this isn’t the first time North Korea has threatened to respond with war or even use nuclear weapons, its release in the context of the Cheonan incident must not be dismissed lightly – especially given signs that Kim Jong Il has instructed the DPRK military to get ready for combat.
Given the current uncertainties surrounding succession, Kim Jong-Il will not want to look weak to the DPRK military – the group holding the most significant power broker in North Korea. By not following through on at least some of the type of actions detailed in North Korea’s warnings, Kim could risk being seen as ineffectual – potentially causing problems for the planned succession to his son Kim Jong-Eun. Kim’s leadership over the coming days and weeks will thus be informed by this context. Similarly, Lee Myung Bak has stressed that South Korea ‘will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence’. He too will be under pressure to show strong leadership, especially in advance of the June 2, 2010 local elections in South Korea. In this context, it seems there are several potential flashpoints that could lead to escalation.
Firstly there is the complex issue of how to address the incident at the UN. On May 24, Ban Ki Moon condemned North Korea, and expressed hope that when South Korea brings this incident before the UN Security Council, swift action will be taken. Should a new round of sanctions be approved, and in light of its May 20 warning, North Korea may find itself obliged to at the very least intensify its military presence around the disputed northern limit line and engage in provocative acts – which in turn could escalate into conflict through the stern responses promised by South Korea. It will be up to the UN Security Council to approve a new round of sanctions. While most of the international community has accepted the Cheonan report, China has so far remained neutral, calling for all parties to ‘calmly and properly handle the issue and avoid escalation of tension’ – even after two days of intensive lobbying by Hillary Clinton in Beijing. Given the recent visit to China by Kim Jong Il last month and Beijing’s vested interests in maintaining the regime in Pyongyang (as explained here), this should come as no surprise.
China is going to have to make a choice to either supporting North Korea– a regime it has a long bloodline history with and country in which it has significant economic interests, or South Korea, a strategic partner which has become one of China’s major trading partners. Complicating matters is that if it vetoes sanctions based on credible and scientific international findings, Beijing’s ever improving international aspirations could be damaged, due to making it appear willing to support unprovoked aggression and killing by a state considered by many as a pariah. Alternatively China could abstain from the vote, but this would mean any sanctions would pass, perhaps leading to an escalatory response from North Korea.
The second potential flashpoint relates to South Korea’s psychological warfare campaign. Initially stopped in 2004 as part of a North-South agreement to suspend propaganda across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), South Korea have decided to erect facilities along the 150 miles of the MDL and resume both anti-regime radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, to make North Korea recognize that its illegal activities will definitely have consequences’. In addition, reports today suggest Seoul will drop propaganda leaflets in North Korea detailing the Cheonan findings and a statement criticizing North Korea’s behavior. In response, North Korea Monday warned that it would fire on and destroy such facilities, with South Korea in turn stating that it would view such a move as ‘an act of military provocation and would merit the exercise of self-defense under international laws.’ Without cool headedness on both sides, this potential flashpoint could raise tensions significantly.
Thirdly, South Korea has said it is preparing to fully participate in the U.S.-led ship interdicting Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in an attempt to stem the proliferation of North Korean weapons of mass destruction. While South Korea is already obliged to interdict suspect North Korean cargoes as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, a more proactive approach will be deemed provocative by the DPRK, which could raise the level of its military responses to any attempted interdiction.
Fourthly, South Korea has banned North Korean vessels from entering its territorial waters, including the straits between the southern island of Jeju and the mainland. Adding three to four days onto journeys for DPRK vessels headed from East coast to West coast ports, this blockade of sorts could be one that North Korea may attempt to flout early on. This has the potential of exacting potentially aggressive South Korean responses, given Lee Myung Bak’s statement that ‘if our territorial waters…are violated, we will immediately exercise our right of self-defense’.
Fifthly and finally, North Korea has announced that it will cut all ties with South Korea. A South Korean official today stated that Pyongyang has already acted on part of this threat, cutting all marine communications between the two Koreas. This greatly increases the potential for misunderstandings and accidents, and given the charged atmosphere, also the chances of military escalation.
Where escalation will lead in any of these areas is hard to predict. All-out war is neither in the interest of North or South Korea. But it has been avoided in the aftermath of other similarly provocative incidents; the DPRK’s bombing of flight 858, two assassination attempts on South Korean presidents in 1968 and 1983, and after the bloody 1976 ‘axe incident’.
So far things, have played out in a relatively calm fashion. Despite a North Korean threat to expel all South Koreans from the Kaesong Industrial complex, it appears that Pyongyang is not actually acting on this. Even though South Korea’s psychological campaign has begun, there has been no military response thus far from North Korea. And despite reports that Kim Jong Il has personally instructed the military to prepare for war, troops do not appear to be on alert at the moment. So it seems North Korea is being careful not to escalate the situation in any areas where it could really cost them.
Nevertheless, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons might today make it more confident in responding with force to any further South Korean responses This is especially so given Kim Jong Il’s need to show strong leadership in advance of his succession. In the highly charged atmosphere, further conflict cannot be ruled out.
Fuel Swaps Compared
Building on the very useful analysis of CAP and IISS, here are some of the key differences between the October 2009 and May 2010 fuel swap proposals:
1) Iran’s uranium supply is larger now: 1,500kg in 2009 vs. 2,300kg in 2010. As initially laid out, the swap would have removed nearly 80 percent of Iran’s stockpile of LEU. As it stands now, the proposal would remove only about 50 percent, leaving behind enough to, theoretically, build one bomb.
2) In the original proposal, Iran’s fuel would be shipped to Russia, enriched to 19.75 percent, and then sent to France to be converted into fuel rods. In the new proposal, Iran would send its fuel to Turkey for storage.
3) The 2010 plan does not outline what will happen to the 1,200 kg of LEU being stored in Turkey once the deal concludes. Should another country offer up its own stockpile of LEU for enrichment, which is far from guaranteed, then send that enriched fuel to France for conversion, no provisions exist to state where Iran’s original LEU will go at the end of the process. One would assume back to the country that offered its LEU for conversion. For this scenario to work, however, the US or Russia must first agree to provide 1,200kg of LEU.
4) Paragraph 8 of the 2010 proposal states that: “In case the provisions of this Declaration are not respected Turkey, upon the request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran’s LEU to Iran.” The terms “not respected” are broad and give Iran the right to request the return of its LEU with no specification as to what constitutes a violation.
5) The 2009 proposal would have granted the IAEA full-access to Iran’s nuclear program – 2010 does not include any statements regarding inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities.
6) The 2010 plan requires that the fuel be delivered to Iran within in one year. France’s fuel fabricator AREVA EURODIF S.A. has indicated, however, that it will require at least two years to produce the required amount of fuel.
7) The 2010 proposal states the “right of all State Parties [to the NPT], including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination.” This statement could be taken to assert Iran’s right to continued enrichment in contradiction of current UN Security Council Resolutions, but its intent is not clear.
Preliminary Thoughts on the Draft NPT RevCon Final Document
A draft final document penned by the President of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (Indonesian Libran Nuevas Cabactulan) has been circulating at the United Nations — and the internet — in the past 24 hours.
After a quick read through of the draft final document, it is clear that the core sticking points amongst States parties remain the same: disagreement over the voluntary vs. binding nature of the Additional Protocol, which would strengthen IAEA ability to oversee and inspect nuclear programs; the Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, for which a distinct conference in 2012 has been proposed and which Israel is being lobbied to attend; and the ever-present debate over a timeline for disarmament by the nuclear weapon states.
However, the draft document also makes clear how forcefully the Non-Aligned Movement states are seeking to delink non-proliferation from nuclear energy; the document text quite stridently defends their right to peacefully develop nuclear energy. Some interesting points are highlighted below:
33: “The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.”
And 34, which reaffirms the right of States parties to the Treaty to develop “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”
35 is also emphatic: “The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.”
Also notable:
On non-NPT states parties (103): “The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without conditions and promptly.”
Notably absent is any mention of Israel (although they are called out by name later).
On diplomacy: “The Conference emphasized that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State Party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.”
Unsurprisingly, the text of the final document does not mention Iran by name, but does express concern “with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by States parties, and calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.”
On the Additional Protocol: point 25 “notes that the entry into force and implementation of additional protocols in non-nuclear weapons States is of vital importance for IAEA to be able to provide credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of non-nuclear-weapon States’ nuclear programmes.”
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On an unrelated note, it seems likely that the United Nations Security Council will wait until the Lebanese presidency of the UNSC is over, i.e. until June, to begin discussing the fourth round of sanctions against Iran. This saves face for Lebanon, and will also allow the NPT RevCon to get the attention it warrants during this last, closing week.