Russian and U.S. officals have said that an agreement was close before, only for the negotiations to continue to drag on. This time things look to be different. The news out of Geneva, Moscow, and Washington is that the agreement is nearly …
From Mowing the Grass to Groundwork for Withdrawal in Afghanistan
When last month’s Operation Moshtarak descended upon the provincial town of Marjah, there was much justifiable skepticism amongst the policy community. In the history of the long engagement in Afghanistan, operations designed to clear an area were common, while holding and building upon that progress was less frequently seen. The New York Times neatly summarized the typical pattern:
For much of the past eight years, American and NATO forces have mounted other large military operations to clear towns and cities of Taliban insurgents. And then, almost invariably, they have cleared out, never leaving behind enough soldiers or police officers to hold the place on their own. And so, almost always, the Taliban returned — and, after a time, so did the American and NATO troops, to clear the place all over again. “Mowing the grass,” the soldiers and Marines derisively call it.
Moving Away from Mowing the Grass
Enter the UK’s Major General Gordon Messenger, who spoke yesterday at the New America Foundation about how to prevent a cyclical pattern of “mowing the grass” of insurgency in Afghanistan…
How exactly does one prevent merely mowing the grass? It sounds simple enough: make sure an Afghan security force is in place to fill any potential security void upon the end of an operation. Operations should be jointly planned and executed, all the way down to the lowest level, by both ISAF and the Afghan national forces. Substantive partnering with Afghans will set the groundwork for a strong eventual US and NATO transition out of the country that is not conditions based, said Messenger. Properly trained Afghan forces (ANP and ANA) gradually taking on an increasingly large percentage of operations planning and execution will allow for ISAF forces to confidently withdrawal and leave a solid security foundation.
Prioritizing the wants and needs of the civilian population is also an instrumental factor in moving beyond mowing the grass. Securing the allegiance and trust of the population should drive policy, not simply routing the Taliban. As Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently said:
The battlefield is not necessarily a field anymore. It is in the minds of the people…in this type of war, when the objective is not the enemy’s defeat but the people’s success.
Messenger emphasized that both of these two vital operational foci are being implemented by General McChrystal in Afghanistan, but that the timeline for success was at least a year long. Gaining the trust of the population takes time, as does properly recruiting and training a domestic security force.
Civil-Military Integration Vital
The hearts and minds campaign is firmly rooted in McChrystal’s “government in a box” concept. Messenger insisted that, on the heels of a strong foundation of security and local governance, civilian reconstruction and development teams should enter the fray. He even went so far as to say that civilian governance advisors are the “most important element” in an operation – not the military guys. Our own Afghanistan Ag Man is one of the guys implementing what ABC News calls
the counterinsurgency tactic of bringing a surge of governmental officials, Afghan police, and development projects with them, in a bid to win the Afghan people’s support — support deemed critical in a war where the enemy lives among the population.
The United States, through our troop surge that is just beginning to be seen on the ground in Afghanistan, and ISAF in general are committing huge resources to this counterinsurgency strategy. It will take some time to see whether or not this scaling up of resources and energy will pay off, but NOH hopes that the investment, already committed, will allow for a responsible withdrawal around the promised deadline of summer 2011.
Where to from here?
There are a couple of clear trends to keep an eye on that will strengthen as the US approaches the July 2011 troop withdrawal benchmark.
One is the influx of a civilian corps responsible for reconstruction and development. The State Department, for instance, is gradually building a Civilian Response Corps that is designed to provide a coordinated, deliberate, and well-trained group of experts that can help a post-conflict country get back on its feet. Such civilian experts will begin to have a larger presence in Afghanistan as the military prepares to leave.
A second sign is the increasing signaling of support for the Afghan forces. ISAF media releases refer to “Afghan-international security force” patrols, and although the Afghan security forces have so far been receiving less-than-stellar reviews, ISAF has no choice but to continue to recruit, train, and shift responsibility to the domestic forces that will ultimately be in charge of their country’s safety and security.
It behooves us to note that the withdrawal date will be exactly that – the commencement of what will most likely be a slow, gradual, careful process of US troop extraction from Afghanistan.
Roadblocks to Implementation of the U.S.-India Deal
As I blogged in late February, there has been progress toward implementing the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal. I also pointed out that obstacles remain to the deal’s entry into force, including completion of an agreement regarding a nuclear spent fuel reprocessing facility and approval by New Delhi of a liability limitation bill for U.S. firms.
With the news last week that the government decided not to introduce the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill in the Indian parliament, there is still no telling when U.S. firms will be able to start reaping the benefits from nuclear trade with India. The tragic comedy that many opponents of the deal warned it would become seems to be playing out as predicted: U.S. efforts to rewrite the rules on international nuclear trade are likely to end up benefiting firms in Russia, France, and other nations much earlier (and perhaps even far more) than their U.S. counterparts…
The proposed liability limitation bill would shield U.S. suppliers from liability in the event of a nuclear accident and make plant operators responsible for damages from any accidents. It would cap legal liability for international nuclear reactor operators at $65 million and limit the Indian government’s financial obligation to roughly $385 million. It would also require that all assertions of wrongdoing be filed inside of 10 years.
Without such legislation U.S. firms would likely be unable to get the necessary insurance to engage in nuclear cooperation. Competitors to U.S. firms such as France’s Areva and Russia’s Rosatom do not require liability limitation legislation because they are covered by protections from their home governments.
While the Indian cabinet has approved the legislation, consideration of the bill was pulled on March 15 by the lower house of parliament, the Lok Sabha. Speaker Meira Kumar deferred consideration after receiving notice from at least four members of the opposition that they intended to block the bill at the introduction stage, as they found it to be in violation of the Indian Constitution and several former Supreme Court rulings.
The ruling government in India largely supports the bill, as it is in their interest to fully implement the U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Cooperation Deal. They argue that the nation requires a liability structure to bring it up to par with global standards, especially given the frequent power blackouts that affect even the capital, New Delhi. Analysts believe Prime Minister Manmohan Singh wanted to secure approval of the legislation before he travels to Washington in April for President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit. They now estimate he will seek passage of the bill before Obama visits India later this year.
Critics of the bill in India include members of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Communist Party of India (Marxist). They have voiced concern that the bill is being forced through parliament as a result of U.S. pressure, noting that the ruling government is “safeguarding the interests of the United States at the expense of the safety of Indian people.” They argue that the legislation does not provide adequate protection for residents and leaves the bulk of responsibility for any ensuing land reclamation efforts to Indian citizens. Under the bill, the majority of compensation for victims of nuclear accidents would fall on Indian taxpayers.
One observer notes, however, that the bill does have a loophole allowing the operators of Indian nuclear power plants the “right of recourse” against supplier firms if an accident results “from the willful act or gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, equipment or services, or of his employee.” This right is not included in the IAEA’s Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), which India also plans to join, and, according to the observer, should work to allay Indian concerns that the supplier is completely protected, even if the amount is capped. Omer Brown of the DC-based council for the Contractors International Group on Nuclear Liability (CIGNL) also emphasized that joining the CSC would ensure that India would be “eligible to get supplemental funds from the CSC international fund paid by the United States and other CSC Member States.”
Information Minister Ambika Soni has stated that the ruling coalition would pursue an understanding with the opposition prior to sending the measure back to parliament. Science and Technology Minister Prithviraj Chavan also supports reconsideration, noting that “there is no urgency to introduce the bill.” Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Nirupama Rao, who was in Washington early last week, continued to insist that the U.S.-India deal was “proceeding smoothly and satisfactorily,” adding that “we are in the process of operationalizing the agreement through close coordination between our two governments.”
In other news, little progress appears to be being made in negotiations on a spent fuel reprocessing arrangement, which is an additional required step before the U.S. and India can begin nuclear trade. Current estimates are that negotiations may not conclude until after the May NPT RevCon.
One thing we know for sure is that while the U.S.-India deal remains in limbo, countries such as Russia and France, which do not face the same impediments to nuclear trade, will continue to eat up more of the lucrative Indian nuclear energy market pie, estimated to exceed $150 billion in coming years . Will there be any pieces left for the U.S. by the time all of the roadblocks are removed?
Iran to Hold Major Gathering This Spring
No joke – This spring, Iran will hold an international conference on… wait for it: Nuclear Disarmament.
The conference, dubbed “Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapon [sic] for None,” will be held in Tehran on April 17 and 18.
Foreign ministers, representatives and nuclear experts from 60 countries have been invited to attend the event where “participants are slated to assess the causes and reasons underlying the lack of heed and attention to the implementation of nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regulations.”
Do you think this might mean some serious contemplation by Iran of its numerous violations?
So grab your tickets today! The conference even includes a field trip. Perhaps on their way to Isfahan attendees will take the advice of Nathan Hodge and stop off at Natanz, maybe even Qom… could be a great trip!
An (anonymous) American Advisor in Rural Afghanistan: Part IV: On the Militarization of Aid
The fourth of occasional postings
Guest Post by Afghanistan Ag Man
Perception is reality in Afghanistan. Anything and everything–from my appearance, to my actions, to my words–can have a positive or negative effect on our missions. In rural Afghanistan, situations may not be exactly as they appear and people may not be who they claim to be.
For example, before I left for Afghanistan in late 2009, I received a lot of advice on how to conduct myself while there. One suggestion was that I grow a beard in an effort to blend in. In Afghanistan, it is widely known that beards are a symbol of both status and wisdom. In fact, the greyer the beard the better (alas, being only 25 years old, I was out of luck on the color, but that didn’t stop me from trying). When I left the United States, I was sporting a poorly grown, patchy beard. However, it didn’t take long working with Afghan locals and farmers before I realized that my attempts were somewhat foolish (and could perhaps have actually been counterproductive).
Let’s face it: I’m an outsider. Instead of denying this fact, I purposely wear Levi jeans, plaid shirts, and an old Tractor Supply Company hat. Hell even if I could grow a grey beard it would not help me blend in, especially because I’m usually traveling with an entourage of camo-clad soldiers. Not to mention it’s really hard to shave out in the field, since we’re often without showers, bathrooms, and running water.
Oddly enough, because of my appearance local Afghans find it easier to trust me. In a recent meeting I attended with the Provincial Agriculture Director and his employees, it was their opinion that I look different with “my green eyes and red face.” They have seen pictures of stereotypical American farmers and I embody that picture. To them, my appearance lends me legitimacy; it helps to convince them that I am indeed an agricultural advisor and not bent on gathering information for a secret Special Forces operation.
All of which provides a nice segue to the real purpose of this post. Since arriving in Afghanistan I’ve become more attune both to what I think are ill-placed efforts on the part of some foreign civilians to blend in to the local communities and villages by simply growing a beard, and the hostility with which some Afghans still view U.S. military personnel. A large part of my job is to build trust with local farmers and to work with them and Afghan ministry officials to identify and find solutions to agricultural and development problems. Yet while protocols do not allow me to travel the country without US and/or ISAF escorts, the fact that I am embedded with military personnel does not necessarily mean that my aid has become “militarized”…
Some United Nations officials and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating in Afghanistan have recently criticized ISAF for allegedly “militarizing aid.” This so-called militarization, however, needs to be better defined and the execution of aid–through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), District Support Teams (DSTs), Civil Affairs (CA)–should be kept in perspective.
Aside from the CA team of military officers that primarily distribute our Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Field Ordering Officer (FOO) funds aimed at quick-impact and emergency programs, each member of my team (whether they be from the Department of State or the US Agency for International Development or the Department of Agriculture) is an employee of their home agency on loan to the Department of Defense. Our goal is to begin development and reconstruction activities once military operations have “cleared” an area of security threats.
Though a technicality, it is important to point out that we work with the military when it comes to transportation and security needs, which allows me and my civilian colleagues to quickly respond to a cleared area. We do not, however, use our aid as a reward for intelligence. The military realized long ago that there are many tribal tensions in Afghanistan and that different tribes have tried to use ISAF as a tool to exact revenge on a rival tribe or to carry out a personal vendetta against a neighbor. I do not–nor does my civilian team–participate in the trade of infrastructure or “Cash-for-Work” projects in return for intelligence.
In fact, to accomplish many of our goals, we usually assess a need and often work with NGOs as implementing partners of our programs, projects, and trainings, who in turn employ local nationals (LNs) to physically perform the tasks in the communities. The actual implementation of aid, therefore, is not “militarized” in the negative sense that many have labeled it.
In a perfect world, NGOs would be the first-responders, as they were before the NATO-led military operations started in 2001. However, they are usually incapable of entering zones that are insecure, even when employing local nationals. Instead, those of us from State, USAID, and Agriculture often enter these unstable areas to begin delivering the first allocations of assistance, which could include the reconstruction of community buildings or homes destroyed during fighting, to assisting with a long-standing orchard disease or pruning demonstrations.
While I appreciate that this is a sensitive issue, it is hard for me to find merit in the argument that aid should not be delivered to Afghans in Helmand or Kandahar or Wardak (three of the most violent provinces) simply because it is delivered with ISAF security and transportation.
Again, in a perfect world, I would go without military security to locations throughout the province, thus avoiding any possible confusion that I am a part of the military. Better yet, officials and employees of GIRoA would directly deliver this much-needed assistance to their fellow citizens. In fact, as mentors and advisors to the GIRoA directors and extension workers, my colleagues and I are trying to augment their capacity to deliver aid. However, I often serve as a liaison between the farming community and Afghan agricultural extension workers due to their fear of retribution for working for GIRoA. Were I not allowed to physically walk into the fields of Afghanistan’s farms (which requires military escorts), needs would not be met.
Furthermore, I think it goes too far to place the blame for violence against UN and NGO employees in Afghanistan on blurred lines between military personnel and the PRT, DST, and CA workers they protect. Doing so obscures the fact that the abductions and killings of foreign aid workers by the Taliban is due to calculated targeting, not “confusion” that arises from “militarized aid.” The execution of aid workers is often blatant and planned.
That said, I recognize the fine line between military and civilian assistance, which is why I take every step possible to differentiate myself from the (necessary) military aspects of our operations. For example, when I enter a village, I do not partake in the military’s system of documenting individuals for tracking purposes. I do not go on missions or patrols that are strictly for security purposes (though often security issues and agro-economic issues are interrelated). I do not wear Army Combat Uniforms (ACUs). And I do not carry a weapon.
I know my appearance alone will not win over Afghans, but it can become an unnecessary obstacle to achieving our development goals. How I am perceived by Afghans is, rightly or wrongly, who I am to them. Likewise, if the first-line of aid must be provided by clean-shaven, foreign civilian officials like myself, accompanied by ISAF troops, then I think the label of “militarized aid” should not have the negative connotation that it currently is given by some in the UN and NGO communities.