by John Isaacs and Kingston Reif On March 26, President Obama announced that after nearly a year of tough negotiations, the U.S. and Russia have reached agreement on the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the “New START Treaty”). Presidents […]
Some Preliminary Thoughts on the New START agreement
Today President Obama announced that after nearly a year of tough negotiations, the U.S. and Russia have reached agreement on the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the “New START Treaty”). Presidents Obama and Medvedev will sign the new agreement on April 8 in Prague, Czech Republic.
The new agreement is a modest but critically important and necessary first step toward reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. The treaty enhances U.S. security by verifiably reducing surplus U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles and ensuring a stable and predictable U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. Moreover, it will allow the U.S. to maintain a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent and will not limit development of U.S. missile defenses or advanced conventional weapons systems.
And did I mention that it already has strong bipartisan support?
Below are some preliminary comments on what we know so far about the specifics of the new agreement based on recent news reports, materials released this morning by the White House, and remarks this morning from President Obama, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton…
Limits
New START limits each side’s deployed strategic warheads to 1,550. In a partial an interesting departure from how START I counted warheads, each deployed heavy bomber counts as one warhead toward this limit. (Update 3/27: See Amyfw’s helpful clarification on this below!) Regarding delivery vehicles (the missiles and bombers used to deliver nuclear warheads to their target) the treaty includes two limits:
• A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
• A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
The Joint Understanding signed in Moscow last July stated that the new treaty would limit each side’s strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to between 500 and 1,100. Not surprisingly, the two sides settled on the midpoint of their opening positions.
Why are there two limits? Amb. Linton Brooks suggested last year that the upper limit of 800 “will allow the Russians to say that they captured all of those systems and that the United States couldn’t go build a bunch more empty silos and somehow get a breakout capability.”
New START will not require significant cuts in the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles and it will not require any cuts in the number of U.S. warheads in storage.
On paper, the warhead limit will require about a 30% cut in the number of deployed U.S. warheads. The United States currently deploys approximately 2,126 strategic nuclear warheads, with a comparable number of warheads in reserve. Russia is believed to deploy approximately 2,600 strategic nuclear warheads. However, since each deployed heavy bomber will now count as only one warhead, under New START the U.S. currently deploys far fewer than 2,126 warheads (according to the best estimates we currently have 500 warheads on 60 or 113 bombers – depending on how you count; if you do the math, that already puts us at 1700-1800 warheads)! FYI: Someone please correct me if I screwed this up!
New START’s limit of 800 delivery vehicles is similar to the actual inventory of U.S. nuclear-armed missiles and bombers. It is estimated that the U.S. currently has 800-900 delivery vehicles, while Russia has an estimated 600-700 strategic delivery vehicles. Moreover, New START will not count U.S. delivery systems – such as B-1 bombers and the four Trident submarines – that have been converted to conventional-only roles.
New START’s counting rules combine elements from both START and the Moscow Treaty. Like START, New START counts each type of missile and bomber as one delivery vehicle against the limits of 700 and 800 delivery vehicles. A la the Moscow Treaty approach, New START counts only those nuclear warheads that are actually deployed, save for the bomber twist. The new treaty largely reflects a splitting of the difference between Russia’s preferred approach of counting delivery vehicles, and the U.S.’s preferred approach of counting deployed warheads.
The U.S. and Russia have seven years to achieve the limits in the treaty. The agreement will remain in force for a total of ten years.
Verification
See here, here, and here for some of my thoughts on this issue.
As we’ve know for some time, the new treaty draws upon START I’s provisions and includes new provisions that are pegged to the new rules and limits. Secretary of Defense Gates noted this morning that “The verification measures for this treaty have been designed to monitor compliance with the provisions with this treaty.” The White House stated that the provisions “will be simpler and less costly to implement than the old START treaty.” Presumably there are provisions that allow for data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections of actual warhead loadings, which would be a first for a strategic arms control treaty.
The new treaty’s verification provisions should be judged on their ability to ensure compliance with this treaty, not a treaty that was negotiated in the 1980s and early 1990s. On that basis Gates thinks that what we got is more than enough: “I think that when the testimony of the intelligence community comes on the Hill, that the DNI and the experts will say that they are comfortable that the provisions of this treaty for verification are adequate for them to monitor Russian compliance, and vice versa.”
New START also contains a simplified and less demanding provision on telemetry. START I stated that “telemetric information…assists in verification of Treaty provisions concerning, for example, throw-weight and the number of reentry vehicles.” However, the very purposes for which the telemetry provision was crafted in START I likely no longer exist in the new treaty. According to Gates, “we don’t need telemetry to monitor compliance with this treaty.” That the U.S. negotiating team was still able to secure an agreement to exchange telemetric information on up to five missile launches a year is a nice win for transparency and confidence-building.
Missile Defense
The Joint Understanding released by the U.S. and Russia in July 2009 stated that the follow-on to START I would deal only with strategic offensive arms. At the same time, it said that the new agreement would note an “interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.”
New START closely mirrors the Joint Understanding. According to a White House fact sheet on New START, “the Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs.” The U.S. could have caved to their Russian counterparts on missile defenses or any of the other complex issues that delayed signature of the treaty well past START I’s expiration on December 5. But they didn’t.
Reports indicate that while the offense-defense link is noted in the preamble of the new treaty, the text of New START does not contain any formal or legal limitations on missile defenses. As was the case with START I, the U.S. and Russia may also issue unilateral statements on how they interpret the relationship between the new treaty and missile defense.
Ratification Prospects in the Senate
I’ll defer to John on this but I too an optimistic about the treaty’s prospects in the Senate. Afterall, no Senator has taken a position in opposition to the treaty, not even Kyl. For his part, Gates seems none too impressed with some of the concerns that have been raised about the process: “Missile defense is not constrained by this treaty. And we have in our budget, the President’s budget that went to the Hill for FY ’11, almost $5 billion for investment in the nuclear infrastructure and maintaining the stockpile. So I think we have addressed the concerns that there may have been on the Hill.”
Some Questions I Still Have…
…most of which will be answered by the treaty text.
-Will the agreement or any of its associated documents say anything about pursuing deeper reductions after this treaty? If not, will the two governments say anything about deeper reductions via some other means around the time when the treaty is signed?
-How explicit is the reported link between offensive and defensive forces in the preamble of the treaty? Will each party state their position on missile defense in the preamble?
-What do the verification provisions re: mobile missiles look like?
-How many on-site inspections will there be to verify actual warhead loadings?
-What does the new counting rule re: bombers portend for the future of the U.S. bomber force? Do we no longer care how many warheads are on bombers?
-Are the Russian’s expected to issue a unilateral statement to the treaty declaring their right to withdraw from the agreement if they believe U.S. missile defenses upset strategic stability? If so, will the U.S. issue a unilateral statement in response?
-Given the current U.S. force of approximately 900 nuclear-armed delivery systems is greater than the reported limit of 800 in the treaty, which leg(s) of the triad will see some cuts?
-If U.S. delivery systems that have been converted to conventional-only roles are excluded from the treaty’s limits, what provisions were put in place to assure the Russians that these systems can’t be quickly returned to the nuclear war plan?
-How will the treaty count – if at all – long-range conventional systems (i.e. prompt global strike)?
-Will the negotiations be completed when Presidents Obama and Medvedev sign the treaty (reportedly in Prague in early April) or will negotiations on some of the treaty’s annexes and other associated documents continue after the signing ceremony?
Senior Lawmakers Question Funding for Nuclear Security
One year ago this April, President Obama first outlined his goal to “secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years” in order to “ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon.”
I don’t want to overstate the threat, but the likelihood of a nuclear attack is far from impossible. In January, a group of activists breached security at the Kleine Brogel air base in Belgium, where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. A similar incident also took place the previous November. In January, the activists were not only able to hop the simple wire fence to get inside, they were able to enter the area where hardened shelters are located, containing aircraft and 10-20 U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs. Replace those activists with terrorists and the situation could get out of hand.
Unfortunately, the President’s budget for FY 2010 did not live up to his ambitious goal of only four years to secure enough material to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. In fact, it provided over $200 million less than the last budget of the Bush administration.
This year things have changed. President Obama’s FY 2011 budget includes a total increase of approximately $320 million for global nuclear security and forecasts growth in the coming years for key programs run by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
The $2.7 billion budget request for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation portfolio includes approximately $560 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, an increase of 68 percent, which will remove and secure “high-priority” vulnerable nuclear material around the world and accelerate conversions of highly enriched uranium fueled research reactors to the use of low-enriched uranium.
It also includes $590 million for the International Material Protection and Cooperation program, an increase of $18 million, designed to enhance the security of nuclear stockpiles and weapon-usable nuclear material in “countries of concern” and to improve the ability to detect the illicit trafficking of those resources.
At a meeting of the House Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittee earlier this month, Vice Chairman Ed Pastor noted that, “Securing vulnerable nuclear material is a laudable goal, a goal that this committee supports. However, the magnitude of the increase, 26 percent, raises concerns whether the increase can be effectively executed in a single year.”
Ranking subcommittee Republican Rodney Frelinghuysen also stated that the president’s four-year objective is “laudable” but “not well defined.” Frelinghuysen noted that his “constituents are increasingly concerned about the country’s growing budget deficit and are calling for budget cuts, not budget increases.”
In his response, Steven Black noted multiple changes at NNSA that may positively affect its productivity, including a drop in the “personnel vacancy rate.” In addition, NNSA’s contracting process has been modified to allow for the execution of procurement actions “fairly quickly” and make use of small businesses to help carry out fuel removals and perform feasibility studies for research reactor conversions. “Without overpromising, we do believe we can effectively spend the [FY 2011] funds that we’re requesting of you,” he said.
Black acknowledged that, “It’s not easy to build a nuclear weapon,” but pointed out that “the consequences of a nuclear attack would be so dire that we would be greatly under-serving the American public if we failed to do everything we could as quickly as we can.”
For an objective look at the numbers, though, consider Alex Toma and Ken Luongo’s excellent comparison:
In 2007, climate change funding was at $6.5 billion — more than triple what we spend today on nuclear security. And nuclear security spending is only about one-third of 1 percent of the total defense budget this year… the real question should be whether we can afford not to aggressively finance the president’s four-year goal.
New START Imminent?
Russian and U.S. officals have said that an agreement was close before, only for the negotiations to continue to drag on. This time things look to be different. The news out of Geneva, Moscow, and Washington is that the agreement is nearly …
From Mowing the Grass to Groundwork for Withdrawal in Afghanistan
When last month’s Operation Moshtarak descended upon the provincial town of Marjah, there was much justifiable skepticism amongst the policy community. In the history of the long engagement in Afghanistan, operations designed to clear an area were common, while holding and building upon that progress was less frequently seen. The New York Times neatly summarized the typical pattern:
For much of the past eight years, American and NATO forces have mounted other large military operations to clear towns and cities of Taliban insurgents. And then, almost invariably, they have cleared out, never leaving behind enough soldiers or police officers to hold the place on their own. And so, almost always, the Taliban returned — and, after a time, so did the American and NATO troops, to clear the place all over again. “Mowing the grass,” the soldiers and Marines derisively call it.
Moving Away from Mowing the Grass
Enter the UK’s Major General Gordon Messenger, who spoke yesterday at the New America Foundation about how to prevent a cyclical pattern of “mowing the grass” of insurgency in Afghanistan…
How exactly does one prevent merely mowing the grass? It sounds simple enough: make sure an Afghan security force is in place to fill any potential security void upon the end of an operation. Operations should be jointly planned and executed, all the way down to the lowest level, by both ISAF and the Afghan national forces. Substantive partnering with Afghans will set the groundwork for a strong eventual US and NATO transition out of the country that is not conditions based, said Messenger. Properly trained Afghan forces (ANP and ANA) gradually taking on an increasingly large percentage of operations planning and execution will allow for ISAF forces to confidently withdrawal and leave a solid security foundation.
Prioritizing the wants and needs of the civilian population is also an instrumental factor in moving beyond mowing the grass. Securing the allegiance and trust of the population should drive policy, not simply routing the Taliban. As Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently said:
The battlefield is not necessarily a field anymore. It is in the minds of the people…in this type of war, when the objective is not the enemy’s defeat but the people’s success.
Messenger emphasized that both of these two vital operational foci are being implemented by General McChrystal in Afghanistan, but that the timeline for success was at least a year long. Gaining the trust of the population takes time, as does properly recruiting and training a domestic security force.
Civil-Military Integration Vital
The hearts and minds campaign is firmly rooted in McChrystal’s “government in a box” concept. Messenger insisted that, on the heels of a strong foundation of security and local governance, civilian reconstruction and development teams should enter the fray. He even went so far as to say that civilian governance advisors are the “most important element” in an operation – not the military guys. Our own Afghanistan Ag Man is one of the guys implementing what ABC News calls
the counterinsurgency tactic of bringing a surge of governmental officials, Afghan police, and development projects with them, in a bid to win the Afghan people’s support — support deemed critical in a war where the enemy lives among the population.
The United States, through our troop surge that is just beginning to be seen on the ground in Afghanistan, and ISAF in general are committing huge resources to this counterinsurgency strategy. It will take some time to see whether or not this scaling up of resources and energy will pay off, but NOH hopes that the investment, already committed, will allow for a responsible withdrawal around the promised deadline of summer 2011.
Where to from here?
There are a couple of clear trends to keep an eye on that will strengthen as the US approaches the July 2011 troop withdrawal benchmark.
One is the influx of a civilian corps responsible for reconstruction and development. The State Department, for instance, is gradually building a Civilian Response Corps that is designed to provide a coordinated, deliberate, and well-trained group of experts that can help a post-conflict country get back on its feet. Such civilian experts will begin to have a larger presence in Afghanistan as the military prepares to leave.
A second sign is the increasing signaling of support for the Afghan forces. ISAF media releases refer to “Afghan-international security force” patrols, and although the Afghan security forces have so far been receiving less-than-stellar reviews, ISAF has no choice but to continue to recruit, train, and shift responsibility to the domestic forces that will ultimately be in charge of their country’s safety and security.
It behooves us to note that the withdrawal date will be exactly that – the commencement of what will most likely be a slow, gradual, careful process of US troop extraction from Afghanistan.
