Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

While the results of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) have yet to be released, we can be sure that at least one decision has already been made: Full steam ahead on a major refurbishment study for the B61 gravity bomb.  

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s FY 2011 budget, released yesterday, includes $251.6 million for the B61 Phase 6.2/6.2A design definition and cost study, an increase of nearly $220 million over what Congress appropriated for FY 2010.  As I had suspected, last year’s request of $60 million and Congressional appropriation of $32.5 million for a non-nuclear refurbishment study turned out to be a mere placeholder that paved the way for a much larger request (and likely appropriation) for a full nuclear and non-nuclear study this year.  NNSA describes the purpose of the study as follows:

In FY 2011, funding supports a life extension study of the nuclear and non-nuclear components scope, including implementation of enhanced surety, extended service life and modification consolidation. This life extension study in coordination with the B61 Project Officers Group will publish a Phase 6.2A Report and Weapons Design and Cost Report. This report will document the conceptual designs, program costs and schedules associated with the nuclear and non-nuclear refurbishment scope, including development of concepts and costs to replace arming and fuzing components (e.g., neutron generator, power supplies, radars and programmer) to address near term end-of-life and sustainment concerns on the B61 bomb family. The study will evaluate options for improving safety and use control features and ensures compatibility and integration with modern aircraft such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Completion of the study will also provide options and a path forward to enable LANL and SNL participation in development of detailed designs to extend the life of the nuclear explosive package which may include an extension of the B61 nuclear primary’s life (reusing the existing B61 nuclear pit), potential implementation of multipoint safety, and reuse or remanufacture of the canned subassembly (CSA) and for a complete life extension of the B61 -3, -4, -7, and -10, if directed by the Nuclear Weapons Council.

A few things stand out here…

This year’s budget request for the B61 is absolutely massive.  I went back and had a look at the requests for the RRW and the largest request was for about $88.7 million in FY 2008.  It kind of makes me wonder if a “study” is all the NNSA is asking for.

A central purpose of the LEP is to consolidate the different mods of the B61 into a single mod (often referred to as the B61-12).  By way of background, the B61 is a family of dual-purpose tactical/strategic weapons, the first of which entered the stockpile in 1968.  There are currently two strategic (the mod 7 and 11) and three non-strategic versions (the mod 3, 4, and 10) of the B61 in the U.S. arsenal.  This would give STRATCOM and the Air Force the flexibility to use the new mod in different capacities, largely wiping out the strategic/non-strategic distinction that currently defines the existing mods.

In explaining the massive increase in requested funding for the B61 LEP, NNSA states that it is necessary to “ensure continued support for our extended nuclear deterrence commitment.”  I take this to mean that NNSA thinks the U.S. will need to keep B61s on European soil for the foreseeable future (Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen estimate that approximately 200 B61-3s and 4s are deployed at six bases in the five European NATO countries).  If this is also the recommendation of the NPR, I hope it at least acknowledges the views of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and our NATO allies on the continued European deployment (though I’m not holding my breath).  It also wouldn’t hurt if the NPR also recommended consolidating our remaining weapons in Europe at a smaller number of (say one or two) U.S. bases.  

As one senior leader of USEUCOM put it to the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, “We pay a king’s ransom for these things [i.e. nuclear weapons in Europe] and…they have no military value.”  Likewise this year NATO is conducting a review of its Strategic Concept.  As part of this review, our NATO partners will surely address this continued European deployment.  The Belgian Senate has unanimously called for the withdrawal of the B61s from Europe, while the German Foreign Minister also recently called for their removal.  And yesterday the foreign minister of Poland co-authored an op-ed in the New York Times proclaiming that “The time has come to cover sub-strategic nuclear weapons with an arms control regime, which would look like the one that was established long ago for strategic arms.”

Will NNSA be able to ensure that tinkering with the nuclear explosive package to enhance surety will not violate the new Stockpile Management Programs’ requirement that any changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile can only be made if they further reduce the need for nuclear weapons testing?  Questions remain as to whether this is possible.  Last year’s Energy and Water Appropriations Bill called for a study (upon completion of the Nuclear Posture Review) “by the JASON Defense Advisory Group examining whether the planned B61-12 can be expected, without nuclear testing, to offer sufficient margin and other advantages as to constitute a long-term 21st Century weapon, or whether it is more likely to be an interim weapon leading to near-term replacement or retirement, and to recommend any additional research that may be needed to make an informed decision on this matter.”

Will Congress be able to roll back funding for the proposed LEP and/or limit funding to a non-nuclear LEP only as it did last year?  Two key factors will make such an effort more difficult this year.  First, the Obama administration is deeply committed to demonstrating its commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.  The B61 LEP is a key part of that effort.  Second, the House Energy and Water Appropriations Committee, which took the lead in seeking to reduce funding for the B61 LEP last year as well as the RRW in 2007 and 2008, staked its opposition on the fact that the U.S. did not have an overarching nuclear strategy outlining why such programs were necessary.  Once the Nuclear Posture Review is released on March 1, we will have such a strategy.    

Chalk up another Republican endorsement for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Last Friday former Utah Republican Senator Jake Garn called on the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty.  Said Garn:

Today, one of our greatest security interests is to discourage nuclear weapons testing by others. A global verifiable ban on testing would help block the ability of nuclear-armed countries, such as China, to develop more advanced nuclear weapons. Without nuclear weapon test explosions, could-be nuclear-armed nations — like Iran — would not be able to proof test the smaller, more sophisticated nuclear warhead designs that could be used to arm ballistic missiles.

Evidence that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has some pretty sensible views on nuclear weapons continues to pour in.  Last week Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama reaffirmed the DPJ’s commitment to Japan’s three nonnuclear principles.  Meanwhile, in an end of the year letter to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Japanese Foreign Minister Okada stated that the Japanese diplomats who told the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States that the TLAM-N is a key piece of the U.S. extended deterrent to Japan might have gone a little overboard.  According to Okada:

Hence, although the discussions were held under the previous Cabinet, it is my understanding that, in the course of exchanges between our countries, including the deliberations of the above mentioned Commission, it was never the case that views were expressed as being those of our government concerning whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems such as TLAM/N and RNEP. If, in some tentative way such a view was expressed, it would clearly be at variance with my views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament.

In a speech on European Security at L’Ecole Militaire in Paris Secretary of State Clinton reiterated the Obama administration’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons.  She also commented on the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.  On the Review Clinton noted: we are conducting a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to chart a new course that strengthens deterrence and reassurance for the United States and our allies while reducing the role and number of the nuclear weapons we have.  How exactly this tightrope will be walked will be revealed (as of now) on March 1.

In his April 2009 Prague speech on a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, President Obama vowed to purse a number of steps to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.  “As long as these weapons exist,” the President added, “the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”

Vice President Joe Biden takes to the page of the not-so friendly Wall Street Journal op-ed page today to outline how the Obama administration’s upcoming Fiscal Year 2011 budget, which will be released next week, will allow the U.S. to maintain a strong deterrent into the future…  

Recent reports have suggested that the Administration is about to propose a 10% increase in the nuclear weapons budget.  The Vice President confirms these reports:

To achieve these goals, our budget devotes $7 billion for maintaining our nuclear-weapons stockpile and complex, and for related efforts. This commitment is $600 million more than Congress approved last year. And over the next five years we intend to boost funding for these important activities by more than $5 billion. Even in a time of tough budget decisions, these are investments we must make for our security. We are committed to working with Congress to ensure these budget increases are approved.

Biden’s op-ed comes on the heels of last week’s Four Horsemen op-ed which also makes the case for a renewed commitment to our nuclear laboratories and infrastructure.  Like the Four Horsemen, Biden echoes many of the concerns expressed by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States about the state of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure.  He writes that “our laboratories and facilities have been underfunded and undervalued,” placing particular emphasis on “the growing shortage of skilled nuclear scientists and engineers” and “the aging of critical facilities.”

Nick Roth over at ANA provides a good overview of how this money is likely to be spent.  Expect increased funding for stockpile surveillance, new facilities at Los Alamos and Oakridge, and nonproliferation, and substantial funding for the newly-created Stockpile Management Program.

I think Biden’s op-ed serves a number of different purposes.

First, the op-ed responds to Republican demands, these days expressed in the context of the Obama administration’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear reductions agreement with Russia, that the U.S. must modernize its “nuclear deterrent.”  While Jon Kyl has repeatedly twisted what both the Strategic Posture Commission and the Defense Authorization Act call for on this front, the administration no doubt seeks to demonstrate that it will keep the arsenal up to snuff, and that it views increased funding for the nuclear enterprise as a necessary step to secure Republican support for a new arms control agreement and the CTBT.  As one administration official put it on background to Politico’s Laura Rozen:

the op-ed can be considered the opening salvo in an Administration effort to reframe the debate on U.S. nuclear weapons policy in advance of key developments this spring: the budget     release next week, which Biden previews, completion of the Nuclear Posture Review, the anticipated signature and ratification of a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] follow-on agreement with Moscow, two key nuclear summits in Washington in the spring, and laying the groundwork for eventual Senate consideration of the comprehensive nuclear test ban convention, the CTBT. He cited White House concerns that critics have been unchallenged on these issues for too long.

Second, while the op-ed expresses (overblown?) concerns about the state of our nuclear laboratories and facilities, it notes that we can continue to maintain our nuclear arsenal without testing, and says nothing about a need to produce new warhead designs or give existing warheads new military capabilities.  The evidence that we can continue to rely on existing stewardship and life extension programs to maintain our nuclear weapons is overwhelming.

Finally, the op-ed reaffirms the strong bipartisan support that exists for President Obama’s nuclear security agenda.  Hopefully the names “Kissinger” and “Schultz” continue to be part of just about every pitch the administration makes in support of this agenda going forward.