Last week I commented on Walter Pincus’ story on FOGBANK and the Kyl amendment(s). Via Frank Munger, I see that NNSA has released a FAQ on FOGBANK (the full text is pasted below the jump). The key takeaway: All issues involving Fogbank prod…
How to think about "extended deterrence"
The issue of extended deterrence has been in the news a lot in the past few weeks. First, via GSN’s Martin Matishak, at last week’s STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium Brad Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, stated:
there will be an increased emphasis [in the Nuclear Posture Review] on extended deterrence and the assurance of allies….”The concern about tipping points is rising,” Roberts said, noting that the anxieties of partner nations in East Asia have “sharpened” as a result of North Korea’s two nuclear tests and the modernization of the Chinese military’s nuclear capabilities.
And yesterday, on the 64th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bomb drop on Hiroshima, Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso reiterated his nation’s commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and global nuclear disarmament, while at the same time warning that he considers nuclear abolition to be “unimaginable”. Yukio Hatoyama, the leader of Japan’s primary opposition party took an even stronger pro-disarmament line, noting that “Realizing a nuclear-free world as called for by U.S. President [Barack] Obama is exactly the moral mission of our country as the only atomic-bombed state.” Japan has long been considered to be the most important beneficiary of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Those who are wary about reducing the role and size of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy are increasingly pointing to the challenges associated with protecting and reassuring allies in an age of Russian aggression, Chinese military modernization, and North Korean and Iranian provocation as a reason why we must be very cautious about further nuclear cuts with Russia, the CTBT, etc.
For example, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States raised a lot of eyebrows in the emphasis it placed on extended deterrence. Take, for example, this graf from the executive summary:
For the deterrence of attacks by regional aggressors and even China, the force structure requirements are relatively modest. The focus on Russia is not because the United States and Russia are enemies; they are not. No one seriously contemplates a direct Russian attack on the United States. Some U.S. allies located closer to Russia, however, are fearful of Russia and its tactical nuclear forces. The imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons, which greatly favors Russia, is of rising concern and an illustration of the new challenges of strategic stability as reductions in strategic weapons proceed. The need to reassure U.S. allies and also to hedge against a possible turn for the worse in Russia (or China) points to the fact that the U.S. nuclear posture must be designed to address a very broad set of U.S. objectives, including not just deterrence of enemies in time of crisis and war but also assurance of our allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries. Indeed, the assurance function of the force is as important as ever.[emphasis mine].
Though it didn’t explicitly say so, the Commission implies that extended deterrence is one of the most important, if not the most important, factor driving the size and characteristics of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Below the jump I outline some reasons to avoid overstating the value of extended deterrence. For more go read Jeffrey and Hans.
1. So long as U.S. allies could fall victim to nuclear attack, the U.S. should retain nuclear weapons to deter such an attack. However, allied concerns about the state of the U.S. nuclear umbrella should not be taken to mean that they oppose any or even significant changes to U.S. nuclear posture. Rather, key allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey don’t want to be surprised by changes to U.S. strategic posture. They want to be consulted well ahead of time.
2. There is much more to assuring allies than the nuclear component of extended deterrence. For example, a critical factor in an ally’s confidence in the credibility of extended deterrence is its confidence in the strength of its political relationship with the United States. If political relations fray then the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent will be perceived to be weak, no matter what type of or how many nuclear weapons the United States possesses. Nuclear weapons are often relied on as a crutch to avoid the hard choices and difficult negotiations with allies that changes in U.S. nuclear posture would require.
3. As the Carnegie Endowment’s George Perkovich has noted, there has never been a halcyon day of extended deterrence. On the one hand, some U.S. allies have always feared that the U.S. might bungle its way into a nuclear war. Conversely, there has always been a tension between U.S. alliance commitments and the fears on the part of allies that the U.S. might abandon them. These tensions, however, have not become more pronounced than they were during the Cold War.
That’s More Like It
In my post last week on the Kyl Amendment, I noted that the Obama administration needs to more forcefully make the affirmative case for the START follow-on treaty, with particular emphasis on (1) why a new arms control treaty with Russia will increases U.S. security and (2) rebutting arguments made by skeptics of the START follow-on process.
As if right on cue, newly-appointed Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher did just that in her remarks at the STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium on July 30 in Omaha, Nebraska. I’ve excerpted her comments on START from her full remarks below the jump. My only (minor) qualm is that I would have led with how the new treaty “will enhance our national security and provide for an effective deterrent.” Instead, Tauscher begins by stating that the new treaty ” is the beginning of a new narrative for the post-Cold War generation that need not be paralyzed by the threat of nuclear war and it is a down payment for deeper reductions in the future.” But overall it was an excellent case for the START follow-on treaty.
Update 8/6: John argues that while Tauscher’s remarks were effective in rebutting criticisms of the START follow-on process, they were largely silent on why nuclear reductions are important and would benefit U.S. security. I think that’s a fair point, though given that this was the first real effort on the part of a high-ranking administration official to make the case for the agreement, this was still a strong initial step.
Let me start by making the strongest case I can for the New START Treaty.
I believe the New START Treaty is the beginning of a new narrative for the post-Cold War generation that need not be paralyzed by the threat of nuclear war and it is a down payment for deeper reductions in the future.
We are fortunate to begin our work on the foundations already established by the Limited Test Ban, INF, SALT, START, and the Moscow Treaty as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Rose Gottemoeller and an interagency team are hard at work with their Russian counterparts drafting the New START treaty that will combine the predictability of START with the flexibility of the Moscow Treaty. In the recent Moscow Summit’s Joint Understanding, two separate limits are set out for delivery vehicles and their associated warheads. In case there is doubt, you can find it in paragraph four of the Joint Understanding. Both of these steps will enhance our national security and provide for an effective deterrent.
I want to take a minute to address some of the criticism that’s been directed at the New START treaty. Some say that the new treaty will not induce other countries to give up their weapons programs.
We are not so naïve as to believe that problem states will end their proliferation programs if the United States and Russia reduce our nuclear arsenals. But we are confident that progress in this area will reinforce the central role of the NPT and help us build support to sanction or engage states on favorable terms to us. Our collective ability to bring the weight of international pressure against proliferators would be undermined by a lack of effort towards disarmament.
Critics have also said that we are putting the New START treaty ahead of the Nuclear Posture Review. That is not the case. As many of you know, the Obama Administration tasked the NPR, as a first step, to develop a nuclear force structure and posture for use in the negotiations.
While the NPR’s work is still going on, it will inform the positions we take as we negotiate the New START treaty with Russia. The United States’ positions in the treaty negotiations are fully consistent with the nuclear policy strategy and force structure being developed in the NPR. I want to thank STRATCOM for its substantial contributions to this process.
Regardless of the numbers and force structure and strategy identified by the NPR, we need a robust nuclear infrastructure. We need to ensure that there is a safe and effective deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist without nuclear testing. I strongly support the critical role that extended deterrence has played in our national security policy. It must remain a central element of our national security policy. We must be able to tell our allies, “We’ve got your back.” This is one of the key issues being addressed in the NPR.
The Obama administration and key stakeholders must address the serious need to bolster the human capital and infrastructure necessary to maintain a credible, safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. As our nuclear arsenal is reduced to its appropriate level, these capabilities will become even more critical. A loss of the skilled engineers, technicians, planners, and operators, increases the risks and uncertainties we could face in the years to come.
Because of the critical role a viable nuclear arsenal has in our deterrent strategy, I helped write sections of the Defense Authorization bill that are intended to help ensure a sustainable nuclear deterrent as long as we need it. It’s called the Stockpile Management Program. It’s right there in section 4204 of the bill. We were very specific that the program increase the reliability, safety, and security of the stockpile without having to test.
And we built a fence around the program. We said that any changes to the stockpile cannot create new weapons and should further decrease the likelihood of testing. This is going to survive in conference and the next hurdle is to make sure that Stockpile Management is properly funded.
I want to make one last point. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev agreed that missile defenses will not be part of these negotiations, even while recognizing that there is an inherent link between offenses and defenses, something first recognized by the Nixon administration in 1972. The New START Treaty is about offensive arms.
We have agreed to continue to discuss these issues separately with the Russian government. But we have made it clear, our missile defense plans in Europe are aimed at the burgeoning Iranian capability and are not directed at Russia. I’m a strong supporter of missile defense. I know they have the potential to protect against attacks by countries with ballistic missile arsenals, like North Korea and Iran.
So we will pursue programs that are operationally and cost effective. The problem is that if we build systems that don’t address near term threats or are not thoroughly tested, we’ll lose the support of the American people. That’s why, I often say, that I have worked to protect missile defense from its most ardent supporters.
Sandinista!
Recent rumors about Iran’s “close ties” with Latin America have caused Washington to shake in its alarmist boots. In January, Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of Iranian “subversive activity” in the region. “The Iranians are building a huge embassy in Managua,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added in May. “And you can only imagine what that’s for.”
To date, there is still no sign of the embassy in Nicaragua despite Clinton’s breathless warning. But additional warnings have come from elsewhere.
In May, a secret Israeli government report was leaked that implicated Venezuela and Bolivia in the sale of uranium to Iran. Hugo Chavez has not found time in his weekly 12-hour broadcast “Alo Presidente” to refute the accusation. The Evo Morales camp in Bolivia denied it, though Morales did raise eyebrows after announcing a pending low-interest $280 million loan offer from Iran.
In July, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman visited Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Argentina to address Israeli concerns over uranium sales and terrorist activities throughout the continent. His concerns were not reciprocated in Brazil or Colombia. Brazilian President Lula said little about Iran’s program, noting only that he hoped for “every state to sign the NPT” and for the Middle East to be a region “free of nuclear weapons.”
Though it severely undercuts the international non-proliferation regime to play fast and loose with the nuclear fuel cycle, the NPT is not entirely proliferation-proof. It is an imperfect document that is only as strong as the collective will of its signatories. The NPT has been circumvented and ignored before. In 1980, France aided Iraq’s nuclear program by selling it a research reactor and 165 lbs of highly enriched uranium.
Many non-nuclear weapons states resent that they must accept far tougher restrictions on their civilian nuclear activities than the nuclear weapons states. Arguably, Venezuela and Bolivia are acting within the bounds of the treaty, and Iran is just cashing in on its sovereign right to pursue “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” as guaranteed in Article IV of the NPT.
Links between Iran and alienated, leftist South American regimes no doubt leave U.S. officials with images of Contras and coups dancing in their heads. Yet if the United States wants to maintain control over proliferation not curtailed by the NPT, it should address the root causes through sustained dialog with Iran and its alleged suppliers in both bilateral and multilateral settings. Ominous public warnings by American policymakers will do little to bring the truth to light or resolve the situation diplomatically.
More Fog on FOGBANK
FOGBANK just won’tgo away. Writing in today’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus revisits the now well-known difficulties NNSA has had in reproducing the classified substance as part of the refurbishment of the W76 warhead. According to Pincu…