by John Isaacs “The moment appears ripe for a renewal of arms control with Russia, and this bodes well for a continued reduction in the nuclear arsenal. The United States and Russia should pursue a step-by-step approach and take a modest first step to ensure that there is a successor to START I when it […]
Israel and the Nuclear Security Summit
Last week Israel’s Prime Minister announced his decision to cancel abruptly his appearance at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C. Israeli officials suggested that Netanyahu scuttled the trip due to fears that a group of Arab states might have used the conference to demand Israel sign up to the Non Proliferation Treaty. At a time when Israel continues to lobby allies to punish Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons program, such focus on its own program would have made it a target for criticism. And in the context of nuclear terrorism, this criticism seems increasingly valid.
Netanyahu’s attendance at the summit would have been unprecedented. He would have been the first Israeli premier ever to participate in discussions on nuclear issues. It’s also a subject he is knowledgeable about, having written specifically about it in his book, ‘Fighting Terrorism’. And it’s a subject that is particularly relevant for Israel, since historically it has been a frequent victim of terrorist attacks.
That Israeli adversaries such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and possibly Syria have all at one stage or another pursued nuclear weapons illustrates two things. First, it suggests that the deterrence Israel supposedly gains from its opaque nuclear posture has done little to stop its adversaries from pursuing nuclear weapons. Secondly, it’s possible that Israel’s nuclear program may have actually motivated some of these programs, or at least served as a convenient excuse for programs which may have gone ahead regardless of Israel’s nuclear status. The more nuclear programs there are in the region, particularly if they are pursued clandestinely, the greater the risk that materials could be diverted – with or without permission – to radical groups..
Egypt’s 1990 call for a Middle Eastern Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction ought now to be reviewed again. The proposals would prohibit the 22 nations that make up the Arab League plus Israel and Iran from possessing all forms of WMD – whether nuclear, biological or chemical. They would also oblige intrusive procedures to guarantee full compliance, allowing for no exception to the agreement.
This idea was endorsed in the Resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 NPT Review Conference as a way of getting Middle Eastern states to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty at a time when they were becoming increasingly frustrated by Israel’s nuclear posture. If established, not only would it reduce the potential for catastrophic war in the region, but the proposal would also have the added benefit of minimizing the risk that terrorists might one day acquire fissile materials that could be used in an attack.
As Zeev Maoz suggested in his 2003 study questioning the security value of Israel’s nuclear program, ‘in return for greater regional security, Israel must give up its nuclear weapons’. Indeed, if it’s serious about reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism, the pursuit of a Middle Eastern Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction should become a priority goal for Israel. In light of its vast conventional superiority and strong ties with the U.S, Israel is in a position to denuclearize as part of this policy, so long as every other state in the region is not allowed to possess nuclear weapons.
In contrast, attempting to escape criticism wherever possible, while reprimanding others for IAEA non-compliance, seems an unlikely way to reduce the potential for nuclear proliferation in the region – and thus the threat of nuclear terrorism.
START follow-on: The Senate calculus
by John Isaacs Published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Online on March 29, 2010 Article summary below; read the full text online At long last, the United States and Russia are on the verge of signing a new treaty that reduces the countries’ nuclear arsenals. The treaty, a follow-on to the landmark 1991 Strategic […]
Those Were the Weeks That Were: Nuclear Spring
by John Isaacs Stepping back from the past few frantic days on nuclear weapons issues, it is useful to realize how much has been accomplished. The last two weeks have arguably been the two most eventful weeks on reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons since the advent of the nuclear age. • On March […]
Interesting developments in the Russia / Iran S-300 deal?
Back in February I blogged about the ongoing delays surrounding the delivery of Russia’s S-300 PMU-1 air defense system to Iran. At the time, Russia cited technical problems as being the cause of the delay whilst simultaneously promising Tehran that they would still honor the sale. But according to a new story from Russian media outlet RIA Novosti, it seems that the Iranians are still no closer to getting their hands on the advanced air defense system. This time the delay has been explained as being caused by ongoing ‘talks’, again with the Russian caveat that ‘contracts have been signed, and they are being implemented’.
Since the S-300 contract was signed in December 2005, it would seem that the only talks that could be delaying delivery are those not involving the Iranians. As Richard Weitz recently pointed out, in light of the ongoing nuclear impasse, its likely that Israel and the U.S are exerting significant diplomatic pressure on Moscow to delay delivery for as long as possible. Iran’s hope that ‘Russian officials [are not] swayed by political pressure from other countries’ reflects their frustration at what appears to be the continuing success of Israeli and American efforts. But as Weitz suggests, these efforts ‘will matter little if China chooses to sell them its HQ-9 surface-to-air missile, which is characterized as “a not-so-bad Russian S-300 for less money.”’ Which is where things get interesting…
Just three days ago it was reported that Russia had shipped China 15 batteries of the S-300 missile defense system. According to a Russian language source (translated using Babelfish) these missiles were of the advanced PMU-2 variant, and were ordered in August 2007. This Interfaks source suggests the Chinese ordered 15 battalions, not the 15 batteries reported by RIA Novosti, which would be a far larger order.
China’s purchase of the S-300 system is nothing new, having ordered an initial batch of the PMU-1 variant back in 1992. However, following substantial orders in the early 90s, Russia gave China clearance to begin manufacturing their own clone of the S-300 PMU1 in 1995, which Beijing called the Hongqi-10 (HQ-10). China then built upon this technology and since 2002, has been producing its very own longer-range modification – the HQ-15. But given that the HQ-15s 200 km extended range now matches that of the S-300 PMU2, why did China feel the need to order 15 battalions / batteries from Russia in 2007?
One explanation could be that despite its similar range, the HQ-15 might not yet be on par with the PMU-2 system in other technical areas. As such, the Chinese may have invested in the PMU-2’s in order to reverse engineer them, with the aim of refining their own HQ-15 technology. But given the already close nature of the two systems, might it not have made more sense and been cheaper for the Chinese to simply invest in one or two ‘evaluation’ systems to work from, instead of the reported fifteen batteries / battalions? Perhaps, but given China’s ample fiscal resources it’s also possible that they sought to field a large network of PMU-2s as soon as possible, supplementing them with refined HQ-15’s as and when possible.
If this theory is true, and assuming these PMU-2s are designed to replace older (but still relatively modern) surface to air missile systems such as the HQ-9 / HQ-10 or Russian made S-300 PMU-1s, it’s possible that China may now have fifteen spare air defense systems. Keeping in mind that Iran only ordered five systems from Russia, and that Tehran has recently alluded to the possibility of buying alternatives from the Chinese, Beijing’s spare capacity could serve as the basis of a China-Iran deal if and when it were to come up.
Alternatively, although far less likely, is that China ordered some of these PMU-2s directly on behalf of Iran, and may transfer them either overtly or clandestinely at a future date.
Even if neither of these theories is true, the bottom line is that the quick order-to-delivery time of China’s PMU-2’s illustrates that Russia can and will sell its defense systems promptly if it wishes. Which is why Iran’s frustration with Russia is likely only growing.
