Reimagining the Pelindaba Treaty: Africa’s Role in a New Arms Control Era

by Nkazimulo Moyeni*

As Africa accelerates its peaceful nuclear energy ambitions under the watch of international safeguards, the frameworks that govern arms control must evolve to reflect the continent’s energy needs and geopolitical aspirations. Africa is no longer just a passive observer of great power nuclear rivalry, but can become a strategic actor in shaping a more inclusive and development-sensitive global arms control architecture.

The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, commonly known as the Pelindaba Treaty, was adopted in 1996 as a major milestone in global non-proliferation. It affirmed Africa’s commitment to abstaining from nuclear weapons while promoting cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Yet, the global arms control landscape it was born into has changed. The post-Cold War optimism and deep cuts in nuclear arsenals have been replaced by renewed competition between nuclear states as a characteristic of  today’s multipolar and energy-hungry world. With the United States disengaging, China seeking to control the continent’s resources and Russia propping up dictatorships, Africa faces serious challenges. Nuclear proliferation should not be among them. The Pelindaba Treaty can be reinterpreted not only as a prohibition instrument but as a foundation for African agency in arms control and nuclear governance.

Africa stands at the crossroads of two pressing global imperatives. The first is the need for non-proliferation and disarmament in an increasingly unstable security environment. The second is the urgency of equitable access to sustainable energy. Nuclear energy offers Africa a low-carbon path to industrialisation and energy security. Several states including Egypt, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria are actively exploring nuclear power programs, with South Africa already operating a commercial nuclear plant. These developments are taking place under the close supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ensures that peaceful nuclear programs do not translate into proliferation risks. But the trust deficit that pervades global nuclear governance can subject African states to heightened scrutiny without affording them the institutional power to shape the rules of the game.

To address this imbalance, participating governments could reinterpret the Pelindaba Treaty beyond its prohibitive scope. Article III of the treaty affirms the right of all state parties to use nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. This provision, often overshadowed by the treaty’s disarmament narrative, is an essential entry point for building a regional nuclear governance model that reflects African priorities. Operationalizing the treaty to support capacity-building in nuclear safety, security and verification can empower African institutions such as the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) to take on a more assertive role.

Operationalization of the Pelindaba Treaty could involve the following concrete measures:

1. Capacity-building and education: Develop structured regional training programs in nuclear safety, security, safeguards and law. These could be facilitated through AFCONE in collaboration with African universities and international partners, laying the foundation for indigenous expertise.
2. Institutional development: Expand AFCONE’s mandate beyond compliance monitoring to include advisory and coordination functions for peaceful nuclear development. This would require formalized relationships with national regulatory bodies, ministries of energy and foreign affairs departments across member states.
3. Regional legal frameworks: Establish a continent-wide network of nuclear legal experts through bodies like the African Nuclear Law Association (ANLA), who can work with AFCONE to create standardized legislation, model laws and regulatory templates tailored to African contexts.
4. Verification and peer review mechanisms: Create African-led monitoring and peer-review systems that complement IAEA safeguards, increasing trust among states and bolstering the credibility of Africa’s peaceful nuclear ambitions.
5. Public awareness and stakeholder engagement: Develop a public education and civil society engagement program to demystify nuclear energy, reduce public resistance, and increase transparency around nuclear policies and infrastructure.
6. Financial mechanisms: Establish a member state-funded Nuclear Development Fund under AFCONE to support legal, technical and infrastructural development in nuclear energy, including the establishment of regional nuclear research centers and nuclear law schools.
7. Political advocacy: Empower AFCONE to serve as the continental voice in global non-proliferation dialogues — akin to the role played by Euratom in Europe — ensuring that African interests are not just represented but embedded in international nuclear governance processes.

In this way, the operationalization of the Pelindaba Treaty becomes more than a passive commitment to non-proliferation; it transforms into a proactive architecture for African nuclear governance, development and leadership. The treaty should be viewed as both a protective shield against nuclear weapons and a springboard for sovereign innovation in nuclear science and technology. By anchoring this dual mandate in concrete policy, legal and institutional frameworks, Africa can take its rightful place at the forefront of the global energy transition — on its own terms.

Currently, AFCONE faces budgetary and technical constraints that limit its ability to monitor and verify compliance across the continent. Strengthening AFCONE must be a continental priority. This will require political will from African Union member states, increased domestic funding and stronger collaboration with regional bodies such as the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA). A robust AFCONE can serve not only as a watchdog but as a catalyst for peaceful nuclear development, offering training, verification expertise and diplomatic platforms for African countries to engage with global powers on equal footing.

Verification is another area where the Pelindaba Treaty can be reimagined. The treaty prohibits the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons on African soil but does not set out mechanisms for on-site verification. Incorporating modern verification tools, including satellite imagery and remote sensing, into AFCONE’s mandate could significantly enhance transparency and trust. Partnering with the IAEA and international verification organizations can bring African expertise into global efforts, fostering reciprocal trust and helping bridge the North-South divide that continues to haunt disarmament diplomacy.

This reorientation of the Pelindaba Treaty would also open the door for Africa to shape other emerging conversations in arms control, such as norms for small modular reactors (SMRs), and the intersection between climate goals and nuclear energy deployment. Africa has often been a bystander as non-proliferation policies were crafted elsewhere. But with its nuclear-weapon-free status, it holds moral and strategic authority to call for a more development-friendly sustainable global energy regime. This includes advocating for technology transfers and equitable access to nuclear fuel cycles, and participating in export control regimes on an equal footing.

The NPT and Pelindaba: Raising the Bar, Not Replacing the Floor

Repurposing the Pelindaba Treaty could also fill key gaps in the NPT’s implementation within the African context, politically, geographically and institutionally, particularly as the treaty does not provide an operational mechanism tailored to regional peace and development concerns, especially in Africa.

Pelindaba is grounded in Africa’s unique history with nuclear injustice, such as uranium extraction under colonial regimes, nuclear testing and marginalization in global nuclear governance. It gives African states collective political agency over nuclear-related issues, which the NPT does not structurally enable. Pelindaba prohibits not just the possession and use of nuclear weapons, but also:

1. Stationing of nuclear weapons by foreign powers
2. Nuclear testing anywhere within the continent or its territories
3. Dumping of radioactive waste, an issue not addressed in the NPT.

The treaty can be repurposed to align more effectively with African peace and security frameworks under the African Union, offering a nuclear governance model that is integrated into continental development goals, something the NPT is not designed to do.

The Pelindaba Treaty can also offer a platform for African collaboration on peaceful nuclear energy, especially as more African states pursue SMRs and civilian nuclear infrastructure. The NPT promotes peaceful use, but does not provide mechanisms for regional cooperation, legal harmonization or technical support, which Pelindaba can support if repurposed. Africa can set the standard for the world by using an adaptation of the Pelindaba Treaty to close the NPT loopholes allowing enrichment beyond levels needed for energy production and accumulation of fissile material for naval propulsion. By doing so, African governments would position themselves to assert a moral and legal stance, advancing nuclear disarmament from a Global South perspective, particularly through multilateral blocs like the African Union (AU), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and G77.

A New Arms Control Paradigm

The paradigm shift that Africa must champion is one that redefines arms control not as a policy of competition but as a tool for promoting cooperation and sustainable development. The traditional arms control agenda has focused on reducing stockpiles and managing deterrence among great powers. In contrast, Africa’s experience offers a model of restraint paired with aspirations for peaceful use. The Pelindaba Treaty embodies this balance and can serve as the basis for a new global norm that prioritizes inclusive security, energy equity and regional agency.

This shift will not be easy. It demands that African countries speak with a coordinated voice at forums like the United Nations, the NAM, the IAEA Board of Governors and the NPT Review Conferences. It also requires consistent domestic investment in scientific research, legal frameworks and technical institutions that can support independent nuclear governance. More importantly, it calls for a mindset change in global capitals that still view arms control as an issue for the major nuclear powers, excluding half the planet that would nonetheless suffer from a nuclear war.

Ultimately, the future of arms control must reflect the realities of a diverse and interconnected world. African states are not merely observers of this future but must be its architects. By revitalizing and reinterpreting the Pelindaba Treaty, Africa can help build a more just and balanced nuclear order that ensures both global security and energy justice.

Africa is next up in arms control. The time to act is now.

*Editor’s note: Writing for the Center’s new Next Up in Arms Control series, Nkazimulo Moyeni is a South African lawyer and legal strategist specializing in nuclear energy law, non-proliferation policy, and capital markets. He is the founder and President of the African Nuclear Law Association (ANLA) and the principal at Ga Seriti Legal. His work focuses on strengthening Africa’s nuclear governance, regulatory frameworks, and legal capacity for sustainable energy futures.