A detailed summary of the US Army’s M1 Abrams Tank.
How to Save $48 Billion from the US Nuclear Triad Over the Next 10 Years – While Still Keeping it
Last week, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its annual ”Options for Reducing the Deficit” report outlining 103 options to reduce the budget deficit between FY 2014 and FY 2023. Of specific interest to us, the report identifies potential savings in the submarine and bomber legs of the US nuclear triad; the ternary strategy of nuclear delivery systems that includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long-range strike bombers (LRS-B).
Individually, the bomber option would save $32 billion between FY 2014 and FY 2023 while the submarine option would save $16 billion between FY 2015 and FY 2023. Amazingly, neither option would eliminate either leg of the nuclear triad. Below are summaries of the two options:
Bomber Option: Postpone the development of the new Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). The Air Force currently possesses 76 B52-Hs, 63 B1-Bs and 20 B2-As for a total fleet size of 159 long-range strategic bombers. The service is planning to replace this aging fleet with 80-100 new long-range strike bombers beginning in the middle of the next decade to the tune of an estimated total procurement cost of $55 billion. The CBO option would defer development of the new bomber until after FY 2023. This would save $32 billion between FY 2014 and FY 2023.
Option advantages identified by the CBO:
1. The $32 billion in savings could be spent on maintaining quality and readiness, which the Air Force claims is suffering from a lack of funding.
2. The delay could potentially allow the Air Force to incorporate newer technologies into the aircraft design that do not currently exist. This would likely improve the lifespan of the aircraft in future years.
Option disadvantages identified by the CBO:
1. There is a risk that the current generation of bombers may need to be retired earlier than expected and/or that the new LSR-B may take longer to develop than expected. If either scenario occurs, the US may be left without an adequate long-range strike capability.
2. The existing bomber fleet consists of only 20 stealth aircraft, the B-2As. As air defense systems become more advanced, the need for long-range stealth aircraft increases. Going forward, such a small fleet of stealth aircraft may not suffice.
3. As the US re-balances to East Asia, a region marked by limited basing options and long distances, the existing LRS-B capability may be inadequate.
Submarine Option: Cut the number of existing Ohio-class submarines in addition to deferring the development of and reducing the total order of the new Ohio-replacement submarines. At present, the Navy maintains a fleet of 14 Ohio-class nuclear-armed submarines (designation SSBN). The Navy currently plans to replace this fleet with 12 new nuclear-armed submarines (designation SSBN(X)) by 2042. The CBO option would reduce the existing SSBN fleet from 14 to 8 by FY 2020, defer the start of the SSBN(X) program from FY 2021 to FY 2024, and reduce the total order of SSBN(X) submarines from 12 to 8. Implementation of this option would save just under $16 billion between FY 2015 and FY 2023.
Option advantages identified by the CBO:
1. The sea leg of the US strategic deterrent would remain credible and robust. Each of the 8 submarines (of either class) can carry 128 warheads deployed across 16 missiles (8 warheads per missile). This would total 1,024 deployed nuclear warheads in the sea-leg of the nuclear triad alone, allowing the United State’s to maintain the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.
2. Costs accrued from modernizing the missiles and warheads that these submarines carry would potentially be reduced. Because there are fewer submarines in the fleet, fewer missiles and warheads will require modernization at the end of their life span.
Option disadvantages identified by the CBO:
1. The submarine leg of the nuclear triad would be less effective. Fewer submarines would mean that fewer areas could be patrolled and that a smaller fleet would be available for deployment in a crisis.
2. Each submarine would be easier to target. Because each submarine would have to fire more ballistic missiles in order to hit the same amount of targets that a fleet of 12 submarines could, more trajectories could be used by an adversary to accurately calculate the origin of the launches.
3. Delaying development of the SSBN(X) would disrupt the joint UK-US development of a common missile compartment, which the UK requires for its own fleet of strategic nuclear-armed submarines.
The Pentagon will hopefully give these options some serious consideration. If across-the-board sequester cuts remain in place, $454 billion will have to be cut from the Pentagon budget between now and FY 2021. The two CBO options won’t cover all of these required savings, but they sure would help.
Pentagon pushes for billions to refurbish nuclear bombs
I’ve written my October Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column on the misbegotten B61 life extension program (LEP). Here’s how I begin:
At an estimated cost of more than $11 billion, the life-extension program for the B61 bomb would be the most ambitious and expensive nuclear warhead refurbishment in history. Concerned by this massive (and still growing) cost and skeptical of the need for a program of such breadth, two of the Senate’s appropriations subcommittees—Energy and Water, as well as Defense—slashed allotted spending on it in their respective fiscal 2014 funding bills.
Worried that their favorite refurbishment program is on the ropes, the Pentagon and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have launched a counteroffensive with an assist from supporters in Congress. The lobbying effort will be on full display on October 29 at a hearing hosted by the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee. It will include testimony in support of the life-extension program from the head of US Strategic Command and high-ranking representatives of the NNSA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The case against the proposed B61 life extension is simple: It is unaffordable, unworkable, and unnecessary. In addition, it is premised on assumptions about demand for nuclear bombs that may no longer be valid 10 years from now, when the program is scheduled to be completed. It would be foolish to spend $11 billion on an overly ambitious overhaul, when the future of at least half the weapons is uncertain and more cost-effective alternatives are available.
Read the whole thing here.
As I note in the column, the B61 is set to take center stage at a House Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing tomorrow afternoon. Expect the Pentagon/NNSA witnesses to expound all manner of arguments about how the current LEP of record is the cheapest LEP that meets military requirements to extend deterrence in Europe and Asia and ensure continued delivery by the B-2 bomber, would allow for a reduction in the size of the stockpile of nuclear gravity bombs (including the potential retirement of the earth penetrating B61 mod 11 and the aging B83 strategic gravity bomb), reduce long-term B61 life cycle costs, increase the safety of the refurbished weapons, obviate the need for an unplanned B61 life extension program in the 2020s, and is impossible to ditch at this point because NNSA has already dumped so much time and money into it.
Let’s set aside for the moment the fact that all of these arguments have major flaws (for example the B61 is already arguably the safest nuclear weapon in the stockpile; the Pentagon/NNSA have not provided a guarantee that the mod 12 would lead to the elimination of the B83; because the expected life of the mod 12 is only 20 years NNSA already has a second (!!) life extension program for the B61 on the books that is scheduled to begin in 2033 and could always move that date up a few years as a follow-on to a less ambitious LEP than the mod 12 if necessary; as of June 2013 NNSA had only spent $300 million on engineering work for the mod 12; NNSA has an ignominious history of launching into major protects only to determine later that it had overstated requirements and ignored more cost-effective alternatives; etc.).
The most important question that needs an answer is how NNSA plans to complete its proposed scope of work by 2019 given the current budget environment. Because as of now it’s not clear how the agency can do so.
Pentagon pushes for billions to refurbish nuclear bombs
by Kingston Reif Published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Online on October 25, 2013. Article summary below; read the full text here. At an estimated cost of more than $11 billion, the life-extension program for the B61 bomb would be the most ambitious and expensive nuclear warhead refurbishment in history. Concerned by this massive […]
The Stimson and CATO Diets for Nuclear Weapons Spending
Slimming down by starting a healthy diet is usually a smart decision to make when weight has become a health issue. The US Department of Defense has been forced into such a decision (at least for now) as a result of sequestration, which would, in the long-term, eliminate $500 billion from America’s national security spending coffers over the next decade. Against this backdrop, the Washington-based Stimson Center and CATO Institute recently proposed their own diets for the US defense budget.
The Stimson’s band of academic and military defense experts, known as the “defense advisory committee”, present 27 specific recommendations they call “Strategic Agility”. This strategy would result in annual fiscal savings of around $50 billion while maintaining US national security.
Of particular interest is the report’s identification of cost saving measures in nuclear weapons spending; a particularly fatty expense. It calls for retiring an ICBM wing, eliminating the stockpile of non-strategic B-61s, and scaling back the B-61 life extension program. The planned order of 12 new nuclear-armed Ohio-class replacement submarines would also be reduced to 10 under the proposal. Such changes will cut around $1.4 billion annually from the defense budget while maintaining a viable US nuclear deterrent.
An interesting facet of Stimson’s proposed diet is its argument for the continuation of the triad of nuclear delivery systems (bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles). This is presumably a result of the underlying philosophy of “Strategic Agility”, which places a high priority on “visible evidence of US commitments and capabilities”. According to Stimson, a combination of bombers, missiles and submarines provides such evidence.
Conversely, a recent report by the CATO Institute questioned the strategic and fiscal rationale for the triad. Like the Stimson report, the CATO report authors Benjamin H. Friedman, Christopher Preble and Matt Fay propose a reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons. However, the CATO report calls for a shift from a triad of nuclear delivery systems to a dyad of systems based on land- and submarine-based missiles.
Aside from the massive fiscal savings that would result from a reduction to a monad, such a system would maintain a healthy US strategic nuclear deterrent. This argument rests in part on the fact that submarines are difficult to destroy and have the capability of launching a large number of nuclear warheads near a potential target; something the other systems lack. This ultimately reveals the other systems to be unnecessary and, therefore, perfect candidates for fiscal savings.
The report acknowledges the context within which it is arguing and concludes that a monad system is politically unfeasible. Intercontinental ballistic missiles enjoy strong political support, which makes them very difficult to cut. Bombers, by comparison, enjoy relatively less political support, and so, in light of the need for savings, a nuclear dyad would be the next best option.
The different nuclear force structures proposed by Stimson and CATO are certainly reflected in the tremendous differences in savings for nuclear spending that each report identifies. The slimmed down arsenal resulting from CATO’s proposed cuts to two of the three delivery systems amounts to an annual estimated saving of $20 billion. The Stimson slim fast estimates a far smaller annual saving of around $1.4 billion when one only considers the cuts related to nuclear weapons spending.
It is of course a sad fact about diets that many who require them never really start them, and, even if they do, the chances that they will stick with it are slim. This will most probably be the case with Congress and the Pentagon when it comes to the nuclear diets proposed by the Stimson Center and the CATO Institute, at least initially. Their appetite for nuclear defense spending has been traditionally large and definitely unhealthy.
However, the long-term implementation of sequestration would put enormous pressure on U.S. nuclear spending plans. If the face of such budget cuts you can only hide big ticket modernization programs such as a new nuclear ballistic missile submarine and a new long-range penetrating bomber for so long. This is all the more reason to take the Stimson and CATO recommendations seriously.
