Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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Atomic Anxiety: Iranian Enrichment and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

The recent joint plan of action concluded between the P5 + 1 and Iran has met with mixed reviews both at home and abroad. States in the Middle East have been particularly vocal on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, leading some to suggest that any continued Iranian enrichment could yield a cascade of proliferation in the region. Since the P5 + 1 agreement came into effect, some have insisted that if a final deal allows even a very limited level of Iranian enrichment, countries throughout the region will be tempted to pursue nuclear weapons or a substantive nuclear energy program with enrichment and/or reprocessing capabilities. The evidence, however, suggests that such fears are unfounded.

Saudi Arabia has long been skeptical of international negotiations with Iran. Saudi leaders have enthusiastically supported the international sanctions aimed at Iran, and as a competing regional power, it is likely that they would not mind seeing Iran weighed down by continued sanctions. Other Gulf States share Saudi Arabia’s concern. Bahrain resents alleged Iranian interference in its internal affairs and opposes any negotiated settlement that might alleviate Iran’s economic woes. Abu Dhabi, the largest member of the United Arab Emirates, also opposes any sanctions relief, partly due to their own territorial dispute with Iran.

Of the states opposing the current deal, however, the first to receive a visit from a US leader was Israel, where Vice President Joe Biden discussed the Iranian nuclear program and a host of other issues with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Though Israel strongly opposed the initial P5 + 1 deal, its reaction following the announcement of the implementation agreement was somewhat muted. Saudi leaders similarly offered a tepid statement of support for the deal, but some in the ruling family have publicly criticized it. Saudi Arabia will receive a visit from President Obama in March designed in part to allay Saudi concerns. Though Saudi and Bahraini business leaders have also evinced skepticism of a thaw in relations with Iran, they appear ready to wait and see if a comprehensive nuclear deal can allay some of their concerns.

Middle Eastern states are not, however, unanimously united against the joint plan of action. Turkey, which has previously evinced wariness of the Iranian nuclear program, praised the agreement and offered “to provide every kind of support for the success of the process”. Oman hosted the secret US-Iranian talks that led to the breakthrough meetings in Geneva, and Dubai, which aims to bolster its trade with Iran, has welcomed the P5 + 1 agreement, putting it at odds with its fellow emirate, Abu Dhabi.

While these states have been more welcoming of the deal, it is clear that they support the diplomatic process partly because they fear the possibility of a nuclear Iran. While Iran’s neighbors generally feel threatened by the possibility of a nuclear Iran, the support for the pact—even if tepid in some states—suggests that a civil Iranian nuclear program with low levels of enrichment would not spark a new wave of nuclear proliferation.

When it comes to nuclear proliferation, not all states are created equal. Rather, when making the argument that an Iranian nuclear program, however limited, could lead to a cascade of proliferation, the three states most frequently identified as possible proliferators are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Egypt, however, will need to cobble together a functioning government before it can explore enrichment. Turkey, which would be more capable of such an undertaking than Egypt, already hosts US nuclear bombs through NATO.

Saudi Arabia, it would seem, is the most likely of the three to seek nuclear weapons or a substantial enrichment program in response to continued Iranian enrichment. US security guarantees, which, as in the case of Turkey, sometimes come in the form of nuclear bombs but could just as easily rely upon conventional forces, will play an important role in dissuading these countries from pursuing dangerous and potentially destabilizing nuclear programs of their own. For the time being, ongoing diplomatic efforts have forestalled any such moves, and even though other states are clearly threatened by a hypothetical Iranian nuclear weapon, it is not clear that a limited degree of Iranian enrichment conducted under IAEA safeguards would yield proliferation in the region.

In addition, as Kingston Reif argues in his recent Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column, it is not at all clear why an agreement that verifiably puts Iran farther away from a bomb than at any time since it began enrichment will suddenly increase the incentives for other Middle Eastern states to start hedging.

The technical and managerial challenges associated with nuclear programs are daunting enough. As has been argued elsewhere, however, it would take a perfect storm—more than simply an Iranian nuclear weapon, let alone a restricted enrichment program—to provoke proliferation in any of the states considered above. The continued existence of a limited and closely monitored Iranian nuclear energy program and accompanying low-level uranium enrichment is thus unlikely to encourage proliferation in the region.

Why We (Still) Shouldn’t Worry About a Saudi-Pakistan Nuclear Transfer

In recent years, a number of analysts and former government officials have argued that Saudi Arabia would feel pressured into pursuing its own nuclear deterrent should Iran, a country that the Saudis view with contempt and fear, develop its own nuclear arsenal. In light of the Kingdom’s inability to domestically develop such a capability in a short amount of time, the concern was that Saudi Arabia would purchase a nuclear weapon from its long-time ally Pakistan, whose nuclear weapons program was partly financed by the Gulf kingdom.

Claiming this “conventional wisdom” was “wrong”, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) argued in its February 2013 report “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds a Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” that a nuclear weapon transfer from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia was highly unlikely should Iran ever attain a nuclear weapon. Aside from the lack of hard evidence of any assurance from Pakistan that it would sell its weapons to Saudi Arabia, both countries would face significant disincentives to ever follow through with such a transaction.

On the Saudi side, it would face a harsh backlash from the international community. Saudi Arabia is a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory and its contravention of this treaty and the norm it encapsulates would likely cause many countries to issue far-reaching and damaging economic sanctions against the Gulf kingdom. The US-Saudi security relationship, upon which the country is so dependent for its military security, would also be nullified, and Israel might consider a reactionary strike against Saudi Arabia, similar to those against Iraq in 1981.

Pakistan would face a similar international backlash. Although it is not an NPT signatory, its actions as a nuclear weapons proliferator would also contravene accepted international proliferation norms and likely result in far-reaching economic sanctions. In light of Pakistan’s weak economy and political institutions, it would suffer considerably if such sanctions were issued.

Taken together, the CNAS report concludes that both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have no incentive to pursue a nuclear weapons transaction in the event of Iranian weaponization.

Nine months later, doubts have been raised on this assessment following the publication of a BBC investigative report claiming that unnamed NATO sources confirm the existence of a Saudi-Pakistan nuclear agreement. In the report’s own words, Pakistani nuclear weapons “are now sitting ready for delivery” to the Gulf Kingdom.

Along with the “recent ‘rift’ between the US and Saudi Arabia and ambiguous statements from Saudi officials regarding the existence of this nuclear arrangement, the report has helped resurrect fears about the prospect of a Riyadh ready to go nuclear. Just yesterday, Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal wrote with full confidence that, should Iran go nuclear (which he believes they will), “Saudi Arabia will move swiftly to acquire a nuclear deterrent from its clients in Islamabad.”

So, should we doubt the CNAS assessment of the situation? Will Saudi Arabia attain a nuclear weapon from Pakistan?

The answer to both questions is no. Even if the arrangement does exist, which the CNAS report originally doubted, the prospect of Pakistan transferring a nuclear weapon to Saudi Arabia any time soon is as slim as it was before.

Why? Because the array of disincentives facing both countries that the CNAS report identified in February still remain nine months later. If Riyadh purchased a weapon from Islamabad, both countries would still suffer from the damaging effects of the international backlash that would result. The costs continue to vastly outweigh the benefits.

Even if Iran attains a nuclear weapon and begins to act aggressively towards Saudi Arabia, it is not clear that a nuclear transfer would likely follow. While the Kingdom may seriously consider the acquisition of a nuclear weapon to defend itself in such a scenario, Pakistani incentives are unlikely to change. In comparison to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is not threatened by Iran or its ambitions in the wider Middle East. The benefits of selling a nuclear weapon would remain low in the face of high costs and so while Saudi Arabia may come to favor a transfer, Pakistan would likely refuse it.

Thus, the CNAS report’s overall assessment remains valid in light of these new findings. Regardless of whether a nuclear arrangement exists between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the likelihood of a nuclear transfer remains low for the foreseeable future. There are many justified fears concerning the potential consequences of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This just isn’t one of them.

New Study Downplays Threat of “Nuclear Handoff,” But Nuclear Terrorism Threat Remains

Over the past few weeks, several blogs have spotlighted a recent article by scholars Keir Lieber and Daryl Press that analyzes the threat of a nuclear weapons state transferring nuclear weapons to a terrorist organization. The article – “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists” — asserts that a state has little incentive to deliberately transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group, because if that group were to carry out a nuclear attack with said weapons, neither party would remain anonymous, and retribution from the attacked state would undoubtedly ensue.