by Paulius Razukevicius*
The world is facing potentially its most precarious moment since the end of the Cold War. China’s military and economic reach stretches across continents, sparking unease throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. In Eastern Europe, Ukraine remains a flashpoint, with conflict outcomes as uncertain as ever and Russia poised to disrupt the rules–based international order at any cost. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the recent reelection of Donald Trump has cast a shadow of unpredictability over NATO, shaking Europe’s confidence in its closest ally.
For the Baltic states, NATO’s frontline, these threats are all too familiar. Leaders there have long warned of Russia’s ambitions and understand the urgency of resilience. Europe stands at a critical juncture: adapt to these challenges with unity, or risk becoming an afterthought in a world where alliances are no longer guaranteed.
Cold War Deterrence in a Modern Landscape
NATO’s nuclear deterrence has relied heavily on U.S. support, with contributions from the UK and France. Over recent decades, NATO scaled back its nuclear presence, focusing on reductions in nuclear forces after the Cold War. However, as the United States juggles global commitments, this strategy faces new pressures. Meanwhile, Russia has modernized its nuclear arsenal and increased its military exercises, highlighting a willingness to project power that NATO’s current policy has proved insufficient to deter.
While NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy has been effective in preventing direct attacks on alliance territory, it has done little to curb Russian aggression elsewhere. The strategy’s limitations became evident with Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and with the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By focusing solely on NATO’s immediate borders, the current deterrence framework has left neighboring nations vulnerable, giving Russia a sense of impunity to act outside NATO’s sphere. Although it remains unlikely that Russia would directly attack NATO, the growing boldness of its actions and rhetoric feeds concerns in allied capitals. As NATO reassesses its deterrence, it must consider the need for a strategy that addresses threats beyond its borders, ensuring that Russia’s ambitions do not further destabilize the region.
A Call to Heed the Baltic Perspective
For years, Western European leaders have largely dismissed the warnings voiced by politicians from the Baltic states whenever they raised alarms about the expansionist ambitions of Russian President Vladimir Putin. These countries, however, possess a deep understanding of the Kremlin’s motives and hold a “bitter historical memory of the violence that Moscow is willing to unleash to pursue its goals.” Recent events have underscored the need to listen to these frontline nations, whose proximity to Russia and experience with its aggression give them a unique and invaluable perspective of security threats.
The Baltics have long urged NATO to adopt a more proactive stance that addresses not only conventional threats but also the hybrid tactics defining modern conflict. Their insights underscore the need for NATO to move beyond nuclear deterrence toward a multi-domain strategy, incorporating cyber defenses, conventional forces and resilience against disinformation. This approach, championed by the Baltics due to their proximity to Russia’s tactics, reflects today’s reality in which threats blend nuclear and non-nuclear elements. By integrating hybrid readiness exercises and enhancing cyber and informational capabilities, NATO can strengthen its deterrence to counter both traditional and unconventional aggression, just as the Baltics have long advocated, while reducing the perceived role of nuclear forces in allied deterrence.
Nuclear Weapons
While NATO remains committed to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, nuclear weapons will continue to play a crucial role in its deterrence strategy as long as they exist. Exercises like the annual Steadfast Noon play a crucial role in maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear posture, involving non-live training with nuclear-capable aircraft. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, allies underscored the importance of both conventional and nuclear capabilities within NATO’s defense strategy. With Russia continually expanding its nuclear potential and escalating its threats, maintaining credible conventional and nuclear forces, including through more frequent exercises, would reinforce the alliance’s readiness. Such a strategy demonstrates NATO’s commitment to credible deterrence while balancing its responsibilities toward arms control and stability in the region.
Over time, this balanced posture could succeed in reopening dialogue with Russia, laying the groundwork for reducing nuclear stockpiles on both sides. For the Baltics, this would not only enhance regional security but also address the particular risks posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons in their vicinity. By demonstrating both strength and openness, NATO can pave the way for a more stable and secure Europe.
Pathways to Dialogue Through Resilience
By embracing the Baltic stance – standing tall and unafraid to take necessary actions – NATO and its allies can commit to a strategy that combines readiness with openness to dialogue. Promoting military readiness by itself is at best a half–measure; it only makes sense when paired with readiness for diplomacy. While many Europeans may hesitate to reopen talks, the recent election of a U.S. president inclined toward portraying himself as a deal-maker makes it likely that the door to dialogue could be opened. By increasing multinational exercises and reinforcing non-nuclear capabilities, NATO sends a message of strength not as a provocation, but as a foundation for security and engagement.
This approach serves as a confidence-building measure, creating space for renewed dialogue on critical issues such as reducing nuclear stockpiles and enhancing European security. In this way, resilience and preparedness can pave the way to meaningful diplomatic progress, reinforcing NATO’s role as both a protector and a promoter of peace.
*Editor’s note: Writing for the Center’s new Next Up in Arms Control series, Paulius Razukevicius, a Boston University graduate, specializes in security, defense, and nuclear deterrence. Originally from Lithuania, his interests focus on arms control and NATO strategy, with an emphasis on enhancing regional and global security through strategic cooperation and policy development.
DISCLAIMER: Next Up in Arms Control is a way for the Center to present an opportunity for dialogue and provocation through the thoughtful exchange of ideas and opinions on new or different ways to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear threats. Opinions are the authors’ alone and not necessarily reflective of Center’s positions on the issues addressed.
