By Andrew Sullivan
January 17, 2014
In the to and fro on the AIPAC sanctions bill, it’s easy to get lost about how precisely the law would immediately kill the negotiations. Edward Levine has a terrific primer on why that would happen, citing various, specific parts of the law:
Section 301(a)(2)(I) requires the President to certify, in order to suspend application of the new sanctions, that “Iran has not schumerchipsomodevillagetty.jpgconducted any tests for ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 500 kilometers.” While this objective may be consistent with a UN Security Council resolution, it moves the goalposts by making the new sanctions contingent not just on Iran’s nuclear activities, but also on its missile programs. This paragraph also does not specify a time period (although the requirement in section 301(a)(1) for a certification every 30 days might imply one), so Iran’s past missile tests beyond 500 km might make it impossible for the President ever to make this certification.
Which is the point. Or take this provision:
Section 301(a)(4) reimposes previously suspended sanctions if the President does not make the required certifications. This paragraph applies not only to the sanctions mandated by this bill, but also to “[a]ny sanctions deferred, waived, or otherwise suspended by the President pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action or any agreement to implement the Joint Plan of Action.” Thus, it moves the goalposts even for the modest sanctions relief that the United States is currently providing to Iran.
Or this one:
Read the rest of the article here.