By John Erath
*SPOILERS BELOW*
If the way we think about nuclear weapons has changed over time, should the way we approach arms control do so as well?
This thought occurred to me as I drove home recently after seeing Dune Part 2, Denis Villeneuve’s conclusion of his adaptation of Frank Herbert’s 1965 novel. Nuclear weapons play a role in Herbert’s sci-fi epic and its film adaptations. Villeneuve is not the first director to attempt to bring Dune to the screen, and the ways in which he and his predecessor chose to present the use of nuclear weapons illustrate the changes in thinking on the role of such weapons in the real world. Minor spoilers will follow.
The first movie version of Dune was directed by David Lynch and premiered in 1984 to mixed reviews. It was a vision of its times, complete with blow-dried hair, mostly naked pop stars and a techno soundtrack, just as Herbert’s novel, with its emphasis on hallucinogenic drug use as a path to understanding the universe, was a creation of the 1960’s. As the protagonists prepare the final battle, they almost casually incorporate a nuclear strike into their planning to open the way for their troops. That is the only reference to nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, military planners routinely assumed that future conflicts would involve nuclear weapons and included their use in tactical and operational planning, so audiences of the time could have expected that “atomics,” as Herbert referred to them, would be a logical part of the battle for Arakis.
The 2024 version of the story, however, makes the decision to employ a nuclear weapon more momentous. In the Villeneuve film, the discovery of nuclear weapons and the deliberations on employing them are treated with gravity. It is strongly implied that the atomics are intended as deterrents, and, when they are used, it is to remove an obstacle to armed forces — not against people. This portrayal is more consistent with the post-Cold War idea that the primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter and that any consideration of their use would represent a significant escalation.
The difference in the way filmmakers approached the use of a nuclear weapon reflected the change in strategic thinking about such weapons. As we contemplate the future of arms control, it would be well to be guided by the idea that things have indeed changed since the Reagan administration. Today’s situation is more complicated than the days when U.S. and Soviet delegations could sit opposite each other and talk about eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces. In 2024, China and North Korea are increasing their strategic forces, Russia has invaded its neighbor while cheating on many of its treaty obligations and Iran is enriching uranium. The problem set has multiplied in complexity, so that bilateral numerical restrictions on U.S. and Russian strategic weapons no longer seem as stabilizing as they did in simpler times.
It may be unsettling to contemplate the end of such restrictions when the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires in 2026, but there remains an important stabilizing role for arms control in managing risks and reducing threats. The challenge, however, will be to move beyond the simplistic ’80s approach and construct a model for the 21st century that takes into account the global nature of the problem. The modern version of Dune resolved the need for a more comprehensive take on the story by splitting it into two films. Arms controllers will similarly need more complex approaches — but probably not hallucinogenic drugs.
