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You are here: Home / Archives for Treaties / Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

May 27, 2010

The NPT Review Conference’s Focus on a Nuclear Free Middle East

As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) comes to a close in New York, the call for a ban on nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East has come back into the fore as a top issue. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs), which exist in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, are zones in which countries commit themselves to not acquire, manufacture, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Article VII of the NPT affirms the rights of countries to establish such zones.  A NWFZ in the Middle East has been on the NPT agenda since the treaty’s entry into force in 1970. Since the 1995 NPT RevCon, the goal has been more adamantly pursued by Egypt, but still to no visible avail.

Nevertheless, the start of this year’s NPT RevCon saw the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China all voice unequivocal support for the initiative— with ample support from states in the region too.  The Arab Group has stated that failing to achieve it would be a failure of the NPT as a whole.  While some view a NWFZ in the Middle East as a lofty, far-off, or even impossible goal, there is no denying the worth it would have.

The implications of the initiative are clear. Israel, not just Iran, would have to foreswear nuclear weapons.

Israel’s program is controversial for numerous reasons.  First, Israel is deliberately ambiguous about its nuclear weapons capability, officially maintaining that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the region.  Second, as one of the only countries in the world to have ever carried out preemptive attacks on nascent nuclear programs (for example in Iraq and Syria), Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is often viewed as particularly hypocritical. Finally, in defiance of numerous requests and resolutions issued by the General Assembly of the UN which call on Israel to join the NPT, Israel nevertheless continues to refuse. This places it in the not so select company of Pakistan, North Korea, and India.

The situation is further complicated by instability in the region and the ongoing peace process- the progress of which will be consequential in determining the success of disarmament efforts (a belief supported by the current U.S. administration). Many Arab states and Iran view Israel’s nuclear arsenal as a threat to their security and the stability of the region. Moreover, they view the removal of Israel’s arsenal as a precondition to lasting peace in the region. Israel, however, tends to view peace as a precondition to any disarmament or reduction in force levels, claiming it needs a strong defense to defend against “hostile” neighbors. Iran’s nascent nuclear program, coupled with Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetoric, lend credence to Israel’s argument.

This deadlock implies neither the situation for disarmament nor the situation for peace exists; and yet, it is evident that the current situation is not sustainable.

It is thus encouraging that on the eve of the close of the NPT RevCon, leaders are hustling to reach a compromise on how to establish the NWFZ. Egypt has submitted working papers that outline tangible steps towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, and is leading a movement—now seconded by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon- to create a conference to specifically address the establishment of a Mideast NWFZ. Meanwhile, U.S. and Egyptian senior officials are attempting to secure Israel’s attendance at this conference. Tomorrow evening will reveal if they succeed.

If a final document is agreed to, it will likely call for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Important as these steps are, there are other challenging steps that must be taken if these goals are to be achieved.  

For example, Israel will have to make dialogue and diplomacy a more important part of their foreign policy, as opposed to military threats, and will have to withdraw from the occupied territories. Meanwhile, the Arab states and Iran must acknowledge Israel’s existence as a state, and respect its sovereignty accordingly. This involves, for example, the cessation of rockets fired from Southern Lebanon by Iranian sponsored Shi’a Hezbollah militants.

Achieving the goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East will be taxing and perplexing at each level of the process – but it will be well worth the effort.  It is encouraging to hear that representatives at the NPT RevCon appear up for the task. We can only hope they will begin to make progress.

Posted in: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

May 25, 2010

Preliminary Thoughts on the Draft NPT RevCon Final Document

A draft final document penned by the President of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (Indonesian Libran Nuevas Cabactulan) has been circulating at the United Nations — and the internet — in the past 24 hours.

After a quick read through of the draft final document, it is clear that the core sticking points amongst States parties remain the same: disagreement over the voluntary vs. binding nature of the Additional Protocol, which would strengthen IAEA ability to oversee and inspect nuclear programs; the Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, for which a distinct conference in 2012 has been proposed and which Israel is being lobbied to attend; and the ever-present debate over a timeline for disarmament by the nuclear weapon states.

However, the draft document also makes clear how forcefully the Non-Aligned Movement states are seeking to delink non-proliferation from nuclear energy; the document text quite stridently defends their right to peacefully develop nuclear energy.  Some interesting points are highlighted below:

33: “The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.”

And 34, which reaffirms the right of States parties to the Treaty to develop “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”

35 is also emphatic: “The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.”

Also notable:

On non-NPT states parties (103): “The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without conditions and promptly.”
Notably absent is any mention of Israel (although they are called out by name later).

On diplomacy: “The Conference emphasized that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State Party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.”

Unsurprisingly, the text of the final document does not mention Iran by name, but does express concern “with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by States parties, and calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.”

On the Additional Protocol: point 25 “notes that the entry into force and implementation of additional protocols in non-nuclear weapons States is of vital importance for IAEA to be able to provide credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of non-nuclear-weapon States’ nuclear programmes.”

—

On an unrelated note, it seems likely that the United Nations Security Council will wait until the Lebanese presidency of the UNSC is over, i.e. until June, to begin discussing the fourth round of sanctions against Iran.  This saves face for Lebanon, and will also allow the NPT RevCon to get the attention it warrants during this last, closing week.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

April 28, 2010

Does Climate Change Affect the 2010 NPT RevCon?

In the arms control community, the third pillar of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — the right to peacefully use nuclear energy — is like the ugly duckling, marginalized while the other two pillars — non-proliferation and disarmament — are more loudly championed.

Nonetheless, the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy technology is an equal pillar of the treaty, and an increasingly important one as the international community struggles to grapple with climate change.

The United Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change today released a report that clearly outlines how a carbon-based energy market contributes to climate change:

At the global level, the energy system – supply, transformation, delivery and use – is the dominant contributor to climate change, representing around 60 per cent of total current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

And:

Emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels are major contributors to the unpredictable effects of climate change, and to urban air pollution and acidification of land and water.

The report also emphasizes that the energy industry will have to be at the forefront of reform towards more sustainable, responsible, environmentally-friendly technology in order to mitigate against climate-change causing greenhouse gas emissions:

Reducing the carbon intensity of energy – that is, the amount of carbon emitted per unit of energy consumed – is a key objective in reaching long- term climate goals. As long as the primary energy mix is biased towards fossil fuels, this would be difficult to achieve with currently available fossil fuel-based energy technologies. Given that the world economy is expected to double in size over the next twenty years, the world’s consumption of energy will also increase significantly if energy supply, conversion and use continue to be inefficient. Energy system design, providing stronger incentives for reduced GHG emissions in supply and increased end-use efficiency, will therefore be critical for reducing the risk of irreversible, catastrophic climate change.

Especially after the failure of COP15 and the resulting Copenhagen Accord to provide binding commitments on the part of States Parties to mitigate against rising greenhouse gas emissions, affected nations might look for rigorous support of nuclear energy at the NPT RevCon.

Moreover, the UN report adds that the push for cleaner energy technologies also comes at a time when the Millennium Development Goals call for universal energy access, especially lacking amongst the world’s poor:

Worldwide, approximately 3 billion people rely on traditional biomass for cooking and heating, and about 1.5 billion have no access to electricity. Up to a billion more have access only to unreliable electricity networks. The “energy-poor” suffer the health consequences of inefficient combustion of solid fuels in inadequately ventilated buildings, as well as the economic consequences of insufficient power for productive income-generating activities and for other basic services such as health and education. In particular, women and girls in the developing world are disproportionately affected in this regard.

If the international community designs to both decrease greenhouse gas emissions and expand energy access, then nuclear energy emerges as the least-bad currently available option en route to sustainable energy and away from fossil fuel consumption.

Yes, there are proliferation risks involved in peaceful nuclear energy use.  Yes, there are environmental concerns.  The international community should make every effort to secure nuclear energy facilities while also hastening the move towards other alternatives.

But nuclear energy expansion can be a stepping stone towards those cleaner technologies, a necessary evil that nonetheless should be emphasized and supported as a way to mitigate against climate change-causing greenhouse gas emissions, reduce our dependence on fossil fuel consumption, and broaden energy access to all.  

The end goal is still clean technologies that don’t carry proliferation risks, like hydro, solar, and wind.  However, given our competing priorities – tackling climate change, reducing energy poverty, and providing security against proliferation risks – nuclear energy as a necessary evil en route to a global economy that can fully support renewable energy might be our best option.

Posted in: Environment and Climate Change, Front and Center, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

April 24, 2010

Egypt is NPT’ed (a.k.a. Not Particularly Thrill’ed)

Lest there are a few of you out there who have flirted with the notion that the so-called “Nuclear Spring” would cause the rest of the world, particularly the non-nuclear weapon states, to hold hands and sing “kumbaya”, Colum Lynch’s report from Monday’s UN General Assembly debate on Disarmament and World Security provides a chilly does of reality.    

Via Lynch:

“There is mistrust,” said Egypt’s U.N. ambassador, Maged A. Abdelaziz, who is serving as chairman of the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement. Speaking before the General Assembly debate entitled “Disarmament and World Security,” the Egyptian envoy said the five major nuclear powers are seeking to impose new demands on non-nuclear powers while failing to fully live up to their own disarmament obligations, and permitting a special group of nations — India, Israel, and Pakistan — a free pass to produce nuclear weapons, without having to abide by the obligations of signatories to the NPT. “States outside the treaty are reaping the benefits of the treaty,” he said.

…

The Egyptian diplomat outlined the NAM’s opposition to a series of Western-backed initiatives, including a proposal to punish countries that withdraw from the NPT and a plan to establish a U.N. fuel bank to supply nuclear non-nuclear states. In addition, he said NAM had “serious concerns” about U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887, promoted last September by Obama, which strengthens the 15-nation body’s authority to confront states that fail to comply with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. “We are not as non-nuclear states going to accept that each time there is progress in disarmament that we have to take more obligations on our side,” said Abdelaziz. [emphasis mine].

I suspect that those who actually believe that the NPT Review Conference will be a cakewalk for the U.S. meet in a very small room.  But this does not mean that the Conference is doomed to failure.  Nor is it to say that New START, the NPR, and the Nuclear Security Summit haven’t strengthened the U.S. case that it is revitalizing its commitment to its obligations under the NPT…

Rather, my sense is that Egypt and other NAM states are laying down a marker.  They want to signal that while the actions taken by the U.S. and Russia in recent weeks are welcome, they do not equal disarmament, and as Daryl notes, they certainly do not render null and void the obligations the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states made at previous review conferences.

Three things in particular stood out to me about Ambassador Abdelaziz’s remarks.  First, the issue of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East will once again be a point of contention.

Second, Abdelaziz’s reference to states outside the treaty reaping the benefits of the treaty suggests to me that the U.S.-India nuclear deal could be a much bigger issue at this review conference than some people think.

Finally, while stockpile reductions are important, non-nuclear weapon states certainly do not see them as a panacea.  As Deepti Choubey pointed out in her excellent 2008 study on the attainability of new nuclear bargains,

The lesson from this exchange is that further stockpile reductions alone will not rehabilitate the U.S.’s reputation or provide it with enough leverage to gain more support for its nonproliferation agenda. “The United States would get more credit if it linked its actions to its commitments,” observed one UN official.

The world’s reaction to the Nuclear Posture Review is likely to be especially important in this regard.  These reactions are still coming in.  On Wednesday the Carnegie Endowment hosted an event on international perspectives on the NPR that I was unable to attend, but I look forward to scouring the transcripts to see what came out of the discussion.

In any event, it looks like Ambassador Susan Burk and her team are going to have their work cut out for them in New York come May.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

December 9, 2009

Fact Sheet: 2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit

by John Isaacs and Leonor Tomero December 9, 2009 2010 will be an important year for nuclear security and nonproliferation. Two events in particular will impact the global nuclear nonproliferation regime: 1) the Global Nuclear Security Summit and 2) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT BACKGROUND In April 2009, President Obama […]

Posted in: Factsheets on Non-Proliferation, Issue Center, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Treaties

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