By John Erath
The June 1 Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian airfields have a greater significance than the numbers of aircraft destroyed or damaged on the ground. In the context of the ongoing war, the strikes showed clearly that Ukraine is still in the fight and not stuck with “no cards to play.” The broader importance of the attacks, however, derives from the role of most of the affected aircraft in Russia’s strategic deterrent.
Although there are conflicting accounts of how many and what types of planes were damaged and destroyed, there is growing evidence that at least some were Tu 95s and Tu 22Ms, two long-range bombers. Both these planes have been employed in missile strikes against Ukraine, but they also have a strategic role as delivery systems for nuclear weapons. By hitting them, Ukraine was not just trying to reduce missile strikes on its cities but was also striking Russia’s nuclear delivery capabilities. This has two important strategic implications.
Obviously, the war between Russia and Ukraine is one between a nuclear and a non-nuclear state. Russia has repeatedly emphasized the fact by threatening Ukraine with nuclear devastation should it start winning, threats that this far have proved effective as western governments have consistently held back military assistance to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia for fear of making nuclear war more likely. It turns out, however, that Ukraine has not enjoyed being on the receiving end of such intimidation and decided to do something about it. Already facing a possible nuclear attack, decision makers in Kyiv felt that eliminating at least some of the delivery systems to be used could make them safer. This illustrates an underappreciated downside to Moscow’s use of nuclear blackmail as a tool of statecraft: those on the receiving end might decide the risk of action to break the cycle is lower than the risk of Russia continuing to benefit from the practice.
The other important lesson to be learned is that nuclear assets are vulnerable. Russian command had moved the bombers far out of range of Ukrainian forces and launched missiles from them beyond the effective radius of air defenses specifically to preserve these high-value targets. Ukraine nevertheless found a way to strike them. While the damage done does not devalue Moscow’s nuclear deterrent – Russia still has hundreds of other delivery systems – it should provide warning.
Despite the steps taken to secure them, Russian bombers were struck. While it may not be from truck-launched drones next time, it would be a mistake to consider nuclear delivery systems secure. On June 1, using relatively inexpensive means, Ukraine was able to cause damage initially estimated in billions to Moscow’s strategic forces. Clearly, advanced equipment and high spending do not necessarily provide security in a situation where recent advances make drone technology and AI readily available at low cost. As Ukraine demonstrated, all that is required is some creativity and careful planning to damage the strategic forces of the world’s largest nuclear power.
As governments of other nuclear states contemplate spending billions for modernization of nuclear forces, they should heed this lesson. Strategic forces can be vulnerable to creative, low-cost attacks, and basing national security on nuclear capabilities can prove a costly error.
