June 1, 2006
On June 1, 2006 the international Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission released its report “Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms.” The report represents the
culmination of over two years of study and deliberation by the 14 eminent
members of the Commission, led by Dr. Hans Blix, former head of the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This document
summarizes the chief findings and recommendations of the Commission with
regard to biological weapons. The full report can be found at http://wmdcommission.org.
FINDINGS
- The need for extensive international cooperation to eliminate the
threats posed by biological weapons iis more urgent today than
ever.i - The “potentially rising threat” of bioterrorism, coupled with
“profound concern that modern economies may be particularly vulnerable
to disruption from the deliberate spread of disease.” - The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is “the
central component of the overall regime” for “control of the hostile
uses of the life sciences.” The BTWC
completely prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and
acquisition of biological weapons. (1) There are currently 155 States
Parties to the Convention. (2) - UN Security Council Resolution 1540 “enhances Article IV of the
BTWC. “The resolution requires all nations to
adopt and enforce laws and domestic controls to prohibit and help
prevent the development, acquisition, possession or use of biological
weapons by terrorists and other non-state actors. - “A multifaceted approach [to the biological weapons threat] is
required n one that strengthens the multilateral normative and legal
prohibition regime, while linking it with other kinds of governmental
and non-governmental, national and international measures.” - “A key to progress worldwide would be for the US to commit
itself actively to international approaches and instruments.”
In this regard, “the BTWC remains the only
multilateral treaty with a broad consensus that provides an
international standard by which biological activities can be
judged.”
RECOMMENDATIONS
The commission makes numerous recommendations for cooperative
international action to reduce the biological weapons threat. Most “aim
at making maximum use of th[e] opportunity” provided by the Sixth Review
Conference of the BTWC. (3) According to the
Commission, “in view of the developments since” the last full review of
the BTWC in 1991, “the Parties need to carry
out a full review during the 2006 Review Conference, reassert the
Convention’s role as the central component of the overall regime and
agree on concrete measures to implement it.”
- “The states parties should reaffirm common understandings reached
at previous review conferences and take action on all subjects of
[BTWC] meetings since 2003. (4) This Review Conference should
reaffirm that all developments in the life sciences for hostile
purposes are prohibited by the Convention.” - The States Parties should establish “a substantive
programme of work” for the next five years, starting with “regular
annual meetings from 2007,” in order to “consider ways and
means to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of
the BTWC.” States Parties should also “ensure more frequent reassessment of the implications of scientific
and technological developments,” because “rapid developments
in the life sciences could eventually outpace national and
international efforts to prevent, control, or manage the hostile uses
of biology.” - “All states not yet party to the
BTWC should adhere to the Convention.” In
order to strengthen the overall regime, States Parties should
“launch a campaign to achieve universal adherence by the time of the
Seventh Review Conference” in 2011. - In order “to achieve universal adoption of national
legislation and regulations to implement the [BTWC] completely and
effectively, the states parties should offer technical assistance and
promote best-practice models of such legislation.” The
Commission notes that ithe effectiveness of the prohibitions of the
BTWC depends on the full national
implementation of the Convention through national legislation and
regulations. Such action would also support
UNSC Resolution 1540. - “As a part of the confidence-building process [within the
BTWC] and to promote transparency and
harmonization, all states parties should make annual
biological-weapon-related national declarations and make them
public.” The Commission notes that the number of States
Parties that submit annual declarations “has never been high and has
been declining. Given that the data are not publicly reviewed, little
political attention is paid to them and states therefore have little
incentive to report.” - “States parties Oe should establish a standing secretariat
to handle organization and administrating matters related to the
treaty, such as Review Conference and expert meetings.” Other
potential functions might include supporting efforts to achieve
universal adherence to the BTWC, and the
coordination and/or provision of assistance with national
implementation legislation and with the submission and distribution of
national declarations. - “The BTWC has no standing institution to
monitor and oversee compliance and implementation,i or to investigate
unusual outbreaks of disease or allegations of biological weapons use.
Therefore States Parties should ienhance the investigatory
powers of the UN Secretary-General [including] a specialist
unit, modeled on the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission [UNMOVIC], to assist in investigating unusual
outbreaks of disease and allegations of the use of biological
weapons.” - To be “as well prepared as possible” for a biological weapons
attack “governments should pursue public health surveillance to
ensure effective monitoring of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop
practical methods of coordinating international responses to any major
event that might involve bioweapons. They should strengthen
cooperation between civilian health and security-oriented authorities,
nationally, regionally and worldwide.” - “Governments should also review their national bio-safety
and bio-security measures to protect health and the environment from
the release of biological and toxin materials. They should harmonize
national bio-security standards” in order to help prevent
terrorist access to dangerous pathogens, technologies, facilities and
knowledge.
The Commission also makes two non-formal recommendations: 1)
“bioindustry can and should” cooperate actively with governments “in
preventing abuse of biotechnology,” as the nuclear and chemical
industries have done to their benefit; 2) “all countries and competent
institutions [should] provide bioweapon awareness training for biologists
and bio-technologists working in the public and private sectors to
raise awareness of the moral issues as well as instilling good practices
for maintaining the security of materials, facilities and sensitive
technologies.”
WMD COMMISSION STUDIES
The WMD Commission requested and published
thirteen studies related to biological weapons during the course of their
work. These studies can be found at http://wmdcommission.org.
No 1: “Review of
Recent Literature on WMD Arms Control,
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), May 2004 (includes a section devoted to
biological weapons)
No 14: “Managing
the Biological Weapons Problem: From the Individual to the
International” Jez Littlewood, August 2004
No 16: “Comparison
of States vs. Non-State Actors in the Development of a
BTW Capability” Sellstr and Anders
Norqvist. October 2004
No 18: “The Global
Governance of “Contentious” Science. The Case of the World Health’s
Organizations Oversight of the Small Pox Virus Research Jonathan B Tucker and Stacy M Okutani, October 2004
No 19: “WMD
Verification and Compliance: The State of Play” Foreign Affairs
Canada, prepared by VERTIC, October 2004
(includes a long section devoted to biological weapons)
No 20: “WMD
Verification and Compliance: Challenges and Responses” Foreign
Affairs Canada (includes much discussion of biological weapons)
No 22:
“Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment” Gary A. Ackerman and Kevin
S. Moran, November 2004
No 23: “Enhancing
BWC Implementation: A Modular
Approach” Trevor Findlay and Angela Woodward, December
2004
No 26: “A
Verification and Transparency Concept for Technology Transfers under the
BTWC” Jean Pascal Zanders, February
2005
No 28: “The Central
Importance of Legally Binding Measures for the Strengthening of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)” Graham S.
Pearson, February 2005
No 30: “Indicators
of State and Non-State Offensive Chemical and Biological
Programmes” Edited by Ingrid F 0/00ngmark and Lena Norlander, August
2005
No 32: “National
Measures to Implement WMD Treaties and Norms:
the Need for International Standards and Technical Assistance” Andreas Persbo and Angela Woodward, August 2005
No 40: “A Standing
United Nations Verification Body: Necessary and Feasible” Trevor
Findlay, December 2005 (includes extensive discussion of biological
weapons)
(1) In order ito exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, “Parties to the
Convention agree inever in any circumstances to develop, produce,
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 1) Microbial or other
biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 2) weapons,
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”
(2) Sixteen States have signed but not yet ratified the
BTWC: Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote
diIvoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates,
Tanzania. There are 24 non-signatory States: Andorra, Angola, Cameroon,
Chad, Comoros, Cook Island, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu,
Zambia.
(3) To be held from November 20 – Dec 8, 2006 in Geneva
Switzerland.
(4) The subjects were: for 2003, national implementation measures,
including penal legislation, and national mechanisms to maintain the
security and oversight of pathogens and toxins; for 2004, enhancing
international capabilities for responding to the alleged use of
biological weapons or suspicious disease outbreaks, and national and
international infectious disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
response mechanisms; for 2005, the content, promulgation, and adoption of
codes of conduct for scientists.
