By Conor Donlevy
On December 2, 1942, Manhattan Project scientists working at the University of Chicago (including our sister organization’s founder, Leo Szilard) created the first sustained, man-made nuclear chain reaction underneath the stands of a football field using a pile of graphite and uranium. The reactor was dubbed the “Chicago Pile-1” and its success laid the groundwork for the development of both nuclear weapons and energy technology. The findings from the Chicago Pile led to the development of the atomic bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki — as well as energy-generating civilian reactors. Chicago Pile 1 itself was transported to what would eventually become Argonne National Laboratory to father the first generation of energy-producing nuclear reactors.
Energy and weapons. The same chain reaction can either power a city or destroy it. As nuclear weapons and reactors became more complex and commonplace over the course of the 20th century, the international community put new risk mitigation measures in place in the form of arms control agreements and non-proliferation regimes to defend against the threat of nuclear annihilation. Although this threat was never eliminated, by the close of the century, serious progress had been made to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons and potential diversion of peaceful nuclear energy technology to clandestine weapons development.
Energy and weapons. The same chain reaction can either power a city or destroy it.
Unfortunately, much of the progress in non-proliferation is under threat. The global strategic landscape continues to grow more fraught as the rules-based international order crumbles, eroding longstanding norms aimed at reducing nuclear risk and the ability of new nations to acquire nuclear weapons.
When this erosion is coupled with geopolitical pressures encouraging countries to proliferate, such as questions regarding the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, the risk of proliferation from adversaries and allies alike rises dramatically. The question then is, how can the United States mitigate this risk?
One major hurdle to proliferation prevention is the dual-use nature of certain technologies used by nations exercising their internationally recognized right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy. As countries increasingly turn to nuclear power, proliferation risks increase. Beginning with the original Chicago Pile experiment, the technology to produce a fission reaction has been used to create reactors and bombs. It can be difficult to tell if a nation is misusing this technology for nefarious purposes without rigorous and invasive oversight. For a real-world example of this conundrum, see Iran.
As one of the world leaders in nuclear energy, the United States has significant leverage when collaborating with foreign nations on their nuclear programs. Congress recognized the need to exercise this leverage to ensure that robust verification accompanied new nuclear energy development to avoid the dual-use problem, resulting in the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. This law created several non-proliferation criteria governing nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries, and provided Congress with the ability to review, and if necessary, block these international nuclear cooperation agreements.
Congress has never exercised the blocking mechanism created by the law, but it will have ample opportunity to do so as the Trump administration pursues its ambitious goal of negotiating at least 20 new international nuclear cooperation agreements before the end of this term. Given the current proliferation-friendly global climate, it is critical that Congress holds each of these agreements to the highest standard, especially those negotiated with nations with expressed desires to obtain nuclear weapons capability, such as Saudi Arabia.
Given the current proliferation-friendly global climate, it is critical that Congress holds each of these agreements to the highest standard, especially those negotiated with nations with expressed desires to obtain nuclear weapons capability, such as Saudi Arabia.
Fortunately, a model exists for nuclear cooperation that greatly diminishes proliferation risk. The agreement signed between the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during the Obama administration is considered the “Gold Standard” for nuclear cooperation. It required the UAE to bring into force an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which includes the most invasive inspections of declared and undeclared nuclear sites, and to swear off developing nuclear fuel technologies that could be used for weaponization of uranium or plutonium.
These “Gold Standard” provisions are more stringent than what is required by current U.S. law. The Additional Protocol model had not yet been created by the IAEA when Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and, despite some efforts to include provisions in the legislation to require U.S. control of the nuclear fuel cycle in international agreements, no such provisions were included in the final version.
Needless to say, the world has changed since 1978. Opportunities for nuclear proliferation have multiplied, and the perceived value of nuclear weapons is growing. As the world moves into a new nuclear age, it is necessary to recall the lessons of the Chicago Pile experiment and the dangers of the dual nature of nuclear reactions. If the United States wishes to be at the forefront of a nuclear renaissance, it must also bear the responsibility for ensuring that renaissance’s safety. Congress recognized the unique leverage the United States possesses to enforce safe practices surrounding nuclear technology sharing in the past and must do so again. A failure to do so could be catastrophic.
