by John Erath, Senior Policy Director
Most of the media coverage of nuclear weapons issues in 2026 has focused on Iran for good reason. Iranian production of a nuclear weapon would affect peace and security in the Middle East and beyond. With the Trump administration seeming finally to settle on prevention of nuclear proliferation as the reason for its war against Iran (for now), the outlines of a potential peace deal, under which Iran “assures” the world that it does not have nuclear weapons, are there to guide the negotiations mandated by the Memorandum of Understanding — should they occur. The Trump administration faces the unenviable task of spinning another policy disaster as somehow being a gold-plated, shiny success. Amid the noise generated by all attention on Iran, there is another development potentially unfolding that would be an unexpected — and likely unintentional — success for U.S. interests.
This more positive outcome could occur in Ukraine, which has been quietly turning things around in its war with Russia during — and very possibly due to — a period of relative White House neglect.
This more positive outcome could occur in Ukraine, which has been quietly turning things around in its war with Russia during — and very possibly due to — a period of relative White House neglect. This was most clearly seen in the dramatic scaling down of Russia’s May 9 Victory Day parade, reportedly over concerns of Ukrainian drone strikes. Also, in April, Ukraine, for the first time in two years, recaptured more territory than it lost. Together with ongoing reports of strikes against targets deep inside Russia, the picture seems to have shifted dramatically from one in which Ukraine had “no cards.”
Together with ongoing reports of strikes against targets deep inside Russia, the picture seems to have shifted dramatically from one in which Ukraine had “no cards.”
This shift conflicts directly with a main line of effort for Russia, promulgating a narrative that Ukraine is losing the war, and aiding Kyiv further would be a waste, a narrative that the Trump administration has, at times, accepted uncritically. Adopting the Russian narrative served the President’s one-time goal of ending the war in twenty-four hours by (over) simplifying the problem, but ultimately proved the wrong way to try to end the war. What should have been clear all along was that Russia’s preferred narrative was self-serving and only loosely based in reality. For the better part of the conflict Russian territorial gains have been meager and come at unsustainable cost. Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s strategy of portraying such minor advantage as evidence of the inevitability of a Russian victory found a willing audience in the White House.
Since late February, when the Iran war began to claim White House attention, Ukraine has fared considerably better in its own fight.
Better now for Ukraine that President Trump and his advisors are momentarily distracted by Iran, Cuba and possibly the Epstein Files. Since late February, when the Iran war began to claim White House attention, Ukraine has fared considerably better in its own fight. Much of this advantage is due to improving Ukrainian tactics, increased availability of effective drones and the like, but partially Ukraine is doing better because it has been left alone to fight its war its way. Using primarily indigenous equipment, though enabled by western intelligence data, Ukraine has put together some impressive successes.
In earlier periods of the conflict, Ukraine depended heavily on western-supplied arms and equipment. These were provided at an inadequate rate that served only to keep the fighting stalemated. One reason for the meager supply was the fear, at first, that Russia would respond by employing nuclear weapons. Even after it became clear that Moscow understood that nuclear weapons would do no good on the battlefield, U.S. and European leaders clung to the same anti-escalation dogma and doled out only enough military assistance to hold back the Russians. By 2026, however, Ukraine has moved from dependence on international arms supplies that come with use restrictions to ever greater home-grown capabilities.
By finding their own way to military success, the Ukrainians have rid themselves of the Putin-Trump narrative that Ukraine could not win,
In a way, this has turned out for the best. Not for the thousands of Ukrainians who have suffered through four years of hardship, but for the possibility that the war may end on favorable terms. By finding their own way to military success, the Ukrainians have rid themselves of the Putin-Trump narrative that Ukraine could not win, even impressing Marco Rubio. For the first time since 2023, it now seems there is an outcome for Ukraine beyond effectively ceding sovereignty to Moscow or trading substantial territory for a probably temporary respite. Actually reversing at least some of the Russian occupation is a possibility. And Ukraine has opened the way through its own efforts.
This is not to say that the U.S. and NATO should promote Ukrainian success by ignoring it. Instead, as has been the case since 2022, the best policy would be to let Ukraine determine how and when to end the war. The role of the West should be to support ending the war in a way that leads toward a lasting peace rather than a temporary ceasefire. There is one particular area with which NATO can be useful, and that is managing Russia.
There was a short-lived moment of optimism in Moscow when the U.S. war in Iran resulted in an increase in oil prices, providing a respite for the Russian economy, but the influx in cash did not solve the problems posed by unsustainable losses.
As it has become apparent, even to pro-Kremlin observers, that the war has turned against Russia, there has been a renewed spate of ominous warnings from senior officials that further Ukrainian strikes deep into Russia could raise the possibility a of nuclear response. There was a short-lived moment of optimism in Moscow when the U.S. war in Iran resulted in an increase in oil prices, providing a respite for the Russian economy, but the influx in cash did not solve the problems posed by unsustainable losses. As the pressure on the Putin government mounts, so do its threats of nuclear use. In recent days, Russia has conducted nuclear weapons “drills” with Belarus and fired a scarce Oreshnik nuclear capable missile at Ukraine, both well-rehearsed signals that Russia could use nuclear weapons if pushed too far. At this time, it is not possible to know Russia’s breaking point, but faced with possible military and economic collapse, some Russians could consider desperate measures to stave off defeat.
Temporarily ignoring Ukraine while blundering over Iran may have had an unintended benefit, but the time is approaching for reengagement.
That is where NATO and other countries can play a role. While continuing to message that any use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable, NATO leaders should also signal that they do not seek regime change in Moscow or dismemberment of the Russian state. Russians remember what they were taught of 1917 and fear military defeat that could endanger the existence of the state. By underlining that loss of the occupied areas of Ukraine will not lead to further territorial diminishment of Russian lands, NATO leaders not only open a way to end the war but reduce the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used. Temporarily ignoring Ukraine while blundering over Iran may have had an unintended benefit, but the time is approaching for reengagement.
