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China’s Nuclear Weapons – Tempering Fears with a Dose of Reality

Several reports about China’s nuclear weapons program have come out in the past few weeks, and they are causing imaginations to run wild and some fears to grow beyond the realm of reality. The fact is that China has indeed been modernizing its arsenal, but it is important to put this modernization in perspective and to not overstate the Chinese nuclear threat.

The primary source of the panic is a map supposedly detailing Chinese nuclear attack plans in the event of conflict that would leave 5 to 12 million Americans dead. This “plan” and the map have made their rounds on many major news sites. Fortunately, a little detective work by the Federation of American Scientist’s Hans Kristensen has revealed that the map wasn’t even produced by the Chinese government. Instead, it seems to have been part of a slideshow posted on a military technology website unaffiliated with the Chinese government.

The map was released around the same time that the Chinese government unveiled details about their development of a small fleet of ballistic missile submarines. These details caused even more dramatic stories about how these submarines could attack U.S. cities with JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missiles. Aside from the fact that no Jin-class submarines have ever sailed on deterrent patrols, there are several major technical problems that prevent this from being reality.

First, according to Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, the current fleet of three Jin-class subs is not currently armed with nuclear weapons because China’s Central Military Commission forbids the mounting of warheads on missiles unless they are about to be used (this doctrine has, so far, extended to submarine launched ballistic missiles as well). This means the submarines leave port with no ability to fulfill their purpose as a deterrent. Second, China’s submarine fleet is incredibly loud and easy to track. The Jin-class is reported to be louder than Soviet submarines that were built 30 years ago. Third, the JL-2 missile only has a range of about 7,200 km. If the missiles were actually armed with warheads; they would be able to threaten U.S. bases in the region but would be unable to reach any major U.S. cities. To even target Washington, D.C., the submarine would have to sail almost to Hawaii without detection. Navy Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, has summed up these shortcomings quite effectively: “For a submarine-launched ballistic missile to be effective it has to be accurate, and you have to be stealthy and survivable and I’ll leave it at that.”

China is also expanding its arsenal of land based ballistic missiles; however, some of this expansion is temporary as certain systems are being developed to replace older missiles like the DF-3A and DF-4 which were deployed in the 1970s and 80s, respectively. Even with the 2007 unveiling of the DF-31A, which has a range of 11,000 km and the under-development DF-41, which has a range of 13,000 km, China will only have around 50 (out of about 240-300 total) land based missiles capable of reaching the continental United States. The usefulness of these missiles, however, is limited because firing them at the U.S. would mean firing the missile over Russian territory, which could provoke a nuclear response from Russia.

The modernization of nuclear weapons by a foreign power is rightfully bound to cause some concern; however, much of the media reporting has painted the picture of a possible doomsday scenario that could happen today or tomorrow, and this is simply not the case. As Gregory Kulacki has noted, “under the counting rules of the New Start agreement between the United States and Russia, the size of China’s nuclear arsenal would officially be counted as zero. This is because the several hundred warheads China is believed to possess are not mated to the missiles that can deliver them, but are kept in storage, like the several thousand warheads the United States and Russia each hold in reserve in addition to the 1,550 each of the two nuclear superpowers are allowed to deploy under the treaty.”

It is also important to remember that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is more than enough to deter any actual attacks from China against the U.S. homeland, forward deployed U.S. troops, and U.S. allies. The United States has almost 2,000 warheads mounted on missiles that can reach China compared to the 45-50 warheads that can reach the United States, and this fact is well known by the Chinese government.

In other words, it is by no means time to bring back the nuclear attack drills taught in American schools during the Cold War, nor is it necessary to consider expanding our own nuclear program because of China.

Following Up on the Obama-Xi Summit: What’s Next for North Korea’s Nuclear Program?

Now that the shirtsleeves of President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping have been rolled back down, it is time to evaluate the fruits of this past weekend’s US-China summit, particularly with regards to North Korea. When compared with previous US-China meetings, there were no fashion faux pas, no hecklers, and no one accidentally referring to Xi’s home country as the “Republic of China.”  Nonetheless, those looking for so-called “deliverables” on the North Korean issue were likely disappointed by the summit’s outcome.

Speaking to reporters on Saturday, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon said that, after a “lengthy discussion,” the two presidents “agreed that North Korea has to denuclearize…and that we should work together to deepen US-China cooperation and dialogue to achieve denuclearization.” While this is certainly not a negative development, it does not represent anything that the two sides have not said before, and falls somewhat short of hopes that the summit would yield a formal framework between the US and China on how the two countries plan to tackle the North Korean issue.

So, where does this leave us now? Without question, there are several reasons to be optimistic about the prospects of concrete US-China action vis-a-vis Pyongyang…

1. China’s Toughening Line on North Korea: I touched upon this in my previous post, but the Chinese government has recently given several indications that it plans to “get tough” with its provocative ally. Not only has the PRC privately pushed Pyongyang to return to six-party talks, but it has also backed up those insistences with more-concrete actions, such as supporting tougher UN sanctions, closing key North Korean bank accounts, and restricting the number of visas issued to North Korean guest workers.

2. China Has Very Good Reasons to Push for a Denuclearized North Korea: In an insightful post on his blog, Via Meadia, Walter Russell Mead argues that, besides the obvious rationale of wanting to avoid a nuclear-armed North Korea, China also has deeper reasons for wanting to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. As Mead astutely points out, a nuclear North Korea incentivizes Japan to build up its military strength, pushes Tokyo and Seoul deeper into the protective arms of the United States, and, I would add, lends further credence to the Obama administration’s “Asian pivot.” Given this, a case could certainly be made that it is in China’s geostrategic interests to push Pyongyang to denuclearize.

3. A Slightly-Less-Provocative Posture from North Korea: Though North Korea continues to repeat its commitment to maintaining a nuclear arsenal, it has, in recent weeks, avoided taking any overtly-provocative actions in the vein of its nuclear and missile tests from earlier this year. Moreover, tensions between North and South Korea seems to have cooled – the two sides recently re-opened a cross-border hotline, and met on Sunday to set up cabinet minister-level talks for later this week (though it now appears that that particular dialogue has been put on-hold).

But there are also a couple of reasons to be pessimistic:

1. How Hard is China Willing to Push? Yes, it is true that the PRC has toughened its stance towards North Korea in recent months. However, questions remain as to how much pressure Beijing is really willing to exert against its recalcitrant neighbor. The Chinese government’s fear of a North Korean collapse leading to chaos along the PRC/DPRK border, as well as resulting in a unified, US-allied Korea is an oft-cited (most recently by the AP’s Matthew Pennington) reason for Chinese inaction on the North Korean issue.

2. We’ve Been Here Before With North Korea: Avid Pyongyang-watchers will have to forgive me for seemingly stating the obvious, but here goes: historically, North Korea has had a tendency to engage in provocative behavior, dial down tensions and express a willingness to return to negotiations, only to later restart the cycle with another round of provocations. Thus, we should be careful of ascribing too much meaning to Pyongyang’s toned-down rhetoric, or its overtures to Seoul.

Recommended Reading: The US-China Summit and North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

On Friday and Saturday, President Obama will meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Sunnylands Resort in Rancho Mirage, California. Both governments have sought to portray this weekend as an opportunity for Obama and Xi to build their relationship on a more casual, informal level. This marks a departure from past US-China summits, which have been, for the most part, “dour, orchestrated affairs conducted by teams of men in dark suits.” However, while this has been billed as a “shirtsleeves summit,” that does not mean that important business is off the table. Rather, Obama and Xi are expected to discuss a range of issues highly relevant to the Sino-American relationship, including Chinese cyberespionage, territorial disputes in East Asia, and – most importantly in the eyes of Nukes of Hazard – North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Below is a roundup of some relevant news stories and analyses that will give you a better idea of the current state of the US-China-North Korea triangle, and what to expect from this weekend’s summit.

China’s Hardening Stance Towards North Korea

North Korea’s nuclear test  in February, coupled with its missile launches in May, have reportedly frustrated many Chinese officials, and have prompted the Chinese government to take a tougher line towards its longtime ally.

•    As pointed out by a recent report from the Associated Press, while China remains wary of taking any actions that could result in a collapse of the North Korean regime, it has taken several punitive measures in response to the Kim government’s recent provocations, such as supporting tougher UN sanctions against North Korea in February, and shutting accounts that North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank had opened in Chinese state banks
•    According to a June 4 article by Reuters’s Benjamin Kang Lim, during recent bilateral talks, the Chinese government implored North Korea to stop its nuclear and missile tests, which the PRC officials said “put China in a difficult position and are not conducive to (North) Korea.”

North Korea’s Continuing Defiance

However, despite increasing pressure from the US, China, and the rest of the international community, North Korea has given no indication that it plans to scale back its nuclear ambitions.

•    From a May 27 article in the Wall Street Journal: “North Korea’s state media on Sunday reiterated Pyongyang’s commitment to building nuclear weapons, dousing limited hopes that the isolated state might engage in talks about its nuclear program under pressure from China.”
•    On May 17, a UN panel found that international sanctions are, indeed, slowing down North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. However, on June 3, a study from Johns Hopkins’s US-Korea Institute asserted that the DPRK could be able to restart production of plutonium in one or two months.

What Should/Will the “Shirtsleeves Summit” Accomplish?

The US-China-North Korea dynamic seems to be in a state of mild evolution. What does this mean for this weekend’s meeting between Presidents Obama and Xi? It depends on who you ask:

•    Some analysts believe that the summit should serve merely as a foundation for future Sino-US cooperation on the North Korean issue:
      —  In a June 5 op-ed for The New York Times, Gi-Wook Shin, Thomas Fingar, David Straub argue that, “Obama should use this first encounter to focus on underscoring for Xi where U.S. and Chinese interests on the Korean Peninsula overlap,” in the hopes of creating a “trajectory of increasing Chinese cooperation in dealing with Pyongyang.”
•    Other analysts believe that more substantive successes could be achieved at the summit:
      —  In an interview this past Tuesday with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, former US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell asserted that President Obama would see success on the North Korean issue, arguing that, “…the Chinese have just about have it with North Korea.”
•    Others, however, are urging caution:
      —  Over at Foreign Policy, Issac Stone Fish writes that, “China watchers in Washington don’t expect much in the way of concrete ‘deliverables,” and quotes Asia expert Victor Cha as saying that, “We have plenty of things where we want nine yards, and we don’t get that – we get four yards, if we’re lucky.”

US vs. Global Military Spending

How much does the U.S. spend on its military compared to other countries?  A whole lot.

Head on over to the Center’s site to see our latest analysis — including lots of charts and graphs.

Here’s a snippet of what you’ll find…

Though China is often cited as the country’s next great military adversary, U.S. military spending currently doubles that of all of the countries in Asia combined. In 2012, the U.S. consumed 41 percent of total global military spending. The U.S. also remained in the top 10 highest spending countries as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), one widespread measure of military spending, trailing behind countries such as Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, all of which have a significantly lower total military expenditure as well as a lower total GDP.

Understanding China’s Nuclear Arsenal – Comments by Maj. General Yao

On April 8, 2013, the Carnegie Endowment hosted their biannual Nuclear Policy Conference.  The first day was marked by a panel featuring U.S. Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, Rose Gottemoeller, People’s Liberation Army Major General Yao Yunzhu (China,) and former Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Alexei Arbatov.

The panel was entitled Prague 2.0? Deterrence, Disarmament and Nonproliferation in Obama’s Second Term but the conversation provided an opportunity for General Yao, director of the Center on China-American Defense Relations at the Academy of Military Science, to offer some insights into China’s strategic thoughts and vision for its largely opaque nuclear program.

The major take-away from General Yao’s comments was her articulation of the three underpinnings of Chinese nuclear strategy.  According to General Yao, China’s nuclear arsenal requires three components: survivability, a penetration capacity and a deterrent threat.

General Yao repeatedly highlighted the Chinese no first-use doctrine and that more than ninety percent of the global nuclear arsenal is still controlled by the US and Russia, either as stored or deployed nuclear weapons.  In order to move toward a multilateral framework for arms control, General Yao said that the “U.S. and Russia have to do one or two rounds of negotiations to further reduce” their arsenals.

The panel also discussed further US-Russian bilateral reductions. During this conversation MP Abratov stated that “China is the only state that could quickly build up to level of U.S.-Russian” nuclear arsenal size.  

General Yao responded that, “China will not seek nuclear superiority” and that the smaller Nuclear Weapons States should promise not to enter an arms race with the U.S. or Russia.

MP Abratov called on the Chinese to be more transparent about the size of their nuclear arsenal.  “China is the only serious specter,” according to MP Abratov.  It seems strange for a Russian to criticize the Chinese on a lack of transparency with their arsenal which has been a hallmark of Soviet and Russian policy.

General Yao responded that due to the small size of the Chinese arsenal and its no first-use a “certain amount of opaqueness is necessary” to achieve its three required characteristics..  General Yao also noted the presence of Chinese underground tunnels as part of their survivability strategy. These tunnels have prompted a small number of observers to argue that China could be storing a much larger number of nuclear warheads than US intelligence estimates suggest, though there is little evidence to support this view.  

Undersecretary Gottemoeller did praise the Chinese for their efforts to lead a terminology working group for nuclear weapons that would help to create mutual understanding among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council.  She cited the need to “create fabric, environment for future multilateral negotiations.”  However, Undersecretary Gottemoeller seemed to be the only panelist looking forward to multilateral arms controls talks in the near-term.