The U.S and South Korea are not currently implementing policies that will garner positive results with North Korea, nor do they have an over-arching strategy for dealing with the isolated nation, agreed three American experts at a policy forum event in Washington D.C Wednesday.  Assessing the current situation from various perspectives, the panelists all implied that a more proactive, cohesive and long-term approach to engagement with Pyongyang would yield better outcomes for all involved.

Steven Linton, Founder of The Eugene Bell Foundation, a humanitarian organization providing development assistance to North Korea, started his analysis by suggesting that for a very long time North Korea has been looking for a positive and client-type relationship with the United States.  Asking rhetorically how Washington managed to “blow it”, he answered by suggesting that American “ideological constructs” may be partly to blame.  Ideological constructs that suggested ‘carrots’ would make North Korea change as a result of being “overwhelmed [with U.S] sincerity and good intentions”, or inversely, that ‘sticks’ would compel better behavior through the use of sanctions and threats.   He put it to the audience that both of these ideological constructs have “now come face to face with reality and been shattered”…..

He remarked that, “North Korea is neither going to be guiled into doing something that it thinks is against its national interest, nor is it going to be threatened.  The sooner we get away from that kind of simplistic approach the better.  And I think one of the ways we can start to build a more realistic framework for understanding North Korea is to at least go back and look at modern Korean history.”

In this regard Linton suggested that while for decades the DPRK had been obsessed with exporting its Juche ideology to the world, as the country became poorer in the 1980s it instead became “focused primarily on building real political and diplomatic relationships to allow it to survive”.  Responding to this situation he asked, “What have we offered North Korea?  Are we offering them national survival or are we offering them another extreme makeover according to an ideology that will essentially negate most of what they consider their primary gains in the last fifty years?”

With the context set, Linton suggested that current policy “does not compute as national survival” for North Korea.  

In moving forward from the current impasse he pointed out that it was imperative that countries such as the U.S and the ROK also stop responding to North Korea in a North Korean manner.  He pointed out that South Korea, despite having a pluralistic society, huge civilian sector resources, and an enormous private sector pool of wealth, nevertheless tries to funnel all possible engagement through the Government – in just the same way that North Korea conducts all of its relations with Seoul.   He conjectured that while private sector is the strongest part of a free society, U.S sanctions currently prevent American enterprise from making a difference, pointing out that “When a free society tries to funnel everything through government initiatives and ministries, you have a weakening rather than a strengthening of the process.”

A proactive approach would instead advocate a more hands-off approach allowing private organizations and enterprises engage North Korea on an individual basis, without the conditions and constructions currently being imposed by the current administrations in Seoul and Washington D.C.   Presenting a video of some of the Eugene Bell Foundations’ success in North Korea, he finished his analysis by illustrating some of the positive impact such activities could have.

Karen Lee, Executive Director of the National Committee on North Korea, suggested that lessons learned regarding the sanctions applied to Iraq had seemingly gone over the head of South Korea.  Remembering the widespread hurt to Iraq’s civilian population caused by the blunt approach applied after the Gulf War, she noted that the international community by consensus currently advocates sanctions that cause the minimal damage to civilian life.  Consequently, South Korea’s decision to now prevent the bulk of NGOs from either delivering aid or conducting monitoring visits illustrates just how far the country is out of touch with today’s international sentiment.  She added that Iraq “was a lesson that was learned the hard way, and I would expect that the South Korean government would come back inside within international consensus and lift that ban on NGO activities as quickly as possible.”

Labeling the various sanctions applied to North Korea as ‘tactics’, Lee rhetorically asked the administrations of South Korea and the U.S, “Where is the strategy? We know what your first and second step is, but what is the third step?”  Citing the measures taken in response to the sinking of the Cheonan case as evidence of this over-reliance on tactics, she pointed to the lack of an exit strategy as smyptomic of the overall lack of an over-arching North Korea strategy in both Seoul and Washington.  

Dwelling on the issue, Lee proposed that for sanctions to work effectively States must be united in their application and all must be in a position to have something to sacrifice.   For its part and as a result of Washington’s decades long policy of economic isolation, she suggested that it correspondingly had very little to lose when pushing for sanctions.  Correspondingly, Beijing, having significant economic trade with the DPRK, would have a lot more to lose if it were to vigorously impose robust sanctions – an important point to remember when accusing China of not currently doing enough, she added.   But from Seoul’s perspective,
“A very interesting new development is that South Korea is now making an economic sacrifice in response to the Cheonan.  It will be interesting to see if South Korea is able to sustain this economic sacrifice…A recent Chosun Ilbo report says that business people engaged in North Korean projects say they will be ruined if trade does not resume.  So lets say that South Korea listens to its people and that trade is restarted again.  How can the US continue to criticize China if it chooses not to engage in sanctions against the DPRK…if it doesn’t also choose to criticize South Korea, if in fact it makes this decision.”

Lee went on to show how little influence the US currently has with North Korea by citing the fact that the Obama administration recently linked visas for Track Two dialogue to success on the nuclear issue, a decision that actually took place before the Cheonan incident.  She remarked, “I don’t think visa denial is an expression of strength, I actually think its an expression of weakness.  I would like to see our government develop a transparent visa policy that encourages dialogue, not discourages it.”

Having illustrated the context behind each countries approach to sanctions, Lee rounded off her talk by pondering the situations they could ever be rolled back, especially with regards to partial compliance – a point that underscored her argument that they should only ever be part of a much larger North Korea strategy.

Doug Bandow, a Senior Fellow at Cato Institute rounded off the talk by recommending a new policy of engagement for Washington to pursue.  

Noting that Pyongyang is currently proceeding on both its nuclear and missile programs with a sanctions regime already in place, he suggested it was clear that current policy was not delivering any real results.  He argued that the concept of ignoring North Korea in the hope that the problem would go away was also imprudent, as illustrated by the fact that Pyongyang often acts belligerently when left alone for too long.   As a result, Bandow suggested that the lack of over-arching policy that the other speakers had alluded to in their presentations illustrated the need for a “refashioned form of engagement” with the U.S involving China involved in a “more positive way”.

While admitting that “I think there is no option that we know will work”, Bandow added, “Nevertheless, we have to look at some options and make some changes compared to where we’re at.  One of which strikes me is that we have to have diplomatic relations with North Korea.  Whatever the rest of the issues, I see little to gain from refusing to recognize North Korea”.   He remarked that such recognition would provide some sense to Pyongyang of respect from the U.S, while giving Washington some strongly needed inside information on a very closed society.  

He added that to get into North Korean society, the more people that could go there from the West and have relationships, the better.  However, he did admit that it was difficult to gauge the overall impact of such liaison.   Consequently he also advocated a separation of Private and Governmental aid as a means of facilitating the work of organizations such as the Eugene Bell Foundation in future times of tension.  

As part of this approach Bandow stated that it would be essential to simultaneously convince China that it is in their interest to be more proactive with North Korea.  He consequently recommended a new approach that would illustrate both how and why China should think differently.   Firstly, by making Beijing realize that the current situation was not necessarily as stable as it might think- through pointing to the sometimes strong pressure within the U.S to take military action against the DPRK following acts of belligerency.  Secondly, that China should not assume that future WMD proliferation by North Korea will be met with the same restraint that has been characteristic of responses so far.  Thirdly, that the U.S will not be interested in remaining in the middle of the situation forever and might one day allow the ROK or Japan to move ahead on their own nuclear programs.

He also suggested that China should be made clear that the U.S would not try and take unilateral advantage in the event things worked out badly, and that countries such as Japan and the ROK should be willing to share the costs of any future refugee problems.   Longer-term he stated that “If China was helpful in resolving the situation…the U.S would be quite prepared to say America’s military role is over on the Korean peninsula”, noting it is approaching the time when Washington should step back.  

In this regard he noted that without the 29,000 U.S troops stationed in South Korea, the U.S would actually not have much interest in the issue, nor would it be within easy reach of North Korean retaliation.   Without this presence he thus asserted that other countries in the region would face an increased onus to step up and deal with the issue, allowing the U.S to take a more supportive role in future.

The event took place at the CATO Institute in Washington D.C on Wednesday July 14 2010.  It was moderated by d Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.

What to do about North Korea – CATO

On September 21, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak proposed a “grand bargain” with North Korea. Tired of counterproductive step-by-step negotiations with Pyongyang, Lee’s deal was a one-shot process: complete and irreversible denuclearization in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid.

On September 30, the North responded to the offer, calling it “ridiculous.” Given this response, we should not expect a similar American proposal. Or should we?

The Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter believes we should, and his reasoning is clever. In a September 30 briefing, Carpenter and Doug Bandow argued that while there are no good options, the best chance of persuading North Korea to adopt policies acceptable to the United States (i.e. denuclearization) is through coordinated effort with China.  

Carpenter proposed that the United States offer its own one-shot grand bargain not as a diplomatic end-game with North Korea, but as a shrewd gambit to persuade Beijing to get tough with Pyongyang. (It’s worth noting that Carpenter is fond of the grand bargain concept; he has proposed a similar approach for dealing with Iran). Carpenter referred to the strategy as “smoking North Korea out,” by which he means forcing North Korea’s hand and making them reveal their true intentions to the United States and, more importantly, to China.  

It is unclear whether or not Pyongyang is truly considering denuclearization, though it has pledged to work for a nuclear-weapons-free peninsula. This uncertainty (or hope) is enough to prevent China from confronting North Korea; after all, China has some legitimate concerns that include North Korean destabilization leading to a chaotic refugee flow and the potential geopolitical threat from a united Korea. China also knows, however, that an established nuclear weapon power on the peninsula is not in its interests.  

Carpenter’s presentation suggested that he does not expect Pyongyang to accept the grand bargain, which would include a non-aggression pact and economic aid in return for denuclearization. For Carpenter, Pyongyang’s rejection of the deal would clarify their intentions and reveal their determination to become an established nuclear weapon power. In such a situation, China would be left with no choice but to bring out its stick.

One problem, however, is that such diplomatic litmus tests tend to be of questionable utility, particularly when it comes to North Korea. Carpenter said that rejection of the grand bargain would mean North Korea had determined to go nuclear, but this assumes Pyongyang: a) knows what it wants; b) has decided upon a course of action that will get it what it wants; and c) attributes as much importance to the grand bargain offer as Carpenter does. As Travis ranted awhile ago, imperfect information makes conjectures about North Korean intentions suspect by default.

Another potential problem in Carpenter’s approach is that if the United States expects the grand bargain to fail, it might act accordingly. This pitfall has been prevalent in U.S. policy toward Iran. Skeptical that negotiations will bear fruit, a few Obama administration officials reportedly believe that direct talks with Iran are important mainly because they provide political cover for more coercive actions down the road. If articulated publicly – like when placating congressional hawks with tough talk on Iran, for example – such sentiments not only cause Iranian leaders to doubt American sincerity, but also assume future coercive steps to be a foregone conclusion. Such assumptions could quickly become self-fulfilling prophecies in both Iran and North Korea.  

Implementing Carpenter’s strategy becomes dangerous if it succeeds when we do not expect (or want) it to. Chester Crocker explained this type of scenario a few weeks ago in the New York Times: “If we succeed in changing the position of the other country’s decision-makers, we then must decide whether we will take yes for an answer and reciprocate their moves with steps of our own.” Carpenter’s strategy is crafty, but it would be imprudent unless we were actually serious about following through.

Carpenter also appraised U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis Pyongyang’s two nuclear tests. He concluded that it was a mistake by both the Bush and Obama administrations to issue immediate public statements after both tests pledging full nuclear umbrella protection for South Korea and Japan. If it were up to Carpenter, the United States would have issued private statements of assurance to South Korea and Japan but kept China guessing about the U.S. level of commitment to these two countries. If this had occurred, China might more earnestly fear the proliferation implications of Pyongyang’s tests, and the possibility of South Korea and Japan pursuing the bomb would have been an alarming consideration.  This could have been a critical impetus for China to get tough on North Korea.