Attacking the Brain: Why NC3 Needs a Treaty

by Roc Iore*

Your arms, legs, joints, and muscles are functioning correctly, as are your eyes, ears, brain and nervous system. Even if you live in a competitive environment with other people around you, everyone agrees not to attack each other’s bodies. Everyone can also attack each other’s ability to see, hear, feel and make decisions, but there is no agreement not to target these critical functions. Now, what would you do if you suspected that an opponent was trying to prevent you from seeing an incoming attack? While simplified, this situation reflects the worrying reality currently governing the nuclear triad (air, land and sea capabilities) and the nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) system. 

The NC3 (comprising, among others, radars, bunkers, mobile command posts, satellites like the American Space Based Infrared System, and the American and Russian “Doomsday planes”) commands and synchronizes nuclear capabilities. As for the triad, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), in force until February 5, 2026, is the last remaining agreement between the United States and Russia that regulates their numbers and delivery systems. In contrast, China has never had to limit the number of its warheads and delivery systems in the first place. With major nuclear powers deterred from attacks on each others’ weapons, the systems managing them could seem a tempting target — or obvious vulnerability. 

It is, therefore, urgent that the international community, particularly these three nuclear-armed countries, negotiate future arms control agreements with the NC3 in mind, and how it could also dramatically escalate a situation. Eventually, however, addressing the NC3 is not the goal — it must only be an intermediate step toward disarmament. 

The fact that the NC3 is simultaneously so crucial in “moving” the triad and not covered by any formal international agreement is a significant escalation risk and a shortcoming of the current situation. We often hear the phrase “use them or lose them” referring to nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which could also apply to an airbase of strategic nuclear bombers: the fear of being preemptively attacked can incentivize a country to also use its weapons in a preemptive way. With the threat of an attack on the NC3, this dangerous dynamic begins even earlier: if I believe that my adversaries want to compromise my ability to see, assess and make a sound decision, should I launch a preemptive strike against them? That the NC3 is partly made of dual-use infrastructure (for example, satellites) compounds the risks of early and sudden escalations. Without even threatening nuclear infrastructure per se, an accident could very well trigger a nuclear war. 

Ideally, countries would eventually negotiate a new “Treaty on the NC3”, which would include elements of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (such as pre-launch notifications of space launch vehicles) or the 1976 UN Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. A potential treaty would, unlike the other treaties, address a functional domain (the NC3) instead of a geographical or operational domain (space): it would, for example, include ground-based infrastructure through a commitment not to attack or sabotage early-warning radars; cyberspace through an agreement not to attack or disrupt parts of the infrastructure covering the NC3; or even personnel through a commitment not to target key personnel or procedures in attacks or surveillance. However, the current political climate, whether in Europe, the United States or China, is not conducive to achieving this goal. Distrust and suspicion of non-compliance render the conclusion of a legally binding treaty impossible for now. 

However, countries can still take steps to establish or update confidence-building measures at a technical level. Discussions could begin at the Tracks 2 or 1.5 levels and aim to restart hotlines, such as the one between the United States and Russia, or establish them, such as one between the United States and China. One of the nuclear-armed countries could even show leadership and take some unilateral measures, like the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991. Such an arrangement would add needed transparency and perhaps open a path to a later, verifiable agreement. 

Addressing the NC3 would bring several benefits. First, it would finally consider one pillar of the nuclear deterrent as described in the U.S. government’s own Nuclear Matters Handbook: “U.S. policy states that the nuclear deterrent is only as effective as the command and control network that enables it to function.” Second, it would indirectly strengthen other treaties and initiatives, such as the Outer Space Treaty, the UN First Committee’s work on an anti-satellite ban, or the UN Open-ended Working Group on reducing space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviours. It could also foster communication and mutual understanding, without the pressure of having to conclude broader and more binding agreements. 

Critics might argue that the reason the NC3 has not been addressed (and cannot be in the future) is its dual-use aspect and the high level of secrecy surrounding its infrastructure. However, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and even the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention represent cases of dual-use goods regulated by international agreements. While the same critics would be right to question the effectiveness of these frameworks, the difference with the NC3 is that states might be interested in increasing international predictability in an infrastructure used simultaneously for weather forecasting, disaster relief, urban planning, navigation and the control of the most powerful weapons ever created. 

So far, deterrence has held, and the world has avoided falling into a general nuclear war and the risks that attacks on the nuclear triad represent. However, the NC3 also poses non-negligible dangers of escalation that have not been adequately addressed. By reducing uncertainty about the NC3, the international community can not only increase confidence and reduce arms races but also work more efficiently toward a world free of nuclear weapons. 

*Editor’s note: Writing for the Center’s new Next Up in Arms Control series, Roc Iore is a graduate student at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, concentrating in international security. He was a career officer in the Swiss Army for more than ten years and holds a B.A. in Public Policy from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.