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You are here: Home / Archives for Europe / United Kingdom

August 16, 2011

Enhancing U.S. Security Through Treaties

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller spoke to the U.S. Strategic Command 2011 Deterrence Symposium on August 4, and her comments regarding progress on the New START treaty were encouraging.

Gottemoeller stated that the Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, has been “very successful,” and she likened its implementation to a “fast moving train.”

To date more then 1,000 notifications have been passed between Washington and Moscow, tracking movements and changes in the status of each country’s strategic offensive arms and delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller noted that U.S officials and their Russian counterparts have been “constantly in communication,” strengthening mutual understanding and confidence.

On site inspections began as of the first week of April, and Gottemoeller said they have proceeded at an “intense pace.”

When START I expired in December 2009, Russia was no longer required to provide notifications about changes in its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States was unable to conduct on-site inspections. As George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, James Baker III, Lawrence Eagleburger and Colin Powell wrote in the Washington Post last December: “America’s understanding of Russia’s arsenal (was) degraded, and resources (were) diverted from national security tasks to try to fill the gaps.”

Since April, eight on site inspections have taken place, and the two sides are keeping up with one another. Inspectors are even receiving data about warhead loadings on their counterpart’s missiles, and can confirm these numbers on any randomly selected ballistic missiles – an inspection right achieved only in the new treaty.

Both parties have also displayed their strategic systems to each other, strengthening and validating the verification regime. The U.S. presented its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers to the Russians and the Russian Federation showed its RS-24 Inter Continental Ballistic Missile and associated road mobile launcher to the U.S. This exchange marked the first time U.S. officials have ever had the opportunity to view this new Russian strategic system.

These successes rebut criticisms that New START was just a long list of U.S. concessions made to the Russians. As Gottemoeller noted, “concerns that were raised during the ratification debate are being assuaged now essentially by the process of implementation.” In the last few months, U.S. officials and military planners have regained crucial insight into Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.

New START, Gottemoeller said, has been a “bright spot” in U.S.-Russian ‘reset’ of relations. It is a testament to the growing strength of the partnership that since the passage of New START, two additional arms control agreements have been implemented: the 123 Agreement for nuclear cooperation with Russia entered into force in January 2011 shortly after the ratification of New START, and the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, meant to eliminate excess weapons-grade plutonium, was brought into force recently on July 13.  

Gottemoeller expressed confidence in chances for further arms control agreements with Russia, as well as multilateral dialogue within the P-5 (United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) and further bilateral conversations to lay the groundwork for negotiations with other nuclear powers.

Certainly, positive results from the Treaty’s implementation should encourage Washington and Moscow to pursue formal negotiations on a new treaty to further reduce their nuclear arms, which should contain verifiable limits on all types of nuclear warheads, including tactical warheads.

Emma Lecavalier is a Summer 2011 intern with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Posted in: Europe, Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog, United Kingdom

October 29, 2009

New UK Disarmament Group Seeks Unified European Voice

A newly created elite group of British cross-party parliamentarians dedicated to multilateral nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation (aptly titled the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation) was officially launched today with a meeting in Westminster. Former Defence Secretary Des Browne is the group’s convener.

Drawing inspiration from America’s Four Horsemen, the British group seeks to secure the world from nuclear dangers. Their plans include reducing nations’ reliance on nuclear weapons and advocating for the CTBT. Yet perhaps their most valuable aspiration is the group’s hope to create a unified European voice.

In an event hosted by the Carnegie Endowment last month, Des Browne introduced this mission as part of his goal for the group: “We hope to bring Europe together. As I say, every country in Europe has its Gang of Four, but they’re operating broadly separate from each other.” In the press release announcing their launch, the group stated that they hope to “provide an authoritative European voice to back up the position of U.S. President Barack Obama.”

Such an enterprise could provide U.S. politicians and lawmakers with a clear window into the European stance on key issues. As the press release explains: “The group has also tasked itself with ensuring that politicians in the U.S., of all political persuasions, are in no doubt of their allies’ positions on extended deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.”

The issues of extended deterrence and tactical nuclear weapons have fueled an intense debate in Washington over the future of U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe. Withdrawal of U.S. tactical nukes from Europe would go a long way toward promoting global nuclear reductions, but this possibility has run into numerous obstacles.

Despite strong indications that the tactical deployments are unwanted and unnecessary, critics of withdrawal argue that our European allies want the nukes. They argue that withdrawal would lead to anxiety and even proliferation as the Europeans would begin to doubt the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And the critics have plenty of anecdotes from their own meetings with Europeans to support this view.

On the other hand, Des Browne at Carnegie articulated his strong personal view that tactical nuclear weapons could be discarded without undercutting anyone’s strategic defense. He also expressed his confidence that the United States could withdraw its tactical nuclear deployment from Europe smoothly without prompting some sort of extended deterrence crisis, provided that the United States properly engaged diplomatically with Europe in the process.

The UK group’s pursuit of a unified European voice should help to clarify these types of conflicting messages The U.S. political process and future of nuclear reductions are in great need of a clear and coherent message from U.S. allies. The UK group has spotted this problem and seems poised to ameliorate it.

Posted in: Europe, Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog, United Kingdom

March 3, 2008

U.S. Arms Sales Agreements Worldwide, 1999-2006

by Travis Sharp Updated March 4, 2008 Check out our analysis of U.S. arms sales agreements with the Middle East. The United States is far and away the leader in worldwide arms sales agreements. Consider the following: From 1999 to 2006, the United States averaged $15.44 billion per year in worldwide arms sales agreements. That […]

Posted in: Asia, Europe, France, Issue Center, Missile Defense, United Kingdom

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