• Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Skip to footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

  • Policy Issues
    • Fact Sheets
    • Countries
    • Nuclear Weapons
    • Non-Proliferation
    • Nuclear Security
    • Biological & Chemical Weapons
    • Defense Spending
    • Missile Defense
    • No First Use
  • Nukes of Hazard
    • Podcast
    • Blog
      • Next Up In Arms Control
    • Videos
  • Join Us
  • Press
  • About
    • Staff
    • Boards & Experts
    • Jobs & Internships
    • Financials and Annual Reports
    • Contact Us
  • Donate
  • Search
You are here: Home / Archives for Europe / United Kingdom

September 16, 2014

Could the Loch Ness Monster Lose Its Bang?

Scotland is best known for scotch, golf, and the Loch Ness Monster; but a new phrase should come to mind as of late: nuclear weapons. Scotland will hold a historic referendum this Thursday to vote on independence. If Scotland’s largest political party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), gets its way, Scotland’s secession from Great Britain will mean seceding from the UK’s nuclear arsenal, too.

Britain’s nuclear program, colloquially known as Trident, includes four Vanguard-class submarines which carry 160 nuclear warheads on 58 Trident II D5 missiles leased from the US.  Today, this fleet of submarines is exclusively housed and serviced out of Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, near Glasgow, Scotland. HMNB Clyde is comprised of Faslane Naval Base and the Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulpart.  The secessionist party, however, envisions an independent Scotland free of nuclear weapons and intends to expel the Trident program within the first term of the Scottish Parliament, by 2020.

So, what happens to Trident if Scotland votes yes?

A “yes” vote would threaten the UK’s nuclear deterrent. A “no” vote would continue the union of Great Britain and Scotland , and current plans to renovate the nuclear weapons program will continue as planned.  

In a letter to Scottish first minister Alex Salmond, the former British chief of naval staff Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope wrote, “Your plans for the removal of all nuclear submarines from Faslane in the event of Scottish independence would add a dangerous period of destabilization in our nuclear defense posture at a time when the international picture is clearly deteriorating…”  Scottish National Party spokesperson Angus Robertson replied, “While the anti-independence camp is determined to waste over £100 billion on unusable and obscene Trident nuclear weapons, a Yes vote will rid Scotland of weapons of mass destruction.”

In actuality, the money allotted for renovations on the Trident program is closer to £35.8 billion, which is equivalent to roughly $58.1 billion– nearly one fourth of the UK’s projected defense budget for the next decade.

The Ministry of Defense denies having a contingency play for Trident, hoping that Scotland will vote to remain part of the United Kingdom.

Perhaps Britain is reluctant to publicize a plan of action because there are no good options. The four prevailing theories on what will become of the Trident program in an independent Scotland are generally troublesome and will likely be unpopular. If the referendum passes, Britain could:

Relocate the submarines and their support vessels to HMNB Portsmouth in Plymouth, England
According to the Royal United Service Institute’s August 2014 paper on relocation possibilities for Trident, HMNB Devonport in the southwest town of Plymouth, England is the most logical location. Relocating the nuclear-armed submarines and their support vessels would not be cheap, though. HMNB Devonport is not logistically equipped to accommodate this type of weapon. It would force out the base’s existing fleet, and access routes would have to be dredged for the larger submarines to dock. Safety is a concern, too. Risk of accidental ignition could be perceived as threatening the lives of Plymouth’s 260,000 inhabitants. The proposed replacement munitions facility is near Falmouth, a popular tourist destination east of Plymouth. Additionally, the submarines stationed at Devonport would have to travel 50 nautical miles, or three times the distance between Faslane and Coulport, to reach Falmouth; t least six hours of patrol time would be spent making that journey.

Base the UK’s nuclear program in the US or France
The UK leases its Trident II D5 missiles from the United States. Britain’s nuclear-armed submarines frequent the US Naval Submarine Base in Kings Bay, Georgia for repairs and maintenance.  While hosting the UK’s nuclear program in Georgia, or NATO’s other nuclear-armed country, France, may be tempting, it’s not a suitable long-term solution. As the RUSI report notes, one of the main purposes of Britain’s nuclear program is to be equipped to defend itself if, in the case where the US or France is unwilling or unable to defend the UK against a nuclear threat – no matter how unlikely the scenario. Housing Britain’s nuclear weapons in another country would call into question the credibility of the UK’s program.

Additionally, Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly states that nuclear-weapon states are not permitted to transfer weapons to other countries. The UK arsenal would have to be entirely isolated from foreign hands in order to avoid accusations of not adhering to the NPT.  

Scrap its nuclear weapons program altogether
A “yes” vote could lead, however unlikely, Britain to scrap its nuclear weapons program altogether; after all, there are no easy or cheap alternatives. Support for Britain’s nuclear arsenal in England and Wales is marginally higher than those opposed (43% in favor, 36% opposed). In contrast, Scottish voters support disarmament 46% to 37%.  If the UK were to abandon its nuclear program, the US would become the only nuclear power in NATO as France does not promise its nuclear weapons to the alliance. The US is keenly interested in the UK maintaining its nuclear commitment to NATO.  

Leave the nukes in Scotland
The  Scottish National Party recognizes that the removal of nuclear weapons from HMNB Clyde will take time; their target date for relocation is four years after their goal of formal independence by 2016. In any event, keeping the UK’s nuclear arsenal in an independent Scotland long-term would be problematic. Keeping the UK’s nukes in a territory that’s no longer part of the UK would lead to obvious questions about Britain’s nuclear force credibility.

Whether the Trident fleet is relocated to England, elsewhere, or becomes the newest exhibit at the Imperial War Museum in London, is yet to be seen. What is clear is that Westminster will have a major challenge on its hands relating to the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal if Scotland votes “yes” this Thursday.

Posted in: Europe, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog, United Kingdom

April 30, 2014

Fact Sheet: Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories in 2014

Prepared by Lesley McNiesh Updated by Justin Bresolin, Sam Kane, and Andrew Szarejko CHART: Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 2014 Nuclear weapons programs are generally shrouded in secrecy and all of the totals listed above should be considered estimates. The numbers in the chart above are based on the most recent available estimates from the Bulletin […]

Posted in: Asia, China, Europe, Factsheets & Analysis on Nuclear Weapons, Factsheets & Analysis on Russia, France, India and Pakistan, Israel, Issue Center, Middle East, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Russia, United Kingdom, United States

April 18, 2012

Independence for Scotland and Disarmament for the United Kingdom: The Law of Unintended Consequences

A mixture of geography and nationalism has set the stage in the United Kingdom for a referendum in 2014 that will ask voters a straightforward question with complex consequences: Should Scotland be an independent nation?

Posted in: Europe, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog, United Kingdom

April 18, 2012

Independence for Scotland and Disarmament for the United Kingdom: Or, the Law of Unintended Consequences

By Matthew Fargo A mixture of geography and nationalism has set the stage in the United Kingdom for a referendum in 2014 that will ask voters a straightforward question with complex consequences: Should Scotland be an independent nation? A complicating factor for the referendum is that while the United Kingdom is a permanent member of […]

Posted in: Europe, Issue Center, Nuclear Weapons, United Kingdom

August 16, 2011

Enhancing U.S. Security Through Treaties

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller spoke to the U.S. Strategic Command 2011 Deterrence Symposium on August 4, and her comments regarding progress on the New START treaty were encouraging.

Gottemoeller stated that the Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, has been “very successful,” and she likened its implementation to a “fast moving train.”

To date more then 1,000 notifications have been passed between Washington and Moscow, tracking movements and changes in the status of each country’s strategic offensive arms and delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller noted that U.S officials and their Russian counterparts have been “constantly in communication,” strengthening mutual understanding and confidence.

On site inspections began as of the first week of April, and Gottemoeller said they have proceeded at an “intense pace.”

When START I expired in December 2009, Russia was no longer required to provide notifications about changes in its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States was unable to conduct on-site inspections. As George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, James Baker III, Lawrence Eagleburger and Colin Powell wrote in the Washington Post last December: “America’s understanding of Russia’s arsenal (was) degraded, and resources (were) diverted from national security tasks to try to fill the gaps.”

Since April, eight on site inspections have taken place, and the two sides are keeping up with one another. Inspectors are even receiving data about warhead loadings on their counterpart’s missiles, and can confirm these numbers on any randomly selected ballistic missiles – an inspection right achieved only in the new treaty.

Both parties have also displayed their strategic systems to each other, strengthening and validating the verification regime. The U.S. presented its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers to the Russians and the Russian Federation showed its RS-24 Inter Continental Ballistic Missile and associated road mobile launcher to the U.S. This exchange marked the first time U.S. officials have ever had the opportunity to view this new Russian strategic system.

These successes rebut criticisms that New START was just a long list of U.S. concessions made to the Russians. As Gottemoeller noted, “concerns that were raised during the ratification debate are being assuaged now essentially by the process of implementation.” In the last few months, U.S. officials and military planners have regained crucial insight into Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.

New START, Gottemoeller said, has been a “bright spot” in U.S.-Russian ‘reset’ of relations. It is a testament to the growing strength of the partnership that since the passage of New START, two additional arms control agreements have been implemented: the 123 Agreement for nuclear cooperation with Russia entered into force in January 2011 shortly after the ratification of New START, and the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, meant to eliminate excess weapons-grade plutonium, was brought into force recently on July 13.  

Gottemoeller expressed confidence in chances for further arms control agreements with Russia, as well as multilateral dialogue within the P-5 (United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) and further bilateral conversations to lay the groundwork for negotiations with other nuclear powers.

Certainly, positive results from the Treaty’s implementation should encourage Washington and Moscow to pursue formal negotiations on a new treaty to further reduce their nuclear arms, which should contain verifiable limits on all types of nuclear warheads, including tactical warheads.

Emma Lecavalier is a Summer 2011 intern with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Posted in: Europe, Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog, United Kingdom

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Go to page 1
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Go to page 3
  • Go to page 4
  • Go to page 5
  • Go to page 6
  • Go to Next Page »

Primary Sidebar

Recent Posts

  • The Future of Arms Control: 2023 Annual Conference September 20, 2023
  • The Evolving Cyber-Based Threat: The Need for International Regulations to Avoid ‘Accidental’ Conflicts September 12, 2023
  • 전문가들 “김정은 방러, 전방위 군사 협력 현실화…중국 셈법 복잡” September 12, 2023
  • North Korea’s Kim Jong Un to meet with Vladimir Putin as Russia seeks closer military ties, more support for Ukraine war September 5, 2023
  • Biological threats have evolved for the worse, and we are not prepared September 1, 2023

Footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

820 1st Street NE, Suite LL-180
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202.546.0795

Issues

  • Fact Sheets
  • Countries
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Non-Proliferation
  • Nuclear Security
  • Defense Spending
  • Biological and Chemical Weapons
  • Missile Defense
  • No First Use

Countries

  • China
  • France
  • India and Pakistan
  • Iran
  • Israel
  • North Korea
  • Russia
  • United Kingdom

Explore

  • Nukes of Hazard blog
  • Nukes of Hazard podcast
  • Nukes of Hazard videos
  • Front and Center
  • Fact Sheets

About

  • About
  • Meet the Staff
  • Boards & Experts
  • Press
  • Jobs & Internships
  • Financials and Annual Reports
  • Contact Us
  • Council for a Livable World
  • Twitter
  • YouTube
  • Instagram
  • Facebook

© 2023 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Privacy Policy

Charity Navigator GuideStar Seal of Transparency