Via Heather Hulburt, Executive Director of the National Security Network, comes still more evidence that despite what Jon Kyl would have you believe, there was a time not so long ago when some Republicans deemed it ok not to freak out about the configuration of Russia’s nuclear forces or the absence of provisions to verify the size and location of those forces.

In prepared testimony for a July 2002 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Moscow Treaty, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld chided those who viewed START I as a model of effective arms control:

There are those who do not see the difference in the size of these treaties as a sign of progress. To the contrary, they would have preferred a voluminous, legalistic arms control agreement, with hundreds of pages of carefully crafted provisions and intrusive verification measures.

These critics operate from a flawed premise: that, absent such an agreement, our two countries would both try to break out of the constraints of this treaty and increase our deployed nuclear forces. Nothing could be further from the truth.

During the Cold War, the stated rationale for arms control was to constrain an arms race. But the idea of an arms race between the United States and Russia today is ludicrous. The relationship between our two countries today is such that U.S. determined—unilaterally—that deep reductions in our deployed nuclear forces are in the U.S. interest.

We would have made these cuts regardless of what Russia did with its arsenal. We are making them not because we signed a treaty in Moscow, but because the fundamental transformation in our relationship with Russia means we do not need so many deployed weapons. Russia has made a similar calculation. The agreement we reached in Moscow is the result of those determinations—not the cause of them.

That is also why we saw no need for including detailed verification measures in the treaty. First, there simply isn’t any way on earth to verify what Russia is doing with all those warheads. Second, we don’t need to. Neither side has an interest in evading the terms of the treaty, since it simply codifies unilaterally announced reductions—and gives both sides broad flexibility in implementing them. Third, we saw no benefit in creating a new forum for bitter debates over compliance and enforcement. Today, the last place in the world where U.S. and Russian officials still sit across a table arguing with each other is in Geneva. Our goal is to move beyond that kind of Cold War animosity—not to find new ways to extend it into the 21st century.

None of which is to suggest that Rummy was right.  Legally-binding, verifiable limits on the size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals greatly enhance U.S. security by bringing predictability and stability to U.S.-Russian nuclear relations, giving each side confidence that neither side is attempting to retain a significant strategic advantage, and reducing the chances for misunderstanding and worst-case scenario planning.  While neither side wants to retain all of START I’s verification provisions, New START is likely to include an updated system of procedures so that each side can continue to have confidence that it knows what the other is doing.

Nor should we be cavalier about Russian missile development.  As Daryl Kimball noted in response to news that the U.S. will soon lose its ability to continuously monitor Russian missile production at Votkinsk, “How significant [the loss of Votkinsk] is depends on what other monitoring mechanisms will be worked out.”

Rather, the point is to highlight yet again how remarkably unserious and disingenuous the attacks on New START from the likes of Jon Kyl, Paula DeSutter, etc. have been.

Guest Post by Alex Bollfrass (Click here to read Freezer Burn, Part I)

On to Part II of the discussion of Thomas Schelling’s “A world without nuclear weapons.”

Besides the argument about non-verifiability, Schelling’s main contention against nuclear abolition is grounded in the seemingly limitless power of nuclear weapons – and therefore their irresistible appeal in the case of a major crisis.  Schelling played an enormous role in shaping our understanding of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War – and it shows.  

He relies too strongly on the notion that a handful of nuclear weapons can rule the world as long as no other country can balance them with an arsenal of its own:

[I]f, at the outset of what appears to be a major war, or the imminent possibility of major war, every responsible government must consider that other responsible governments will mobilize their nuclear weapons base as soon as war erupts, or as soon as war appears likely, there will be at least covert frantic efforts, or perhaps purposely conspicuous efforts, to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible.

This belief in the overwhelming power of the Bomb comes from a reading of WWII that has been convincingly dismantled by Ward Wilson.  In a forthcoming manuscript, Ward points out that the destruction of cities, the one thing nuclear weapons do well, have never won wars.  Think of the US Civil War: Sherman may have burned Atlanta and the Union captured the South’s capital, Richmond, but the war ended only when the Confederate armies were surrounded and faced certain defeat.  Defeating armies is not something nuclear weapons, particularly small numbers of nuclear weapons, are particularly adept at.

In a disarmed world, the major powers would have accepted this line of reasoning; otherwise they would have never agreed to divest themselves of these weapons. They would also have instituted a robust enforcement process beyond the current Security Council arrangements to ensure a swift conventional response to a violation.  This means that they would be both far less likely to attempt to reconstitute their arsenals in a bid to gain an advantage in an impending crisis, nor would they be as spooked about seeing their rival do so as Schelling postulates.  

But even if a crisis would not automatically “go nuclear,” would countries be more likely to break out without the stabilizing effects of nuclear deterrence?  No – and that is another assumption about nuclear weapons based on an incomplete reading of history.  Observing that the US-Soviet rivalry never erupted into direct conflict, proponents of retaining nuclear arsenals identify them as the crucial peacekeepers.

A potent antidote to this causal explanation is Zbigniew Brzezinski’s recent piece in Foreign Affairs (subscription required). He offers a full account of why the US and the Soviets never came to blows – without ever invoking nuclear deterrence. This has important implications for the future of US-Russian relations, too.  As discussed in Part I, the U.S. and Russia are the only two countries that could conceivably hide the materials necessary to maintain a near-weapons capability (something Schelling erroneously believes every major power to be capable of). Eternal harmony and love between the two is not necessary.  Instead, a stable geopolitical arrangement would suffice to prevent the emergence of the paranoid escalatory dynamic Schelling fears. In a disarmed world this is a given, because we would not have gotten there without an improvement in relations between the US and Russia and the conclusion of a more stable European security system.  

Although Schelling is correct that “every responsible government” will have a plan to re-arm if necessary, it will also analyze the costs and benefits of upping the nuclear ante before taking this step. This does not mean that making a decision to reconstitute will be ruled out, but it is far from self-evident that the “urge to preempt” is the irresistible temptation that Schelling describes.  

Even in moments of crises, a world without nuclear weapons would therefore be far more stable than he suggests.   How would it compare to the stability of the world today?  We would be rid of the potentially catastrophic risk of nuclear warfare.  This does not eliminate the need for further analysis and study of the merits of global zero.  But Schelling’s reasoning should not dissuade President Obama and other leaders from pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament.

To conclude on a conciliatory note: I may disagree with the Nobel Laureate on the dynamics of nuclear abolition, but there is no question that Schelling and I can find common ground celebrating last week’s disarming first strike against Stanford’s offense. Go Bears!

Alex Bollfrass works for the Unblocking the Road to Zero project at the Stimson Center, where his better angels are fighting a losing battle against the temptations of conference-origin baked goods.

As the diplomatic standoff with Iran continues to heat up, Yukiya Amano of Japan today begins his tenure as the new Director General of the IAEA. In an interview with Reuters in February, Amano praised President Obama’s willingness to open dialogue with Iran. But dialogue has not gone well thus far, which prompted exiting Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to declare last Friday that the IAEA’s cooperation with Iran has reached a “dead end.” With these firm farewell words from ElBaradei, it is now Amano’s turn to navigate the technical and political minefield that is the Iranian nuclear program…

Mohamed ElBaradei has been a controversial figure due to his hostile relationship with the Bush administration. During his term, ElBaradei was criticized by Washington for politicizing the IAEA and taking a relatively soft stance on Iran. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice placed much of the blame for Iran’s nuclear developments on ElBaradei’s leadership of the Agency.  She accused ElBaradei of “muddying the message” to Iran and stated that “The IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy. The IAEA is a technical agency…”

In contrast, Amano is known to be more of a technocrat than a diplomat. In his February interview, he stated: “The IAEA’s basic function is not political negotiation but implementing already agreed safeguards. Remarks by the director have political implications which, if made without properly assessing these implications, can be very dangerous.”

In fact, much of Amano’s support in his July 1st election was rooted in the belief that he would “depoliticize” the IAEA in the wake of ElBaradei’s leadership. The AP’s George Jahn noted in July that, “without publicly saying so, the U.S. and its allies had made clear before Tuesday’s voting that they favored Amano because they saw him as someone who would manage the IAEA without thrusting himself into the political fray.”  In a similar vein, UPI explained that, “poor Asian and African nations regard him as too aligned with rich nations.” The developing nations largely supported South African candidate Abdul Minty, who had run for the position on a platform of moderate activism aimed at challenging the nuclear weapon states on disarmament issues.

Amano has tried to deflect concerns that he has a hidden, factional agenda. At a conference shortly after his election, Amano told reporters: “As a national from Japan, I will do my utmost to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. To do that, the solidarity of all the member states, countries of the north, from the south, from east and west, is absolutely necessary.”

Amano has also called for a wider understanding of the IAEA as not only a nuclear watchdog, but also a key facilitator of peaceful nuclear energy use.  He explained that new perceptions of the IAEA as a “dual objective organization” would be “helpful in strengthening confidence in the agency.”

As for how Amano’s vision of a depoliticized IAEA and increased solidarity will play out in the context of the Iranian nuclear issue, NoH wishes the new Director General the best of luck.  He is likely to need it.

Update: James Acton has published a more in-depth analysis of the IAEA’s change in leadership on Carnegie’s website

A few weeks ago I noted that it was ironic that Senator Jon Kyl has been accusing the Obama administration of being weak on verification in its pursuit of a New START agreement considering his past lackadaisical approach to this topic.  Apparently the Senator’s inconsistency knows no bounds.

In a November 21 speech on the Senate floor, Sen. Kyl warned of the consequences of allowing START I to expire on December 5.  “The U.S. will lose a significant source of information that has allowed it to have confidence in its ability to understand Russian strategic nuclear forces,” he proclaimed.

Arms control advocates have been raising concerns about the impending disappearance of START I’s verification, monitoring, and inspection provisions for years.  The same cannot be said of Sen. Kyl, whose sudden admiration for START I’s verification scheme contrasts sharply with his position on the Bush administration’s 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which contained no such verification procedures.  In praising SORT on the Senate floor in April 2003, Sen. Kyl stated:

This treaty is a masterstroke. It represents, and, I am sure, will be sent as ushering in a wholly new approach to arms control for a wholly new era. The simplicity of this treaty is a marvel. It is extremely brief, indeed just three pages long. It is shorn of the tortured benchmarks, sublimits, arcane definitions and monitoring provisions that weighed down past arms control treaties.

In addition, Sen. Kyl was one of 50 mostly Republican Senators to vote against an amendment proposed by Sen. Kerry to add verification requirements to SORT.

So he was against verification before he was for it?

What’s the cause of his new-found verification religion?  Has it something to do with a Democrat being in the White House?

Kyl’s November 21 floor speech also tries to blame the Obama administration for Russia’s plans to deploy the road-mobile RS-24 missile, a new, multiple-warhead version of the single warhead SS-27.  

Yet the Bush administration did not make an issue out of Russia’s development of the RS-24.  This was in keeping with the conclusions of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which declared that it was no longer appropriate to size and configure U.S. nuclear forces in relation to the Russian arsenal.  

As Amb. Linton Brooks, a former Republican official and negotiator of the START I agreement, noted at an October 26 event on START at the United States Institute of Peace: “The fact that the Secretary of Defense in the last administration said both publically and privately that we didn’t care [about the RS-24] may have suggested to them [the Russians] that it was ok….We had a long time…to call them on that and we as a government chose not to.”

Sen. Kyl claims that the Obama administration has given next to no consideration of how to bridge the gap between the expiration of START I and entry into force of New START.  This is simply not true.  As numerous Obama administration officials have noted, the two sides have been negotiating a bridging agreement in parallel to the new Treaty to cover the gap.  The Administration has not, however, divulged the details of a bridge agreement that is still being negotiated.

Sen. Kyl ends his speech by noting that “the U.S. would have been very well served with a simple 5 year extension of the 1991 Agreement, as the treaty allowed.”  Earlier versions of Senator Kyl would likely have opposed this position, as he apparently had no qualms with the Bush administration’s decision not to seek an extension of START I in 2007 and 2008.  

In any event, the time for talk of a simple five year extension has long since past, thanks in large part to the Bush administration’s unwillingness to consider it.