The Obama administration in Geneva yesterday formally revealed its new strategy for strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Anticipating the release of the White House’s “National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats,” Dr. Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told Global Security Newswire last Friday: “What’s important is the U.S. government is giving political attention to this issue, and making it clear the U.S. is not a one-trick pony and that in addition to the very ambitious nuclear agenda, the government is also very concerned about biological weapons.”

Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher did indeed proclaim the administration’s commitment to the issue. However, the strategy has drawn criticism for reaffirming the Bush administration’s opposition to creating an international monitoring system to verify treaty compliance…

It is important to understand why the Bush administration announced eight years ago that a BWC verification protocol was “not in the best interests of the United States and many other countries.” First, the Bush team felt that the protocol’s provisions were overly influenced by particular nations’ demands. According to FAS, Iran, who played a key role in the deliberations of the Ad-Hoc Group tasked with drafting the protocol, “insisted throughout that all export control regimes, and particularly the Australia Group arrangements, be totally abolished.” In addition, according to Dr. Tucker, Russia sought to define the “types and quantities” of pathogens and toxins banned by the agreement, thereby limiting its scope. Russia and Iran continue to seek such provisions.

An intrusive verification protocol was also perceived by the Bush administration, and perhaps now by the Obama administration, as a burden to biodefense research and the growth of the biotechnology industry. Although a broad interpretation of the BWC, particularly Article X, allows for the production of small amounts of hazardous biological agents for peaceful study, a verification protocol would subject the U.S. biodefense and biotechnology complex to “increased inspection costs and bureaucratic hurdles.” Moreover, the access required for inspections could also threaten to expose vulnerabilities in the U.S. biodefense shield or reveal lucrative pharma-industry secrets.

These concerns appear not to have changed since the Bush administration’s rejection of the verification protocol in November 2001. Meanwhile, biotechnology has continued to advance at a revolutionary pace, advanced techniques have been disseminated around the world and throughout populations, and the biological dual-use dilemma has been amplified. Given these trends, some doubt that effective monitoring through a verification protocol is possible. For this reason, Undersecretary Tauscher explained, “We have carefully reviewed previous efforts to develop a verification protocol and have determined that a legally binding protocol would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security.”

Verification protocol aside, the Obama administration’s new strategy contains a collection of objectives to mitigate biological threats. One of those objectives is to promote global health security, which includes providing assistance to other nations to bolster their disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and response programs. Such an approach links security with public health, thereby countering not only nefarious biological weapon threats but also natural infectious disease outbreaks. The White House strategy also includes a variety of confidence and transparency building measures.

But in a press release yesterday, the experts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies suggest it may take more far-reaching steps than are presented in the new strategy to truly impact the BWC. A close look at the White House strategy document makes it seem more like a reiteration of recommendations generally supporting biological threat reduction rather than a fresh roadmap for strengthening the BWC as an effective central pillar. In fact, the 23-page document’s emphasis on the BWC is limited to a brief pledge in the introduction to uphold the treaty’s obligations, fleeting mentions in a few bullet points, and a single subsection about the need to revitalize the BWC in one of the seven strategic objectives.

Is the United States the only nuclear power that is not modernizing its nuclear arsenal, as is often alleged by some defense hawks?  If by “modernization” we mean the regular production of new missiles and warheads, then yes; U.S. strategic forces…

The approach of some vocal Republicans to the “New START” negotiations goes something like this: suggest a dozen different ways that a new arms control agreement with Russia could be detrimental to U.S. security without actually opposing a new arms control agreement with Russia.  That strategy continued last week…

On December 3, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a resolution on New START which never opposes a new treaty.  True to form, however, the resolution calls on the President not to sign an agreement with Russia that could compromise our ability to deter China and other would-be nuclear powers; to provide Congress with reports on both negotiations with Russia and China’s nuclear forces; to complete the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) before signing an agreement; and to ensure that a new agreement does not constrain U.S. missile defenses.  

While the bill is unlikely to go anywhere legislatively (recall that the Senate, not the House, has jurisdiction over treaties), as The Cable’s Josh Rogin notes, it can play an important role on the level of narrative.  Ros-Lehtinen’s resolution is the latest in a long list of efforts on the part of some Republicans to define New START as bad for U.S. interests.  So far 57 Republicans have cosponsored Ros-Lehtinen’s bill. I’d like to see 57 Democrats (and Republicans) cosponsor separate House legislation that describes how a New START agreement will enhance U.S. security.

None of the arguments in the resolution are new, although this is the first time China has figured so prominently in the debate. We’ve provided rebuttals to them over at our START Resource Center.  Below are some detailed responses to the specific concerns raised in the resolution. The bottom line: Ros-Lehtinen shouldn’t worry; the Obama administration has her back.

1. To reiterate, the resolution never opposes a New START agreement. It could, but it does not.

2. The resolution asks that a New START agreement not jeopardize our deterrent vis-à-vis China.  This is puzzling.  Even after a New START agreement, the U.S. will still have at least 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear weapons (as will the Russians), plus many thousands more in reserve. In contrast, China has only 240 total weapons and only 25-40 missiles capable of striking the U.S., far from the U.S. total.  The resolution cites a U.S. intelligence estimate that the Chinese could have over 100 missiles capable of striking the U.S. 15 years from now.  First, it’s important to note that U.S. intelligence estimates have repeatedly overestimated the speed and content of China’s modernization programs.  Second, given the numbers being considered for New START, even if one assumes that China could have 100 such missiles by 2035, the U.S. would still have an overwhelming advantage.

3. The resolution calls on the President to provide Congress with reports on both negotiations with Russia and China’s nuclear forces.  Clearly a report on negotiations with Russia should be doable once they are completed, as should a report on China’s nuclear forces, although such estimates already exist.

4. Perhaps the most pointed demand made by the resolution is that the administration should complete the NPR before signing an agreement.  However, the Pentagon has repeatedly stated that it is satisfied that the NPR has sufficiently informed the negotiations. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9, Marine General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: “We prioritized in the Nuclear Posture Review . . . the activities and the analysis that would be necessary to support the timelines associated with the START negotiations or the follow-on START negotiations. . . . I’m very comfortable that we prioritized that analysis at the front end in order to support these negotiations.”   The expiration of START I on December 5 and the close link between the New START negotiations and the NPR process mean that it is both necessary and prudent to try and negotiate a new Treaty by the end of the year without waiting for a finalized NPR.

5.  Finally, the resolution calls on the administration to protect U.S. missile defenses in a new agreement.  The Obama administration has already made it crystal clear that it will comply with this wish.  Presidents Obama and Medvedev have stated that New START will deal only with strategic offensive arms. The offense-defense link might be noted in the preamble of the new treaty, but the text of New START will not contain any formal or legal limitations on missile defenses.

UPDATE 6:35PM: Jeffrey Lewis and Max Bergmann offer their own takes.

Last month, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) sought to authenticate North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapon state by citing a recent assessment by Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. KCNA reported that “the Federation of American Scientists of the United States has confirmed (North) Korea as a nuclear weapon state.” However, KCNA’s report was an oversimplification of the Norris-Kristensen assessment. Yesterday, the South Korean Yonhap News Agency disseminated Kristensen’s rebuttal to the KCNA report, though over a week after it had been made. Better late than never…

Norris and Kristensen did list North Korea as a state that possesses nuclear weapons. On the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Kristensen wrote: “It’s certainly curious that they would need our reaffirmation, but after two nuclear tests we feel it is safe to call North Korea a nuclear weapon state.” However, Kristensen added that KCNA omitted a “huge caveat.” The original assessment reads:

We are not aware of credible information on how North Korea has weaponized its nuclear weapons capability, much less where those weapons are stored. We also take note that a recent U.S. Air Force intelligence report did not list any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles as nuclear-capable.

Concluding his rebuttal to the abridged analysis by Pyongyang’s media monopoly, Kristensen wrote:

In other words, two experimental nuclear test explosions don’t make a nuclear arsenal. That requires deliverable nuclear weapons, which we haven’t seen any signs of yet.

A rebuttal to Kristensen’s rebuttal, in the form of a new KCNA report, is unlikely. Hopefully, a flying missile rebuttal will not come too soon either.

In a major foreign policy speech in April in Prague the President outlined an ambitious strategy in pursuit of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The President also stated: “I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime.”

This caveat has both irked disarmament advocates who think that abolition should happen much more quickly and has given credence to naysayers who consider such an undertaking to be too difficult. Perhaps, as Johan Bergenäs noted in World Politics Review, older generations may be too cynical to embark on such a monumental task.

In an effort to involve the next generation in the cause of reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, the State Department has launched a campaign to facilitate the exchange of ideas between future leaders of the U.S. and Russia.

As part of this new campaign, the State department arranged and facilitated a November 12th discussion at Foggy Bottom between American and Russian students on a range of non-proliferation issues including geopolitical changes affecting nuclear deterrence, the potential expansion of the nuclear club, and diplomatic remedies to instances of non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

Efforts at engaging future leaders are critical to reaching the “mountain top” mentioned in the now-famous Wall Street Journal Op-ed authored by George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. In the article, the four senior statesmen compare nuclear disarmament to climbing a mountain. We cannot currently see the top; however, we know it is there and it is important to begin the climb.

Granted, this may be perceived as naïve by the many cynics among us, but cynicism is what needs to be overcome if abolition is going to be realized in our or anyone’s lifetime. As Joe Cirincione puts it

“Cynicism in all its forms is still pervasive in the political process.  Overcoming it will be our greatest challenge, for it can sap the will of officials, filling them with a fear of appearing weak or foolish, and demoralize proponents, who will shrink from commitment to an apparently hopeless cause.”

Frankly, it is time that our sense of urgency caught up with our destructive capabilities; it is time to begin the difficult task of eliminating nuclear weapons.