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You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

December 7, 2009

North Korean Media Rebuffed

Last month, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) sought to authenticate North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapon state by citing a recent assessment by Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. KCNA reported that “the Federation of American Scientists of the United States has confirmed (North) Korea as a nuclear weapon state.” However, KCNA’s report was an oversimplification of the Norris-Kristensen assessment. Yesterday, the South Korean Yonhap News Agency disseminated Kristensen’s rebuttal to the KCNA report, though over a week after it had been made. Better late than never…

Norris and Kristensen did list North Korea as a state that possesses nuclear weapons. On the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Kristensen wrote: “It’s certainly curious that they would need our reaffirmation, but after two nuclear tests we feel it is safe to call North Korea a nuclear weapon state.” However, Kristensen added that KCNA omitted a “huge caveat.” The original assessment reads:

We are not aware of credible information on how North Korea has weaponized its nuclear weapons capability, much less where those weapons are stored. We also take note that a recent U.S. Air Force intelligence report did not list any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles as nuclear-capable.

Concluding his rebuttal to the abridged analysis by Pyongyang’s media monopoly, Kristensen wrote:

In other words, two experimental nuclear test explosions don’t make a nuclear arsenal. That requires deliverable nuclear weapons, which we haven’t seen any signs of yet.

A rebuttal to Kristensen’s rebuttal, in the form of a new KCNA report, is unlikely. Hopefully, a flying missile rebuttal will not come too soon either.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 7, 2009

Reaching the Mountain Top

In a major foreign policy speech in April in Prague the President outlined an ambitious strategy in pursuit of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The President also stated: “I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime.”

This caveat has both irked disarmament advocates who think that abolition should happen much more quickly and has given credence to naysayers who consider such an undertaking to be too difficult. Perhaps, as Johan Bergenäs noted in World Politics Review, older generations may be too cynical to embark on such a monumental task.

In an effort to involve the next generation in the cause of reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, the State Department has launched a campaign to facilitate the exchange of ideas between future leaders of the U.S. and Russia.

As part of this new campaign, the State department arranged and facilitated a November 12th discussion at Foggy Bottom between American and Russian students on a range of non-proliferation issues including geopolitical changes affecting nuclear deterrence, the potential expansion of the nuclear club, and diplomatic remedies to instances of non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

Efforts at engaging future leaders are critical to reaching the “mountain top” mentioned in the now-famous Wall Street Journal Op-ed authored by George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. In the article, the four senior statesmen compare nuclear disarmament to climbing a mountain. We cannot currently see the top; however, we know it is there and it is important to begin the climb.

Granted, this may be perceived as naïve by the many cynics among us, but cynicism is what needs to be overcome if abolition is going to be realized in our or anyone’s lifetime. As Joe Cirincione puts it

“Cynicism in all its forms is still pervasive in the political process.  Overcoming it will be our greatest challenge, for it can sap the will of officials, filling them with a fear of appearing weak or foolish, and demoralize proponents, who will shrink from commitment to an apparently hopeless cause.”

Frankly, it is time that our sense of urgency caught up with our destructive capabilities; it is time to begin the difficult task of eliminating nuclear weapons.

 

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 7, 2009

Warm and Fuzzy (“Happy Happy Joy Joy Crap”)

Christmas is almost here, and for those of you with endless hours of winter break free to sit in front of your computers (or children), the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has you covered.  Beginning at 4:00 a.m. MST (6:00 a.m. EST) on Christmas Eve, Santa trackers will begin answering phones and replying to email on Santa’s progress.

NORAD even has a website where you can count down to Christmas and receive updates from the North Pole.  According to the website, “Santa’s elves have been busier than usual this year,” so you can visit each and every day to receive holiday updates and even watch him prepare his sleigh and reindeer before you track his every movement on Christmas Eve.

According to NORAD, the program began:

…on Dec. 24, 1955, after a phone call was made to the Continental Air Defense Command Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colo. The call was from a local youngster who dialed a misprinted telephone number in a local newspaper advertisement. The commander at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colo. who answered the phone that night gave the youngster the information requested – the whereabouts of Santa. This began the tradition of tracking Santa… the NTS Operations Center will be occupied for 25 hours with over 1,200 volunteers on Christmas Eve, who will be receiving hundreds of thousands phone calls and emails from families around the world.

So don’t be a Scrooge, give NORAD a call on Christmas Eve.  Come on, it’s fun!

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 4, 2009

Obama’s Diplomacy Pays Dividends

By Travis Sharp and Kirk Bansak

North Korea was randomly assigned today to what looks to be the “group of death” in next year’s World Cup in South Africa. In addition to North Korea, the group includes Brazil (ranked 2nd in the world), Portugal (5th), and the Ivory Coast (16th). Last month, the Telegraph reported that Kim Jong-Il has banned World Cup 2010 coverage on North Korean television except for victory highlights.

In other words, no World Cup on TV in the DPRK next year.

In contrast, the United States drew the much more manageable England (9th), Algeria (28th), and Slovenia (33rd). It may be worth checking FIFA’s bylaws to see if the United States can swap its preferable group placement in exchange for North Korean denuclearization. After all, as one wise guy tried to argue while we watched the draw at lunch, regular Americans don’t care about soccer anyway, right?

The head of one regular American is definitely going to explode soon.

NOH believes it is clear that President Obama is responsible for this fortuitous World Cup development. Clearly his diplomacy is making things easier internationally for the United States and more difficult for North Korea. Any assertion to the contrary is intellectually dishonest and fundamentally un-American.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 3, 2009

Toxic T

To bolster the security of our critical infrastructure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) yesterday announced its plan to simulate chemical attacks on Boston’s subway system, known as The T. But, Bostonians, do not despair: your activities will not be disrupted, subway schedules will not be altered, and you might not even realize the study is happening…unless you notice the presence of white coats and research gadgets, which could always be mistaken for MIT shenanigans…

Using a harmless tracer gas, the DHS Science & Technology Directorate will team up with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority to study airflow characteristics of chemical smoke and gas in dozens of T stations and subway cars. This will take place from December 5 to 11. According to the DHS release, the study will yield “data that will help guide the design of next generation detection systems and enable transportation systems to strengthen evacuation, ventilation and other incident response strategies.”

The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s agenda since 9/11 has included expanding its network of chemical sensors, though its bid last year for funding to install more sensors was denied by the Transportation Security Administration, an arm of DHS. Underlying the rejection was skepticism about the effectiveness of sensors in an actual emergency. As TSA spokesman Christopher White explained: “Current chemical detection systems do not warn the traveling public or system operators in a real-time environment that would deter or prevent a catastrophic event or attack…We’re very focused on active items, funding active activities and projects that would deter a terrorist attack.”

But that was back in 2008, and chemical sensor technology has presumably advanced since then. This month’s study will further augment the usefulness of sensors by helping to shape ideas for new designs, to determine ideal placement locations, and to increase understanding of chemical attack dynamics in general.

The potential for chemical terrorism is not simply the stuff of TV thrillers. In 1995, members of the millennial Japanese mystical cult Aum Shinrikyo (now called Aleph) released sarin nerve agent into the Tokyo subway system. Failure to develop an effective delivery system limited its impact, but the attack still claimed twelve lives and injured over a thousand. Scientists recruited by Aum Shinrikyo had previously experimented with biological agents, including anthrax. Thankfully they were unable to get over the technical hurdles involved in weaponizing the pathogens.

Although Aum did not achieve its goal of mass casualties, its 1995 attack revealed frightening possibilities common to all major cities. The vulnerability of Russia’s old chemical weapon stockpiles as well as advances in dual-use technology, such as microreactors, compound those risks. Let’s hope some valuable discoveries will be made in Boston this month.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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